A map provided by LNG Canada shows the potential footprint of the liquifaction facility and marine terminal next to the Rio Tinto Alcan aluminum smelter. The map was part of LNG Canada’s filing for a BC environmental assessment and shows that the old Eurocan dock would be part of the facility.(LNG Canada)
Rio Tinto has signed an option agreement with the LNG Canada project “to acquire or lease a wharf and associated land at its port facility” in Kitimat.
Since LNG Canada, a joint venture of Shell Canada Energy, Phoenix Energy Holdings Limited (an affiliate of Petro-China Investment (Hong Kong) Limited), Kogas Canada LNG Ltd. (an affiliate of Korea Gas Corporation) and Diamond LNG Canada Ltd. (an affiliate of Mitsubishi Corporation) has not yet made a Final Investment Decision on the project, the option will likely be triggered if that decision is made. There is currently uncertainty about Royal Dutch Shell projects worldwide due to management restructuring at the parent company.
The news release quotes Sam Walsh, chief executive, Rio Tinto as saying: “This is an excellent example of how we can generate meaningful value from our existing assets by selling options on port facilities to LNG Canada enabling it to share one of the best deep water ports on the western seaboard of the country. This innovative approach will provide an expanded gateway for Canadian resources to worldwide markets which has the potential to benefit the communities and economy of British Columbia.”
Andy Calitz, vice president, LNG Canada commented in the news release: “We are pleased to confirm the finalization of this agreement. We believe the LNG Canada project represents the best opportunity to bring the liquefied natural gas industry and its benefits to the people and
communities of British Columbia.”
The deal between Rio Tinto, parent company of Rio Tinto Alcan, for the old Eurocan dock, has been in the works for some time. When LNG Canada filed for its environmental assessment with the province of British Columbia a few weeks ago, the map showed the footprint of the project extended from the old Methanex plant site, where LNG Canada will be located through RTA lands on the Kitimat river estuary to the dock, long before Wednesday’s deal was signed.
The federal government’s main consultation with First Nations on the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel report is limited to just three simple questions that had to be answered within 45 days, according to documents seen by Northwest Coast Energy News.
Cover of Volume 1 of the Joint Review Panel ruling on Northern Gateway
That despite the fact that the first volume of the JRP report “Connections” is 76 pages and the second volume “Considerations” is 418 pages including the 209 recommendations and appendices and came after two years of hearings and tens of thousands of pages of evidence.
On Dec. 6 and again on Dec. 16, 2013, just prior to the release of the Joint Review Panel report, Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project wrote to the First Nations potentially affected by Northern Gateway, saying their response had to be filed within 45 days of the release of the JRP. Since the report was released on December 19, 2013, that made the initial deadline January 31, 2014.
The letter also told the First Nations that if they wanted their positions included in the “Crown Consultation Report” that would be part of the package on Northern Gateway presented to the federal cabinet, that position had to be limited to just two to three pages “given the number of groups involved” with a final deadline of April 16, 2014.
Maracle’s letters used the term Phase IV to define the post JRP consultations, implying there were three earlier stages of consultation, something many First Nations have disputed, especially since the Harper government had earlier maintained that the JRP itself was the constitutionally mandated consultation.
The cabinet has until June 19, 2014, 180 days after the release of the report to approve the issuing of the federal permits for the Northern Gateway project. Consultation with First Nations on projects such as the Northern Gateway is required by the Constitution and has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The three questions outlined in the letter were:
Does the Report appropriately character the concerns you raised during the JRP process?
Do the recommendations and conditions in the Panel Report address some/all of your concerns?
Are there any “outstanding” concerns that are not addressed in the Panel Report? If so, do you have recommendations (i.e proposed accommodation measures) how to address them?
Consultation on implementation
The third question appears to confirm what most political observers have said, approval of the Northern Gateway by the Harper cabinet is a a forgone conclusion, since Maracle speaks of “accommodation measures.” When the JRP approved the Northern Gateway project, the panel said that Enbridge’s proposed “mitigation” measures in case of a spill were adequate, something environmental groups and First Nations are now disputing in court.
It appears from the correspondence seen by Northwest Coast Energy News, that the federal government will only consider further specific consultations with First Nations after the approval of the Northern Gateway and only then on the implementation and construction process, rather than consulting on the project as a whole.
The Haisla have filed a document in response to the JRP that notes that
The Haisla Nation needs to understand Canada’s views of the role that future federal decisions might play for the proposed project. In its December 12, 2013 to Mr. Maracle, the Haisla Nation asked the federal government to provide a comprehensive list of the regulatory permits which would be issued the the federal government decision-makers in Haisla Nation Territory in the event the proposed project is approved and describe the consultation process that would occur prior to decisions being on those regulatory permits, within 45 days of the issuance of the JRP Report.
Mr. Maracle’s January 29, 2014 [reply] suggests that the only future federal decisions on the proposed project which may entail consultation are specific watercourse crossing and fish habitat destruction permits issued by Fisheries and Oceans Canada.
Whole-of-government
One of the problems reaching back to long before the Joint Review Panel hearings began is that the Harper government policy was what they called a “whole-of-government” approach in its consultations with First Nations, saying: “The Crown is open to discussing how consultation with the framework provided will be carried out.”
In their repose, the Haisla say the federal government never defined how the “whole-of-government” approach to First Nations was going to work and noted:
What Canada should have realized is that it has a very real obligation to consult with the Haisla Nation at the deepest end of the consultation spectrum that cannot be pigeon-holed into a one size fits all approach.
Further, the term whole-of-government is misleading, as this approach actually prohibits the majority of government from engaging in consultation.
The Haisla then say: “Documents we have obtained under an Access to Information Request clearly indicate individual departments were asked not to communicate directly with the Haisla Nation.”
The response goes on to say:
Further questions at federal government witnesses during the JRP process confirmed that federal departments had not met with the Haisla Nation since the commencement of the JRP process. While these witnesses were reluctant to confirm that they had been prohibited from meeting with us, they repeatedly referred to the “whole-of-government” approach to consultation as their reason for not meeting.
Canada’s “whole-of-government” approach clearly limited engagement to a strict process with no opportunity for real engagement.
Earliest stages
The Haisla are telling the Harper government:
It is clear that the Haisla Nation that we are the very earliest stages of consultation with Canada about the proposed project….It is clear to the Haisla Nation that the 45-day period within which Canada has unilaterally determined face-to-face meetings with all the Aboriginal groups potentially affected by the proposed project will occur is not an adequate amount of time to complete a meaningful consultation process.
The Haisla Nation are calling on the federal cabinet to postpone its decision on the Northern Gateway project to allow time for adequate consultations with First Nations, according to the Haisla response to the Joint Review Panel, seen by Northwest Coast Energy News.
The Joint Review Panel report and recommendations were released on Dec. 19, 2013 and the cabinet has 180 days from that point to recommend approval of the project.
The Haisla argue that Section 54 of the National Energy Board act allows the Governor-in-Council, the federal cabinet, to extend the timeline if it wants to, if recommended by the Minister of Natural Resources.
So far, the Harper government has refused to extend the deadline. The Haisla response document says Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross spoke to Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver on the telephone requesting the extension, but, according to the document, all Oliver did was point to the legislation that calls for the 180 day response to a joint review report.
The Haisla response document also has a long lists of what the Haisla say are flaws in the Joint Review Panel report.
Consultations
In correspondence with the Haisla, Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project, says:
the process set out by the Government of Canada in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework was finalized after receiving and carefully considering input from Aboriginal groups….The Government of Canada believes the process outlined in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework provides for a deep level of meaningful consultation with Aboriginal groups with Phase IV being the final step prior to a decision being made on the Project.
The Haisla dispute there has been any “deep level of meaningful consultation,” citing in the document a long list of attempts to engage the federal government with little or no response.
In their response, the Haisla Nation Council says:
Canada, has, to date, refused to engage in meaningful consultations with the Haisla Nation. Instead Canada has unilaterally imposed what it calls a “deep level meaningful consultation” process which is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons…
The document lists attempts by the Haisla to engage with ministers and government departments including requests for a meeting with then Environment Minister Peter Kent, prior to the opening of the JRP formal hearings in Kitamaat Village in January 2012. Although the Haisla requested a meeting with Kent, several times in 2011, no meeting ever occurred. It was not until April 19, 2012, four months later that Kent replied to the Haisla saying he had asked the President of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency to meet with the First Nation prior to the start of the JRP hearings. However, it was apparently impossible to schedule such a meeting in December, 2011.
To which the Haisla reply:
For over six years, Canada ignored Haisla Nations requests for meetings. Once the JRP’s oral hearings process commenced, Canada further closed the door on any opportunity for a meeting until the JRP Report was release. This refusal to consult was baseless. The ongoing JRP process was not a rational or justifiable basis for Canada’s refusal to consult…
Canada has yet to meet with the Haisla Nation to discuss the proposed project, other than to tell the Haisla Nation it is only engaging through the JRP process for now. This is not consultation. It is, perhaps, at best an initial step towards a consultation process.
Ignoring the Eyford report
Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver (front far right) answers questions after his news conference at the Northwest Community College Long House, March 19, 2013. Douglas Eyford is standing behind Oliver. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)
In March 2013, Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver flew to Terrace for a photo op to announce the appointment of Douglas Eyford to consult First Nations on the Northern Gateway project. Oliver then flew back to Ottawa without meeting anyone in the region. Eyford’s report Forging Partnership Build Relationship was released in November, 2013.
The Haisla say:
Mr. Eyford’s Report recommended that Canada should consider undertaking early engagement to address Aboriginal interests that may not be dealt within a regulatory process. The Haisla Nation has been seeking such early engagement from Canada since the proposed project was first announced.
Mr. Eyford’s Report also recommended that Canada should engage and conduct consultations n addition to those in regulatory processes, as may be required, to address issues and facilitate resolutions in exceptional circumstances. The Haisla Nation also asked for this, identifying early that this proposed project was an exceptional circumstance due to the significant potential impacts on the Haisla Nation.
The Haisla Nation Council response was sent to Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project. The Haisla also sent copies of the response to Joe Oliver, the Minister of Natural Resources, Gaetan Caron, Chair of the National Energy Board, Leon Aqlukkaq, Minister of the Environment, Bernard Valcourt Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Gail Shea, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, BC Premier Christy Clark, Steve Thomson, BC Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources and Mary Polak, BC Minister of the Environment.
The Haisla Nation response to the federal government’s request for consultation on the Joint Review Panel report on the Northern Gateway lists what the First Nation sees as flaws in the panel’s assessment of the project. (The Haisla filed their first list of flaws in the JRP in a court challenge).
In the response, seen by Northwest Coast Energy News, the Haisla are objecting to both the government’s and the JRP’s attitude toward the idea of consultation as well as some of the specific findings by the panel. The Haisla also fault the JRP process for refusing to take into consideration reports and studies that were released after the evidentiary deadlines.
Overall, the Haisla say
The JRP report is written in a way that prevents an assessment of how or whether the JRP considered Haisla Nation concerns and of how whether the JRP purports to address the Haisla Nation’s concerns. Further the JRP Report is lacking n some of the fundamental justification required to understand how arrived at its recommendations.
So what are the Haisla concerns?
In the document filed with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, the Haisla say:
The proposed project carries with it an inordinate amount of risk to Haisla Nation Territory. The Haisla Nation is being asked to play host to this proposed project, despite the risk the proposed project poses to the land waters and resources relied on by the Haisla Nation for sustenance and cultural heritage. The risk includes a huge risk to Haisla Nation aboriginal rights to trap, hunt and fish, to gather seafood and gather plant materials. It could result in significant damage to the Haisla Nation cultural heritage—its traditional way of life…..
The terminal site is one of the few areas suitable for terminal development in our territory. It is also home to over 800 Haisla Nation Culturally Modified Trees (CMTs). Northern Gateway proposes to irrevocably alter the land, the use of the land and access to this land for the duration of the proposed project, which is anticipated to be at least 80 years. This irrevocable alteration includes the felling of our CMTS….
By seeking to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for the proposed project, Northern Gateway will be effectively expropriating the economic value of this land. Northern Gateway is proposing to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for a project with no benefit to the Haisla Nation and which is fundamentally at odds with Haisla Nation stewardship principles.
Obstructed clear understanding
The Haisla say that “Canada has failed to adhere is own framework” for the JRP because in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework says “Federal departments will be active participants in the JRP process to ensure the environmental assessment and consultation record, is as accurate and complete as possible.”
The Haisla say “Canada provided limited written evidence to the JRP” and goes on to say that the “federal governments not only failed to provide relevant information but also obstructed a clear understanding of project impacts.”
Among the evidence relevant to Northern Gateway that the federal government was “unable or unwilling to provide” includes:
Natural Resources had expertise on acid rock damage and metal leaching but did not include evidence on that in their evidence
Fisheries and Oceans did not have a mandate to conduct an assessment of the potential toxicological effects of an oil spill.
Environment Canada did not review or provide information on the spills from pipelines.
The federal government witnesses were unable to answer questions about the toxicity of dispersant.
Environment Canada was asked if it had studies of the subsurface currents and the movement of submerged oil. Environment Canada told the JRP did not measure hydrodynamic data but relies on DFO. DFO cold not provide any witnesses to the JRP with expertise on subsurface currents.
In the formal response on the JRP report, Haisla also say:
The JRP has concluded that the risk of a large spill form the pipeline in the Kitimat River Valley is not likely, despite very significant information gaps relating to geohazards, leak detection and spill response.
The JRP has concluded that a large spill would result in significant adverse environmental effects. However, the JRP appears to base a finding that these effects are unlikely to occur on an unreasonable assumptions about how widespread the effects could be or how long they would last. The JRP has not considered the extent to which a localized effect could impact Haisla Nation.
The JRP relies on the concept of “natural recovery” as mitigation of significant adverse effects. The Haisla Nation asked the JRP to compel information from Northern Gateway about the applicability of its evidence to species found in Haisla National Territory. The JRP, however, refused to compel this evidence from Northern Gateway.
The JRP has accepted at face value that Northern Gateway would shut down its pipeline within 13 minutes in the event of a rupture and has failed to consider the effects of a large spill that is not detected with this timeframe through the control centre (or was in the case of Kalamazoo, is detected by the control centre but is systematically mischaracterized and ignored).
As part of the consultation process the Haisla want 22 changes to the JRP report, changes which echo the Haisla Final Written Argument that was filed at the end of the hearings.
It says:
The Panel should find that potential impacts to asserted Haisla Nation aboriginal rights and title from the proposed project are such that project cannot be found to be in the public interest in the absence of meaningful consultation… The current status of engagement and the federal government imposition of a 6-month time limit to complete consultation raise serious concerns that meaningful consultation will not be possible. Therefore the proposed project is not in the public interest.
Among the others are:
The JRP should have determined the significant of adverse effects to rare ecological communities that cannot mitigated.
The JRP should have provided more information to allow a reasonable assessment of the risk of a spill from the pipelines.
The JRP would have considered all factors to contribute to the risk of a spill.
The JRP should have found that Northern Gateway’s assessment of the toxicity of an oil spill because it did not consider the full range of products to be shipped nor did it consider the potential pathways of the effect of a toxic spill, whether from a pipeline, at the marine terminal or in the case of a tanker spill
The evidence had not demonstrated that Northern Gateway’s spill response would be able to mitigate the effects of a spill either at the pipeline, at the Kitimat marine terminal or from a tanker spill.
The JRP did not consider the impact of the Kitimat Marine Terminal on their cultural and archaeological heritage, including culturally modified trees.
Members of the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel, left to right, Kenneth Bateman, chair Sheila Leggett and Hans Matthews make notes at the June 25, 2012 hearings at the Haisla Recreation Centre, Kitamaat Village. A map of Douglas Channel can be seen behind the panel. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)
The Haisla Nation in their response to the Crown on the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel details four studies, three Canadian and one American that were released after the Joint Review evidentiary deadline had passed, evidence that the Haisla say should be considered in any consideration of the Northern Gateway pipeline, terminal and tanker project. (The American report from the National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration was released after the JRP final report)
JRP chair Sheila Leggett’s constant citing of rules of procedure and her stubborn refusal to consider new evidence and studies in a dynamic situation that was changing rapidly was one of the reasons that many people in the northwest said the JRP had lost credibility.
The Haisla say: “It is incumbent upon Canada to consider and discuss the information in these reports as part of a meaningful consultation process…” and then lists “key findings” that have potential impacts on aboriginal rights and title:
The West Coast Spill response for the government of British Columbia which found:
Most oil spilled into the marine environment cannot be cleaned up
There is a disconnect between planning and actual repose capability
Canada’s spill response is “far from world class.”
The Transport Canada Ship Oil Spill Preparedness and Response study:
Douglas Channel will go from low risk to high risk for pills if the project goes ahead
The study recommends preparation for a “true worst case discharge” rather than “the credible worst case discharge” as proposed by Northern Gateway
Canada needed a much more rigorous regulatory regime covering tankers.
The joint federal government technical report on the properties of bitumen from the Canadian Oil Sands:
There are uncertainties on how diluted bitumen would behave in a marine environment.
Northern Gateway did not provide adequate information about sediment levels to allow for proper study of interaction with diluted bitumen
Dispersant may not be effective.
Weathered diluted bitumen would “reach densities at which it will sink freshwater without mechanical or physical assistance.”
The US National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration report on Transporting Alberta Oil sands:
Diluted bitumen has “significant differences from conventional crudes.’ (The JRP used conventional crude as a benchmark in its findings)
The physical properties of diluted bitumen “fluctuate based on a number of factors.
Pipeline operators may not have detailed information related to products in the pipeline at the time of a spill
There is a lack of experimental data on the weathering behaviour of oil sands product which limits the ability of spill response organizations “to understand and predict the behaviour and fate of oil sands products in freshwater, estuarine and saltwater environments.”
An Orca off Vancouver Island (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)
The worldwide population of Orcas probably crashed during the last Ice Age, creating a “bottleneck” in the genetic diversity of the species around the world, a problem that could continue to affect killer whales today, according to a new genetic study published on February 4,2014.
Rus Hoelzel from the School of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, at Durham University, in the UK and colleagues used DNA sequencing from archive material from earlier studies, or from museum specimens to track the evolution of the Orcas.
One group of Orcas that lives off South Africa are an exception, with greater genetic diversity than others, the new study has revealed.
“Killer whales have a broad world-wide distribution, rivaling that of humans. At the same time, they have very low levels of genetic diversity,” Hoelzel said.
“Our data suggest that a severe reduction in population size during the coldest period of the last ice age could help explain this low diversity, and that it could have been an event affecting populations around the world.
The Orca population along the Northwest Pacific Coast has the same low genetic diversity as in other areas, the study showed.
The killer whale is as a top predator, feeding on everything from seals to sharks. That means from the top of the food chain, the Orca also serves as a sentinel species for past and future ocean ecosystems and environmental change.
In the study published in the journal Molecular Biology and Evolution, Hoelzel and his colleagues assembled 2.23 gigabytes of Northern Hemisphere killer whale genomic data and mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from 616 samples worldwide.
The scientists concluded that killer whales were stable in population size during most of the Pleistocene (2.5 million – 11,000 years ago) followed by a rapid decline and bottleneck during the last great period of the Ice Age (110,000-12,000 years ago).
“Our data supports the idea of a population bottleneck affecting killer whales over a wide geographic range and leading to the loss of diversity,” Hoelzel said. “The South African population stands out as an exception, which may be due to local conditions that were productive and stable over the last million years or so.”
They are pointing to the “Benguela upwelling” ocean system which delivers nutrient rich cold water to the oceans off South Africa. The Benguela system remained stable despite the last glacial period and the nutrient rich water would have been able to sustain the supplies of fish and dolphins that killer whales in this part of the world feed on.
The scientists believe that other major upwelling systems around the world – the California current off North America; Humboldt off South America; and the Canary current off the coast of North Africa – were either disrupted or collapsed altogether during the last glacial or Pleistocene periods. This could potentially have reduced the food supply to killer whales in these areas, leading to the fall in their numbers.
While it was likely that other factors affecting killer whale populations were “overlapping and complex”, the scientists ruled out hunting as an effect on the bottleneck in populations. Hunting by early man could not have happened on a sufficient enough scale to promote the global decline in killer whale numbers.
In an e-mail to Northwest Coast Energy News, Hoelzel said that the team sequenced the DNA from a male killer whale from the Southeast Alaska resident community. “This genome revealed the same pattern of historical population dynamics as we found for a whale from the North Atlantic, suggesting shared history across a very broad geographic range, and a shared population bottleneck around the time of the last glacial maximum,” Hoelzel said.
The scientists say looking at the genetic diversity of the ocean’s other top predators, such as sharks, might potentially suggest a negative impact on their numbers too during the Ice Age.
Tomorrow’s clean water depends on nine guiding principles, says UBC Forestry Prof. John Richardson. (Martin Dee/UBC)
A group of biologists from across Canada have proposed a nine step program to sustain healthy waterways and fisheries not only in this country but around the world.
The key to clean waterways and sustainable fisheries is for the management plan to follow nine guiding principles of ecological water management, according to John Richardson, a professor in the Dept. of Forest and Conservation Sciences at the University of British Columbia, one of 15 freshwater biologists who created the framework to help protect fish and ecosystems into the future.
Fish habitats need waterways that are rich in food with places to hide from predators and lay eggs, according to the framework published on January 31 in the journal Environmental Reviews.
“Fish are strongly impacted when nutrients, sediments or pollutants are added to their habitat. We cannot protect fish without maintaining a healthy freshwater ecosystem,” Richardson,who led the policy section on protecting fish habitats, said in a UBC news release. Other policy sections addressed areas such as climate change and biodiversity.
Humans have put key waterways at risk because of land development and the loss of the vegetation along rivers and streams, Richardson said, adding connecting waterways are also critical for healthy ecosystems. “If fish can’t get to breeding or rearing areas because of dams, culverts, water intakes or other changes to their habitats, then the population will not survive,” he said.
With more pressure on Canada’s waterways, Richardson and his colleagues wanted to create a framework of evidence-based principles that managers, policy makers and others could easily use in their work. “It’s a made in Canada solution, but the principles could be applied anywhere in the world,” he said.
The paper says:
Freshwater ecosystems are among the most imperiled on Earth with extinction rates of freshwater fauna higher than for many other ecosystems and vastly exceeding historic background rates/ Freshwater is vital to humans, and clean water is rapidly becoming a limiting resource for many societies. The greatest threat to freshwater ecosystems is the loss or alteration of freshwater habitats through human development yet our societies and economy depend directly on the services provided by healthy freshwater ecosystems.
It also notes:
Most ecosystem services of fishes are supported by a diverse fauna, not by merely the few species directly favoured by humans. Humans live side-by-side with fishes and other aquatic organisms in watersheds, and we derive our quality of life from the health of these ecosystems.
The paper, which was supported in part by federal government financing, only touches on the controversy over the gutting of the environmental protection for Canadian waterways by the Harper government. It goes on to stay that the protests are not enough and more is needed:
Recent changes to Canadian fisheries policies have motivated responses by the public and the scientific community yet a broad contemporary scientific assessment of what is required to manage freshwater fisheries resources is lacking. A template of the core ecological concepts underlying sound fisheries policies, based on the best available science will support policy and management decisions and the design of monitoring programs to evaluate the success of these actions.
With more pressure on Canada’s freshwater ecosystems, Richardson and his colleagues wanted to create a framework of evidence-based principles that managers, policy makers and others could easily use in their work. “It’s a made in Canada solution, but the principles could be applied anywhere in the world,” he says.
Healthy freshwater ecosystems are shrinking and reports suggest that the animals that depend on them are becoming endangered or extinct at higher rates than marine or terrestrial species, says Richardson. Humans also depend on these ecosystems for basic resources like clean drinking water and food as well as economic activity from the natural resource sector, tourism and more.
The components of a successful management plan include:
Protect and restore habitats for fisheries
Protect biodiversity as it enhances resilience and productivity
Identify threats to ecosystem productivity
Identify all contributions made by aquatic ecosystems
Implement ecosystem based-management of natural resources while acknowledging the impact of humans
Adopt a precautionary approach to management as we face uncertainty
Embrace adaptive management – environments continue to change so research needs to be ongoing for scientific evidence-based decision making
Define metrics that will indicate whether management plans are successful or failing
Engage and consult with stakeholders
Ensure that decision-makers have the capacity, legislation and authority to implement policies and management plans.
These recommendations are based on nine principles of ecology:
Acknowledge the physical and chemical limits of an ecosystem
Population dynamics are at work and there needs to be a minimum number of fish for the population to survive
Habitat quantity and quality are needed for fish productivity
Connecting habitats is essential for movement of fish and their resources
The success of freshwater species is influenced by the watershed
Biodiversity enhances ecosystem resilience and productivity
Global climate change affects local populations of fish
Human impacts to the habitat affect future generations of fish
Rio Tinto Alcan and the Kitimat Modernization Project (KMP) are chartering a converted Baltic ferry to expand the modernization project’s work lodging for nine months, as the company gears up for “the final construction year,” RTA said Tuesday in a news release.
The ship, the Motor Vessel Silja Festival, will be renamed the “Delta Spirit Lodge” in honour of the first ship used for worker accommodation in the early days of the Kitimat project, the Delta King.
M/V Silja Festival
RTA says the ship left Estonia on Monday and is expected to arrive in Kitimat near the end of February. The ship “will have a service staff of approximately 110 and will offer first rate amenities including 500 bedrooms, kitchen, dining and lounge facilities.” The “Delta Spirit Lodge” will dock at RTA’s “Terminal B,” the former Eurocan wharf for the duration of the contract.
The charter agreement was made in cooperation with Transport Canada and Bridgemans Haisla LP to provide the accommodation services. RTA spokesperson Colleen Nyce said in the release, “With the decision to secure a very large accommodation ship, Rio Tinto Alcan has taken another responsible action to ensure that the temporary workforce associated with the Kitimat Modernization Project causes minimal burden on its host community.”
The 34,414 gross tonne, 171 metres overall, eleven deck ferry was built in Aker Finnyards in Helsinki, Finland and went into service on September 1, 1986, as a passenger and roll on roll off ferry. It was renamed the Silja Festival in 1991 and refitted in 1992. It has 588 passenger cabins, plus restaurants, a show bar, shops, cafés, a sauna and conference facilities. The ship also boasts a casino.
The registered owner is the Tallin Swedish line, based in Tallinn, Estonia. It is managed by HT Shipmanagement of Riga, Latvia and flags the Latvian flag.
Earlier a news release from US Shipbrokers announced the deal, saying:
US Shipbrokers is pleased to announce that we have just facilitated with co-brokers the Charter/Purchase of the M/V Silja Festival from her owners Tallink Group to Canadian interests . The Cruise Ferry Silja Festival will be used as an accommodation vessel for a construction project in British Columbia. US Shipbrokers was contacted by charterers in December due to our vast experience with accommodation charters throughout the United States and the Caribbean, and with our network of worldwide brokers and our proven results, we were able to close this charter/purchase within one month.
With little fanfare, the Canadian Standards Association has announced on its website that it is conducting a review of the standards for pipelines and LNG facilities in this country, including marine terminals.
There are more details and information on how to contact the CSA on the web pages.
LNG Standards
Draft Scope/Description:
1 Scope
1.1
This Standard applies to the
(a) design;
(b) location;
(c) construction;
(d) operation; and
(e) maintenance
of facilities for the liquefaction of natural gas and facilities for the storage, vaporization, transfer, handling, and truck transport of LNG. It also contains requirements for the training of personnel.
1.2 1
For facilities that load or unload LNG from a marine vessel, this Standard contains requirements for the interconnecting piping between the loading/unloading arm flange and the storage tank(s), and other piping and appurtenances on the pier or jetty itself.
1.3
This Standard applies to all containers for the storage of LNG, including those with insulation systems applying a vacuum.
1.4
This Standard does not apply to frozen ground containers.
1.5
This Standard includes non-mandatory guidelines for
(a) small LNG facilities (see the definition of “small facility” in Clause 3 and see Annex B); and
(b) LNG vehicle fuelling stations employed for fleet and public LNG vehicle fuel dispensing operations (see the definition of “fuelling station” in Clause D.2 and see Annex D).
1.6
This Standard does not apply to the following:
(a) the transportation of refrigerants by any means;
(b) the transportation of LNG by railcar or marine vessel;
(c) the transportation of LNG or regasified LNG by pipeline beyond the facility boundary, except as specified in Clause 1.2; and
(d) facilities designed to allow the use of LNG as a fuel for railroad locomotives, or marine vessels.
1.7
All references to pressure throughout this Standard refer to gauge pressures unless otherwise specified.
1.8
All pipe sizes refer to nominal pipe sizes (NPS).
1.9
The values given in SI units are the units of record for the purposes of this Standard. The values given in parentheses are for information and comparison only.
1.10
In CSA standards, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard.
Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material.
Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements.
Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (nonmandatory) to define their application.
Oil and gas pipeline systems
Draft Scope/Description:
1.1
This Standard covers the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipeline systems that convey
(a) liquid hydrocarbons, including crude oil, multiphase fluids, condensate, liquid petroleum products, natural gas liquids, and liquefied petroleum gas;
(b) oilfield water;
(c) oilfield steam;
(d) liquid or dense phase carbon dioxide; or
(e) gas.
Notes:
(1) Vapour phase carbon dioxide pipeline systems fall under item (e).
(2) Designers are cautioned that the requirements in this Standard might not be appropriate for gases other than natural gas, manufactured gas, or synthetic natural gas.
1.2
The scope of this Standard, as shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, includes
(a) for oil industry fluids, piping and equipment in offshore pipelines, onshore pipelines, tank farms, pump stations, pressure-regulating stations, and measuring stations;
(b) oil pump stations, pipeline tank farms, and pipeline terminals;
(c) pipe-type storage vessels;
(d) carbon dioxide pipeline systems;
(e) for gas industry fluids, piping and equipment in offshore pipelines, onshore pipelines, compressor stations, measuring stations, and pressure-regulating stations;
(f) gas compressor stations; and
(g) gas storage lines and pipe-type and bottle-type gas storage vessels.
1.3
This Standard does not apply to
(a) piping with metal temperatures below –70 °C;
(b) piping (except oilfield steam distribution piping) with metal temperatures above 230 °C;
(c) gas piping beyond the operating company’s gas distribution system (covered by CAN/CSA-B149.1);
(d) piping in natural gas liquids extraction plants, gas processing plants (except main gas stream piping in dehydration and all other processing plants installed as part of gas pipeline systems), gas manufacturing plants, industrial plants, and mines;
(e) oil refineries, terminals other than pipeline terminals, and marketing bulk plants;
(f) abandoned piping;
(g) in-plant piping for drinking, make-up, or boiler feed water;
(h) casing, tubing, or pipe in oil or gas wells, wellheads, separators, production tanks, and other production facilities;
(i) vent piping for waste gases of any kind operating at or near atmospheric pressure;
(j) heat exchangers;
(k) liquefied natural gas systems (covered by CSA Z276);
(l) liquid fuel distribution systems;
(m) loading/unloading facilities for tankers or barges;
(n) refuelling facilities; and
(o) hydrocarbon storage in underground formations and associated equipment (covered by CSA Z341 Series).
1.4
This Standard is intended to establish essential requirements and minimum standards for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipeline systems. This Standard is not a design handbook, and competent engineering judgment should be employed with its use.
Note: For steel pipe of grade higher than Grade 555, requirements in addition to those specified in this Standard might be needed. Matters that should be considered include joining, thermal aging effects during coating application, strain capacity (including cold bending), pressure testing, assessment of imperfections, and repair.
1.5
1.5.1
The requirements of this Standard are applicable to the operation, maintenance, and upgrading of existing installations; however, it is not intended that such requirements be applied retroactively to existing installations insofar as design, materials, construction, and established operating pressures are concerned.
1.5.2
Where class locations change pipelines in such locations shall be subject to the requirements for design factor, location factor, valve spacing, depth of cover and clearance, materials, pressure testing, historical repair methods and repair criteria for the higher class location, or shall be subjected to an engineering assessment to determine the suitability of the pipeline for service in the changed class location (see Clause 10.7.1).
1.6
Unless otherwise stated, to determine conformance with the specified requirements, it is intended that observed or calculated values be rounded to the nearest unit in the last right-hand place of figures used in expressing the limiting value, in accordance with the rounding method of ASTM E29.
1.7
Where any requirements of this Standard are at variance with the requirements of other publications referenced in this Standard, it is intended that the requirements of this Standard govern.
1.8
It is not the intent of this Standard to prevent the development of new equipment or practices, or to prescribe how such innovations are to be handled.
1.9
In CSA standards, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard. Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material. Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements. Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (nonmandatory) to define their application
The Haisla Nation have filed a challenge to the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel with the Federal Court of Appeal requesting that court quash the JRP findings.
The Haisla suit comes at a time that a coalition of environmental groups and the Gitxaala Nation are asking for court reviews of the JRP. The court challenge also comes at time when the District of Kitimat Council has maintained its position on an April 12 plebiscite asking the residents of Kitimat if they approve of the Joint Review Panel’s findings on the Northern Gateway project.
Late Wednesday, the Gitga’at Nation at Hartley Bay also announced they are challenging the JRP.
The Haisla argument filed by Jennifer Griffiths of Donovan and Company, representing the Haisla Nation, points to the Scope of Factors governing the JRP saying the proponent (Enbridge Northern Gateway) must “provide a sufficient description of the local setting to allow the Panel, other regulators, the public and others to clearly understand the rationale for environmental assessment decisions.”
The application asks that courts order that:
the findings be referred back to the JRP for further consideration
the Panel obtain and consider the necessary information about marine environment and freshwater and marine fish habitat
the Panel provide its assessment of effects of the project on Haisla Nation cultural heritage
the court direct the Panel to provide it assessment of the adequacy of Crown consultation to date
the Panel reconsider its public interest assessment after considering adequacy of consultation, impacts on cultural heritage and impacts on aboriginal rights and interests
that the JRP report “as issued on December 19, 2013, does not contain the recommendations required” under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.
In the Haisla challenge, the Nation argues the Panel erred by:
making findings about potential impacts to the marine environment and freshwater and marine fish habitat without having before it information it was required to consider under the Scope of Factors
failing to assess the environmental effects of the project on Haisla Nation cultural heritage
failing to provide a rationale for its conclusion that there would be no adverse environmental effects on cultural heritage
failing to provide a rationale for its conclusions regarding significant adverse effects, including but not limited to the conclusion that, after mitigation, the likelihood of significant adverse environmental effects resulting from project malfunctions are very low
failing to provide a summary of comments received from interested parties on potential conditions
concluding that a large spill from pipeline facilities, terminal or tankers is unlikely
concluding that, after mitigation, the likelihood of significant adverse environmental effect resulting from the project malfunctions or accidents is low
fails to justify its conclusion that a large spill from pipeline facilities terminal or tankers is unlikely
fails to justify its conclusion that, after mitigation, the likelihood of significant adverse effects resulting from the project malfunctions is very low.
Fails to provide a rationale for the conclusion that there would be no adverse environmental effects on cultural heritage
The Haisla challenge also says the Joint Review Panel failed “to conduct its assessment in a precautionary manner” when it recommended:
that the project is not likely to result in significant adverse effects with respect to freshwater fish and fish habitat
that project is not likely to result in significant adverse effects with respect to marine fish and fish habitat
recommended that the project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects in Canada on cultural heritage
concluded that a large spill from the pipelines, terminal or tanker is unlikely
concluded that the project is in the public interest.
The Haisla challenge also argues that the “Panel failed to observe procedural fairness in the hearing and deliberation” by:
failing to extend timelines a reasonably requested by parties
failing to consider all the information available to it about the large spill of oil as a result of the rupture of the Enbridge pipeline in Kalamazoo, Michigan
failing to assess impact on aboriginal rights or interests in its public interest assessment
failing to fully consider the submission of the Haisla Nation on potential conditions for the project.
The challenge also deals with the issue of cultural modified trees, especially the JRP’s finding that “impacts to Haisla Culturally Modified Trees can be mitigated” and by concluding “that impacts to Haisla Nation Culturally Modified Trees can be mitigated by including a condition that Northern Gateway file a plan to protect and manage post-1846 CMTS.” The part of the challenge dates back to time when Enbridge surveyors entered Haisla traditional territory without permission and as part of the survey cut down or damaged cultural modified trees.
On the afternoon of January 22, the Gitga’at Nation at Hartley Bay also announced they were filing a challenge to the JRP.
A news release from the Gitga’at says “the Joint Review Panel erred in law, including by failing to properly consider all evidence provided by the Gitga’at, whose culture and way of life would be severely threatened by supertanker traffic, shipping bitumen from Alberta and importing condensate from Asia and elsewhere.”
The application states that while the Gitga’at are resilient, they are also highly vulnerable to threats to their local ecosystems and community well being from impacts cause by increased tanker traffic. The negative impacts to Gitga’at society, culture, identity, health, and economy will only increase in the event of an oil spill, with the impacts increasing with the size and consequences of the spill. Traditional foods harvested from the sea comprise the largest portion of the Gitga’at diet.
On January 16, Ecojustice lawyers, representing ForestEthics Advocacy, Living Oceans Society and Raincoast Conservation Foundation, filed the lawsuit seeking a court order to prevent Cabinet from relying on the flawed JRP report to approve the proposed pipeline.
“The JRP did not have enough evidence to support its conclusion that the Northern Gateway pipeline would not have significant adverse effects on certain aspects of the environment,” said Karen Campbell, Ecojustice staff lawyer. “The panel made its recommendation despite known gaps in the evidence, particularly missing information about the risk of geohazards along the pipeline route and what happens to diluted bitumen when it is spilled in the marine environment.”
The humpback whale recovery strategy identifies toxic spills and vessel traffic as two threats to the iconic species’ survival and recovery — all relevant information that should have been considered during the review hearings.
