New US pipeline safety report finds more problems with Enbridge, problems also found in other big pipeline companies

Leak detection report coverA new draft report for the U.S. Congress from the United States Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration takes new aim at Enbridge for failures in its pipeline leak detection and response system.

Not that the PHMSA is singling out Enbridge, the report is highly critical of leak detection systems on all petroleum and natural gas pipeline companies, saying as far as the United States is concerned, the current pipeline standards are inadequate.

The release of the “Leak Detection Report” written by Kiefner & Associates, Inc (KAI) a consulting firm based in Worthington, Ohio, comes at a critical time, just as Enbridge was defending how it detects pipeline leaks before the Joint Review Panel questioning hearings in Prince George, where today Enbridge executives were under cross-examination by lawyers for the province of British Columbia on how the leak detection system works.

In testimony on Wednesday, October 12, Enbridge engineers told the Joint Review Panel that the company’s pipelines are world-class and have a many prevention and detection systems.

Northern Gateway president John Carruthers testifed there is no way to eliminate all the risks but the company was looking for the best way of balancing benefits against the risk.

However, the KAI report points out that so far, all pipeline company cost-benefit analysis is limited by a short term, one to five year point of view, rather than looking at the entire lifecycle of a pipeline.

Two Enbridge spills, one the well-known case in Marshall Michigan which saw bitumen go into the Kalamazoo River and a second in North Dakota, both in 2010, are at the top of the list in the study for PHMSA by the consulting firm.

On the Marshall, Michigan spill the KAI report goes over and adds to many of the criticisms of Enbridge in the National Transportation Safety Report in July which termed the company’s response like the “Keystone Kops.”

The second spill, in Neche, North Dakota, which, unlike the Marshall spill, has had little attention from the media, is perhaps equally damning, because while Enbridge’s detection systems worked in that case–the KAI report calls it a “text book shutdown”– there was still a spill of 158,928 gallons (601,607 litres) of crude oil, the sixth largest hazardous liquid release reported in the United States [between 2010 and 2012] because Enbridge “did not plan adequately for containment.”

(The KAI report also examines problems with natural gas pipelines, including one by TransCanada Northern Border line at Campbell, Wyoming in February 2011. Northwest Coast Energy News will report on the natural gas aspects of the report in a future posting.)

The highly technical, 270-page draft report was released on September 28, as Enbridge was still under heavy criticism from the US National Transportation Safety Board report on the Marshall, Michigan spill and was facing penalties from the PHMSA for both the Marshall spill and a second in Ohio.

Looking at overall pipeline problem detection, KAI says the two standard industry pipeline Leak Detection Systems or LDS didn’t work very well. Between 2010 and 2012, the report found that Computational Pipeline Monitoring or CPMs caught just 20 per cent of leaks. Another system, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition or SCADAs caught 28 per cent.
Even within those acronym systems, the KAI report says major problem is a lack of industry standards. Different companies use different detector and computer systems, control room procedures and pipeline management.

The report also concludes that the pipeline industry as a whole depends far too much on internal detectors, both for economic reasons and because that’s what the industry has always done. External detectors, the report says, have a better track record in alerting companies to spills.

A significant number of spills are also first reported by the public or first responders, rather than through the pipeline company system and as KAI says of Enbridge, “Operators should not rely on the public to tell them a pipeline has ruptured.”

The consultants also say there are far too many false alarms in spill detection systems.

Although the KAI report concentrates on the United States, its report on Enbridge does raise serious questions about how the company could detect a pipeline breach or spill in the rugged northern British Columbia wilderness where the Northern Gateway Pipeline would be built, if approved by the federal government.

The report comes after the United States Congress passed The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act, which was signed into law by President Barack Obama on January 3, 2012. The law called on a new leak detection study to be submitted to Congress that examines the technical limitations of current leak detection systems, including the ability of the systems to detect ruptures and small leaks that are ongoing or intermittent. The act also calls on the US Department of Transportation to find out what can be done to foster development of better technologies and economically feasible ways of detecting pipeline leaks. The final report must be submitted to Congress by January 3, 2013.

(The draft report does note in some ways, Canadian standards for detecting pipeline leaks are better than those in the United States. For example, Canada requires some pipeline testing every year, the United States every five years. It also finds European pipeline monitoring regulations also surpass those in the United States).

The spills studied in the report all found weaknesses in one or more of those three areas: people, company procedures and the technology. It appears that the industry agrees, at least in principle, with executives telling the consultants:

The main identified technology gaps – including those identified by operators – include: reduction or management of false alarms; applicable technical standards and certifications; and value / performance indicators that can be applied across technologies and pipelines.

The report echoes many of the findings of the US National Transportation Safety Board in its examination of the Enbridge Marshall, Michigan spill but it applies to all pipeline companies, noting:

Integration using procedures is optimal when it is recognized that alarms from the technology are rarely black-and-white or on/off situations. Rather, at a minimum, there is a sequence: leak occurrence; followed by first detection; followed by validation or confirmation of a leak; followed by the initiation of a shutdown sequence. The length of time that this sequence should take depends on the reliability of the first detection and the severity of the consequences of the release. Procedures are critical to define this sequence carefully – with regard to the technology used, the personnel involved and the consequences – and carefully trained Personnel are needed who understand the overall system, including technologies and procedures.

We note that there is perhaps an over-emphasis of technology in LDS. A recurring theme is that of false alarms. The implication is that an LDS is expected to perform as an elementary industrial automation alarm, with an on/off state and six-sigma reliability. Any alarm that does not correspond to an actual leak is, with this thinking, an indicator of a failure of the LDS system.

Instead, multiple technical studies confirm that far more thought is required in dealing with leak alarms. Most technologies infer the potential presence of a leak via a secondary physical effect, for example an abnormal pressure or a material imbalance. These can often be due to multiple other causes apart from a leak.

The report takes a critical look at the culture of all pipeline companies which divides problems into leaks, ruptures and small seeps. Under both pipeline practice and the the way problems are reported to the PHMSA in the US a “rupture is a situation where the pipeline becomes inoperable.” While a rupture means that a greater volume of petroleum liquid or natural gas is released, and is a higher priority than a leak or seep, the use of language may mean that there is a lower priority given to those leaks and seeps than the crisis created by a rupture.

(Environmental groups in British Columbia have voiced concerns about the cumulative affect of small seeps from the Enbridge Northern Gateway that would be undetectable under heavy snow pack either by an internal system or by external observation)

Overall, the report finds serious flaws to the way pipeline companies are conducting leak detection systems at the moment, including:

  • Precisely the same technology, applied to two different pipelines, can have very different results.
  • Leak Detection Systems do not have performance measures that can be used universally across all pipelines. Compounding the problem are different computer systems where software, program configuration and parameter selection all contribute, in unpredictable ways, to overall performance.
  • Many performance measures present conflicting objectives. For example, leak detection systems that are highly sensitive to small amounts of lost hydrocarbons are also prone to generating more false alarms.
  • The performance of a leak detection system depends critically on the quality of the engineering design, care with installation, continuing maintenance and periodic testing.
  • Even though an internal technology may rely upon simple, basic principles, it is in fact, complex system that requires robust metering, robust SCADA and telecommunications, and a robust computer to perform the calculations. Each of these subsystems is individually complex.
  • Near the inlet and the outlet of the pipeline a leak leads to little or no change in pressure. Flow rates and pressures near any form of pumping or compression will generally be insensitive to a downstream leak
  • Differences in any one of these factors can have a dramatic impact on the ultimate value of a leak detection system.

The report goes on to  say:

There is no technical reason why several different leak detection methods can not be implemented at the same time. In fact, a basic engineering robustness principle calls for at least two methods that rely on entirely separate physical principles.

The report strongly recommends that pipeline companies take a closer look at external leak detection systems. Even though the US Environmental Protection Agency began recommending the use of external detection as far back as 1988, the companies have resisted due to the cost of retrofitting the legacy pipeline network. (Of course if the pipeline companies had started retrofitting with external detectors in 1988 they would be now 24 years into the process).

KAI says:

  • External leak detection is both very simple – relying upon routinely installed external sensors that rely upon at most seven physical principles – and also confusing, since there is a wide range of packaging, installation options, and operational choices to be considered.
  • External leak detection sensors depend critically on the engineering design of their deployment and their installation.
  • External sensors have the potential to deliver sensitivity and time to detection far ahead of any internal system.
  • Most technologies can be retrofitted to existing pipelines. In general, the resistance to adopting external technologies is, nevertheless, that fieldwork on a legacy pipeline is relatively expensive.
  • The report goes on to identify major bureaucratic roadblocks within pipeline companies. Like many other big corporations, walls exist that prevent the system from working well
  • A particular organizational difficulty with leak detection is identifying who “owns” the leak detection system on a pipeline. A technical manager or engineer in charge is typically appointed, but is rarely empowered with global budgetary, manpower or strategic responsibilities. Actual ownership of this business area falls variously to metering, instrumentation and control, or IT.

The report calls for better internal standards at pipeline companies since with leak detection “one size does not necessarily fit all”.

It also notes that “flow metering is usually a central part of most internal leak detection systems,” but adds “flow meter calibration is by far the most laborious part of an internal system’s maintenance.

Also, the central computer and software technology usually has maintenance requirements far greater than most industrial automation and need special attention.”

While a company may do a cost benefit analysis of its leak detection system and risk reduction system it will generally emphasize the costs of the performance and engineering design of the leak detection system, the companies usually place less emphasis on the benefits of a robust system, especially the long term benefits.

At present the pipeline companies look at the benefit of leak detection as a reduction in risk exposure, or asset liability, “a hard, economic definition… understood by investors.” But the report adds that leak detection systems have a very long lifetime and over that life cycle, the cost-benefit approaches the reduction in asset liability caused by the system, when divided by annual operational costs. However, since pipeline companies budget on a one to five year system the long term benefit of robust, and possibly expensive spill detection is not immediately apparent.

Enbridge

The consultants studied 11 US oil spills, the top two with the greatest volume were from Enbridge pipelines. The others were from TE Products Pipeline, Dixie Pipeline, Sunoco, ExxonMobil, Shell, Amoco, Enterprise Products, Chevron and Magellan Pipeline. Not all US spills were used in the KAI report, the 11 were chosen for availability of data and documentation.

The largest spill in the KAI study was the pipeline rupture in Michigan at 843,444 gallon (3,158,714 litres) which has been the subject of continuing media, investigative and regulatory scrutiny. The second spill in North Dakota, has up to now received very little attention from the media. That will likely change once the US Congress gets the final report. Even though the Neche, North Dakota spill, has been described as “text book case” of a pipeline shutdown, there was still a large volume of oil released.

Marshall, Michigan spill

On the Marshall, Michigan spill that sent bitumen into the Kalamazoo River the report first goes over the facts of the 843,444 gallon spill and the subsequent release of a highly critical report from the US National Transportation Safety Board. It then looks at the failures of Enbridge’s detection system from the point of view mandated for the report to Congress:

The pipeline was shutting down when the ruptured occurred. Documentation indicates that a SCADA alarm did sound coincident with the most likely time of the rupture. It was dismissed. The line was shut down for around 10 hrs and crude oil would have drained from the line during this time.

On pipeline start up, alarms in the control room for the ruptured pipeline sounded. They were dismissed. This was repeated two more times. The pipeline was shut down when the control room was notified of the discharge of the crude oil by a member of the public. The time to shut down the pipeline is not relevant here because of the 17 hours that elapsed after the rupture occurred.

The review identified issues at Enbridge relevant to this Leak Detection Study:

1. Instrumentation on a pipeline that informs a controller what is happening to the pipeline must be definitive in all situations.
2. However, the instrumentation did provide warnings which went unheeded by controllers.
3. Instrumentation could be used to prevent a pump start up.
4. Operators should not rely on the public to tell them when a pipeline has ruptured.
5. Pipeline controllers need to be fully conversant with instrumentation response to different operations performed on the pipeline.
6. If alarms can be cancelled there is something wrong with the instrumentation feedback loop to the controller. This is akin to the low fuel warning on a car being turned off and ignored. The pipeline controller is part of an LDS and failure by a controller means the LDS has failed even if the instrumentation is providing correct alarms.
7. If the first SCADA alarm had been investigated, up to 10 hours of pipeline drainage to the environment might have been avoided. If the second alarm had been investigated, up to 7 hours of pumping oil at almost full capacity into the environment might have been avoided.
8. CPM systems are often either ignored or run at much higher tolerances during pipeline start ups and shutdowns, so it is probable that the CPM was inoperative or unreliable. SCADA alarms, on the other hand, should apply under most operating conditions.

Neche, North Dakota spill

At approximately 11:37 pm. local time, on January 8, 2010, a rupture occurred on Enbridge’s Line 2, resulting in the release of approximately 3000 barrels or 158,928 gallons of crude oil approximately 1.5 miles northeast of the town of Neche, North Dakota, creating the sixth largest spill in the US during the study period.

As the report notes, in this case, Enbridge’s detection system worked:

At 11:38 pm., a low-suction alarm initiated an emergency station cascade shutdown. At 11:40 pm., the Gretna station valve began closing. At 11:44 pm., the Gretna station was isolated. At 11:49 pm., Line 2 was fully isolated from the Gretna to Donaldson pump stations.

Documentation indicates a rapid shut down on a low suction alarm by the pipeline controller. From rupture to shut down is recorded as taking 4 minutes. The length of pipeline isolated by upstream and downstream remotely controlled valves was 220,862 feet. The inventory for this length of line of 26-inch diameter is 799,497 gallons. The release amount was around 20 per cent of the isolated inventory when the pipeline was shut down.

The orientation of the 50-inch long rupture in the pipe seam is not known. The terrain and elevation of the pipeline is not known. The operator took around 2 hours and 40 minutes to arrive on site. It is surmised that the rupture orientation and local terrain along with the very quick reactions by the pipeline controller may have contributed to the loss of around 20 per cent of the isolated inventory.

The controller was alerted by the SCADA. Although a CPM system was functional the time of the incident it did not play a part in detecting the release event. It did provide confirmation.

But the KAI review identified a number of issues, including the fact in item (7) Enbridge did not plan for for containment and that containment systems were “under-designed.”

1. This release is documented as a text book shut down of a pipeline based on a SCADA alarm.
2. The LDS did not play a part in alerting the pipeline controller according to
documentation. However, leak detection using Flow/Pressure Monitoring via SCADA
worked well.
3. Although a textbook shut down in 4 minutes is recorded, a large release volume still occurred.
4. The release volume of 158,928 gallons of crude oil is the sixth largest hazardous liquid release reported between January 1, 2010 and July 7, 2012.
5. The length of pipeline between upstream and downstream isolation valves is long at 41.8 miles.
6. If not already performed, the operator should review potential release volumes based on ruptures taking place at different locations on the isolated section.
7. The success of a leak detection system includes planning for the entire process: detection through shutdown through containment. In this case, the operator did not plan adequately for containment so that although the SCADA leak detection technology, the controller and the procedures worked well, the containment systems (isolation valves) were under-designed and placed to allow a very large spill.”

 

 

 KAI Draft report on Leak Detection Systems at the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration website

 

A lesson for BC: Michigan 911 system failed during the Kalamazoo spill, NTSB says

The 911 system failed during the 2010 Marshall, Michigan, Enbridge pipeline breach, according to the full report in the incident released by the US National Transportation Safety Board.

The NTSB report says the 911 operators in Michigan dismissed eight calls reporting gas or petroleum odours over a period of 14 hours between the initial report of a bad odour and the actual discovery of diluted bitumen polluting Talmadge Creek.

The report also says the local firefighters were unfamiliar at that point with potential problems from a bitumen pipeline as opposed to a leak of a consumer natural gas pipeline.

Although the NTSB report puts most of the onus on an inadequate Enbridge “Public Awareness Program” (PAP) which failed to familiarize first responders to potential problems, the report raises questions whether British Columbia, especially the north, is properly prepared for all the energy development that is occurring. Whether or not the Enbridge Northern Gateway project proceeds, there are three active and possibly as many as three or four planned liquified natural gas projects for the northwest, ongoing exploration and production in the northeast and the proposed Kinder Morgan expansion in the lower mainland.

The NTSB says that Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 pm. EDT, a segment of a 30 inch (7.62 cm) diameter pipeline (Line 6B) operated by Enbridge ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a pipeline shutdown planned by Enbridge. The leak was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours, largely due to problems in the Enbridge control room in Edmonton.

During the time lapse, the NTSB says, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two pipeline start ups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons or 3.192 million litres of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River.

According to the NTSB time line, at 8:56 pm., Michigan Gas Utilities dispatched a senior service technician after residents reported a natural gas odour. At 9:25 pm. on July 25, a local resident called the Calhoun County 911 dispatch:

I was just at the airport in Marshall and drove south on Old 27 [17 Mile Road]
and drove back north again and there’s a very, very, very strong odour, either
natural gas or maybe crude oil or something, and because the wind’s coming out
of the north, you can smell it all the way up to the tanks, right across from where
the airport’s at, and then you can’t smell it anymore.

By 9:32 pm., the Marshall City Fire Department had been dispatched in response to the 9:25 pm. call to 911. The 911 dispatcher told the responders there was a report of a bad smell of natural gas near the airport. The responding firefighters were also dispatched. The firefighters checked pipelines and industrial building near the airport. “using a combustible gas indicator” to try to locate the origin of the odour, but did not detect anything.

NTSB map of first responders at Kalamazoo spill
A map from the NTSB report showing where the fire department responded to the reports of a gas smell at Marshall, MIchigan, and the location of the actual pipeline break. (NTSB)

The NTSB says the service technician from Michigan Gas Utilities “crossed paths with some of the fire department personnel” but found no evidence of a gas leak.

The fire department personnel departed the scene at 10:54 pm. to return to the station.

The NTSB report says: “ a combustible gas indicator measures percentage of the lower explosive limit, it likely would not detect the oil unless it was very close to the source.”

At 11:33 pm, the area’s 911 system received the first of the seven additional calls when an employee at a business called to report a natural gas odour.

The 911 dispatcher told the caller that the fire department had already responded
to calls in the area, and no more personnel were dispatched.

A map of the incident response by the NTSB shows that the area near the airport where the firefighters responded was actually some distance from the pipeline rupture.

Over the next 14 hours, the NTSB says, 911 received seven more calls reporting strong natural gas or petroleum odours in the same vicinity. “The 911 dispatcher repeatedly informed the callers that the fire department had been dispatched to investigate the reported odours.”

Enbridge had been working on restarting the pipeline all night. In Edmonton, at 10:16 am, the Enbridge control room spoke to the regional manager based in Chicago to send someone to
walk along the pipeline, upstream and downstream of the Marshall pumping station.

According to the NTSB, the Chicago regional manager replied, “I wouldn’t think so. If it’s right at Marshall—you know, it seems like there’s something else going wrong either with the computer or with the instrumentation. …you lost column and things go haywire, right?” He went on to say, “…I’m not convinced. We haven’t had any phone calls. I mean it’s perfect weather out here—if it’s a rupture someone’s going to notice that, you know and smell it.” The Chicago regional manager told shift lead C1 that he was okay with the control centre starting Line 6B again.

At 11:17 am, a caller from a second gas utility, Consumers Energy, called the Enbridge emergency line telling the control room: “I work for Consumers Energy[30] and I’m in Marshall. There’s oil getting into the creek and I believe it’s from your pipeline. I mean there’s a lot. We’re getting like 20 gas leak calls and everything.”

At 11:18 am Enbridge closed the remote valves sealing off the rupture site within a 2.95-mile section. By 11:20 am., the shift lead had called the Chicago regional manager to tell him about the notification. By 11:37 am., another Consumers Energy employee notified 911 about the crude oil leak in a creek near Division Drive.

The Fredonia Township Fire Department was dispatched by the 911 centre shortly after the call. At 11:41 am., the Edmonton control centre received confirmation from an Enbridge crossing coordinator located at the Marshall pipeline maintenance shop confirming the oil on the ground.

The NTSB says:

The 911 operators repeatedly informed the callers that the fire department had been dispatched to investigate the issue, but the 911 operators did not contact the pipeline operator or advise the public of health and safety risks. The 911 operators never dispatched the fire department in response to the subsequent calls even though these calls occurred over several hours, indicating an ongoing problem. The actions of both the first responders and the 911 operators are consistent with a phenomenon known as confirmation bias,128 in which decision makers search for evidence consistent with their theories or decisions, while discounting contradictory evidence. Although there was evidence available to the first responders that something other than natural gas was causing noticeable odours in the Marshall area, they discounted that evidence, largely because it contradicted their own findings of no natural gas in the area. Similarly, the 911 operators, with the evidence from the first responders of no natural gas in the area, discounted subsequent calls regarding the strong odours in the Marshall area. Those calls were inconsistent with their own views that the problem causing the odours was either nonexistent or had been resolved.

The NTSB report then says:

Although Enbridge had provided training to emergency responders in the Marshall area in February 2010, the firefighters’ actions showed a lack of awareness of the nearby crude oil pipeline: they did not search along the Line 6B right-of-way, and they did not call Enbridge. The NTSB concludes that had the firefighters discovered the ruptured segment of Line 6B and called Enbridge, the two start ups of the pipeline might not have occurred and the additional volume might not have been pumped.

The NTSB reviewed Enbridge’s PAP, which was intended to inform the affected public,
emergency officials, and public officials about pipelines and facilitate their ability to recognize
and respond to a pipeline rupture.

The report says:

Although RP 1162 requires operators to communicate with audiences every 1 to 3 years, Enbridge mailed its public awareness materials to all audiences annually. However, even with more frequent mailings, this accident showed that emergency officials and the public lacked actionable knowledge.

The NTSB goes on to say:

Public knowledge of pipeline locations and the hazards associated with the materials
transported is critical for successful recognition and reporting of releases, as well as the safe response to pipeline ruptures. The transportation of hazardous materials by pipeline is unlike hazardous materials transportation by railroad or highway because a pipeline is a permanent fixture. A pipeline presents a unique challenge to awareness because it is often buried. When pipeline releases occur, a properly educated public can be the first to recognize and report the emergency.

A survey quoted by the NTSB says that of those who responded in the United States. only 23 percent of the affected public and 47 percent of emergency officials responded that they were “very well informed” about pipelines in their community.

The NTSB says Enbridge failed to properly conduct and monitor its public awareness program and management’s “review of its PAP was ineffective in identifying and correcting deficiencies. The NTSB further concludes that had Enbridge operated an effective PAP, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control centre staff tried to start the line.”

In May 2011, Enbridge revised its public awareness plan and created a public awareness
committee, but just months later, in July 2011, the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration conducted an audit of Enbridge’s plans and identified several
deficiencies in the company’s program evaluation and effectiveness reviews and required that
Enbridge correct the deficiencies.

Overall, the report says:

Although Enbridge and PHMSA have taken these actions, the NTSB is concerned that
pipeline operators do not provide emergency officials with specific information about their pipeline systems. The brochures that Enbridge mailed did not identify its pipeline’s location. Instead, the brochures directed the audiences to pipeline markers and to PHMSA’s National Pipeline Mapping System. In the NTSB’s 2011 report of the natural gas transmission pipeline rupture and fire in San Bruno, California, the NTSB made the following safety recommendation to PHMSA:

Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and
hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their
pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and
jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include
pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact
radius.

The report concludes:

The NTSB recommends that the International Association of Fire Chiefs  and the National Emergency Number Association  inform their members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge their members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions.

In Canada, the National Energy Board, which is responsible for overseeing pipeline operations did inspect the Enbridge control room after the NTSB report.

The NEB, of course, has nothing to do with the 911 system.

RCMP North District
RCMP map showing the extent of British Columbia’s “North District.” (RCMP)

One question for northern British Columbia is how prepared is the 911 system to handle a major pipeline incident now or in the future. For police and fire, the RCMP communications system must cover all of “North District” from Prince George. (The RCMP did not return a phone call requesting information on 911 training and procedures)

For BC Ambulance the dispatch centre is in Kamloops.

Fire departments in northwest British Columbia, so far, have had minimal training in potential pipeline problems, like the fire department in Michigan, enough to detect and deal with consumer and local industrial natural gas systems. It’s clear that the province of British Columbia, if it is going to promote liquified natural gas as a foundation of a new provincial economy, it must plan and budget for a major upgrade to the 911 system, with a new police, fire and ambulance dispatch centre.

 

 

 

 

 

US pipeline agency slams Enbridge, calls for independent oversight of Wisconsin cleanup

The US agency that looks after pipelines, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, has issued an updated “Corrective Action Order” on the oil spill at Grand Marsh in Wisconsin, slamming Enbridge because the company’s “integrity management program may be inadequate.”

The order goes on to say:

PHMSA has communicated its longstanding concerns about this pattern of failures with Respondent [Enbridge] over the past several years. Given the nature, circumstances, and gravity ofthis pattern of accidents, additional corrective measures are warranted.

The Corrective Order tells Enbridge to file its cleanup plans with the PHMSA and to have its actions checked by an independent, outside agency.

Before the PHMSA allows Enbridge to restart Line 14, which runs from Superior, Wisconsin, to Mokena, Illinois, and is a part of the 1,900 mile-long Lakehead Pipeline system, which transports “hazardous liquid” from Neche, North Dakota, to Chicago, Illinois, with an extension to Buffalo,

Enbridge must (1) submit, for review and approval, a comprehensive written plan, including timelines for specific actions to improve the safety record of Respondent’s Lakehead pipeline system and (2) hire an independent third party pipeline expert to review and assess the written plan, which the third party will submit to PHMSA and to Respondent concurrently. Further, the third party expert must oversee the creation, execution and implementation of the actions identified in the plan, and must provide monitoring summaries to PHMSA and Respondent concurrently. Respondent must commit to address any deficiencies or risks identified in the third party’s assessment, including repair and replacement of high-risk infrastructure. The plan must be sufficiently detailed with specific tasks, milestones and completion dates.

At a minimum, the plan must address:
a. Organizational issues, including the promotion of a safety culture and creation of
a safety management system;
b. Facilities response plan;
c.Control room management;
d.Priorities for pipe replacement;
e.Training;
f.In-line inspection result interpretation;
g.Current engineering and probability of failure modeling;
h.Leak detection systems;
1.Sensor and flow measuring and valve replacement;
J.Integrity verification;
k.Quality management system; and
1.Any other risk, task, issue or item that is necessary to promote and sustain the
safety ofits pipeline system.

The agency notes also that

After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may identify other corrective actions that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any additional measures required and further amendment of the CAO will be considered. To the extent consistent with safety.

The order says Enbridge will be given an opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.

The PHMSA  Corrective Order was issued about the same time as Canada’s National Energy Board announced that it was conducting its own safety audit of Enbridge operations.

PHMSA Amended Corrective Action Order_08012012

Little difference between diluted bitumen and conventional crude affect on pipelines, Alberta review says

Energy Environment

    A study by an Alberta provincial government agency has concluded that diluted bitumen (also known in the industry as “dilbit”) is little different in its effects on pipelines than conventional or ‘non-oil sands derived’ crude oil.

A review of existing studies was conducted by Jenny Been, P.Eng for the provincial agency,  Alberta  Innovates – Technology Futures.  A news release on the website describes Been as a “corrosion specialist.”  The study “concludes that the characteristics of dilbit are not unique and are comparable to conventional crude oils during pipeline flow.”

Link News release and study (pdf) 
Comparison of the Corrosivity of Dilbit and Conventional Crude

Been’s study takes on the contention that dilbit has higher acid, sulfur, and chloride salts and higher concentrations of abrasive solids than conventional crude.  As well, the study looks at the belief that dilbit transmission pipelines operate at higher operating temperatures compared with crude, which would make the dilbit more corrosive. Environmentalists and other critics say  this leads to  a higher failure rate than pipelines carrying  crude.

The study compared the  properties  of  heavy,  medium,  and  light  conventional Alberta crude oils with three dilbit and one dilsynbit (a mixture of conventional gas diluent and synthetic gas) crude.

The review  concludes “that the characteristics of dilbit are not unique and are comparable to conventional crude oils.”

While two of the four dilbit crudes displayed a slightly higher naphthenic acid and sulfur concentration than the conventional Alberta heavy crudes, the review notes that there are conventional crudes on the market that have displayed higher values.  It says while there have been corrosion problems at refineries where the temperature can exceed  200 C, it says “the  much  lower  pipeline transportation temperatures, the compounds are too stable to be corrosive and some may even decrease the corrosion rate.”

The study also says “sediment  levels  of  the  dilbit  crudes  were  comparable  to  or  lower  than  the conventional crudes, except for a dilsynbit crude, which showed more than double the quantity of solids than most other crudes, but was still well below the limit set by regulatory agencies and industry….Erosion corrosion was found to be improbable and erosion, if present, is expected to be gradual and observed by regular mitigation practices.”

The study’s recommendations note that it is a review and “It has to be understood that this was a high-level review and a focused, peer-reviewed study has not been conducted.   The scope of the work did not include interviews with industry, regulators, or colleagues.”

It calls for the industry to create a database that would further study that differences between dilbit oils and conventional crude oils,  including further study of sludge formation and deposition in the pipeline and the links, if any,  “on sludge chemistry to pipeline sludge formation and sludge   corrosivity,   including   the   ability   of   the   sludge   to   support   microbial populations.”

Been says in the study that Enbridge supports an industry working group on pipeline corrosion management  that is  “addressing these issues by correlating sludge corrosivity with a chemical and microbial geochemical characterization of the sludge.   The work is further considering and optimizing monitoring technologies to enable measurement of the effectiveness of mitigation treatments.  It is recommended that this effort will continue to be supported.”
   
While the study is a review of existing knowledge on diluted bitumen and conventional oil in pipelines,  Been’s introductory remarks clearly show a bias in favour of the bitumen sands, saying, before the Keystone XL project approval was delayed by the U.S. State Department, “TransCanada Pipeline’s (TCPL’s) $13 billion Keystone pipeline system will provide a secure and growing supply of Canadian crude oil to the largest refining markets in the Unites States.”

Been also notes

Environmental  groups  opposed  to  the  pipelines  continue  to  find  material  to  fuel  their concerns: the more than 800,000 gallons of oil spilled into the Kalamazoo River in Michigan last year came from the Cold Lake oil sands region, and the Exxon Mobil spill of 42,000 barrels of oil in the Yellowstone River may have contained dilbit.   Protestors against the Keystone pipeline are gathering in demonstrations across North America leading to mass arrests and drawing widespread attention.

The arguments of these environmental groups don’t go unheard with congressmen and other government officials, who have iterated reported statements and concerns.  The United States Department of States (DOS) has spent the last three years in review with the industry, scientific community, and other interest parties (including numerous public meetings), evaluating the purpose and need for the Project (pipeline), alternatives, and the associated potential environmental impacts.   The result was issued on August 26, 2011 in a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), a comprehensive, detailed volume of work that is available to the public. Public hearings were held and online comments were accepted.

Been notes that as part of the Keystone assessment, the US  Department of Transportation’s  Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued 57
Project-specific Special Conditions above and beyond the requirements of the United States pipeline code for  Keystone XL. Been says TransCanada agreed to the incorporation of the 57 conditions and said would result in a pipeline with a greater degree of safety than typical domestic pipelines.

Environmental groups said the 57 conditions on Keystone were not sufficient, Been noted and the report goes on to say:

Alberta Energy Minister Ron Liepert considers it a challenge of combating emotion with facts, and assures that the facts could be obtained without too much difficulty.  Concerns continue to surface in the media and in the face of few factual studies and a strong confidence in …  tracking statistics that dilbit is not more corrosive than conventional oil, corrosivity claims continue to be used as fuel by certain environmental groups. 

Yet if Enbridge and other energy companies are still working on pipeline corrosion, as Been notes, then there are still problems to be solved.

Given the pro-Keystone statements in the Been’s paper, it is clear that a definitive, independent study is needed on the effects of  diluted bitumen in a pipeline, one that doesn’t come from either a pro-energy industry point of view, nor one conducted by an environmental group that would bring criticism from the energy industry.

Until there is such an independent study, the doubts of the environmental activists must be balanced with assurances coming from the energy industry.

 

US NTSB to pipeline companies: Call 911 in an emergency

It sounds obvious. In an emergency (in most of North America) dial 911.

Only according a US National Transportation Safety Board Report dated June 8 and released today, Pacific Gas and Electric didn’t call 911 in California at the time of a major pipeline breach and fire  on Sept. 9, 2010, in San Bruno, California that caused an explosion that killed eight people, injured many more and caused extensive property damage.
The NTSB report says that while the San Bruno Fire Department was aware of the local natural gas distribution system, the department had no maps and had no briefings on the larger, natural gas transmission pipelines that transversed San Bruno.
The NTSB report says
Because of the differences in operating characteristics, transmission pipelines have different safety risks and concerns for emergency response, including the pipeline company’s  ability to shutdown the pipeline rapidly.  

In a manner similar to the Enbridge situation in Michigan last year (the NTSB report on that incident is still pending), the PG&E data system showed a pressure drop within four minutes of the rupture. 

But it was two off-duty employees who alerted the company’s dispatchers three minutes later to a possible problem.

PG&E dispatched a single technician to the scene who was not authorized to shut off valves. 

In the meantime, public calls to 911 reported the rupture and fire and first responders got to the initial scene in three minutes.

It was not until a technician arrived at the scene and reported in some 16 minutes after the event began that PG&E control room put together the drop in pressure, alarms and dispatcher information and realized that they had a major problem. 

 The NTSB report says in the next paragraph after the incident summary

 

A pipeline operator’s prompt notification to the local emergency response agencies through a 911 emergency call center can be crucial to the success of the emergency response effort and protection of the public. Even in the case of a smaller, slower leak that does not immediately ignite, when the pipeline operator has immediately notified local emergency response authorities of a potential serious problem, can mobilize needed response resources and area better able to recognize quickly the symptoms of a potential serious gas leak threat

.

Apparently under current US regulations, there is no requirement for pipeline operators to call 911.

The report goes on to say

 

The NTSB is concerned that a pipeline operator that does not require control room operators to notify the applicable 911 emergency call center in the event of a possible pipeline rupture can adversely affect the timeliness and effectiveness of emergency response effort. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration issue guidance to operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines regarding the importance of control room operators immediately and directly notifying the 911 emergency call center(s) for the communities and jurisdictions which those pipelines are located when a possible rupture of any pipeline is indicated.

Read the NTSB report on 911 response to the PG&E San Bruno pipeline disaster.

Editors’s Note:

It is clear that this brief NTSB report  (it is still investigating the actual cause of the rupture and explosion) confirms the fears of residents of northwestern British Columbia about pipeline ruptures in the wilderness, whether those pipelines carry bitumen or natural gas, are harder to detect and fix than problems in populated areas like California.
Also residents of northwestern BC are entitled to get more information from the National Energy Board, the BC Utilities Commission and the companies that are proposing large scale transmission of natural gas through this region about the special hazards related to transmission pipelines mentioned in the NTSB report.
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TransCanada restarting Keystone oil pipeline: Reuters

Reuters 

TransCanada Corp (TRP.TO) was restoring operations on Sunday along the Keystone crude oil pipeline, one week after it was shut by a leak at a Kansas pumping station, a company spokesman said.

“We are in the process of restarting Keystone but I can’t give you a firm time line (on shipments) – likely imminent,” said TransCanada spokesman James Millar in statement.

The 591,000 barrel-per-day pipeline brings oil from Hardisty, Alberta to the Cushing, Oklahoma, oil hub.

TransCanada News Release



CALGARY, Alberta – May 13, 2011 – TransCanada Corporation (TSX, NYSE: TRP) (TransCanada) today announced it has re-started its Keystone Pipeline system. The line has been closed since May 7 following an above-ground incident at a pump station in Sargent County, North Dakota. 

More than 30 workers and their equipment have been on site at the Ludden Pump Station. Three hundred and ninety three barrels of oil have been recovered out of an estimated 500 barrels. Three hundred cubic yards of contaminated soil will be removed to an approved location and replaced with clean soil and gravel. The majority of the clean-up should be finished by the weekend.

 “TransCanada has taken this incident very seriously. We have fully communicated details regarding the incident and our corrective actions to our U.S. regulator PHMSA in ensuring the steps we have taken will enable us to safely re-start the pipeline,” said Russ Girling, TransCanada president and chief executive officer. “We reacted quickly, shutting down the line within a few minutes of detecting a drop in pressure, demonstrating our safety systems work effectively.”

US allows restart of Keystone pipeline: Reports

There are media reports that the United States Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration is permitting the restart of the Keystone pipeline after earlier saying it could not be restarted following a spill on May 29.

 

The Wall Street Journal reports

The U.S. Department of Transportation on Saturday approved TransCanada Corp.’s plan to restart its Keystone pipeline…. TransCanada on Saturday provided results of its testing along the Keystone and can restart it as soon as the morning of July 5, the PHMSA said in a letter to the company.

“Based on a review of the information submitted, the restart plan is approved,” PHMSA Central Region Director David Barrett said in the letter.

Reuters reports that pipeline could start as early as Sunday:

 

TransCanada Corp (TRP.TO) can restart its Keystone oil pipeline on Sunday, after the company satisfied a series of safety conditions following leaks that idled the key export line twice in less than a month, the U.S. pipeline safety regulator said on Saturday. 

 The U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration said it approved resumption of crude flows from Canada on the pipeline after the agency evaluated the company’s restart plan and was satisfied safety requirements were met.

As of this posting there is no confirming information on the PHMSA or TransCanada websites.