Northern Gateway | Northwest Coast Energy News

JRP denies most requests from Coastal First Nations to question BC on Northern Gateway

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has denied four out of the five requests from Coastal First Nations to question the province of British Columbia about its position on the controversial pipeline and tanker project. A decision on the fifth request is reserved pending a response from the province and other parties.

So far, the province has not participated in the Joint Review hearings nor has it filed any evidence.

A five part motion by the Coastal First Nations was an attempt to compel the government of Premier Christy Clark to participate.

The motion requested

a) compel the Province of British Columbia (Province) to file a technical report that was reported on in the Globe and Mail on 3 June 2012;

b) compel the Province to file any other reports or assessments it has;

c) allow intervenors to file information requests on any evidence filed by the Province;

d) compel the Province to indicate whether or not it will issue a Certificate for the
Project pursuant to the BC Environmental Assessment Act; and

e) compel the Province to indicate whether it intends to consult with First Nations on the
Project, and if so, how and when.

The JRP reserved its judgement on the request on item (a) to release the report mentioned in the Globe and Mail. A few days after Coastal First Nations made the request, lawyers representing the province requested an extension to respond to the CFN motion. The JRP gave both BC and Northern Gateway until July 16 to respond and then the CFN has until July 20 to reply.

On item (b) forcing the province to release other assessments, the JRP ruled that the information requested was “unclear and excessively broad” and so the request was denied.

On item (c) allowing intervenors to question on evidence from the province, the JRP ruled that Coastal First Nations had requested “a blanket right for parties to ask information
requests on evidence that is not yet filed.” The JRP said “ not persuaded that all parties ought to be given a blanket right to ask information requests on evidence that is not yet filed” and denied the request. The JRP added: “If a party believes it needs to ask a late information
request (as opposed to asking a hearing question) on specific evidence, the Panel will consider
that request.”

On items (d) and (e) the panel cited constitutional concerns, saying it related to authorizations in provincial jurisdiction and ruled “No justification is provided as to why this
information would be relevant to the federal review….” The JRP said it was “persuaded that it has any legal authority over these areas of provincial jurisdiction, or that it would be appropriate or relevant to the federal review, to obtain information about provincial affairs.”

JRP Ruling No 60 CFN Notice of Motion

US National Transportation Safety Board summary report on Marshall, MI, Enbridge oil spill incident blames deficient management and training

The United States National Transportation Safety Board has issued a summary report on the rupture of the the Enbridge pipeline and subsequent oil spill at Marshall, Michigan, in 2010.

The report says that the probable cause of the oil spill included deficient integrity management at Enbridge, which allowed previously known crack defects in corroded areas to spread until the pipeline failed; inadequate training of control center personnel by Enbridge, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.

The full NTSB report will be issued in the coming weeks.

Enbridge responded in a news release that quoted outgoing Enbridge CEO Pat Daniel, who was in Washington for the release of the report:

“We very much appreciate the patience of residents in the communities who were affected by the Line 6B release,” said Patrick D. Daniel, Chief Executive Officer, Enbridge Inc. “Under the direction of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and local health authorities, the Kalamazoo River was re-opened last month for recreational use. We are also pleased to note that wildlife has returned to the area.”

“We believe that the experienced personnel involved in the decisions made at the time of the release were trying to do the right thing. As with most such incidents, a series of unfortunate events and circumstances resulted in an outcome no one wanted,” said Mr. Daniel.

Skeena Bulkley Valley Member of Parliament and NDP House Leader, Nathan Cullen, issued his own news release, saying, “Today’s report by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) into the deadly July 2010 Enbridge spill in Michigan identifies ‘a complete breakdown of safety at Enbridge’ and notes the company knowingly ‘failed to accurately assess the structural integrity of the pipeline.'”

“The findings are actually worse than we feared,” Cullen said. “They are a body blow of breathtaking proportions to Enbridge and yet another wake-up call to the Northwest of the dangers of allowing big oil to run a pipeline through our Northwest watersheds.”

Cullen commended NTSB chair Deborah Hersman for her frankness in terming Enbridge’s Michigan spill “”an accident that is a wake-up call to the industry, the regulator, and the public.”

Here is the complete summary as posted on the NTSB website

Enbridge, Inc. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture

July 25, 2010
Marshall, MI

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of July 10, 2012
(Information subject to editing)
NTSB/PAR-12/01

This is a synopsis from the National Transportation Safety Board’s report and does not include the NTSB’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.

Executive Summary

On Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with crude oil exposure. No fatalities were reported.

Conclusions

1. The following were not factors in this accident: cathodic protection, microbial corrosion, internal corrosion, transportation-induced metal fatigue, third-party damage, and pipe manufacturing defects.

2. Insufficient information was available from the postaccident alcohol testing; however, the postaccident drug testing showed that use of illegal drugs was not a factor in the accident.

3. Had the firefighters discovered the ruptured segment of Line 6B and called Enbridge, the two startups of the pipeline might not have occurred and the additional volume might not have been pumped.

4. The Line 6B segment ruptured under normal operating pressure due to corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from multiple stress corrosion cracks, which had initiated in areas of external of corrosion beneath the disbonded polyethylene tape coating.

5. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h) does not provide clear requirements regarding when to repair and when to remediate pipeline defects and inadequately defines the requirements for assessing the effect on pipeline integrity when either crack defects or cracks and corrosion are simultaneously present in the pipeline.

6. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) failed to pursue findings from previous inspections and did not require Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) to excavate pipe segments with injurious crack defects.

7. Enbridge’s delayed reporting of the “discovery of condition” by more than 460 days indicates that Enbridge’s interpretation of the current regulation delayed the repair of the pipeline.

8. Enbridge’s integrity management program was inadequate because it did not consider the following: a sufficient margin of safety, appropriate wall thickness, tool tolerances, use of a continuous reassessment approach to incorporate lessons learned, the effects of corrosion on crack depth sizing, and accelerated crack growth rates due to corrosion fatigue on corroded pipe with a failed coating.

9. To improve pipeline safety, a uniform and systematic approach in evaluating data for various types of in-line inspection tools is necessary to determine the effect of the interaction of various threats to a pipeline.

10. Pipeline operators should not wait until PHMSA promulgates revisions to 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 before taking action to improve pipeline safety.

11. PII Pipeline Solutions’ analysis of the 2005 in-line inspection data for the Line 6B segment that ruptured mischaracterized crack defects, which resulted in Enbridge not evaluating them as crack-field defects.

12. The ineffective performance of control center staff led them to misinterpret the rupture as a column separation, which led them to attempt two subsequent startups of the line.

13. Enbridge failed to train control center staff in team performance, thereby inadequately preparing the control center staff to perform effectively as a team when effective team performance was most needed.

14. Enbridge failed to ensure that all control center staff had adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities to recognize and address pipeline leaks, and their limited exposure to meaningful leak recognition training diminished their ability to correctly identify the cause of the Material Balance System (MBS) alarms.

15. The Enbridge control center and MBS procedures for leak detection alarms and identification did not fully address the potential for leaks during shutdown and startup, and Enbridge management did not prohibit control center staff from using unapproved procedures.

16. Enbridge’s control center staff placed a greater emphasis on the MBS analyst’s flawed interpretation of the leak detection system’s alarms than it did on reliable indications of a leak, such as zero pressure, despite known limitations of the leak detection system.

17. Enbridge control center staff misinterpreted the absence of external notifications as evidence that Line 6B had not ruptured.

18. Although Enbridge had procedures that required a pipeline shutdown after 10 minutes of uncertain operational status, Enbridge control center staff had developed a culture that accepted not adhering to the procedures.

19. Enbridge’s review of its public awareness program was ineffective in identifying and correcting deficiencies.

20. Had Enbridge operated an effective public awareness program, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control center staff tried to start the line.

21. Although Enbridge quickly isolated the ruptured segment of Line 6B after receiving a telephone call about the release, Enbridge’s emergency response actions during the initial hours following the release were not sufficiently focused on source control and demonstrated a lack of awareness and training in the use of effective containment methods.

22. Had Enbridge implemented effective oil containment measures for fast-flowing waters, the amount of oil that reached Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River could have been reduced.

23. PHMSA’s regulatory requirements for response capability planning do not ensure a high level of preparedness equivalent to the more stringent requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

24. Without specific Federal spill response preparedness standards, pipeline operators do not have response planning guidance for a worst-case discharge.

25. The Enbridge facility response plan did not identify and ensure sufficient resources were available for the response to the pipeline release in this accident.

26. If PHMSA had dedicated the resources necessary and conducted a thorough review of the Enbridge facility response plan, it would have disapproved the plan because it did not adequately provide for response to a worst-case discharge.

27. Enbridge’s failure to exercise effective oversight of pipeline integrity and control center operations, implement an effective public awareness program, and implement an adequate postaccident response were organizational failures that resulted in the accident and increased its severity.

28. Pipeline safety would be enhanced if pipeline companies implemented safety management systems.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following:

Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed.

Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline.

Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.

Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA’s ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness.

Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge’s failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA’s lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA’s limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.

Recommendations

To the U.S. Secretary of Transportation:

1. Audit the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s onshore pipeline facility response plan program’s business practices, including reviews of response plans and drill programs, and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies.

2. Allocate sufficient resources as necessary to ensure that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:

3. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 to clearly state (1) when an engineering assessment of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing of crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable crack defect in a pipeline segment must be excavated and time limits for completing those excavations; (4) pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by the required date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, or stress corrosion cracking as applicable.

4. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h)(2), the “discovery of condition,” to require, in cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available.

5. Conduct a comprehensive inspection of Enbridge Incorporated’s integrity management program after it is revised in accordance with Safety Recommendation (11).

6. Issue an advisory to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated’s integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.

7. Develop requirements for team training of control center staff involved in pipeline operations similar to those used in other transportation modes.

8. Extend operator qualification requirements in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195 Subpart G to all hazardous liquid and gas transmission control center staff involved in pipeline operational decisions.

9. Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194 to harmonize onshore oil pipeline response planning requirements with those of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for facilities that handle and transport oil and petroleum products to ensure that pipeline operators have adequate resources available to respond to worst-case discharges.

10. Issue an advisory bulletin to notify pipeline operators (1) of the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident, and (2) of the need to identify deficiencies in facility response plans and to update these plans as necessary to conform with the nonmandatory guidance for determining and evaluating required response resources as provided in Appendix A of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 194, “Guidelines for the Preparation of Response Plans.”

To Enbridge Incorporated:

11. Revise your integrity management program to ensure the integrity of your hazardous liquid pipelines as follows: (1) implement, as part of the excavation selection process, a safety margin that conservatively takes into account the uncertainties associated with the sizing of crack defects from in-line inspections; (2) implement procedures that apply a continuous reassessment approach to immediately incorporate any new relevant information as it becomes available and reevaluate the integrity of all pipelines within the program; (3) develop and implement a methodology that includes local corrosion wall loss in addition to the crack depth when performing engineering assessments of crack defects coincident with areas of corrosion; and (4) develop and implement a corrosion fatigue model for pipelines under cyclic loading that estimates growth rates for cracks that coincide with areas of corrosion when determining reinspection intervals.

12. Establish a program to train control center staff as teams, semiannually, in the recognition of and response to emergency and unexpected conditions that includes supervisory control and data acquisition system indications and Material Balance System software.

13. Incorporate changes to your leak detection processes to ensure that accurate leak detection coverage is maintained during transient operations, including pipeline shutdown, pipeline startup, and column separation.

14. Provide additional training to first responders to ensure that they (1) are aware of the best response practices and the potential consequences of oil releases and (2) receive practical training in the use of appropriate oil-containment and -recovery methods for all potential environmental conditions in the response zones.

15. Review and update your oil pipeline emergency response procedures and equipment resources to ensure that appropriate containment equipment and methods are available to respond to all environments and at all locations along the pipeline to minimize the spread of oil from a pipeline rupture.

16. Update your facility response plan to identify adequate resources to respond to and mitigate a worst-case discharge for all weather conditions and for all your pipeline locations before the required resubmittal in 2015.

To the American Petroleum Institute:

17. Facilitate the development of a safety management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is similar in scope to your Recommended Practice 750, Management of Process Hazards. The development should follow established American National Standards Institute requirements for standard development.

To the Pipeline Research Council International, Inc.:

18. Conduct a review of various in-line inspection tools and technologies—including, but not limited to: tool tolerance, the probability of detection, and the probability of identification—and provide a model with detailed step-by-step procedures to pipeline operators for evaluating the effect of interacting corrosion and crack threats on the integrity of pipelines.

To the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Emergency Number Association:

19. Inform your members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge your members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions.

Previous Recommendation Reiterated in this Report

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:

Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact radius. (P-11-8)

A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be available at http://www.capitolconnection.net/capcon/ntsb/ntsb.htm. To report any difficulties viewing the webcast, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for webcast technical support.

The complete report will appear on ntsb.gov in several weeks.

In its response, Enbridge went on to say:

“Safety has always been core to our operations. Our intent from the beginning of this incident has been to learn from it so we can prevent it from happening again, and to also share what we have learned with other pipeline operators,” said Stephen J. Wuori, President, Liquids Pipelines, Enbridge Inc. “Enbridge and EEP conducted a detailed internal investigation of this incident in the months following the release and have made numerous enhancements to their processes, procedures and training as a result of the findings of the investigation, including in the control center. Incident prevention, detection and response have also been enhanced. We will carefully examine the findings in the NTSB report to determine whether any further adjustments are appropriate.”

Enbridge says it has e worked closely and cooperatively with the NTSB throughout its investigation. The company isnow reviewing the summary report and will not comment specifically on the contents of the Final Report until it is released by the NTSB Board and analysis of the report has been completed.

JRP excludes Kitimat from questioning round, hearings in Prince Rupert, Prince George and Edmonton

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel will bypass Kitimat for the final questioning hearings on the controversial pipeline.

In a ruling issued late on July 4, 2012, the JRP said the questioning hearings will begin on September 4, 2012 in Edmonton followed by hearings in Prince George and Prince Rupert.

The JRP says a more detailed schedule will be issued closer to the start of the final hearings.

It adds, that details on the location for the final hearings for final argument will be announced at a later date.

In its ruling the JRP said:

As noted previously, these locations are centrally located, have adequate facilities and reasonable transportation access. The Panel is of the view that these locations are appropriate as they are relatively close to the proposed Project and are readily accessible by all parties who are actively participating in the Northern Gateway hearing process and their witnesses. Further, these locations will allow for appropriate hearing facilities that are safe, of an adequate size and can logistically and technologically accommodate a hearing with many participants.

The Joint Review panel acknowledged that some “witnesses would be financially and logistically
unable to attend three different hearing locations for questioning in Alberta and British
Columbia.”

The JRP says it will “to the best of its ability and to the extent reasonable, accommodate
interested parties’ participation at the final hearings through remote participation.
Standard procedures for the final hearings.”

(i) Parties and members of the public may listen to all of the final hearings live,
through the webcast (available from the Panel’s website).
(ii) Parties may register their appearance on the first day of the final hearings
remotely by telephone, or other technology to the extent feasible such as
videoconference or webex. Details regarding potential audio-visual options will
be provided in advance of the final hearings.
(iii)Parties may ask questions of other party’s witnesses by telephone, or other
technology such as vidoconference or webex to the extent possible. Parties will be
asked to confirm their method of participation, in advance of the final hearings for
questioning.
(iv) Parties’ witnesses may be presented for questioning by technology such as
videoconference or webex that is capable of capturing audio and visual images of
the witnesses simultaneously.

The JRP says its staff is working to address issues that may arise from remote questioning and video conferences.

Some key questions such as the effects of the pipeline and tanker traffic on marine mammals will be handled by “concurrent panels,” that is groups of expert witnesses sitting together. That is a standard National Energy Board procedure and was used during the NEB hearings on the Kitimat LNG project in June, 2011.

A separate ruling from the Joint Review Panel requires all parties to provide a list of witnesses for questioning hears on or before Friday, July 13, 2012.

This list must include all experts that have submitted reports on the party’s behalf, as well as those individuals that are able to answer questions on the specific evidence filed. Where relevant, it would be helpful if parties would organize their list of witnesses into “witness panels” by topic.

JR Procedural Direction 8 Final Hearings – Questioning (pdf)

JRP Procedural Matters Final Hearings Witness Panels (pdf)

Enbridge question on “marine vessel activity” on Douglas Channel gets obvious answer from the Haisla

Fog shrouds Kitimat harbour — Fog and low clouds shroud Kitimat harbour on the morning of June 27, 2012. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

If there is a major disconnect between the people who live in the Kitimat region and the rest of Canada, it is the question of vessel traffic on the Douglas Channel, with Enbridge spinning that there is already major tanker traffic on the Channel.

This section from the Northern Gateway website, is often quoted by Enbridge supporters, the vast majority of whom live in Alberta, thousands of kilometres away, have never been to Kitimat, but, somehow from Calgary or Fort McMurray, claim to know more about the Douglas Channel than people who live in Kitimat, including those who have sailed Douglas Channel for decades.

On its website Northern Gateway claims

According to numbers from the Port of Kitimat, not only have vessels carrying industrial products been travelling the channels safely for some 35 years, but so too have ships carrying petroleum products—like the one featured arriving in the Port of Kitimat through the Douglas Channel in the picture above.
In fact, some 1,560 vessels carrying methanol and condensate called on Kitimat port from 1982 to 2009 – that’s over 3,100 transits of vessels dedicated to the transport of petroleum products.
When you add vessel traffic of all industrial activity into Kitimat port, the number jumps to 6,112.
To be clear…the number of ships servicing industry arriving at Kitimat port between 1978 and 2009 is 6,112. That’s 12,224 transits!

So in its questions to the Haisla, Enbridge asked:

c) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation is aware of existing and proposed
marine vessel activity within its Traditional Territory, including:

(i) fuel barges

(ii) cargo/container ships

(iii) commercial fishing vessels

(iv) condensate tankers

(v) liquefied natural gas tankers

Enbridge’s question was an obvious attempt to enhance their spin on vessel traffic on the Douglas Channel, by fishing for an admission that large vessels already ply the Channel, something the residents of the Kitimat, both First Nations and non-aboriginal already know well.

In its response, the Haisla Nation replies:

The Haisla Nation is aware of the existing and proposed marine vessel activity within its Territory, including fuel barges, cargo/container ships, commercial fishing vessels, condensate tankers, and liquefied natural gas tankers.

The Haisla Nation is also aware of the increased cumulative effect of additional marine vessel activity as projects are approved. The presence of this shipping increases the significance of the potential impacts of the project on Haisla Nation aboriginal title and rights, through cumulative impacts.

The Haisla Nation is responsible for some of the vessel traffic within its Territory, with modern forms of transportation having replaced canoes. Until legal developments in the early 2000s which have defined the content of the honour of the Crown with respect resource decisions and potential impacts on First Nations, the Haisla Nation had little say about the projects with associated vessel traffic in its Territory.

While standard petroleum product tankers, many carrying condensate, a natural gas product, have been visiting Kitimat for years, there have. so far, been no supertankers, much less Very Large Crude Carriers. No bitumen carrying tankers have visited Kitimat, a fact always ignored by the region’s critics in Alberta and by Enbridge on its website.

Not only the filing by the Haisla Nation but most of the testimony at the recent public comment hearings in at Kitamaat Village, were about the fear of the growing cumulative effect of greatly increased tanker traffic on the Channel.

Haisla outline where they believe Enbridge Gateway plans are inadequate

In their filing with the Joint Review Panel, the Haisla Nation point to what they say is inadequate information provided by Enbridge on the Northern Gateway project, including:

To date the material provided by Northern Gateway does not adequately explain the known risks inherent to the proposed project and lacks significant detail with respect to the extent and degree of potential effects. The material provided by Northern Gateway does not provide sufficient information to determine how the risks inherent to the proposed project will be minimized, nor how the potential for significant adverse effects will be avoided.

There are a number of areas where the Haisla Nation has identified inadequateinformation, including but not limited to:

.
Design: there is a lack of information about detailed design considerations and monitoring procedures for pipeline integrity to avoid accidents and malfunctions due to corrosion, seismic events, and terrain instability. A notable example of this problem is in the Kitimat River Valley, where Northern Gateway has identified a high level of risk but has not offered any solutions. Another is the concern about the corrosive nature of the material to be transported. Northern Gateway denies that this is a problem, yet the US Department of Transportation Pipeline and
Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) has commissioned a major study to investigate the corrosive nature of diluted bitumen in pipelines.

Materials to be transported: there is a lack of information about the fate, behaviour and effects of diluted bitumen, synthetic crude and condensate in the cold water marine and freshwater environment. This concern has been identified by federal government participants as well as by numerous intervenors, and Northern Gateway has acknowledged the need for more research and information. Yet, Northern Gateway has not agreed to undertake this work so that it is available for review in this process.

Volume of material to be transported: Northern Gateway’s application is for a pipeline that will transport 525,000 barrels of diluted bitumen per day. Yet the pipeline will be built to have a capacity of up to 850,000 barrels per day, and Northern Gateway’s application materials identifies future phases with increased volumes up to this amount. The risk assessments conducted by Northern Gateway are premised on 525,000 barrels per day, and fail to contemplate higher volumes which would affect a number of matters, including but not limited to: pipeline risk; volume of potential spills; and tanker traffic volume. The risk assessment needs to be revised, to address the risks associated with the pipeline transporting 850,000 barrels of diluted bitumen per day. Without this revision, Northern Gateway is asking the JRP to conduct its assessment on incomplete information that, by definition, understates the true potential risk of the proposed project.

.Baseline information: Northern Gateway has not undertaken the studies necessary to generate baseline ecosystem assessments for the Kitimat River drainage and Kitimat Arm, including seasonal habitat utilization by species and life stages throughout the watershed. This information is necessary to determine both stream crossing construction strategy and to assess the potential impacts of a spill, as well as to determine how to respond to a spill and when. A ‘one-size fits all’ approach to stream crossings during construction and spill response, when adequateinformation about seasonal habitat utilization by species and life stages throughout the watershed is lacking, is not adequate. This information is needed to determine when construction can proceed and what timeframe limitations there are for activities, to ensure that adverse effects to fish and wildlife are avoided. This information is also required, should a spill occur, to enable a proper assessment of the extent and degree of adverse effects as well as to provide a proper basis for restoration of affected habitat.

Past spills: there is a lack of information about the cause, effects, emerging information and lessons learned as a result of Enbridge’s large diluted bitumen spill into the Kalamazoo River. We know that 3,785,400 liters of diluted bitumen were pumped out of the pipeline, with a largeportion of that ending up in to the Kalamazoo River. We know the large volume of the spill was the result of numerous attempts to re-pressurize the pipeline despite repeated spill alarms being triggered. We know that government agencies stepped in to manage the spill because Enbridge’s response was not swift enough. We know that Enbridge’s clean-up costs to date exceed insurance coverage. We know that two years later Enbridge is still under a clean-up mandate from the US Environmental Protection Agency and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and that portions of the Kalamazoo River are still closed to recreational use. What we do not know, however, is what the cause of the pipeline rupture was, what Enbridge has learned about how diluted bitumen behaves once it is released into the environment, or how a local population that relies on the river for fishing, for traditional harvesting and gathering of foods and medicines would have been affected.

Oil spill response: there is a lack of information about oil spill response and planning, including best practices, best available technology and the local on-site equipment and personnel required full-time to respond properly to a spill. This is largely due to the lack of adequate baseline information on which to base response planning. Further, Northern Gateway has demonstrated an unwillingness to fully consider how spill response would be carried out until it receives a certificate for its project.

Yet Northern Gateway seeks to rely on spill response as a mitigation strategy. If Northern Gateway seeks to rely on spill response as a mitigation strategy, it should provide in detail, prior to project approval, what its oil spill response would include and demonstrate that it is logistically, technologically and economically feasible. Northern Gateway has not done this.

.Mitigation measures: there is a lack of information about existing proven mitigation measures and their effectiveness in cleaning up an oil spill, restoring habitat and regenerating the species dependent on the affected habitat. This should be evaluated as part of project review, prior to project approval. Where Northern Gateway seeks to rely on a mitigation measure as a basis for project approval, it must demonstrate that the proposed mitigation will actually work.

Avoidance of any significant adverse effects must be the primary goal and dictate the design and location of the proposed project. Mitigation (e.g. complete resolution) of any potential environmental effects should be the preferred option, when all efforts to avoid such effects fail. Compensation for environmental effects must be a last resort and relied on only when best efforts have been made to avoid or mitigate effects. Unfortunately, the material submitted by Northern Gateway suggests that compensation is the primary option and lack of evidence on project design and procedures makes it impossible to evaluate how potential effects could be avoided or mitigated.

For example, Northern Gateway proposes to have spill interception points (river control points) along the Kitimat River Valley as part of its mitigation, but has no realistic plan in place that takes into consideration response delay times, rates of transportation, access issues or baseline ecosystem, fish and wildlife information for the receiving environment.

Main story Haisla Nation confirms it opposes Northern Gateway, demands Ottawa veto Enbridge pipeline; First Nation also outlines “minimum conditions” if Ottawa approves the project

Haisla Nation Response to NGP Information Request (pdf)

Haisla outline conditions, concerns for Northern Gateway project

In its extensive document filed with the Northern Gateway Joint Review panel, the Haisla Nation emphasize their opposition to the project.

However, the Haisla are anticipating that the project will be approved and therefore submitted a lengthy series of conditions for that project, should it be imposed on the northwest by the federal government.

Nevertheless, if the project were to be approved AFTER the Crown meaningfully consulted and accommodated the Haisla Nation with respect to the impacts of the proposed project on its aboriginal title and rights, and if that consultation were meaningful yet did not result in changes to the proposed project, the following conditions would, at a minimum, have to be attached to the project.

1. Conditions Precedent: The following conditions precedent should be met prior to any field investigations, pre-construction activities or construction activities as well as during and subsequent to such investigations or activities. These conditions are necessary to ensure that potential effects of the project can be avoided or mitigated to reduce the likelihood of habitat damage or destruction:

Comprehensive seasonal water quality monitoring throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel that account for seasonal variations in flow, tidal cycles, snowmelt, rainfall, etc.

Parameters for measurement would be have to be agreed upon by the
Haisla Nation prior to certification of the project;

Comprehensive seasonal fisheries surveys of fish habitat utilization throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel that account for where species and life stages are at different times of the year and accurately define sensitive habitats;

Comprehensive seasonal wildlife and bird surveys of habitat utilization throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel that account for where species and life stages are at different times of the year and accurately define sensitive habitats;

Comprehensive seasonal vegetation surveys of habitat utilization throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel that accounts for the distribution of species and life stages at different times of the year and accurately define sensitive habitats;

Development of comprehensive spill response capability based on a realistic assessment of spill containment, spill response and spill capacity requirements throughout the Kitimat River Valley, Kitmat Arm and Douglas Channel. The Haisla Nation’s past experience has shown that relying onpromises is not good enough. This spill response capability must be demonstrated prior to project approval;

Verification that the proposed project would result in real benefits, economic or otherwise, that would flow to the Haisla Nation, to other First Nations, and to British Columbia.

Whenever any field investigations or activities are proposed, the proposal or permit application would have to include the following environmental protections:

Soil and erosion control plans;

Surface water management and treatment plans;

Groundwater monitoring plans;

Control and storage plans for fuels, lubricants and other potential contaminants;

Equipment deployment, access and use plans;

Habitat reclamation of disturbed or cleared areas.

Prior to any pre-construction or construction activities the following detailed studies would have to be undertaken and provided to the Haisla Nation for review and approval, to ensure that the best design and construction approaches are being used, so that potential effects of the project can be avoided or mitigated to reduce the likelihood of habitat damage or destruction:

Detailed analysis of terrain stability and slide potential throughout the pipeline corridor and at the storage tank and terminal site;

Detailed engineering design to mitigate seismic risk and local weather extremes;

.Development of pipeline integrity specifications and procedures including
best practices for leak detection;

Development of storage tank integrity specifications and maintenance and monitoring procedures;

Assessment of spill containment, spill response and spill capacity requirements throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel;

.Development of detailed tanker acceptance program specifications and
procedures;

Development of detailed tanker and tug traffic management specifications and procedures;

Development of detailed port management specifications and procedures including operating limits for tanker operation, movement and docking.

2. Ongoing Consultation: A commitment to ongoing consultation with and accommodation of the Haisla Nation on all of the activities set out above.

3. Ongoing process for variance, waiver or discharge of conditions: A commitment to ongoing meaningful involvement of the Haisla Nation by the National Energy Board prior to any decision on any changes to or sign off on conditions and commitments to any certificate that is issued.

4. Third Party Oversight of Construction: A requirement that NorthernGateway fund a third party oversight committee, which should include a Haisla Nation representative, to monitor certificate compliance during construction of the marine terminal and the pipeline. This committee would have the ability to monitor and inspect construction and should be provided with copies of allcompliance documents submitted by Northern Gateway to the National Energy Board.

5. Operational Conditions: A number of operational conditions should beincorporated into the certificate, including but not limited to:

The requirement to monitor terrain along the pipeline so that breaches based on earth movements can be anticipated and prevented;

The requirement to implement automatic pipeline shutdown whenever a leak detection alarm occurs;

Conditions on the disposal of any contamination that must be removed as a result of an accident or malfunction resulting in a spill that will minimize additional habitat destruction and maximize the potential for regeneration of habitat and resources damaged by the spill;

Parameters for terminal and tanker operations (including standards for tankers allowed to transport cargo; tanker inspection requirements and schedules; escort tug specifications, standards, maintenance and inspection; pilotage protocols and procedures; environmental conditions and operating limits; etc.) as well as other parameters set out in and reliedon for the TERMPOL review to become conditions of any certificate issued by the National Energy Board, with a provision that the Haisla Nation’s approval of any changes to these conditions is required.

Answering the questions from Enbridge Northern Gateway, the Haisla also outline a long series of concerns.

1. Physical and Jurisdictional Impacts

1.1 Construction

The Haisla Nation is concerned about the direct physical and jurisdictional impacts that the construction of the proposed project will have. These concerns are set out for each of the marine terminal, the pipeline, and tanker traffic, below:

Marine Terminal:

a. The proposed marine terminal will require the alienation of 220-275
hectares (554-680 acres) of land from Haisla Nation Territory, land
to which the Haisla Nation claims aboriginal title.

b. The terminal will require the additional alienation of land for
ancillary infrastructure and development, including:

i. road upgrades,

ii. perimeter access roads and roads within the terminal area,

iii. a potential public bypass road,

iv. an impoundment reservoir,

v. a disposal site for excess cut material outside the terminal
area,

vi. a new 10km long transmission powerline, and

vii. a 100-m waterlot with a 150-m “safety zone”.

c. The terminal proposes to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land,
including foreshore and waters, in a way that is inconsistent with
Haisla Nation stewardship of its lands, waters and resources and
with the Haisla Nation’s own aspirations for the use of this land.
Since aboriginal title is a constitutionally protected right to use the
aboriginal title land for the purposes the Haisla Nation sees fit, this
adverse use would fundamentally infringe the aboriginal title of the
Haisla Nation.

d. The terminal will require the destruction and removal of
documented culturally modified trees, some with modifications
dating back to 1754. These culturally modified trees are living
monuments to the history of the Haisla people.

e. The terminal will expose two Haisla Nation cultural heritage sites to
increased risk of vandalism and chemical weathering.

f. The terminal will result in the direct loss of 4.85 hectares (11.98
acres) of freshwater fish habitat (harmful alteration, disruption or
destruction (HADD) under the Fisheries Act).

g. The terminal will require dredging, underwater blasting, and
placement of piles and berthing foundations, resulting in an as yet
un-quantified loss of intertidal and subtidal marine habitat.

Pipeline:

a. The proposed pipeline construction right-of-way will require the
alienation of 9,200 hectares (22,734 acres) of Haisla Nation
Territory – land to which the Haisla Nation claims aboriginal title –
and will put this land to a use that is inconsistent with Haisla Nation
stewardship of its lands, waters and resources and with the Haisla
Nation’s own aspirations for the use of this land.

b. The pipeline will require 127 watercourse crossings in Haisla Nation
Territory. Seven of these are categorized as high risk, 5 as
medium high risk, and 7 are medium or medium low risk for harmful
alternation, disruption or destruction (HADD) of fish habitat. This
risk is just from pipeline construction and does not address the
issue of spills.

c. The pipeline is estimated to result in temporary or permanent
destruction of freshwater fish habitat of 3.1 hectares (7.68 acres) in
Haisla Nation Territory.

d. The pipeline will require the clearing of land and vegetation and the
destruction of wetlands. The extent of this is yet to be quantified.

Tanker Traffic:

a. Although Northern Gateway has not made any submission on this
point, it is clear that having adequate spill response capability at
Kitimat will require additional infrastructure upgrades in and around
Kitimat, as well as potential spill response equipment cache sites.
None of this has been considered or addressed in Northern
Gateway’s application material – as such the material is
incomplete.

b. The construction for this additional infrastructure could result
impacts to ecosystems, plants, wildlife and fish, and in additional
HADD or fish mortality from accidents.

All of the land alienations required for the proposed project would profoundly
infringe Haisla Nation aboriginal title which is, in effect, a constitutionally
protected ownership right. The proposed project would use Haisla Nation
aboriginal title land in a way that is inconsistent with Haisla Nation stewardship of
its lands, waters and resources and with the Haisla Nation’s own aspirations for
the use of this land. Since aboriginal title is a constitutionally protected right to
use the aboriginal title land for the purposes the Haisla Nation sees fit, this
adverse use would fundamentally infringe the aboriginal title of the Haisla Nation.

The Haisla Nation is also concerned about the socio-economic and health
impacts of the proposed project. Northern Gateway has yet to file its Human
Health and Ecological Risk Assessment. Further, the socio-economic impact
analysis submitted as part of the application provides only a limited assessment
of the potential impacts of the project on the Haisla Nation at a socio-economic
level.

Haisla Nation society and economy must be understood within the cultural
context of a people who have lived off the lands, waters and resources of their
Territory since long before European arrival. To limit a socio-economic impact
assessment to direct impacts and to ignore consequential impacts flowing from
those impacts fails to capture the potential impacts of the proposed project on the
Haisla Nation at a socio-economic level.

1.2 Operation

The proposed marine terminal, pipeline corridor and shipping lanes will be
located in highly sensitive habitats for fish, wildlife and plants. Any accident of
malfunction at the wrong time in the wrong place can be devastating ecologically.
The Haisla Nation has identified the following concerns relating to physical
impacts from the operation of the proposed project:

Marine Terminal:

a. Intertidal and subtidal marine habitat impacts as a result of marine
vessels.
b. The likelihood of spills from the marine terminal as a result of operational
mistakes or geohazards.

c. The effects and consequences of a spill from the marine terminal. This
includes impacts on the terrestrial and intertidal and subtidal marine
environment and fish, marine mammals, birds, and other wildlife, as well
as impacts on Haisla Nation culture and cultural heritage that could result
from such impacts.

d. Response to a spill from the marine terminal, including concerns about
spill response knowledge, planning and capability, as well as impacts
flowing from response measures themselves.

Pipeline:

a. The likelihood of spills from the pipeline as a result of pipeline failure,
resulting from inherent pipeline integrity issues or external risks to pipeline
integrity, such as geohazards.

b. The effects and consequences of a spill from the pipelines. This includes
impacts on the terrestrial environment and freshwater environment, and
on plants, fish, birds, and other wildlife, as well as impacts on Haisla
Nation culture and cultural heritage that could result from such impacts.

c. Response to a spill from the pipelines, including concerns about spill
response knowledge, planning and capability, as well as impacts flowing
from response measures themselves.

Tanker Traffic:

a. Increased vessel traffic in waters used by Haisla Nation members for
commercial fishing and for traditional fishing, hunting and food gathering.

b. The likelihood of spills, including condensate, diluted bitumen, synthetic
crude, and bunker C fuel and other service fuels, from the tankers at sea
and at the marine terminal.

c. The effects and consequences of a spill. This includes impacts on the
marine environment and fish, marine mammals, birds, and other wildlife,
as well as impacts on Haisla Nation culture and cultural heritage that could
result from such impacts.

d. Response to a spill, including concerns about spill response knowledge,
planning and capability, as well as impacts flowing from response
measures themselves.

e. Potential releases of bilge water, with concerns about oily product and
foreign organisms.
These issues are important. They go to the very heart of Haisla Nation culture.
They go to the Haisla Nation relationship with the lands, waters, and resources of
its Territory. A major spill from the pipeline at the marine terminal or from a
tanker threatens to sever us from or damage our lifestyle built on harvesting and
gathering seafood and resources throughout our Territory.

Northern Gateway proposes a pipeline across numerous tributaries to the Kitimat
River. A spill into these watercourses is likely to eventually occur. The evidence
before the Panel shows that pipeline leaks or spills occur with depressing
regularity.

One of Enbridge’s own experiences, when it dumped 3,785,400 liters of diluted
bitumen into the Kalamazoo River, shows that the concern of a spill is real and
not hypothetical. A thorough understanding of this incident is critical to the
current environmental assessment since diluted bitumen is what Northern
Gateway proposes to transport. However, nothing was provided in the application
materials to address the scope of impact, the level of effort required for cleanup
and the prolonged effort required to restore the river. An analysis of this incident
would provide a basis for determining what should be in place to maintain
pipeline integrity as well as what should be in place locally to respond to any spill.

The Kalamazoo spill was aggravated by an inability to detect the spill, by an
inability to respond quickly and effectively, and by an inability to predict the fate
of the diluted bitumen in the environment. As a result, the Kalamazoo River has
suffered significant environmental damage. The long-term cumulative
environmental damage from this spill is yet to be determined.

Further, the Haisla Nation is also concerned about health impacts of the
proposed project and awaits the Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment
which Northern Gateway has promised to provide.

1.3 Decommissioning

Northern Gateway has not provided information on decommissioning that is detailed enough to allow the Haisla Nation to set out all its concerns about the potential impacts from decommissioning at this point in time. This is not good enough. The Haisla Nation needs to know how Northern Gateway proposes to undertake decommissioning, what the impacts will be, and that there will be financial security in place to ensure this is done properly.

2. Lack of Consultation

Broadly, the Haisla Nation has concerns about all three physical aspects of the
proposed project – the pipeline, the marine terminal and tanker traffic – during all
three phases of the project – construction, operation and decommissioning.
These concerns have not been captured or addressed by Northern Gateway’s
proposed mitigation. The Haisla Nation acknowledges that a number of these
concerns can only be addressed through meaningful consultation with the
Crown. The Haisla Nation has therefore repeatedly asked federal decision-
makers to commit to the joint development of a meaningful consultation process
with the Haisla Nation. The federal Crown decision-makers have made it very
clear that they have no intention of meeting with the Haisla Nation until the Joint
Review Panel’s review of the proposed project is complete.

The federal Crown has also stated that it is relying on consultation by NorthernGateway to the extent possible. The federal Crown has failed to provide anyclarity, however, about what procedural aspects of consultation it has delegated to Northern Gateway. Northern Gateway has not consulted with the Haisla Nation and has not advised the Haisla Nation that Canada has delegated any aspects of the consultation process.

The Haisla Nation asserts aboriginal title to its Territory. Since the essence of

aboriginal title is the right of the aboriginal title holder to use land according to its
own discretion, Haisla Nation aboriginal title entails a constitutionally protected
ability of the Haisla Nation to make decisions concerning land and resource use
within Haisla Nation Territory. Any government decision concerning lands,
waters, and resource use within Haisla Nation Territory that conflicts with a
Haisla lands, waters or resources use decision is only valid to the extent that the
government can justify this infringement of Haisla Nation aboriginal title.

The Supreme Court of Canada has established that infringements of aboriginal
title can only be justified if there has been, in the case of relatively minor
infringements, consultation with the First Nation. Most infringements will require
something much deeper than consultation if the infringement is to be justified.
The Supreme Court has noted that in certain circumstances the consent of the
aboriginal nation may be required. Further, compensation will ordinarily be
required if an infringement of aboriginal title is to be justified [Delgamuukw].

The Haisla Nation has a chosen use for the proposed terminal site. This land
was selected in the Haisla Nation’s treaty land offer submitted to British Columbia
and Canada in 2005, as part of the BC Treaty Negotiation process, as lands
earmarked for Haisla Nation economic development.

The Haisla Nation has had discussions with the provincial Crown seeking to
acquire these lands for economic development purposes for a liquefied natural
gas project. The Haisla Nation has had discussions with potential partners about
locating a liquefied natural gas facility on the site that Northern Gateway
proposes to acquire for the marine terminal. The Haisla Nation sees these lands
as appropriate for a liquefied natural gas project as such a project is not nearly
as detrimental to the environment as a diluted bitumen export project. This use,
therefore, is far more compatible with Haisla Nation stewardship of its lands,
waters and resources.

By proposing to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land in a manner that is
inconsistent with Haisla Nation stewardship of its lands, waters and resources,
and that interferes with the Haisla Nation’s own proposed reasonable economic
development aspirations for the land, the proposed project would result in a
fundamental breach of the Haisla Nation’s constitutionally protected aboriginal
title.

Similarly, Haisla Nation aboriginal rights are constitutionally protected rights to
engage in certain activities (e.g. hunting, fishing, gathering) within Haisla Nation
Territory. Government decisions that infringe Haisla Nation aboriginal rights will
be illegal unless the Crown can meet the stringent test for justifying an
infringement.
Main story Haisla Nation confirms it opposes Northern Gateway, demands Ottawa veto Enbridge pipeline; First Nation also outlines “minimum conditions” if Ottawa approves the project

Haisla Nation Response to NGP Information Request (pdf)

Editorial: District of Kitimat Council must endorse the Haisla’s conditions for Northern Gateway

The Haisla Nation today filed an extensive document with the Joint Review Panel outlining the nation’s concerns about the Northern Gateway project and, should Stephen Harper attempt to impose the pipeline, terminal and tankers on northwestern British Columbia, the Haisla have set down a detailed series of conditions that they say must be met in both the construction and operation of the project.

It is now clear that the real leadership on the issue of the Northern Gateway for the entire Kitimat region is found at the Haisla Administration building in Kitamaat Village, not at the District of Kitimat council chambers in town on Kingfisher Avenue.

The Haisla have lived in this region for thousands of years and the documents show the First Nation is taking that responsibility seriously, for the filing covers all the bases, planning, construction, operation and even the eventual decommissioning of the pipeline and terminal.

The District of Kitimat, on the other hand, has done absolutely nothing, preferring to wait until the increasingly discredited Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel issues a report that will likely be quickly shelved by Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

While the District council has clung to its policy of neutrality, the Haisla have been proactive in looking to the future and practical in considering all the problems the region will face should the Northern Gateway go ahead.

This site has said in the past, that it matters little whether one supports or opposes the project, the District must begin now to plan for the inevitable problems that will arise once the Northern Gateway goes ahead.

A few weeks ago, on May 20, we pointed out that Bill C-38 had undermined the fence sitting by the District Council and called for the Council to take a position of “armed neutrality” and start working toward the day when the pipeline is probably forced upon the Kitimat region.

That was Strike One.

Now the Haisla have set out a document that not only outlines the deficiencies in the Enbridge plans but also sets outs stringent conditions for the project, should it go ahead.

That is Strike Two.

How many times do we have to say that it is time for the District to act on the Northern Gateway?

The next meeting of the District of Kitimat Council is on Tuesday, July 3, after the holiday weekend. At the meeting, council should introduce and pass a motion endorsing and supporting in principle the conditions for the Northern Gateway project as outlined by the Haisla Nation. Based on support in principle, the District should then do something it has never done, conduct its own study to identify future problems that both the Northern Gateway project and the LNG projects will bring to the District.

On a practical level, the Haisla conditions protect everyone in the Kitimat region, not just the people in Kitamaat Village. The Haisla conditions protect everyone in the District (including supporters of the project) not just now but in the future. While the District does not have the constitutional foundation of aboriginal rights and title, endorsement of the Haisla conditions will strengthen the entire region’s position in facing Enbridge and a stubborn federal government.

By supporting and endorsing the conditions set out by the Haisla Nation and by conducting its own studies, the District of Kitimat can prepare the region for the future of energy development.

Is the District Council going to wait for the metaphorical Strike Three and being forced out, while the federal government, the province of Alberta and the energy companies decide the District’s future?
Main story Haisla Nation confirms it opposes Northern Gateway, demands Ottawa veto Enbridge pipeline; First Nation also outlines “minimum conditions” if Ottawa approves the project

Haisla Nation confirms it opposes Northern Gateway, demands Ottawa veto Enbridge pipeline; First Nation also outlines “minimum conditions” if Ottawa approves the project

The Haisla Nation has confirmed in a filing with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel that it opposes the Enbridge Northern Gateway project.

The document, filed June 29, 2012, is one of the most significant filed with the JRP during all the years of the debate over the controversial Northern Gateway, setting out a three stage process that will govern, whether Enbridge or the federal government like it or not, the future of the Northern Gateway pipeline project.

First, the Haisla Nation affirms that it opposes the Northern Gateway project

Second, the Haisla Nation is demanding that the federal government, in recognition of aboriginal rights and title, reject the Northern Gateway project on Haisla traditional territory.

Third, probably anticipating that Stephen Harper and his government will attempt to force the Northern Gateway on British Columbia, the Haisla are demanding meaningful consultation and set out a stringent set of minimum conditions for the project on Haisla traditional territory.

The Haisla Nation’s lawyers filed the document today late today, June 29, in response to a series of questions posed to the First Nation by Enbridge through the Joint Review process.

The Haisla also say that there already projects that are better suited to their traditional territory, the liquified natural gas projects.

The Haisla position that Ottawa must reject the pipeline if First Nations oppose it is the opening round in the constitutional battle over not just the pipeline, but entire question of aboriginal rights and title. So far the government of Stephen Harper has said that First Nations do not have a “veto” on the pipeline and terminal project.

The Haisla also refuse to answer questions that Enbridge posed on the liquified natural gas projects because the filing argues, the questions are beyond the scope of the current Joint Review inquiry.

Detailed excerpts

Haisla outline where they believe Enbridge Gateway plans are inadequate

Haisla outline conditions, concerns for Northern Gateway project

Why the Haisla oppose Northern Gateway

In the filing with the Joint Review panel, the Haisla outline nine reasons for opposition to the Northern Gateway project:

1. Northern Gateway is proposing to site its project in a location that places at risk the ecological integrity of a large portion and significant aspects of Haisla Nation Territory and resources.

2. All three aspects of the proposed project – the pipelines, the marine terminal and tankers – have the potential to impact Haisla Nation lands, waters and resources.

3. Northern Gateway has neither conducted sufficient due diligence nor provided sufficient information with respect to the assessment of a number of critical aspects of the proposed project, including but not limited to project design, impacts, risks, accidents and malfunctions, spill response, potential spill consequences and the extent, degree and duration of any significant adverse environmental effects.

4. There are significant risks of spills of diluted bitumen, synthetic crude, and condensate from corrosion, landslide hazards, seismic events along the pipeline route and at the terminal site; as well asloss of cargo or service fuels from tanker accidents, with no realistic plan provided for spill containment, cleanup, habitat restoration or regeneration of species dependent on the affected habitat.

5. Diluted bitumen, synthetic crude and condensate are all highly toxic to the environment and living systems and the consequences and effects of a spill could be devastating on the resources that support the Haisla Nation way of life, and would therefore have significant adverse effects on Haisla Nation culture and cultural heritage and aboriginal rights.

6. Risk assessments and technology have not overcome the potential for human error, wherein it is well established that 80% of oil tanker accidents that cause oil spills at sea are a result of human errors: badly handled manoeuvres, neglected maintenance, insufficient checking of systems, lack of communication between crew members, fatigue, or an inadequate response to a minor incident
causing it to escalate into a major accident often resulting in groundings and collisions (http://www.black-tides.com/uk/source/oil-tanker-accidents/causes-accidents.php). It has also become increasingly obvious that maintenance of pipeline integrity and the remote detection of pipeline ruptures is inadequate as exemplified by major environmental damage from recent pipeline ruptures in Michigan and Alberta.

7. The proposed project requires the alienation of Haisla Nation aboriginal title land, and the federal government has refused to engage in consultation with the Haisla Nation about the potential impacts of the proposed project on Haisla Nation aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title.

8. The proposed project would require the use of Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for a purpose that is inconsistent with Haisla Nation stewardship principles and with the Haisla Nation’s own aspirations for this land.

9. For the reasons set out above, the proposed project would constitute an unjustified infringement of Haisla Nation aboriginal title and rights. It would therefore be illegal for the Crown to authorize the project.

Canada is obliged to decline approval of the project

Up until now, the federal government has refused to engage First Nations in the northwestern region over the issue of the Northern Gateway pipeline and terminal, saying that the constitutionally mandated consultation will take place after the Joint Review Panel has released its report. However, the government’s Bill C-38, which gives the federal cabinet (actually the prime minister) the power to decide the pipeline means that the JRP report will be less significant than it would have been before the Conservatives gained a majority government in May, 2010.

The Haisla say the nation has “repeatedly requested early engagement by federal government decision-makers to develop, together with the Haisla Nation, a meaningful process for consultation and accommodation in relation to the proposed project.”

The filing says JRP and “the federal government’s ‘Aboriginal Consultation Framework’ have been imposed on the Haisla Nation and other First Nations, with significant aspects of the concerns expressed by the Haisla Nation about this approach being ignored.”

The Haisla says it “continues to seek a commitment from the federal government to the joint development of a meaningful process to assess the proposed project and its potential impacts on Haisla Nation aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title.”

Later in the filing the Haisla say:

The Haisla Nation has… repeatedly asked federal decision-makers to commit to the joint development of a meaningful consultation process with the Haisla Nation. The federal Crown decision-makers have made it very clear that they have no intention of meeting with the Haisla Nation until the Joint Review Panel’s review of the proposed project is complete…

The federal Crown has failed to provide any clarity, however, about what procedural aspects of consultation it has delegated to Northern Gateway. Northern Gateway has not consulted with the Haisla Nation and has not advised the Haisla Nation that Canada has delegated any aspects of the consultation process.

The Haisla then go on to say:

Canada is legally required to work with the Haisla Nation to develop and follow such a process. If the process establishes that the approval of the proposed project would constitute an unjustified infringement of Haisla Nation aboriginal rights or aboriginal title, then Canada would be legally obliged to decline approval.

Deficiencies and Conditions

Enbridge asked the Haisla that if there are conditions of approval that would nonetheless
address, in whole or in part, the Nation’s concerns; and then asked for details “on the nature of any conditions that the Haisla Nation would suggest be imposed on the Project, should it be approved.”

The Haisla reply that because there are “significant deficiencies in the evidence provided by Northern Gateway to date.” The nation goes on to say that “the acknowledged risks that have not been adequately addressed in the proposed project.” The Haisla Nation then says it “does not foresee any conditions that could be attached to the project as currently conceived and presented that would eliminate the Haisla Nation’s concerns.”

The Haisla then repeat that Enbridge has not provided sufficient information so that

it is difficult for the Haisla Nation to identify conditions to attach to the proposed project as it is still trying to fully understand the potential impacts of the project and the proposed mitigation. This is primarily because there is insufficient information provided by Northern Gateway in its application material.

Although we have attempted to elicit additional information through the JRP’s information request process, Northern Gateway has not provide adequate and complete answers to the questions posed.

The Haisla then anticipate that Stephen Harper will force the pipeline and terminal on British Columbia and say:

Nevertheless, if the project were to be approved AFTER the Crown meaningfully
consulted and accommodated the Haisla Nation with respect to the impacts of
the proposed project on its aboriginal title and rights, and if that consultation were
meaningful yet did not result in changes to the proposed project, the following
conditions would, at a minimum, have to be attached to the project.

The emphasis of the word “after” is in the original document.

The document that then goes on to present an extensive list of list of conditions the Haisla believe should be imposed on the Enbridge Northern Gateway if the project goes ahead.

The conditions include comprehensive monitoring of water quality, fisheries, wildlife and birds, vegetation throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel; development of comprehensive spill response capability throughout the Kitimat River Valley, Kitmat Arm and Douglas Channel.

The Haisla also want soil and erosion control plans; water management plans; control and storage plans for fuels, lubricants and other potential contaminants; detailed plans for equipment deployment and habitat reclamation of disturbed or cleared areas.

The Haisla also want much more detailed studies before any construction, including analysis of terrain stability and slide potential throughout the pipeline corridor and at the storage tank and terminal site; engineering designs to mitigate seismic risk and local weather extremes; development of pipeline integrity specifications and procedures including best practices for leak detection; storage tank integrity specifications, maintenance and monitoring; assessment of spill containment, spill response and spill capacity requirements throughout the Kitimat River watershed, Kitimat Arm and Douglas Channel.

On tankers the Haisla want more details beyond the plans already filed by Enbridge including
detailed tanker specifications, detailed tanker and tug traffic management procedures; detailed port management specifications and procedures including operating limits for tanker operation, movement and docking.

The Haisla are also demanding “on going consultation” on all issues involved by the National Energy Board prior to any decision on any changes to or sign off on conditions and commitments to any certificate that is issued.

The Haisla want an independent third party be part of a committee to oversee the construction proecess to monitor certificate compliance during construction of the marine terminal and the pipeline.

Once the pipeline and terminal operational, the Haisla want conditions imposed on the project that include ongoing monitoring of the terrain along the pipeline, a system that would automatically shut down the pipeline shutdown whenever a leak detection alarm occurs.

The Hasila want conditions “on the disposal of any contamination that must be removed as
a result of an accident or malfunction resulting in a spill that will minimize additional habitat destruction and maximize the potential for regeneration of habitat and resources damaged by the spill.”

As well as more detailed parameters for the tankers, tugs, and pilotage procedures, the Haisla want approval of any future changes in those procedures.

The Haisla are also concerned about the “alienation” of a large area of their traditional territory by the construction of the Northern Gateway project as well as the “additional infrastructure” required by adequate spill response capability and spill response equipment cache sites.

The Haisla say “all of the land alienations required for the proposed project would profoundly
infringe Haisla Nation aboriginal title which is, in effect, a constitutionally protected ownership right” and goes on to say “proposed project would use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land in a way that is inconsistent with Haisla Nation stewardship of its lands, waters and resources and with the Haisla Nation’s own aspirations for the use of this land.”

The Haisla filing then goes on to say:

Since aboriginal title is a constitutionally protected right to use the aboriginal title land for the purposes the Haisla Nation sees fit, this adverse use would fundamentally infringe the aboriginal title of the Haisla Nation.

The report also expresses concerns about the ongoing socio-economic affects of such a large project.

It concludes by saying:

These issues are important. They go to the very heart of Haisla Nation culture.
They go to the Haisla Nation relationship with the lands, waters, and resources of
its Territory. A major spill from the pipeline at the marine terminal or from a
tanker threatens to sever us from or damage our lifestyle built on harvesting and
gathering seafood and resources throughout our Territory.

Northern Gateway proposes a pipeline across numerous tributaries to the Kitimat
River. A spill into these watercourses is likely to eventually occur. The evidence
before the Panel shows that pipeline leaks or spills occur with depressing
regularity.

One of Enbridge’s own experiences, when it dumped 3,785,400 liters of diluted
bitumen into the Kalamazoo River, shows that the concern of a spill is real and
not hypothetical. A thorough understanding of this incident is critical to the
current environmental assessment since diluted bitumen is what Northern
Gateway proposes to transport. However, nothing was provided in the application
materials to address the scope of impact, the level of effort required for cleanup
and the prolonged effort required to restore the river. An analysis of this incident
would provide a basis for determining what should be in place to maintain
pipeline integrity as well as what should be in place locally to respond to any spill.

The Kalamazoo spill was aggravated by an inability to detect the spill, by an
inability to respond quickly and effectively, and by an inability to predict the fate
of the diluted bitumen in the environment. As a result, the Kalamazoo River has
suffered significant environmental damage. The long-term cumulative
environmental damage from this spill is yet to be determined.

Looking to the future, the Haisla are also asking for a plan for the eventual decommissioning of the project, pointing out that “ Northern Gateway has not provided information on decommissioning that is
detailed enough to allow the Haisla Nation to set out all its concerns about the
potential impacts from decommissioning at this point in time.”

Haisla leaders have already expressed concern about the legacy of the Eurocan paper plant. Now it tells Enbridge

This is not good enough. The Haisla Nation needs to know how Northern Gateway proposes to undertake decommissioning, what the impacts will be, and that there will be financial security in place to ensure this is done properly.

Asserts aboriginal title

The section of the report concludes by saying:

The Haisla Nation asserts aboriginal title to its Territory. Since the essence of
aboriginal title is the right of the aboriginal title holder to use land according to its
own discretion, Haisla Nation aboriginal title entails a constitutionally protected
ability of the Haisla Nation to make decisions concerning land and resource use
within Haisla Nation Territory. Any government decision concerning lands,
waters, and resource use within Haisla Nation Territory that conflicts with a
Haisla lands, waters or resources use decision is only valid to the extent that the
government can justify this infringement of Haisla Nation aboriginal title.

The Supreme Court of Canada has established that infringements of aboriginal
title can only be justified if there has been, in the case of relatively minor
infringements, consultation with the First Nation. Most infringements will require
something much deeper than consultation if the infringement is to be justified.
The Supreme Court has noted that in certain circumstances the consent of the
aboriginal nation may be required. Further, compensation will ordinarily be
required if an infringement of aboriginal title is to be justified [Delgamuukw].

The Haisla then go on to say that the preferred use of the land in question is for the liquified natural gas projects:

The Haisla Nation has a chosen use for the proposed terminal site. This land
was selected in the Haisla Nation’s treaty land offer submitted to British Columbia
and Canada in 2005, as part of the BC Treaty Negotiation process, as lands
earmarked for Haisla Nation economic development.

The Haisla Nation has had discussions with the provincial Crown seeking to
acquire these lands for economic development purposes for a liquefied natural
gas project. The Haisla Nation has had discussions with potential partners about
locating a liquefied natural gas facility on the site that Northern Gateway
proposes to acquire for the marine terminal. The Haisla Nation sees these lands
as appropriate for a liquefied natural gas project as such a project is not nearly
as detrimental to the environment as a diluted bitumen export project.

Northwest Coast Energy News is attempting to contact Enbridge Northern Gateway for comment on the Haisla filing. Response may be delayed by the Canada Day holiday.

Haisla Nation Response to NGP Information Request (pdf)

The Enbridge Empire Strikes Back II: The Haisla “fishing expedition”

The Kitamaat Village dock seen on June 27, 2012. Enbridge has filed questions asking the Haisla what they know about current vessel traffic on Douglas Channel. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

A series of questions filed by Enbridge Northern Gateway with the Joint Review Panel appear to be a “fishing expedition” to find out not only what the Haisla Nation feel about the Northern Gateway project but also seeks details of Haisla agreements with the various Kitimat liquified natural gas projects.

In its May filing, Enbridge asks the Haisla Nation 28 pages of questions, many of them political, and also try to find out the sources of funding the Haisla Nation is using for its participation in the Northern Gateway Joint Review process, questioning the credentials of the experts hired by the Haisla and are likely setting up the First Nation for Enbridge’s propaganda campaigns about current vessel traffic on the Douglas Channel.

( See: The Empire Strikes Back I: Enbridge takes on First Nations, small intervenors )

On May 11, Enbridge filed a series of questions with 24 intervenors and First Nations asking detailed questions not only about the technical issues raised by those groups but also their funding sources and their political actvity.

In its questions to the Haisla Nation, Enbridge asks a series of technical questions around the questions of “acceptable risk” and it appears, despite the fact Enbridge officials have listened to the Haisla official presentation at Kitamaat Village last January (and the speeches of Haisla members this week at the pubic comment hearings) that Enbridge is preparing to use a paper-based or Alberta-based concept of “acceptable risk,” as opposed to listening to the First Nation that will be most directly affected by any disaster in the Kitimat harbour or estuary.

The first questions Enbridge asks the Haisla Nation are blunt, and again, appear to contradict what Enbridge has been saying about First Nations agreeing to back the pipeline.

(a) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation opposes the approval of Northern Gateway’s Application for the Project.(b) If the Haisla Nation opposes the approval of the Application, please advise as to whether there are conditions of approval that would nonetheless address, in whole or in part, the Nation’s concerns.

(c) If so, please elaborate on the nature of any conditions that the Haisla Nation would suggest be imposed on the Project, should it be approved.

(d) Please summarize the effects that the Haisla Nation considers would be created by the Project, should it be approved and constructed. Include both positive and negative effects.

(e) Please describe the mitigation measures proposed by the Haisla Nation (if any) to reduce potentially adverse Project effects on the Haisla Nation’s rights and interests.

Another section of questions asks about the funding Haisla may or not be receiving.
The Haisla Nation has expressed the view that inadequate funding has been provided to participate in this proceeding.

Request:
(a) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation has received participant funding from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency to participate in this proceeding.
(b) Please advise as to the amount of participant funding received to date from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.
(c) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation has received significant funding from the Northern Gateway Project for the purpose of preparing traditional use studies in relation to this Project.
(d) Please advise as to the amount of funding received by the Haisla Nation from any other external sources to participate in this proceeding, or otherwise oppose the Northern Gateway Project.
(e) Is the Haisla Nation a member of the Turning Point/Great Bear Initiative?
(f) Has the Haisla Nation received funding, directly or indirectly, from the Turning Point/Great Bear Initiative for the purpose of participating in this proceeding, or otherwise opposing the Northern Gateway Project? If so, how much funding was received?
(g) Has the Haisla Nation received funding from Tides Canada or any similar organization for the purpose of participating in this proceeding or otherwise opposing the Northern Gateway Project? If so, how much funding was received and from whom?
(h)Have any members of the Kitimaat Village Council received funding from Tides Canada or similar organizations to participate in this proceeding or to otherwise oppose the Northern Gateway Project, either directly or indirectly? If so, how much funding was received and by whom? Please include funding received by the Headwaters Initiative in this response.
(i) Are there agreements or understandings in place as between coastal First Nations whereby no
coastal First Nation will oppose LNG development supported by the Haisla First Nation, and no coastal First Nation, including the Haisla First Nation, will support the Northern Gateway Project?

Enbridge then goes on a fishing expedition to find out more about their agreements with the LNG projects.

Position Regarding LNG Projects 1.5
Reference:
(i)
Kitimat LNG, News Release, “Canada, BC, Join Haisla Nation and Kitimat LNG Partners in Marking
Project Go-Ahead; ‘A Very Big Day for Our People’ Says Chief Councillor Pollard” (9 March
2011)
online: Kitimat LNG
<http://mediacenter.kitimatlngfacility.com/Mediacenter/view_press_release.as
px?PressRelease.ItemID=2807>.
(ii) Dina O’Meara, “National regulator approves BC LNG export licence Co-operative
a partnership with Haisla First Nation”, The Calgary Herald (3 February 2012) online The Calgary Herald <http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/National+regulator+approves+export+
licence/6093310/story.html>.

Preamble:
Northern Gateway would like to confirm the Haisla Nation’s position with respect to certain liquefied
natural gas (“LNG”) projects.

Request: (a) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation supports construction and operation of the Kitimat LNG Project (also known as the KM LNG Project).
(b) Please confirm that Kitimat LNG holds an export licence to ship 200 million tonnes of LNG over 20 years from the Kitimat LNG Terminal, to be located at Bish Cove, near the Port of Kitimat, BC, to Pacific Rim markets by marine vessel.

(Note since the National Energy Board approved the export licence, and that is available on the NEB site, why is Enbridge asking the Haisla and the NEB to provide information that is so readily available?)

(c)Please provide copies of all environmental assessment studies, risk assessments, TERMPOL review studies and Aboriginal Traditional Knowledge (“ATK”) studies pertaining to the Kitimat LNG Project. If such studies do not currently exist, please advise when they will be completed and provided. If confidentiality concerns exist in respect of the ATK study, please indicate whether the Haisla Nation is prepared to provide it to the Panel in confidence.
(d) Please provide copies of all agreements that the Haisla Nation has entered into with Kitimat LNG including, impact benefit agreements and lease agreements.
(e) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation supports construction and operation of the BC LNG Export Cooperative Project.
(f) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation is a joint venturer or partner with LNG Partners of Houston, in the BC LNG Export Cooperative.
(g) Please confirm that the BC LNG Export Cooperative holds an export licence to ship 36 million
tonnes of supercooled natural gas over 20 years from floating terminal off Kitimat, BC to
Pacific Rim markets by marine vessel.
(Again this information is publicly available on the NEB website, so why is Enbridge asking the question?)
(h) Please provide copies of all environmental assessment studies, risk assessments, TERMPOL review studies and ATK studies pertaining to the BC LNG Export Cooperative Project. If such studies do not currently exist, please advise when they will be completed and provided. If confidentiality concerns exist in respect of the ATK study, please indicate whether the Haisla Nation is prepared to provide it to the Panel in confidence.
Position Regarding Kitimat – Summit Lake Pipeline Looping Project
1.6 Reference: (i) BC Environmental Assessment Office, “Kitimat
–
Summit Lake Pipeline Looping Project Assessment Report With Respect to Review of the Application for an Environmental Assessment Certificate Pursuant to the Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 43” (12 May 2008) at page 7, online: BC Environmental Assessment Office
<http://a100.gov.bc.ca/appsdata/epic/documents/p270/1214599791218_8e248
a8d30d995f6590f6f694d7789f6e20e141ef52b.pdf>.

(i) states: “The Haisla Nation wrote to the EAO indicating that they support the Project receiving a Provincial EA Certificate, subject to certain conditions (which are being
met).” Reference (ii) provides a First Nations Consultation Report in respect of the Haisla Nation.
Request:
(a) Please confirm that the Haisla First Nation supports the construction and operation of the Pacific Trails Pipeline Project (also known as the Kitimat-Summit Lake Looping Project).
(b)
Please confirm that Reference (ii) accurately describes the nature and strength of claim by the Haisla First Nation in respect of those portions of the Kitimat-Summit Lake Looping Project that will traverse Haisla traditional territory.
(c) Please confirm that
(ci) Reference (ii) lists the mitigation measures proposed by the Kitimat-Summit Lake Looping Project to address construction-related impacts on Haisla First Nation traditional territory, and that such measures are acceptable to the Haisla First Nation. If any such measures are not acceptable, please identify them and advise as to modifications considered appropriate by the Haisla First Nation.

(d) Please advise as to whether similar measures would be requested by the Haisla First Nation to deal with construction-related impacts of the Northern Gateway Project.
(e) Please file a copy of the report entitled Haisla Traditional Use and Occupancy of the Proposed PNG Pipeline Corridor through the lower Kitimat River Valley cited on page 124 of Reference
(ii).] If confidentiality concerns exist in respect of the study, please indicate whether the Haisla are prepared to provide it to the Panel in confidence.

Enbridge also asks the Haisla to provide examples of how the Haisla Nation currently regulates,
or purports to regulate, vessel movements within its Traditional Territory.

(c) Please confirm that the Haisla Nation is aware of existing and proposed marine vessel activity within its Traditional Territory, including:
(i) fuel barges
(ii) cargo/container ships
(iii) commercial fishing vessels
(iv) condensate tankers
(v) liquefied natural gas tankers

On its website Northern Gateway claims

According to numbers from the Port of Kitimat, not only have vessels carrying industrial products been travelling the channels safely for some 35 years, but so too have ships carrying petroleum products—like the one featured arriving in the Port of Kitimat through the Douglas Channel in the picture above.
In fact, some 1,560 vessels carrying methanol and condensate called on Kitimat port from 1982 to 2009 – that’s over 3,100 transits of vessels dedicated to the transport of petroleum products.
When you add vessel traffic of all industrial activity into Kitimat port, the number jumps to 6,112.
To be clear…the number of ships servicing industry arriving at Kitimat port between 1978 and 2009 is 6,112. That’s 12,224 transits!

This Enbridge propaganda campaign has been quite successful in Alberta, leading to constant tweets over the past year, mostly from Albertans such as this one from

@jeffreylowes “Tanker traffic in Kitimat today” So I wonder what the problem is? #northerngateway #cdnpoli http://t.co/w38dt7KA

(Lowes’ Twitter profile describes him as Director of Government & Industrial Relations at MREP Communications A Social Conservative, Opinions are my own. RTs not necessarily endorsements.)

That page is frequently cited on Twitter, again mostly by tweeters from Alberta and Saskatchewan who have never been within 1,000 kilometres of the the BC coast as justification for the increased tanker traffic.

Haisla Nation Chief Counselor Ellis Ross testifies before the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel at Kitamaat Village, January 10, 2012 (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

Countering the Enbridge propaganda, at least in BC, but largely ignored in the rest of Canada, was the eloquence of the Haisla elders at the January 2012 hearings in Kitimat which described the destruction of the local environment by 60 years of industrial development and the testimony of Haisla Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross about the major problems caused by a relatively minor spill in Kitimat harbour.

In addition, many of those who testified at this week’s public comment hearings, noted the difference between the current vessel traffic—no supertankers or Very Large Crude Carriers have yet sailed Douglas Channel and the fears of the vast increase in tanker traffic that will happen if all the various projects including LNG and Enbridge go ahead.

Many of the remaining questions to the Haisla are highly technical responses to their questions or filings with the Joint Review Panel.

Enbridge Information request to the Haisla (pdf)

The Empire Strikes Back I: Enbridge takes on First Nations, small intervenors

Douglas Channel at the site of the proposed Enbridge marine terminal, June 27, 2012. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

Enbridge is striking back against the First Nations and intervenors who oppose the Northern Gateway pipeline and marine terminal projects by filing questions that those groups must answer as part of the Joint Review Process.

On May 11, 2012, Enbridge filed questions with 24 organizations, and from the questions, it appears that Enbridge isn’t just building a strictly legal case in their favour but are preparing to try and discredit opponents.

Enbridge’s questions are part of the legal process. For months, First Nations and intervenors have been filing a whole series of questions asking for clarification of items in the Enbridge’s filings on the project with Joint Review Process and Enbridge has the legal right to ask the First Nations and intervenors to clarify their positions.

However, the difference is that Enbridge is a giant corporation which can afford to spend millions of dollars on both the approval process as well as the current nationwide advertising process, while some of the intervenors are made up of volunteers or retirees working on their own time. Sources among the intervenors have been saying for months that they believe that Enbridge is following a perceived policy of working to wear down the opponents so much they burn out and drop out of the process.

A large proportion of the questions Enbridge is demanding that First Nations and intervenors answer are overtly political, rather than technical responses to their filings.

In an apparent escalation of its campaign against its opponents, Enbridge is using the Joint Review process to ask intervenors about funding, naming such hot button organizations such as Tides Canada, which is under attack by the Harper government. Enbridge is also questioning the “academic credentials” of numerous intervenors and commenters, even though the Joint Review Panel has spent most of the past seven months asking people to comment based on “local knowledge,” leaving the technical questions to the documents filed with the JRP

Some key questions directed at both the Haisla and Wet’suwet’en First Nations seem to indicate that Enbridge is preparing to build both a legal and probably a public relations case questioning the general, but not unanimous support for liquified natural gas projects in northwestern BC, by saying “Why not Northern Gateway,” as seen in this question to the Haisla Nation.

Please advise as to whether similar measures would be requested by the Haisla First Nation to deal with construction-related impacts of the Northern Gateway Project.

Black Swan

A series of questions to the coalition known as the Coastal First Nations questions the often heard assertion that an oil spill on the BC coast is “inevitable,” and Enbridge appears to be prepared to argue that spills are not inevitable. Enbridge asks Coastal First Nations about a study that compared the bitumen that could be shipped along the coast with the proposed LNG projects.

Please provide all environmental and risk assessment studies, including studies of “Black Swan” events, conducted by the Coastal First Nations or any of its members in respect of the LNG projects referred to.

Enbridge is referring to Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s now widely known “theory of high-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare events that are beyond the realm of normal expectations in history, science, finance and technology.”

It is Black Swan events that most of the people of the northwest coast fear when it comes to all the major energy projects, but if as Taleb says they are hard-to-predict and rare, how can the studies Enbridge is requesting actually predict those disasters?

Enbridge’s questions to the Haisla Nation runs for 28 pages and many of those questions are political, not technical, including asking for details of the Haisla support for the various Kitimat liquified natural gas projects and who may be funding the Haisla participation in the Joint Review Process. Many technical questions around the questions of “acceptable risk” and it appears, despite the fact Enbridge officials have listened to the Haisla official presentation at Kitamaat Village last January and the speeches of Haisla members this week at the pubic comment hearings, that Enbridge is preparing to use a paper-based or Alberta-based concept of acceptable risk as opposed to listening to the First Nation that will be most directly affected by any disaster in the Kitimat harbour or estuary.

(See The Enbridge Empire Strikes Back II The Haisla “fishing expedition”)

A series of questions seems to negate Enbridge’s claim that it has the support of many First Nations along the pipeline route because Enbridge is asking for details of agreements that First Nations have reached with the Pacific Trails Pipeline. Enbridge has consistently refused to release a list of the First Nations it claims has agreements with the company, but in the questions filed with the JRP, Enbridge is asking for details of agreements First Nations in northern BC have reached with the Pacific Trails Pipeline.

Funding demands

For example, while Enbridge is refusing to name all the backers of the pipeline for reasons of corporate confidentiality, the company is asking who may be funding the Wet’suwet’en First Nation in its appearances before the Joint Review Panel, including the US-based foundations named by right-wing blogger Vivian Krause, (note Krause recently declared victory and suspended her blog) right-wing columnists and the Harper cabinet:

Please confirm that the Office of the Wet’suwet’en has received participant funding from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency to participate in the Joint Review Panel (“JRP”) proceeding.

Please advise as to the amount of participant funding received to date from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.

Please advise whether or not the Office of the Wet’suwet’en has received funding within the
last 5 years from Tides Canada, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, or any other similar foundations, to oppose the Northern Gateway Project or to oppose oil sands projects in general.

If so, please provide the amount of funding received from each foundation.

In the case of the Raincoast Conservation Foundation, Enbridge is asking for details, including a membership list.

Please provide a description of the Raincoast Conservation Foundation.

Does the Raincoast Conservation Foundation prepare Annual Reports? If so, please provide the most recently published Annual report available.

If the Raincoast Conservation Foundation is a collection of like-minded individuals, please list its members.

Did the Raincoast Conservation Foundation apply for and receive participant funding in this proceeding? If so, how much was received?

While many of Enbridge’s question to the RainCoast Foundation are technical, the company which is currently conducting a multi-million dollar public relations campaign in favour of the pipeline, asks:

Please confirm that the “What’s at Stake? study” was prepared for use as a public relations tool, to advocate against approval of the Northern Gateway.

Enbridge also appears to be gearing up for personal attacks on two of the most vocal members of Kitimat’s Douglas Channel Watch, Murray Minchin and Cheryl Brown, who have been appearing regularly before District of Kitimat council to oppose the Northern Gateway pipeline.

Credentials

On Murray Minchin, Enbridge asks:

Written Evidence Regarding Proposed Liquid Petroleum Pipelines from the proposed Nimbus Mountain West Portal to the Kitimat River Estuary submitted by Murray Minchin of Douglas Channel Watch…. Supplemental Written Evidence Photographic Evidence Regarding Proposed Liquid Petroleum Pipelines from Nimbus Mountain to the Kitimat River Estuary submitted by Murray Minchin of Douglas Channel Watch….

Mr. Minchin provides extensive opinion relative to geotechnical and other technical matters. Request: Please provide Mr. Minchin’s curriculum vitae which includes his education, training and employment history, to demonstrate his qualifications to provide geotechnical and other technical opinions that appear….

Minchin is one of Enbridge’s strongest opponents in Kitimat and in his various appearances (the latest at the anti-Enbridge demonstration in Kitimat on Sunday, June 24, 2012, Minchin has told the audiences that he is self-taught and has spent much of his spare time over the past few years studying the documents Enbridge has filed with the JRP.

As for Cheryl Brown, a vocal critic of the Enbridge Community Advisory Board process, Enbridge has filed a long series of questions about her involvement with the CAB, including asking how many meetings she has attended (see document below)

Two of Enbridge’s questions about Brown stand out

Has Ms. Brown offered a suggestion for a speaker that would have provided a differing viewpoint from those of Northern Gateway?

Many people in Kitimat, not just the outspoken members of Douglas Channel Watch, say they do not trust the Community Advisory Board process. When the CAB held a meeting recently to discuss marine safety, a meeting that was heavily advertised in Kitimat Terrace area, the CAB facilitators ( from a Vancouver -based company) attempted to bar the media, including this reporter, from this “public” meeting, until apparently overruled by Enbridge’s own pubic relations staff. On the other hand, everytime Douglas Channel Watch has appeared before the District of Kitimat Council to request a public forum on Gateway issues, DCW has always insisted that Enbridge be invited to any forum, along with DCW and independent third parties.

Ms. Brown states that Enbridge has not addressed the hard questions. Please confirm that Northern Gateway responded to questions put forth by the Douglas Channel Watch in Letters to the Editor in both the Kitimat Northern Sentinel and Terrace Standard in August of 2009.

Here Enbridge appears to be basing its case on one letter to the editor that appeared in local papers three years ago. During the public comment hearings that the JRP held at Kitamaat Village earlier this week, numerous people testified time and time again that Enbridge was failing to answer major questions about the pipeline and terminal, by saying that those questions would be answered later, once the project is approved.

Bird watching

In one series of questions, Enbridge is demanding a professional level database from the Kitimat Valley Naturalists, the local birdwatching group. Quoting a submission by the naturalists group, Enbridge asks

Paragraph 2.2, indicates that the Kitimat Valley Naturalists has birding records for the estuary for over 40 years and that Kitimat Valley Naturalists visits the estuary at least 100 times per year.

Paragraph 2.3 indicates the Kitimat Valley Naturalists have local expertise in birds of the Kitimat River estuary as well as other plants and animals that utilize those habitats.

Request: To contribute to baseline information for the Kitimat River estuary and facilitate a detailed and comprehensive environmental monitoring strategy, please provide the long term database of marine birds in and adjacent to the Kitimat River estuary, with a focus on data collected by the Kitimat Valley Naturalists in recent years, and where possible, the methodology or survey design, dates, weather and assumptions for the data collection.

Today the Kitimat Valley Naturalists, three local retirees, Walter Thorne, Dennis Horwood and April Macleod filed this response with the JRP:

Northern Gateway has specifically requested the long-term database of birds occurring over many years within the Kitimat River Estuary. The data we have collected includes monthly British Columbia Coastal Water Survey (BC CWS) and yearly Christmas Bird Counts (CBC). The data from
these bird counts are available on the web or in print form.

For access to BC CWS enter http://www.bsc-eoc.org

For access to CBC data, enter http://birds.audubon.org

Historical results for CBC counts have also been published by the journal American Birds. The earliest CBC count for Kitimat was 1974.

In regard to the long-term database, we have significant numbers of records for the foreshore of the Kitimat River Estuary. The number increases when the larger estuary perimeter is considered. These cover a 40-year period with the majority in the last 20 years. We would be willing to provide this information in a meaningful format.

The Kitimat Valley Naturalists, however, lack the expertise or financial ability to convert the data into a format that would address Northern Gateway’s interest in methodology, survey design, dates, weather, and assumptions for data collection.

Alternatively, we do have access to a consulting firm, which is willing to analyze our data and convert it to a useable and practical design. We assume, since this is a considerable undertaking in both time and cost, that Northern Gateway would be willing to cover the associated fees.

We look forward to hearing back from Northern Gateway and pursuing this with a budget proposal.

Northwest Coast Energy News consulted data management experts who estimated that complying with the Enbridge request would likely cost between $100,000 and $150,000.

First Nations

Some Wet’suwet’en houses have opposed the Pacific Trails Pipeline, and while negotiations with Apache Corporation are continuing, Enbridge is asking the First Nation for details of what is happening with that pipeline.

Is it the position of the Office of the Wet’suwet’en that each First Nation whose traditional territory is traversed by the proposed pipeline has a veto on whether it is approved or refused?

Please confirm that the Office of the Wet’suwet’en opposed approval of the Pacific Trails Pipeline (also known as the Kitimat Summit Lake Looping Project).

Does the Office of the Wet’suwet’en continue to oppose construction of the Pacific Trails Pipeline?

Have the First Nations who are proposing to participate as equity owners in the Pacific Trails Pipeline Project advised the Office of the Wet’suwet’en that they accept that the Office of the Wet’suwet’en has a right to veto approval and construction of that Project?

Please confirm that the First Nations holding an equity ownership position or entitlement in the Pacific Trails Pipeline Project (also known as the Kitimat-Summit Lake Looping Project) include:
• Haisla First Nation
•Kitselas First Nation
•Lax Kw’alaams Band
•Lheidli T’enneh Band
•McLeod Lake Indian Band
•Metlakatla First Nation
•Nadleh Whut’en First Nation
•Nak’azdli Band
•Nee Tahi Buhn Band
•Saik’uz First Nation
•Skin Tyee First Nation
•Stellat’en First Nation
•Ts’il Kaz Koh First Nation
•West Moberly First Nation
•Wet’suwet’en First Nation

The majority of questions filed with the Coast First Nations are technical challenges to studies filed by the coalition. Enbridge also filed questions with the Gitga’at, Gitxaala, Heiltsuk Nations and the Metis Nation of Alberta.

(Disclosure: The author, who is also a photographer, sometimes accompanies members of the Kitimat Valley Naturalists to photograph birds during the time they are doing the counts)

Enbridge Cover letter to JRP Information Requests to Intervenors (pdf)

Information Request Coastal First Nations (pdf)

Information Request Haisla (pdf)

Information Request Douglas Channel Watch (pdf)

Information Request Living Oceans Society (pdf)

Information Request Raincoast Conservation (pdf)

Information Request Wet’suwet’en (pdf)

Information Request Kitimat Valley Naturalists (pdf)

Kitimat Valley Naturalists response to Enbridge (pdf)