energy | Northwest Coast Energy News

Spectra Energy, BG Group propose natural gas pipeline to Prince Rupert, creating fourth NW BC LNG project

Spectra Energy Corp of Houston, Texas, today announced that the company has signed a Project Development Agreement with BG Group PLC, based in the United Kingdom, to jointly develop plans for a natural gas transportation system from northeast B.C. to serve BG Group’s potential liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility in Prince Rupert.

The BG group signed an agreement last February with the Prince Rupert Port Authority for a feasibility study to develop an LNG terminal at the port.

Spectra Energy BC project map — A map released by Spectra Energy shows the proposed pipeline project from the shale gas fields of northeastern BC to Prince Rupert (Spectra Energy)

A release from Spectra Energy and BG Groupsays each company will initially own a 50 per cent interest in the proposed transportation project. Spectra Energy will be responsible for construction and operation and BG Group has agreed to contract for all of the proposed capacity.

The approximately 850-kilometre, large diameter natural gas transportation system will begin in northeast B.C. and end at BG Group’s potential LNG export facility in Prince Rupert.

A fact sheet released by Spectra says the project would provide 50 to 60 permanent jobs on completion and about 4,000 jobs during construction.

The Spectra BG project will be the fourth using BC’s strategic position on the Great Circle Route to Asia to export liquified natural gas. TransCanada has signed a deal with Shell for a pipeline, Coastal GasLink, that would initially carry up to 1.7-billion cubic feet a day of gas to the Shell Canada project at Kitimat The Pacific Trails pipeline, could carry more than 1-billion cubic feet a day to the KM LNG partners ship where Apache, EOG and Encana are building a terminal at Bish Cove, south of Kitimat. The fourth project, BC LNG, would use either existing pipelines or share one of the proposed Kitimat pipelines to produce LNG for customers at a barge-based floating terminal at what is sometimes called North Cove, between the KM LNG project at Bish Cove and the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway project which would be close to the Rio Tinto Alcan smelter.

The Spectra release says the new transportation system will be capable of transporting up to 4.2 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas. The project will connect with the Spectra Energy facility at Fort St. John, the centre of the still growing shale gas production and exploration in the northeastern BC.

Greg Ebel, president and chief executive officer, Spectra Energy says in the release:

We are excited to be partnering with BG Group, a recognized world leader in natural gas and more specifically, LNG. This project offers B.C. a unique opportunity to access new markets, strengthen its energy infrastructure, engage stakeholders in economic growth and job creation, and ultimately secure the province’s position as a competitive energy leader.

Furthermore, today’s announcement initiates our next wave of investment opportunity in B.C. We are ideally positioned to create further value for our investors by leveraging surplus B.C. natural gas supplies and facilitating its export to high-demand markets in Asia. This, in turn, will provide multiple opportunities for further investment in our gathering and processing facilities in the province.

Doug Bloom president of Spectra Energy Transmission West adds in the release:

For more than half a century, Spectra Energy has been a part of communities in B.C. This project will build on our expertise and track record of delivering natural gas responsibly, listening to the needs of Aboriginal and local communities, and protecting the environment, as we help deliver on B.C.’s energy potential.
Working together with affected stakeholders and based on preliminary assessments of environmental, historical, cultural and constructability factors, early conceptual routes have been developed. Spectra Energy and BG Group will continue engaging with interested and affected stakeholders, including Aboriginal and local communities, environmental organizations and regulatory agencies, to further refine the project route.

Spectra Energy Fact Box — Fact box from Spectra Energy on the proposed pipeline to Prince Rupert (Spectra)

As is now common with proposed energy projects for northwestern British Colulmbia, Spectra has set up a website for consultations Energy for BC.

Spectra says: “The new outreach initiative is designed to engage with stakeholders on the jobs, revenues and environmental benefits that natural gas can create in British Columbia.”
Spectra also makes the usual commitment to “spend the next several years closely conferring with stakeholders and working through the permitting process for the proposed transportation system.”

Spectra Energy Project Fact Sheet
PDF

What is it about Douglas Channel islands? Now a US agency has added a “Douglas Island”

US FERC Map of LNG terminals in North America — Map from the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission showing LNG export terminal projects in North America (FERC)

What is it about the islands in Douglas Channel? First, Enbridge gets in to a lot of hot water, so to speak, for erasing the islands in Douglas Channel in an animation promoting the Northern Gateway Pipeline. See for example The Vancouver Sun on back on Aug. 16, 2012, when it picked up a story from the Times Colonist – Enbridge map sinks islands, angers critics. The controversial video segment showed Douglas Channel wide open for navigation, rather than marked with about one thousand square kilometres of mountainous islands. This map, created by the Leadnow.ca and Sumofus.org websites was widely used by the media to show the difference. Enbridge later amended its video with a disclaimer that it is “broadly representational.” A video by Shortt and Epic Productions “This is Not An Enbridge animation” showing the beauty of northwestern BC quickly went viral.

As this was happening, the United States government Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a map that shows Liquified Natural Gas import and export terminals across North America, a map that adds an island to the Channel–“Douglas Island.”

In fact, the map manages to get a lot about Canadian LNG projects wrong. It locates the BC LNG project on the non-existent Douglas Island. The company’s name Douglas Channel Energy Partnership actually gives the proper location this way

south of the Moon Bay Marina, within the District of Kitimat and the asserted traditional territory of the Haisla Nation. The site is approximately 10 km southwest of Kitimat and 7 km north of Bees Cove Indian Reserve 6 (Bish Cove)

The small cove where BCLNG will put its barges to create the LNG is often locally called North Cove.

The FERC map also misplaces the Shell LNG project, now known as LNGCanada, in Prince Rupert, even though Shell confirmed the Kitimat location on May 15, 2012. It also calls it Prince Rupert Island, although the town of Prince Rupert is actually located on Kaien Island.

The map does apparently get the KM LNG project somewhat correct, attributing it to Apache Canada, but leaving off Apache’s partners, Encana and EOG.

The map recently also appeared on the website of Oregon Public Broadcasting in an article Five Keys To The Pacific Northwest’s Natural Gas Export Debate by reporter Amelia Templeton, which outlines the growing controversy over the plans to export US LNG through Coos Bay, Oregon via the Jordan Cove Project.

It appears that in Oregon, the Coos Bay LNG project is becoming as controversial as the Northern Gateway project is in Canada.

The issues outlined by Templeton include the threat of expropriation (called “eminent domain” in the US and also a key issue in the debate over the Keystone XL pipeline on the plains). There are arguments on jobs versus the environment, especially the perceived threat to wild rivers and salmon spawning grounds. Finally one issue that is lower on the agenda in northwestern BC but a big worry in Oregon, the potential for a devastating earthquake along the Cascadia fault.

During the NEB hearings on the KM LNG (Apache/EOG/Encana) project in June, 2011, many of the “expert” witnesses urged that that first Kitimat project go ahead quickly because of perceived competition from Oregon.

Unlike in Oregon, LNG projects are generally perceived positively in the northwest and all three are going ahead, although not as quickly as originally planned due to market volatility among prime potential customers in Asia.

US calls for study that could relax double-hulled oil tanker regulations, citing costs to build, energy consumption

The United States Department of Transportation Maritime Administration has issued a call for a study that is calling into question the future of double-hulled oil tankers.

On August 6, 2012 the Maritime Administration, also known as MARAD, issued a “solicitation” for a study on the Safety, Economic and, Environmental Issues of Double Hulls.

In the call for the study, MARAD says:

Following the Exxon Valdez disaster, the passing of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) led to the requirement to replace single hull petroleum tankers with double hull tank vessels sailing in U.S. waters. This requirement was soon adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and became a worldwide regulation. This means that, today, tank vessels worldwide are carrying thousands of extra tons of steel in order to meet the double hull requirements.

Though these double hulls reduce the threat of oil pollution as a result of grounding, they significantly increase the amount of energy needed to propel a vessel and increase the amount of air pollution into the atmosphere. As a result, the maritime industry’s carbon footprint and criteria pollutant emissions are increased.
In addition to the need to burn more fuel, it is acknowledged that double hulls can cause several other problems which will be detailed in this study.

Here in Canada, Enbridge Northern Gateway and its supporters, in briefings on maritime and tanker safety on the west coast of British Columbia, have always said that the changes following the Exxon Valdez disaster in Prince William Sound and the subsequent US Oil Pollution Act as almost guaranteeing that such a disaster could not happen again.

Now it appears that some people in the U.S. Department of Transportation may be worried that increased use of double-hulled tankers will cost too much. There’s also the apparent question of balancing the carbon footprint of increased emissions from tankers with the danger from a hydrocarbon spill.

The request for the study was covered by tanker industry sites such as Marine Link but only surfaced in major media on Sunday, when The National, an English-language newspaper in Abu Dhabi broke the story, “US maritime agency considers overhaul of oil-spill regulation”

Reporter David Black notes:

In July last year, the IMO adopted binding regulations to limit the expected gas emissions increase by reducing fuel consumption of ships by as much as 15 million tonnes in 2020, a 14 per cent reduction, and by 2050, by as much as 1,013 million tonnes. This will lead to savings in fuel costs for the shipping industry of up to US$200 billion a year, says the IMO.

Black says that the US agency seems “to suggest by abandoning the additional weight of double hulls the savings would increase and pollution be cut further, adding “On the other hand, since the introduction of double hulls, pollution from major oil spills has been reduced to practically zero.”

The National story says even the tanker industry itself is worried about the move, quoting the the international tanker owners’ organization.

“We have noted reports about Marad’s intended study on tanker double hulls but, except for what we gather from press articles, we have little knowledge on the reasoning behind this,” said Bill Box, Intertanko’s senior manager for external relations.
“From our members’ experience, double-hull designs have evolved into safe and reliable ships with an excellent safety and pollution prevention record. We might provide comments when such a study would be released by Marad.”

The requirements for the double-hull study, as posted by the US government are:

1. The Contractor shall conduct an assessment of the history in the evolvement of “The Double Hull Rules”.

2. The Contractor shall conduct the assessment of any rules that are being proposed in bodies such as the IMO, U.S. Congress and other such bodies’ worldwide as they relate to additional hulls for environmental reasons.

3. The Contractor shall assess all the relevant safety issues related to double hulls for each class of vessel. E.g. Double bottoms are difficult and expensive to maintain and can result in corrosion problems. Unchecked corrosion in older double hull vessels can lead to cargo leakage into a double bottom and the buildup of dangerous vapor which could cause an explosion under certain conditions. The Contractor will obtain data from appropriate organizations which details the issues in double bottoms on older vessels including cracking, leakage, and the potential for vapor buildup.

4. The contractor shall conduct a complete economic study of the consequences of Double Hulls. E.g. they significantly add to the construction cost of vessels. They result in the loss of cargo space which also adds to the carbon footprint since an additional vessel(s) is needed to carry the same cargo tonnage.

5. The contractor shall assess the complete consequences of the carbon footprint of designing, constructing, maintaining and operating vessels with double hulls. E.g. Apart from the extra propulsive forces and fuel needed, the carbon footprint of double hull maintenance is substantially increased.

6. The Contractor shall prepare a report on the results of the project. The report shall be grammatically correct and must be professionally written to a high level of competence in the English language. The report must clearly specify the safety, economic and environmental issues details above.

Romney endorses Harper’s environmental fast track policy–if oil goes to the United States

Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate for president of the United States today issued his “white paper” on energy policy. It calls for an integrated energy market with Canada, the United States and Mexico. Romney also endorses Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s environmental fast track “one project one review” policy.

The PDF version of The Romney Plan for a Stronger Middle Class Energy Independence is posted on his campaign site.

In the Executive Summary Romney says:

A crucial component of Mitt Romney’s Plan for a Stronger Middle Class is to dramatically increase domestic energy production and partner closely with Canada and Mexico to achieve North American energy independence by 2020. While resident Obama has described his own energy policy as a “hodgepodge,” sent billions of taxpayer dollars to green energy projects run by political cronies, rejected the Keystone XL Pipeline as not in “the national interest,” and sought repeatedly to stall development of America’s domestic resources, Romney’s path forward would establish America as an energy superpower in the 21st century.

It’s key recommendations are:

• Approve the Keystone XL pipeline;

• Establish a regional agreement to facilitate cross-border energy investment,
infrastructure, and sales;

• Promote and expand regulatory cooperation between governments to encourage
responsible energy production, including the creation of a forum for sharing best
practices and technologies; and

• Institute fast-track regulatory approval processes for cross-border pipelines and other infrastructure.

While the white paper is supposed to be the foundation of Republican energy policy, it is itself a “hodgepdge,” mostly a cut and paste job of various reports in the US and Canadian media. While the paper does cite those many sources, it is the kind of compiliation that would get a university freshman a fail, for lack of original content. It also get the name of Canada’s finance minister wrong in one reference, calling him correctly Jim Flaherty in the headline but “Jay Flaherty” in the story credit.

Romney’s paper also seems to be worried that the fact from the prime minister, many economists and policy analysts are saying that it is imperative that Canada diversify its market away from the United States.

Some key highlights of Romney’s white paper of quotes includes:

Obama’s Rejection Of Keystone Will Force Canada To Ship Its Vast Supplies Of Oil To China. “Ronald Liepert, the energy minister in Alberta, said that while Canada would prefer to sell its oil to the United States, ‘this commodity will go someplace.’ In particular, he said, China is already a major consumer of other Canadian natural resources and a small investor in the oil sands. ‘I can predict confidently that at some point China will take every drop of oil Canada can produce.’” (Ian Austen, “Oil Sands Project in Canada Will Go On If Pipeline Is Blocked,” The New York Times, 6/6/11)

Romney then quotes SunMedia:

Canadian PM Harper: “Look, the very fact that a ‘no’ could even be said underscores to our country that we must diversify our energy export markets…We cannot be, as a country, in a situation where our one and, in many cases, only energy partner could say no to our energy products. We just cannot be in that position.” (Bryn Weese, “Harper Determined To Get Canadian Oil To Asia,” Sun News, 4/3/12)

So while Romney wants to approve the Keystone XL pipeline, there is no mention of the Northern Gateway project, but it is clear they don’t want bitumen oil going outside of the continent.

However, the Republicans seem to like quoting Harper’s fast track approach which has caused an uproar here in Canada, quoting the Wall Street Journal:

Compare The Canadian Approach: “One Project, One Review.” “The budget also treats Canada’s energy resources as national assets to be exploited—with as few delays as possible. Thus the budget proposes to eliminate overlapping federal and provincial environmental reviews for major projects. It proposes firm review timelines, including for projects that are already underway, such as the Northern Gateway pipeline from northern Alberta to the Pacific coast. Mr. Flaherty’s catch phrase is ‘one project, one review.’” (Editorial, “Canada Beats America,” The Wall Street Journal, 4/3/12)

and also appearing to endorse downloading to the provinces (or in the case of the US, the states), while warning Americans about Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s statement in the Commons about diversifying Canada’s markets.

Compare The Canadian Approach: “Respect Provincial Jurisdiction … Streamline The
Review Process.” CANADIAN FINANCE MINISTER JIM FLAHERTY: “Canada’s resource industries offer huge potential to create even more jobs and growth, now and over the next generation. This potential exists in every region of the country–natural gas in British Columbia, oil and minerals on the Prairies, the Ring of Fire in Ontario, Plan Nord in Quebec, hydro power in Atlantic Canada, and mining in Canada’s North. Recently it has become clear that we must develop new export markets for
Canada’s energy and natural resources, to reduce our dependence on markets in the United States.
The booming economies of the Asia- Pacific region are a huge and increasing source of demand, but Canada is not the only country to which they can turn. If we fail to act now, this historic window of opportunity will close. We will implement responsible resource development and smart regulation for major economic projects, respecting provincial jurisdiction and maintaining the highest standards of environmental protection. We will streamline the review process for such projects, according to the following principle: one project, one review, completed in a clearly defined time period. We will ensure that Canada has the infrastructure we need to move our exports to new markets.” (Canadian Finance Minister Jay Flaherty, The House Of Commons, Remarks, 3/29/12)

One has to wonder if Mitt Romney’s other policies are also cut and paste jobs and, if elected, how often he will be calling Stephen Harper for advice.

Harper government reserves Gateway environmental decision for the cabinet, sets Dec. 31, 2013 deadline for JRP

The future of the Northern Gateway project is now completely in the hands of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s cabinet.

Today, Friday, August 3, 2012, Environment Minister Peter Kent used the provisions of what the Harper government calls the Jobs, Growth and Long Term Prosperity Act (former Bill C-38) to set a final deadline for a report from the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel on December 31, 2013 and reserve the final environmental decision for the Governor-in-Council.

Today’s move, in effect, is the final gutting of the Joint Review Process, making it irrelevant, since, as long suspected, the government will now make the decision on its own.

The Joint Review Panel no longer has the power to reject the Northern Gateway on environmental grounds, that is now solely up to the Harper cabinet. Once the Gateway project is approved, as expected, the NEB has been ordered to issue the approval certificate within seven days.

By releasing the news on a Friday afternoon before a holiday weekend, the Harper government spin doctors through Environment Minister Peter Kent have also pulled the classic government move of releasing bad news when it will least be noticed.

There is also the new agreement between the Ministry of Environment and the National Energy Board. The revised memorandum of agreement says:

The Governor in Council will make the decision on the environmental assessment (whether the project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects and if, so whether such effects are justified in the circumstances). The Governor in Council will decide, by order, whether the board should issue a certificate and will give reasons for the order.

Under the act, the NEB now has to file its environmental assessments within 543 days of the act coming into force, hence the imposed deadline.

If there are no excluded periods this would mean that the environmental assessment and report must be submitted no later than Dec. 31, 2013.

The final paragraph of Kent’s letter also says

If the Project is approved by the Governor in Council, the NEB will issue the certificate of public convenience and necessity within seven days of the Governor in Council’s order.

That’s a clear indication that the Harper government still intends at this point to fast track the Northern Gateway project.

Apart from giving the most environment unfriendly cabinet in Canadian history the decision power, most of the memorandum of agreement are legalistic changes necessary to bring the former agreement into compliance with the new law.

The environmental sections of the agreement, based on the amendments to the Environmental Assessment act have a couple of interesting points

any change that the project may cause in the environment, including any change it may cause in listed wildlife species as critical habitat or residences of that species….

Although the memo goes on to say

any change to the project that may be caused by the environment whether such change or effect occurs within or outside Canada

While this may be simply legalistic language, given the overall tone of the Harper government’s policy, especially the changes in the Fisheries Act that only protects fish habitat when it affects commercial species, one has to wonder if the emphasis on listed (that is threatened or endangered) species is again a narrowing of the criterion for approving the pipeline.

The second phrase is also ambiguous, seemingly to imply that the environment could be to blame for any problems the project may face. Opponents have long pointed out that the environmental conditions and risks such as geologic instability along the pipeline route and the heavy weather in the waters off British Columbia are factors that increase the danger of an oil spill event whether on land or sea. However, the new agreement presents an almost Orwellian scenario that would blame the environment, an “Act of God” in insurance terms, rather than the company or the government for any future disaster.

The main phrase in the agreement “whether such effects are justified in the circumstances” clearly indicates that the Harper government is fully prepared to ignore the environmental fallout of the Northern Gateway project and so the stage is set for a much wider political battle.

Peter Kent letter to JRP concerning the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project (pdf)

Amendment to the Agreement concerning the Joint Review of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project (pdf)

Province of BC refuses to provide witnesses for Gateway Joint Review hearings

The province of British Columbia has refused requests from some of the intervenors in the Northern Gateway Joint Review to provide witnesses for cross-examination during the final stages of the hearings.

In a letter to the JRP dated on July 20, and posted recently on the JRP website, Christopher Jones, counsel for the province in the hearings says: “I write only to note that the province is an intervnor, not a government participant. Also as the province has not filed evidence, it will not be providing witnesses for cross-examination at the final hearings.”

It was just four days later that Premier Christy Clark and members of her cabinet, in releasing the Liberal government’s five conditions for the Northern Gateway project which called for “Successful completion of the environmental review process.” The provincial government has consistently refused to take part in the proceedings, and with the credibility of the Joint Review process already under question because of the limitations on reviews in Stephen Harper’s Bill C-38, BC’s continued refusal to participate can only further undermine that credibility.

Province of British Columbia Questioning at Final Hearings (pdf)

New US report slams Enbridge for spill record, as scientific investigation opens into diluted bitumen

A new US report is slamming Enbridge for its record on oil spills, just as the BC government set out strict new conditions for building pipelines and tanker traffic in the province.

The United States National Wildlife Association issued a report today called Importing Disaster, The Anatomy of Once and Future Oil Spills. (pdf of report at the bottom of this page)

At the same time, the US Academy of Sciences has opened a new investigation into diluted bitumen.

A letter critical of Enbridge, previously overlooked by the US media is getting new traction, as the anniversary of the Marshall, Michigan, Kalamazoo River spill approaches on July 25.

Enbridge, so far, has not responded to the National Wildlife Federation report.

The environmental group opens the report by saying:

As the biggest transporter of Canadian tarsands oil into the U.S., Enbridge has aresponsibility to the American public to manage their operations in a manner that protects our comm unities and natural resources. But tarsands oil is a very different beast than conventional crude oil, and it is difficult to transport the former safely through pipelines that were designed for the latter. That’s because tarsands oil is more corrosive(due to its chemical mixture)and abrasive(due to high-gritminerals), weakening the pipes to the point that they are more susceptible t oleaks and ruptures. Remarkably, there are no standards in place to ensure that new pipelines are built, maintained and operated with this fact in mind.

The National Wildlife Association goes on to say:

fossil fuel companies have a ‘stranglehold’ on our political establishment, preventing even modest initiatives that could make our energy safer and cleaner. That lobby strategy keeps in place a system that’s led to 804 spills by Enbridge alone in the last decade, and a total of 6,781,950 gallons of oil spilled in the U.S. and Canada.

“Rather than focus on safety and cleanup, Enbridge is recklessly moving ahead with plans to expand their pipeline network in the Great Lakes region and the Northeast, and to double down on high carbon fuel that is proving nearly impossible to clean from Michigan’s waters,” said Beth Wallace, NWF’s Great Lakes outreach advisor.

NWF’s report recommends comprehensive reforms to break the cycle of spills and pollution that continue to threaten communities and speed global warming. Among them, the report calls for stronger safety standards that account for increased dangers associated with heavy tar sands oil, increasing investment in clean energy and efficiency, and campaign and lobbying reforms that would put impacted citizens on a level playing field with Big Oil in the halls of Congress.

The NWF report then says:

The Kalamazoo spill may have been a poster child for corporate negligence but it is far from the company’s only black mark. According to Enbridge’s own reports, between 1999 and 2010, they have been responsible for at least 800 spills that have released close to seven million gallons of heavy crude oil into the environment — or approximately half the amount of oil that spilled from the Exxon Valdez in 1989.

Canada has seen its own share of Enbridge heartache, including a 61,000 gallon spill earlier this summer near Elk Point, Alberta.

The National Wildlife Federation report is calling for stronger pipeline safety standards that account for the dangers of transporting bitumen sands oil from Canada amd wants more rigorous reviews of all pipeline projects. The report calls bitumen sands oil “the planet’s dirtiest oil.”

US media covering the National Wildlife release and looking to the anniversary of the Kalamazoo disaster, are now quoting an overlooked letter from the US advocacy group Public Citizen issued on June 25.

Concerned about Keystone XL pipeline, the advocacy group sent a letter to the Texas House of Representatives, recommending that the state should not wait for US federal rules to prevent tar sands pipeline spills. Public Citizen called the industry’s track record “troubled” and asked the committee to take up legislation that would give Texas broader authority over pipelines.

The committee will examine state regulations governing oil and gas well construction and integrity, as well as pipeline safety and construction, to determine what changes should be made to ensure that the regulations adequately protect the public. Public Citizen will testify in support of stronger rules for the Seaway pipeline (an existing line repurposed to carry tar sands instead of crude oil), the Keystone pipeline (whose southern leg is not yet built) and proposed future tar sands pipelines.

“These companies keep calling it petroleum, but it’s not – these are pipelines of poison,” said Tom “Smitty” Smith, director of Public Citizen’s Texas office.

The media reports on the NWF release are pointing to a new investigation by the US National Academy of Sciences on the safety of diluted bitmenl safety in the United States, that will be part of a report to the US Congress

An ad hoc committee will analyze whether transportation of diluted bitumen (dilbit) by transmission pipeline has an increased risk of release compared with pipeline transportation of other liquid petroleum products. Should the committee determine that increased risk exists, it will complete a comprehensive review of federal hazardous liquid pipeline facility regulations to determine whether they are sufficient to mitigate the increased risk.

On June 25, the committee added three industry experts to the panel as there is growing scrutiny over dilbit in the US, which could become an issue in the presidential race.

NWF Enbridge Oil Spill (PDF)

BC’s desire for “world leading” marine standards collides with Harper’s C-38 chain saw massacre

Today BC Premier Christy Clark’s government outlined a series of “world leading” standards for environmental protection on the ocean and on land, if pipeline projects like the Northern Gateway and the Kinder Morgan expansion are to go ahead.

One has to wonder what Premier Clark told Prime Minister Stephen Harper when she gave him the “heads up” call on the new policy last week?

After all, the BC Liberal’s call for “world leading” standards comes just weeks after the Harper’s government, in Bill C-38, changed environmental assessment into a pro-industry process, gutted the Fisheries Act protection for habitat and severely cut back the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Environment Canada.

So far, in the province of British Columbia, with both the governing Liberals and opposition New Democrats have been spectacularly unsuccessful in persuading the Harper government to reverse the closure of the Kitsilano Coast Guard station.

In the background paper released along with the news release on the five conditions for pipeline and tanker safety, the BC government is calling for greatly enhanced Coast Guard resources and tanker monitoring as well as payment for oil spill response.

Among the conditions for marine safety enhancement BC is asking:

Current response times and planning capacity are less stringent than other jurisdictions like Alaska and Norway. For example, for the types of tankers being proposed for Canada’s west coast, Alaska requires planning for 300,000 barrels. In Canada, response organizations are only required to maintain response plans for spills up to approximately 70,000 barrels (10,000 tonnes). Further, Alaska allows responders 72 hours to reach the spill site, while Canada allows 72 hours plus travel time, which can sometimes add days to the response.
In shared bodies of water, the United States’ requirements exceed Canada’s. For example, the United States requires escort tugs for laden tankers and mandates industry pay for designated and strategically placed emergency response tugs. Canada does not have any similar requirements.
Ensure the Canadian Coast Guard adopts a unified command/incident command structure.
The Canadian Coast Guard has a unique response system which is only used in B.C. The United States, companies and governments worldwide use a unified command/incident command response structure for a range of emergency responses, including marine spills. By bringing the Coast Guard under this system, an effective, co-ordinated response is better ensured while reducing layers of approvals that can delay critical, prompt decision-making.

At Enbridge community briefings in Kitimat last year, the company’s own marine experts said that the 72 hour response time from Vancouver and Victoria for a possible spill in the Douglas Channel was completely inadequate. In its fillings with the Joint Review Panel, Enbridge has proposed setting up and funding its own response stations along the BC coast, although so far, Enbridge has not provided any details on how the response stations would be set up and how they would work.

In 2010, the auditor general reported that Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard have not used a consistent or systematic approach to tanker traffic and spills nor are there formal processes for ensuring that risks are reassessed.

Sheila Fraser found that

Procedures are not in place to verify the Canadian Coast Guard’s readiness. In other words, there is currently no process for providing assurance that the federal component of the oil spill response system is ready to respond effectively.
The Coast Guard had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of its response capacity since 2000.
The results of the Coast Guard’s response efforts—which range from identifying the source of pollution to full cleanup—are poorly documented. There are also limitations with the Coast Guard’s system for tracking oil spills and other marine pollution incidents. These gaps affect its ability to conduct reliable analysis of trends in spills and know how well it is achieving its objectives of minimizing the environmental, economic, and public safety impacts of marine pollution incidents.

In the United States Senate, Canadian Coast Guard response for an oil spill in the Strait of Juan de Fuaca was described as “call the Americans”

For some search and rescue missions the federal government has indicated that it will rely more on the all-volunteer Royal Canadian Marine Search and Rescue service (formerly the Coast Guard Auxiliary) which is already stretched thin in some areas of the Pacific Coast, rather than the full time professionals from the Coast Guard service itself.

On the industry response, BC says

The federal government should review its rules and requirements to ensure industry-funded response funds are sustainable and adequate to fully cover a major response without requiring public money. Currently, the total amount of ship owner insurance and industry funding available for spill response is $1.3 billion. By comparison, the U.S. federal government maintains a spill fund that is forecast to grow to nearly $4 billion by 2016.

Again given the government backs and the Conservative government’s close ties with the energy industry, one has to wonder what if those provisions can be enforced, especially since more and more of the energy industry in Canada is owned off shore, increasingly in China with its sorry environmental record. (Globe and Mail CNOOC’s Nexen bid: A new test for Harper)

If there are to be “world-leading” standards for environmental protection in this country, it has to be paid for. So the question remains, who will pay for it? The federal government is cutting back, Alberta doesn’t want to raise the relatively small royalties it charges the energy industry and Canada is not likely to get a contribution from China.

Who pays to protect the coast and the northern interior going to be a big question for Stephen Harper in the coming months. With the polls showing Adrian Dix and the NDP leading in contention for a provincial election next year, and now with Christy Clark, apparently, demanding higher standards, will Harper open the Ottawa wallet now, will he wait until he faces a much tougher BC premier in Adrian Dix next year, or will he stubbornly hold his course of forcing Canada into his vision of a conservative, limited government nation, with, in the case of an oil spill on land or sea, that will cost the federal treasury billions, even if the energy industry picks up some of the tab?

Auditor General 2010 Report (pdf)

Auditor General 2007 report (pdf)

BC issues list of conditions for Enbridge Northern Gateway, action plan for pipeline projects

Update 3 Joe Oliver statement
Update 2 Statement from Alison Redford
Update 1 Enbridge statement

The government of British Columbia has outlined five what it calls “minimum requirements that must be met for the province to consider the construction and operation of heavy oil pipelines within its borders.”

But at a news conference announcing the conditions, Environment Minister Terry Lake says the province will still not take an official position on the pipeline project itself.

In news release, Premier Christy Clark said, “Our government is committed to economic development that is balanced with environmental protection. In light of the ongoing environmental review by the Joint Review Panel on the Enbridge pipeline project proposal, our government has identified and developed minimum requirements that must be met before we will consider support for any heavy oil pipeline projects in our province. We need to combine environmental safety with our fair share of fiscal and economic benefits.”

Later Monday afternoon, Enbridge released a statement saying:

We wish to reiterate our commitment to working with governments, including BC, in determining what we can do to further address concerns and to engaging in a dialogue to ensure full understanding of the assessments of risk, the many safety and environmental protection measures in the plan as well as the benefits that would come with the project.

The premier of Alberta, Alison Redford, Monday evening released a stinging news release on the conditions outlined by British Columbia for pipelines crossing the province and tanker traffic on the coast.

A key phrase in the release says:

Leadership is not about dividing Canadians and pitting one province against another—leadership is about working together.

In Ottawa, the pro-pipeline Minister of Natural Resource, Joe Oliver, issued an unremarkable statement promoting responsible resource development that managed to avoid mentioning the BC announcement; a statement that could be regarded as a classical press release that says absolutely nothing.

Details of the BC provincial approach are outlined in a “heavy oil policy paper.”

The government also released background information on the conditions.

The five conditions are

Successful completion of the environmental review process. In the case of Enbridge, that would mean a recommendation by the National Energy Board Joint Review Panel that the project proceed
World-leading marine oil spill response, prevention and recovery systems for B.C.’s coastline and ocean to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy oil pipelines and shipments
World-leading practices for land oil spill prevention, response and recovery systems to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy oil pipelines
Legal requirements regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights are addressed, and First Nations are provided with the opportunities, information and resources necessary to participate in and benefit from a heavy-oil project
British Columbia receives a fair share of the fiscal and economic benefits of a proposed heavy oil project that reflects the level, degree and nature of the risk borne by the province, the environment and taxpayers.

The release says that “any project proposal must be approved through appropriate environmental assessment (EA) processes.”

BC government graphic on environmental risk — Pie chart of the “environmental risk” from pipeline projects as released by the government of British Columbia

However, trust for the environmental processes has been falling since Stephen Harper’s government passed Bill C-38 which is designed to fast track approvals and is seen by may in the environmental movement as gutting the review process.

Action plan

The province is also proposing a joint plan of action with the federal government that would include the following elements:

Limits to liability that ensure sufficient financial resources to properly address any spills;
increased federal response capacity;
Full adoption of the Unified Command model;
Strengthened federal requirements on industry for the provision and placement of marine response equipment and infrastructure;
Industry-funded terrestrial (land-based) spill co-operative with sufficient human and technical capacity to manage spill risk from pipelines and other land-based sources;
Increased capacity within the provincial emergency response program to ensure adequate oversight of industry;
A Natural Resources Damage Assessment process to provide certainty that a responsible party will address all costs associated with a spill.

In the release, BC Environment Minister Terry Lake said: “When we consider the prospect of a heavy oil pipeline, and of the increased oil tanker traffic that would result, it is clear that our spill prevention and response plans will require significant improvements. Our government has already initiated discussions with the federal government on improving our response plans and resources,” said Environment Minister Terry Lake. “This represents an opportunity for British Columbia and Canada to develop world-leading environmental protection regimes.”

First Nations

The government release says

The fourth requirement for the B.C. government to consider support for heavy oil pipeline proposals is First Nations participation. Governments in Canada have a duty to consult and accommodate First Nations, and British Columbia is committed to meeting this test. British Columbia has developed a set of tools to help First Nations to partner with industry and participate in economic development. These agreements help to create certainty for development that benefits all British Columbians. British Columbia remains committed to this approach.

“We believe the benefits to First Nations from major pipeline proposals must be clearly identified, along with the measures that will help protect against environmental impacts,” said Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation Minister Mary Polak. “As recently as last week, such an approach was endorsed by the Canadian Council of CEOs in their report on Aboriginal participation.”

Show me the money

The government is also emphasizing that the province benefit from any heavy oil project:

Lastly, British Columbia must receive a fair share of the fiscal and economic benefits of any proposed heavy oil project. B.C. will shoulder 100 per cent of the risk in the marine environment and a significant proportion of the risk on the land should a spill event ever occur. Current heavy oil project proposals do not balance the risks and benefits for British Columbia.

“We have identified aggressive environmental requirements and principles for First Nations engagement, and we have clearly stated we expect a fair share of the fiscal and economic benefits for our province,” said Premier Clark. “British Columbians are fair and reasonable. We know we need resource and economic development, but we also expect that risks are managed, environmental protection is uncompromised and that generations will benefit from the decisions we make today.”

BC government graphic on economic benefits — A pie chart, released by the BC government, showing the economic benefits of pipeline projects

In its release, Enbridge repeated its earlier statements that the company will continue
to reach out and encourage conversation with British Columbians about the project through our website and blogs, community meetings and conversations. We have devoted much effort and resources into consultations with communities, First Nations, and Métis…”

The company went on to say:

Enbridge and the Northern Gateway project team have worked hard to ensure this unique project would be built and operated to the highest standards and has committed to further enhancements to make what is already a safe project even safer.

This project will bring real and tangible benefits to the communities and Aboriginal groups along the proposed route, and to the province of British Columbia as a whole.

US National Transportation Safety Board summary report on Marshall, MI, Enbridge oil spill incident blames deficient management and training

The United States National Transportation Safety Board has issued a summary report on the rupture of the the Enbridge pipeline and subsequent oil spill at Marshall, Michigan, in 2010.

The report says that the probable cause of the oil spill included deficient integrity management at Enbridge, which allowed previously known crack defects in corroded areas to spread until the pipeline failed; inadequate training of control center personnel by Enbridge, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.

The full NTSB report will be issued in the coming weeks.

Enbridge responded in a news release that quoted outgoing Enbridge CEO Pat Daniel, who was in Washington for the release of the report:

“We very much appreciate the patience of residents in the communities who were affected by the Line 6B release,” said Patrick D. Daniel, Chief Executive Officer, Enbridge Inc. “Under the direction of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and local health authorities, the Kalamazoo River was re-opened last month for recreational use. We are also pleased to note that wildlife has returned to the area.”

“We believe that the experienced personnel involved in the decisions made at the time of the release were trying to do the right thing. As with most such incidents, a series of unfortunate events and circumstances resulted in an outcome no one wanted,” said Mr. Daniel.

Skeena Bulkley Valley Member of Parliament and NDP House Leader, Nathan Cullen, issued his own news release, saying, “Today’s report by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) into the deadly July 2010 Enbridge spill in Michigan identifies ‘a complete breakdown of safety at Enbridge’ and notes the company knowingly ‘failed to accurately assess the structural integrity of the pipeline.'”

“The findings are actually worse than we feared,” Cullen said. “They are a body blow of breathtaking proportions to Enbridge and yet another wake-up call to the Northwest of the dangers of allowing big oil to run a pipeline through our Northwest watersheds.”

Cullen commended NTSB chair Deborah Hersman for her frankness in terming Enbridge’s Michigan spill “”an accident that is a wake-up call to the industry, the regulator, and the public.”

Here is the complete summary as posted on the NTSB website

Enbridge, Inc. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture

July 25, 2010
Marshall, MI

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of July 10, 2012
(Information subject to editing)
NTSB/PAR-12/01

This is a synopsis from the National Transportation Safety Board’s report and does not include the NTSB’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.

Executive Summary

On Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with crude oil exposure. No fatalities were reported.

Conclusions

1. The following were not factors in this accident: cathodic protection, microbial corrosion, internal corrosion, transportation-induced metal fatigue, third-party damage, and pipe manufacturing defects.

2. Insufficient information was available from the postaccident alcohol testing; however, the postaccident drug testing showed that use of illegal drugs was not a factor in the accident.

3. Had the firefighters discovered the ruptured segment of Line 6B and called Enbridge, the two startups of the pipeline might not have occurred and the additional volume might not have been pumped.

4. The Line 6B segment ruptured under normal operating pressure due to corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from multiple stress corrosion cracks, which had initiated in areas of external of corrosion beneath the disbonded polyethylene tape coating.

5. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h) does not provide clear requirements regarding when to repair and when to remediate pipeline defects and inadequately defines the requirements for assessing the effect on pipeline integrity when either crack defects or cracks and corrosion are simultaneously present in the pipeline.

6. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) failed to pursue findings from previous inspections and did not require Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) to excavate pipe segments with injurious crack defects.

7. Enbridge’s delayed reporting of the “discovery of condition” by more than 460 days indicates that Enbridge’s interpretation of the current regulation delayed the repair of the pipeline.

8. Enbridge’s integrity management program was inadequate because it did not consider the following: a sufficient margin of safety, appropriate wall thickness, tool tolerances, use of a continuous reassessment approach to incorporate lessons learned, the effects of corrosion on crack depth sizing, and accelerated crack growth rates due to corrosion fatigue on corroded pipe with a failed coating.

9. To improve pipeline safety, a uniform and systematic approach in evaluating data for various types of in-line inspection tools is necessary to determine the effect of the interaction of various threats to a pipeline.

10. Pipeline operators should not wait until PHMSA promulgates revisions to 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 before taking action to improve pipeline safety.

11. PII Pipeline Solutions’ analysis of the 2005 in-line inspection data for the Line 6B segment that ruptured mischaracterized crack defects, which resulted in Enbridge not evaluating them as crack-field defects.

12. The ineffective performance of control center staff led them to misinterpret the rupture as a column separation, which led them to attempt two subsequent startups of the line.

13. Enbridge failed to train control center staff in team performance, thereby inadequately preparing the control center staff to perform effectively as a team when effective team performance was most needed.

14. Enbridge failed to ensure that all control center staff had adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities to recognize and address pipeline leaks, and their limited exposure to meaningful leak recognition training diminished their ability to correctly identify the cause of the Material Balance System (MBS) alarms.

15. The Enbridge control center and MBS procedures for leak detection alarms and identification did not fully address the potential for leaks during shutdown and startup, and Enbridge management did not prohibit control center staff from using unapproved procedures.

16. Enbridge’s control center staff placed a greater emphasis on the MBS analyst’s flawed interpretation of the leak detection system’s alarms than it did on reliable indications of a leak, such as zero pressure, despite known limitations of the leak detection system.

17. Enbridge control center staff misinterpreted the absence of external notifications as evidence that Line 6B had not ruptured.

18. Although Enbridge had procedures that required a pipeline shutdown after 10 minutes of uncertain operational status, Enbridge control center staff had developed a culture that accepted not adhering to the procedures.

19. Enbridge’s review of its public awareness program was ineffective in identifying and correcting deficiencies.

20. Had Enbridge operated an effective public awareness program, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control center staff tried to start the line.

21. Although Enbridge quickly isolated the ruptured segment of Line 6B after receiving a telephone call about the release, Enbridge’s emergency response actions during the initial hours following the release were not sufficiently focused on source control and demonstrated a lack of awareness and training in the use of effective containment methods.

22. Had Enbridge implemented effective oil containment measures for fast-flowing waters, the amount of oil that reached Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River could have been reduced.

23. PHMSA’s regulatory requirements for response capability planning do not ensure a high level of preparedness equivalent to the more stringent requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

24. Without specific Federal spill response preparedness standards, pipeline operators do not have response planning guidance for a worst-case discharge.

25. The Enbridge facility response plan did not identify and ensure sufficient resources were available for the response to the pipeline release in this accident.

26. If PHMSA had dedicated the resources necessary and conducted a thorough review of the Enbridge facility response plan, it would have disapproved the plan because it did not adequately provide for response to a worst-case discharge.

27. Enbridge’s failure to exercise effective oversight of pipeline integrity and control center operations, implement an effective public awareness program, and implement an adequate postaccident response were organizational failures that resulted in the accident and increased its severity.

28. Pipeline safety would be enhanced if pipeline companies implemented safety management systems.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following:

Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed.

Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline.

Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.

Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA’s ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness.

Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge’s failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA’s lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA’s limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.

Recommendations

To the U.S. Secretary of Transportation:

1. Audit the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s onshore pipeline facility response plan program’s business practices, including reviews of response plans and drill programs, and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies.

2. Allocate sufficient resources as necessary to ensure that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:

3. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 to clearly state (1) when an engineering assessment of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing of crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable crack defect in a pipeline segment must be excavated and time limits for completing those excavations; (4) pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by the required date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, or stress corrosion cracking as applicable.

4. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h)(2), the “discovery of condition,” to require, in cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available.

5. Conduct a comprehensive inspection of Enbridge Incorporated’s integrity management program after it is revised in accordance with Safety Recommendation (11).

6. Issue an advisory to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated’s integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.

7. Develop requirements for team training of control center staff involved in pipeline operations similar to those used in other transportation modes.

8. Extend operator qualification requirements in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195 Subpart G to all hazardous liquid and gas transmission control center staff involved in pipeline operational decisions.

9. Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194 to harmonize onshore oil pipeline response planning requirements with those of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for facilities that handle and transport oil and petroleum products to ensure that pipeline operators have adequate resources available to respond to worst-case discharges.

10. Issue an advisory bulletin to notify pipeline operators (1) of the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident, and (2) of the need to identify deficiencies in facility response plans and to update these plans as necessary to conform with the nonmandatory guidance for determining and evaluating required response resources as provided in Appendix A of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 194, “Guidelines for the Preparation of Response Plans.”

To Enbridge Incorporated:

11. Revise your integrity management program to ensure the integrity of your hazardous liquid pipelines as follows: (1) implement, as part of the excavation selection process, a safety margin that conservatively takes into account the uncertainties associated with the sizing of crack defects from in-line inspections; (2) implement procedures that apply a continuous reassessment approach to immediately incorporate any new relevant information as it becomes available and reevaluate the integrity of all pipelines within the program; (3) develop and implement a methodology that includes local corrosion wall loss in addition to the crack depth when performing engineering assessments of crack defects coincident with areas of corrosion; and (4) develop and implement a corrosion fatigue model for pipelines under cyclic loading that estimates growth rates for cracks that coincide with areas of corrosion when determining reinspection intervals.

12. Establish a program to train control center staff as teams, semiannually, in the recognition of and response to emergency and unexpected conditions that includes supervisory control and data acquisition system indications and Material Balance System software.

13. Incorporate changes to your leak detection processes to ensure that accurate leak detection coverage is maintained during transient operations, including pipeline shutdown, pipeline startup, and column separation.

14. Provide additional training to first responders to ensure that they (1) are aware of the best response practices and the potential consequences of oil releases and (2) receive practical training in the use of appropriate oil-containment and -recovery methods for all potential environmental conditions in the response zones.

15. Review and update your oil pipeline emergency response procedures and equipment resources to ensure that appropriate containment equipment and methods are available to respond to all environments and at all locations along the pipeline to minimize the spread of oil from a pipeline rupture.

16. Update your facility response plan to identify adequate resources to respond to and mitigate a worst-case discharge for all weather conditions and for all your pipeline locations before the required resubmittal in 2015.

To the American Petroleum Institute:

17. Facilitate the development of a safety management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is similar in scope to your Recommended Practice 750, Management of Process Hazards. The development should follow established American National Standards Institute requirements for standard development.

To the Pipeline Research Council International, Inc.:

18. Conduct a review of various in-line inspection tools and technologies—including, but not limited to: tool tolerance, the probability of detection, and the probability of identification—and provide a model with detailed step-by-step procedures to pipeline operators for evaluating the effect of interacting corrosion and crack threats on the integrity of pipelines.

To the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Emergency Number Association:

19. Inform your members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge your members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions.

Previous Recommendation Reiterated in this Report

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:

Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact radius. (P-11-8)

A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be available at http://www.capitolconnection.net/capcon/ntsb/ntsb.htm. To report any difficulties viewing the webcast, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for webcast technical support.

The complete report will appear on ntsb.gov in several weeks.

In its response, Enbridge went on to say:

“Safety has always been core to our operations. Our intent from the beginning of this incident has been to learn from it so we can prevent it from happening again, and to also share what we have learned with other pipeline operators,” said Stephen J. Wuori, President, Liquids Pipelines, Enbridge Inc. “Enbridge and EEP conducted a detailed internal investigation of this incident in the months following the release and have made numerous enhancements to their processes, procedures and training as a result of the findings of the investigation, including in the control center. Incident prevention, detection and response have also been enhanced. We will carefully examine the findings in the NTSB report to determine whether any further adjustments are appropriate.”

Enbridge says it has e worked closely and cooperatively with the NTSB throughout its investigation. The company isnow reviewing the summary report and will not comment specifically on the contents of the Final Report until it is released by the NTSB Board and analysis of the report has been completed.