Clio Bay: Ward Cove, Alaska, benchmark for log remediation

Special report: Clio Bay cleanup: Controversial, complicated and costly

Ward Cove
Ward Cove, Alaska, in 2005, after the remediation of the bay was completed in 2001 and old industrial buildings were being demolished. (EPA)

 

Ward Cove, just eight kilometres west of Ketchikan, Alaska, was so polluted by effluent from pulp and saw mills and a fish plant, and filled with 16,000 sunken lots that it qualified for a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Superfund cleanup.

The Ward Cove project is now considered a benchmark for cleaning up similar bays. Alaska officials emphasized to Northwest Coast Energy News, that while Ward Cove does provide guidelines for capping and dredging logs, they were not aware of any project where logs were capped that did not have other forms of contamination.

If you take a look at satellite images of Clio Bay, BC and Ward Cove side by side you immediately you see the similarities and differences between the two bodies of water. (Note due to parameters of Google Earth, images are slightly different scales)

Satellite image of Clio Bay
Google Earth image of Clio Bay
Google Earth image of Ward Cove, Alaska
Google Earth image of Ward Cove, Alaska

Both Clio Bay and Ward Cove are 1.6 kilometres long, somewhat elbow shaped, off a main channel and surrounded by mountains.Ward Cove is 0.8 kilometres wide. Clio Bay is about 0.5 kilmetres wide, 0.8 at its widest point. Both have steep slopes from the mountains. Ward Cove is 61 metres deep at the mouth of the cove, descreasing toward the head. Clio Bay is deeper, 182 metres at the mouth, 90 metres in the centre and between 20 metres and 9 metres at the head.

Both Clio Bay and Ward Cove are subject to tidal circulation. Both Clio Bay and Ward Cove are also influenced by fresh water. Ward Cove is fed by Ward Creek, a smaller Walsh Creek and runoff precipitation the enters the cover from the steep mountain slopes. Clio Bay is fed by one creek, a number of small streams and mountain slope runoff, especially during the spring melt.

Haisla Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross estimates there are between 10,000 and 20,000 sunken logs in Clio Bay. The official summary from the United States Environmental Protection Agency said there were 16,000 sunken logs in Ward Cove.

The major difference with Ward Cove is that it was the site of major industrial development including a pulp mill, a sawmill and a fish plant. That meant the level of pollutants in Ward Cove were much higher than in Clio Bay, which has never been used for an industrial plant. It was the pollutants in Ward Cove, mainly ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and 4-methylphenol combined with the thousands of sunken logs that made the cove a target cleanup and the associated studies.

A fish plant, Wards Cove Packing opened in 1912 and ceased operations in 2002. The Ketchikan Paper Company mill began operating in 1954 and closed in 1997. Prior to 1971, with the rise of the enviromental movement no permits were required by KPC for discharging effluent into the cove. After that the US Environmental Protection Agency issued a discharge permit and monitored effluent. Throughout the time the KPC mill was operating, the EPA says, “high volumes of log storage (approximately 7 billion board feet) caused accumulation of bark waste and sunken logs at the bottom of the cove.” Gateway Forest Products, a sawmill and veneer plant, continued to store logs in Wards Cove until 2002.

A 2009 monitoring report, conducted by the US Army Corps of Engineers after the cleanup for the EPA noted:

An ecological risk assessment was also conducted using a food-web assessment to estimate risks of bioaccumulative chemicals to representative birds and mammals at the top of the Ward Cove food web. The chemicals evaluated were arsenic, cadmium, mercury, zinc, chlorinated dioxins/furans, and PAHs. The results of this assessment indicated that there are no unacceptable risks to higher trophic level organisms in Ward Cove.

A human health risk assessment was conducted to identify potential risks posed by chemicals detected in sediments or seafood (e.g., fish, shellfish). Ingestion of seafood that may contain chemicals bioaccumulated from the sediments was identified as the only complete exposure pathway for humans. The chemicals that were evaluated included: arsenic, cadmium, mercury, zinc, phenol, 4-methylphenol, chlorinated dioxins/furans, and PAHs. Results concluded that sediments in Ward Cove do not pose an unacceptable risk to human health.

A 2007 report on the Wards Cove remediation from the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, noted:

The continuing residues impairment in Ward Cove is caused by the historical accumulation of wood waste on the bottom of the cove. The waste includes an estimated 16,000 sunken logs over at least 75 percent of the bottom and decomposing pulp, wood, and bark waste in sediments in thicknesses up to 10 feet over at least 50 percent of the bottom. Wood waste residues can displace and smother organisms, alter habitat, release leachates, create anoxic conditions, and produce toxic substances, all of which may adversely affect organisms that live both on top of sediments and within sediments.

That is a similar problem to Clio Bay.

The report notes that problems with oxygen increase with depth, noting:

The dissolved oxygen impairment was due largely to the fish-processing waste discharge from the seafood processing facility until 2002, and it was limited to the summer months in deeper waters of the cove (below the picnocline, or stratification layer, approximately 10 meters deep). With that discharge removed, limited monitoring in August and September 2003 indicated that dissolved oxygen impairment might remain near the bottom in waters at depths of 30 meters and greater at certain times and locations due to low natural levels of dissolved oxygen and the continuing decomposition of wood waste. Above 30 meters depth, the waters of the cove appeared to meet the [Alaska state] standard for dissolved oxygen. However, there may be limited capacity for waters at 30 meters and deeper to receive additional loading of oxygen-demanding materials and still meet the standard in summer months.

That should mean that the worries about oxygen depletion at Clio Bay are justified due to Clio’s greater depth.

Studies of the biology of Ward Cove began in 1951, with more in the 1960s and one in 1974. In 1995, Ketchikan Paper Company signed a consent decree with the EPA that called for remediation of Ward Cove, In 2000, KPC and Gateway Forest Products signed a second consent decree with the EPA. Those agreements called on the companies to dredge sediments to improve navigation, remove logs and other debris from the dredging areas and “placing a thin-layer cap of 15-30 cm (six to 12 inches) of sand over about 11 hectares (27 acres) of sunken logs.”

The major studies of Ward Cove began in 1995 after first consent decree. The remediation did not take place until the initial studies were complete in 1999, with dredging and capping taking place from November 2000 to March 2001.

The EPA positioned 13 water quality monitoring stations which operated from 1997 to 2002, to measure salinity, temperature and disolved oxygen, nine inside Ward Cove and four outside the cove in Tongass Narrows. Those studies showed that levels of dissolved oxygen in the cove varied by season, depth and location. Many species from salmon to mobile bottom dwellers like crabs were often able to detect and avoid low oxygen areas.

The plan

The EPA and the companies involved planned the remediation so that it included both dredging, capping logs and sediment and leaving some areas where nature would take its course.

The reports say that complete dredging, removal and disposal of the contamination would have cost $200 million,  The total actual cost of the Ward Cove Remediation Project, beginning with development of the Remedial Design Work Plan, was estimated to have cost $3,964,000 (in 2000 US dollars).

The EPA says cost for the capping component of the project “including preliminary field investigations and reporting, design and plans development, post construction engineering, procurement, construction management, project management, mobilizationm demobilization, engineering/QC and science support, surveys, and capping items” was $2,563,506. Based on the volume of capping material placed, the unit cost of log capping for the Ward Cove Remediation Project was $110 per cubic yard.

Sunken logs retrieved at Ward Cove.
Old logs retrieved from Ward Cove, Alaska during dredging operations to improve navigation. (EPA)

The plan called for dredging about 17,050 cubic yards in the area near the cove’s main dock and the dredging of 3,500 yards metres nearby to improved navigation. Before the dredging, 680 tonnes of sunken logs had to be removed. After dredging, a “thin-layer cap of clean, sandy material” was placed in dredged areas unless native sediments or bedrock was reached during dredging.

In other areas, most covered in sunken logs, the plan called for placement of a thin-layer cap (approximately 6- to 12-inches) of clean, sandy material, with the possibility of “mounding” dropping mounds of sand on specific areas. The 2009 report says the area of sand deposits actually increased “due to the fact that thin layer placement was found to be successful over a broader area, and it was not necessary to construct mounding.”

The plan called for natural recovery in areas where neither capping nor mounding was practicable and so about 50 acres was left alone. (DFO says it plans to leave some parts of Clio Bay uncapped as “reference areas.”)
Slope and sand

Sand capping at Ward Cove
A dredging barge depositing clean sand (originally from Sechelt, BC) during capping operations at Ward Cove, Alaska in 2001. (EPA)

Two studies were carried out as part of the remediation at Ward Cove that do not appear to be contemplated at Clio Bay. The first looked at the “ability of the organic material to support the weight of 15 to 30 centimetres of sand.” Standard engineering equations used at other fill and capping sites were used as part of that study. A second study was carried out to determine the “minimum safety for a given slope,” which given the steep mountains that line Clio Bay, are likely to be factor in the deposit of marine clay. That study determined “For a silty fine sand and a factor of safety of 1.5, the maximum slope would be approximately 40 per cent.”

Those studies led to the conclusion that for the Ward Cove remediation project, the material to be placed on the fine organic sediment could not be gravel and course sand.”

That’s because the larger gravel and course sand “would tend to sink into the sediment and would not provide quality benethic (seabottom) habitat.”

The project decided to use “fine to medium sand with minimal fines.” It also concluded “Because of the very soft existing sediments and steep slopes at Ward Cove, the … material must be released slowly so that the settling velocity is low and bed impact minimized.”

That meant that the EPA had look for a source of quality sand that met their criterion. The sand was found at Construction Aggregates in Sechelt, BC, loaded on 10,000 tonne deck barges, tugged up the coast, unloaded onto land using a conveyor and stockpiled while more tests were done to determine how to deposit the sand on the sunken logs.

Sand bucket at Ward Cove
Dredging bucket modified to deposit sand during capping operations at Ward Cove, Alaska. (EPA)

Sand was placed on a smaller barge and taken to the deposit site. Initial tests were done with a mechanical dredge equipped with a clamshell bucket. The operator deposited the sand using “swaths” released from the bucket. To make it work properly, the bucket, as supplied by a manufacturer had to be modified by welding baffle plates to the bucket and lengthening the chains to insure consistent deposition of the sand. Two computers with special software called WINOPS, designed for dredging operations  “provided the operator and deck engineer the precise locations of the derrick barge position” in order to ensure precise deposition of the sand. WINOPS dredge positioning and guidance software. The WINOPS system made use of three differential global positioning receivers. One GPS receiver was located at the top of the derrick and provided the center positioning of the dredge bucket. Two fixed receivers, one near the starboard center spud and one near the center aft, provided the barge position and heading.

Although using marine clay is likely to produce different engineering challenges at Clio Bay, it is not currently clear that the project has contemplated the level of precision that was used at Ward Cove.

While KM LNG must find a way to dispose of the marine clay from the Bish Cove excavation site, there is a silver lining for the Haisla Nation’s aim of restoring both Clio Bay and the other 50 sites in their traditional territory, since the Kitimat Sand Hill would likely be a ready resource for any future projects.
Monitoring

The EPA considered the project finished in September 2001, and long term monitoring began, with major updates every five years in 2004 and 2009.

An EPA report on the 2004 review showed that the three sand-capped areas and one shallow natural recovery area (not sand-capped) had achieved biological recovery; three other natural recovery areas tested had not achieved biological recovery but were making significant progress.

The  2004 studies showed that benethic (sea bottom) communities in uncapped areas showed “species commonly found in areas where organic enrichment is low or declining.” adding “In three other natural recovery areas, benthic communities have not progressed as far toward recovery but are making significant progress.

By the time of the 2009 update, most of the old industrial infrastucture on land at Ward Cove had been demolished and the land area was slated for redevelopment. Many of the companies that had been there had either gone out of business or had declared bankruptcy and the land was taken over by the Ketchikan Gateway Borough,mostly through foreclosure.

The EPA declared that “The remedial action construction is complete, and the remedial action is an operating or ongoing remedial action.”

The 2009 report says that the project was successful in eliminating sediment toxicity. The area was then quickly being recolonized by a diverse bottom dwelling macroinvertebrate species and those species were spreading beyond the specific study areas, so recovery of Ward Cove is expected to continue.

However the 2004 report went on to say that “the achievement of stable benthic biological communities with balanced species composition in more than 75 percent of the area with documented coverage by wood residues on the bottom of Ward Cove” would happen within 40 years from the 2004 study.

The next review of Ward Cove is slated for August 2015.

 

Sand capping
Diagram of a sand capping operation from a barge. (US Army Corps of Engineers)

 

Diagram of a sediment capping operation knowing as diffusion (US Army Corps of Engineers)
Diagram of a sediment capping operation knowing as diffusion (US Army Corps of Engineers)

 

 

Termie
Diagram of a Japanese system called tremie that uses a hose system to deposit capping material on the seabed. (US Army Corps of Engineers)

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Clio Bay: DFO declines invitation to appear before Kitimat Council

Special report: Clio Bay cleanup: Controversial, complicated and costly

DFO logoThe Department of Fisheries and Oceans has declined an invitation from District of Kitimat Council to appear at a special meeting on Monday, September 30 to discuss the Clio Bay remediation project.  A representative of Chevron will be in the council chambers at the Kitimat branch of Northwest Community College to make a presentation and answer questions.

The letter from DFO to the council  from Dave Pehl works at DFO office in Kamloops says:

Thank you for the invitation to attend District of Kitimat Council meeting on September 30, 2013 to address plans by Chevron Canada and Apache Canada(Kitimat LNG) to remediate habitat conditions in Clio Bay. Regretfully, Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is unable to attend the scheduled council meeting.

Fisheries and Oceans Canada has reviewed a proposal to dispose of soil materials, generated at the Kitimat LNG plant, in Clio Bay, Clio Bay has been used as a log handling site for decades which has resulted in areas of degraded habitat from accumulations of woody debris materials on the sea floor. The project intends to cap impacted areas with inert materials and restore soft substrate seafloor. The remediation of the seafloor is predicted to enhance natural biodiverstiy and improve the productivity of the local fishery for Dungeness crab. The project area does support a variety of life that will be impact and therefore the project will require authorization from Fisheries and Oceans Canada for the Harmful Alteration, Disruption or Destruction (HADD) of fish and fish habitat.

Mapping of the seafloor in Clio Bay has been completed and the project plans prioritizes capping on areas of dense woody debris, followed by areas of soft substrate with woody debris distributed throughout. Mapped areas that are avoided include hard substrates and sensitive habitats such as freshwater streams and eelgrass beds. Buffers have been allocated around sensitive areas and no capping will be conducted in areas of less 10m in depth. Proposed mitigation to avoid potential impacts to areas outside Clio Bay includes avoiding deposition of material within 500m of the confluence of Clio Bay and kitimat Arm. Some areas of degraded or partially degraded habitat will not be capped to serve as reference areas.

Chevron will be required to conduct a pre-construction, construction and post construction monitoring program. Pre-construction monitoring will include collection of baseline information that will be used to assess effectiveness monitoring during and at the completion of the project. Water quality monitoring for turbidity and total suspended solids will be undertaken during construction to determine if established performance criteria are met. The monitoring plan for the project will evaluate

1. Water quality near the sea floor.
2. Fish habitat quality and quantity
3. Biodiversity of the seafloor ecosystem and
4. Distribution of a fishery resource (Dungeness crab)

Reference sites will be used to make comparison between capped and uncapped habitats. Monitoring will continue for a period of five years following the completion of the works. The proponent will be required to report the follow-up monitoring program to DFO in years 1,3 and 5 following construction.

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Gil Island “critical habitat” as humpbacks double at the mouth of Douglas Channel. New study says tanker traffic could threaten key spots

Humpback whale at Bish Cove
A humpback whale, seen here by its small dorsal fin, swims past the Chevron Apache KM LNG site at Bish Cove on Douglas Channel, August 21, 2013. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

 

Updated with comments from Gitga’at First Nation, Nathan Cullen and Shell Canada.

Gil Island is a “critical habitat” for the world’s humpback whales, whose numbers are increasing in Douglas Channel, Wright Sound, Estevan Sound and Camano Sound and nearby waters, according to a study released Wednesday, September 11, 2013. The study also goes on to warn that potential tanker traffic through the “geographic bottleneck” on Douglas Channel to and from Kitimat could threaten that crucial “pit stop” for the humpback whales.

The study, “Abundance and Survival of Pacific Humpback Whales in a Proposed Critical Habitat Area,” by Erin Ashe, of the University of St. Andrews, in Scotland, Janie Wray of Oceans Initiative on Pearse Island, Christopher Picard of the North Coast Caetacian Society in Hartley Bay and Rob Williams of the Gitga’at Nation Lands and Marine Resources Deptartment, is published in the jourrnal PLOS One.

The research team estimated the abundance of Pacific humpback whales by using photo-identification surveillance of adult humpbacks. They found that the number of humpback whales in this region increased each year, and doubled from 2004 to 2011, resulting in a total of 137 identifiable whales in 2011. The survey was conducted year-round. Abundance was estimated only during the summer months of July to September, when the migrating whale population is largest.

The survey focused on summer feeding regions in the northwestern BC coastal fjords that serve as a “pit stop” for whales between migrations. Migrating whales travel to the BC coast from calving grounds as far away as Mexico, Hawaii or Japan. After several months without feeding, the humpbacks arrive in BC, and, the study says, show “strong site fidelity to local feeding grounds” around the entrance to Douglas Channel.

The authors estimated that “survivorship,” the average probability of an adult whale surviving from one year to the next on the northwest coast of British Columbia is among the highest reported anywhere for the species. During “this critical refueling stage in these waters, the whales are more vulnerable to environmental stressors, such as those potentially created by increasing tourism and industrial development in the region.”

The study also says that study area has also been identified as candidate critical habitat for northern resident killer whales and notes the region “has been recolonized by fin whales in recent years.” (With details on the fin whales to come in future studies)

The study estimates there were once about 15,000 humpback whales in the North Pacific when whalers began hunting the animals. That number was down to 1,400 when whale hunting was stopped in Canada in 1966. “It is therefore good news that the segment of the population using our study area is growing and adult survival is near the limit that one would expect for this species. That said, although the population is recovering, there is no evidence that it has yet fully recovered to pre-exploitation levels in BC and we do not wish to become complacent.” the study says.

It goes on to say:

Humpback whales may be facing increasing threats in at least one of their proposed critical habitats in BC. Numerous port facility expansions and new terminal proposals, including numerous crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export proposals, could substantially increase deep-sea shipping traffic through BC’s north and central coast waters. Such developments could exacerbate oil spill, acoustic disturbance, and ship strike risks to humpbacks. In particular, the Gil Island proposed critical habitat area where our work was conducted, spatially corresponds with all shipping routes leading to Kitimat, BC port facilities that are currently being considered by regulatory agencies for high-volume crude oil and LNG tanker traffic and other increased shipping activities.

The monitoring program showed that “a relatively large fraction of BC’s humpback whales rely on the waters around Gil Island, given the small size of the study area.”

 

Humpback whale in Douglas Channel
The tail fins of a humpback whale are seen in Douglas Channel near Bish Cove, as a fishing boat speeds toward Kitimat harbour in a rain storm on Aug. 21, 2013. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

The study warns:

This high reliance on relatively small fractions of available habitat has important implications for conservation and management. It lends support to the proposal to designate the current study area as part of the population’s critical habitat…

This also suggests that area-based management for cetaceans can effectively target small areas if these areas are chosen carefully. The corollary to this, though, is that a tendency for animals to be concentrated or aggregated in small areas lends them vulnerable to catastrophic events like oil spills and ship strikes. Critical habitats like the Gil Island waters are therefore a mixed blessing when high densities of whales are found in geographic bottlenecks that also funnel and concentrate shipping traffic. Anthropogenic threats to this must be evaluated not only in terms of the proportion of available habitat that this area represents, but also in terms of its critical importance to large numbers of whales for critical life-history processes. The risk and ecological consequences of an oil spill in this region would increase substantially if proposals were approved to ship large volumes of oil and LNG traffic through the Gil Island waters. Studies in Pacific waters similar to our study area suggest that oil spills can have severe and chronic impacts to cetacean populations and it is uncertain whether affected populations can recover from such perturbations.

One reason for the study is that while the humpback is considered an endangered species in the United States, in Canada it is listed as “threatened” under Canada’s Species at Risk Act and the increasing numbers could mean that the humpback is downgraded to “special concern.”

The study was based on what is called “community based science,” a cost-effective partnership between scientists, the Gitga’at Nation and other First Nations, NGOs and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

As part of its Pacific humpback whale recovery strategy, DFO has proposed four areas as candidate critical habitat. One criterion for designating critical habitats within northern BC coast feeding grounds is that inlets are used for specialized ‘‘bubble-net’’ feeding behaviour (where the humpbacks create a fishing net of bubbles to catch their prey).

Map of study areaAt the start of the study, the team had noted that “mainland inlets have been somewhat under-represented in habitat studies” and so they began working on the photo-identification of the humpbacks, using two research groups, the North Coast Cetacean Society and the Gitga’at Lands and Marine Resources Department. Surveys were conducted as weather permitted throughout the year from April to November (with occasional trips in February, March and December), from 2004 to 2011.

The aim of the study was to “collect as many high-quality photographs of individually recognizable humpback whales as possible within the study area [referred to in the study  as ‘Gil Island waters’’] from Estevan Sound in the west to Ursula Channel in the east. One 27 foot and one 18 foot boat were used to conduct the surveys. A total of 374 photo- identification surveys conducted over 47 months resulted in a catalogue of 177 high-quality, unique identifications of individual humpback whales.

Information also came from “an informal sightings network including local fishermen and tourism operators who reported humpback and killer whale sightings over VHF radio;” hydrophones monitored for vocalizing humpback whales; and visual monitoring from the land-based Cetacealab facility on the south end of Gil Island.

When a humpback was sighted, they were identified by the fingerprint like tail flukes and the numbers cataloged.

The study was funded by grants to Cetacealab and Gitga’at First Nation from Julie Walters and Sam Rose, and from Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Cetacean Research Program, Species at Risk Program). There was also support from King Pacific Lodge.

Updates

 

In a news release, the Gitga’at First Nation said:

“The importance of our territorial waters for humpback and other species of whales, should give pause to those who would propose tanker routes through the Douglas Channel,” said Arnold Clifton, Chief Councillor of the Gitga’at First Nation. “The increase in whales in our territory coincides with low shipping traffic, however current proposals would increase shipping traffic to unprecedented levels. We remain resolute in our determination to protect whales and the natural heritage of our territory from tankers and other developments that would put them at risk.”
“Our study shows that while still vulnerable, humpback whales are recovering, and this area plays an important role in supporting their numbers,” said lead author, Erin Ashe, a PhD candidate at the University of St. Andrews and a co-founder of Oceans Initiative. “Identifying and protecting critical habitat is one of the most effective ways to support endangered species recovery.”
The waters around Gil Island are especially rich habitat for humpback whales, due to high abundance of their preferred foods, such as krill and herring and due to the remote nature of the coastal fjords. Humpbacks, which rely on acoustic communication, are sensitive to noise pollution from ship traffic.
“It is Cetacea Lab’s contention that all levels of government must collaborate with the Gitga’at First Nation and others in protecting humpback whales from the risk of increased tanker traffic,” said Janie Wray, whale researcher with Cetacea Lab. “This study represents the best available scientific information about the importance of this area to humpback whales. Over the course of our study, we have observed the population more than double, with mothers returning year after year with their calves, introducing the next generation of juvenile whales to the nutrient-rich feeding grounds of Douglas Channel to Caamano Sound.”

 

In his biweekly conference call with Northwest BC reporters, Skeena Bulkley Valley MP Nathan Cullen said: “I don’t get a sense from the way that the federal government has designed this [referring to Enbridge Northern Gateway] project, that on the marine side, any of these things are important to Mr. Harper. When you start to place down the most important values and certainly for British Columbians and Canadians, protecting a humpback feeding ground would seem like an important value in the Great Bear Rainforest, you start to see where the limits and the restrictions are on any idea of moving oil super tankers through such a narrow place. It’s just another bit of evidence, a bit of science that says this is difficult, if not impossible, and Enbridge’s project has made so many of those arguments more and more clear as we start to bring science to the table.

“It’s so frustrating for people that evidence, our opinions and our values just don’t seem to matter to the federal government. They already said yes to this thing years ago and damn the science, damn anything that comes their way. That’s not going to work, not going to work for us and not going to work for the humpback whales.”

A spokesperson for Shell’s LNG Canada project, noting that the company officials had not yet read the study, said, “It’s early days for the proposed project and the start of a thorough regulatory process. We welcome contributions and thoughts on important matters. We will look at this study. As with any project in Canada we work with local First Nations and local communities to minimize the impact of our activities.”

Neither Enbridge Northern Gateway nor Apache, a partner in the KM LNG project, responded to a request for comment.

Apache sells some of its gas and oil assets, confirms commitment to Kitimat project

Apache CorporationApache Corporation said Thursday it will  sell oil and gas producing properties in the Nevis, North Grant Lands and South Grant Lands areas of western Alberta, to Ember Resources Inc., a private Canadian company, for CAN$220 million, as part of the company’s “portfolio rebalancing,” Apache said in a news release.

At the same time, Apache CEO Rodney Eichler said,  “We also remain focused on advancing the Kitimat LNG project to monetize large unconventional resources in the Liard and Horn River basins in northern British Columbia.”

“Going forward, Apache is focused on growing our liquids production from a deep inventory of crude oil- and liquids-rich opportunities that generate attractive rates of return on our extensive remaining acreage in Canada’s Western Sedimentary Basin,”  Eichler said.

“This transaction is one element of a comprehensive review of Apache’s portfolio to determine which assets make the most sense for Apache to own given our growth and return objectives and which assets are better owned by others,” Eichler said. “The Nevis, North Grant Lands and South Grant Lands assets fit in the latter category.”

Apache is selling 621,000 gross acres (530,000 net acres) and more than 2,700 wells that had average net production during the second quarter of 2013 of 67 million cubic feet of gas and 237 barrels of liquid hydrocarbons per day from late Cretaceous sands and coal seams. Apache says “it  will retain 100 per cent working interest in horizons below the Cretaceous, such as potential Duvernay and Nisku, in Nevis and North Grant Lands.”

Apache previously announced plans to divest $4 billion in assets by  the end of 2013. The company intends to use proceeds from the asset divestitures to reduce debt and enhance financial flexibility and to repurchase Apache common shares under a 30-million-share repurchase program authorized by the Board of Directors earlier this year.

In July, Apache announced an agreement to sell its Gulf of Mexico Shelf operations and properties to Fieldwood Energy LLC(Fieldwood), an affiliate of Riverstone Holdings, for cash proceeds of $3.75 billion. In addition, Fieldwood will assume all asset retirement obligations for these properties, which, as of June 30, 2013, Apache estimated at a discounted value of approximately $1.5 billion.

 

Coast Guard plans to pump oil from sunken WWII transport in Grenville Channel

The Canadian Coast Guard says it will undertake “a significant environmental response operation” because more oil is leaking from the sunken Second World War United States Army Transport vessel, the Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski. 

The Coast Guard says that an operation known as “hot tapping” will be used to remove the oil from the Zalinski. Hot tapping was used recently to remove fuel from the sunken cruise liner Costa Concordia off Italy and the container ship Rena which broke up off New Zealand.

The Coast Guard says:

Hot tapping is a well-known and frequently used method of removing oil from the tanks of stricken vessels. Holes are carefully drilled into the side of the vessel to access fuel-tanks and then hot steam is pumped into the tanks. The steam increases the temperature of the oil and enables it to flow more easily. The oil is then pumped to the surface for safe disposal.

The procedure can be done with holes of very small sizes up to very large diameters. Hot tapping is used in both marine and land-based scenarios.

 

The red sections in the image above represent the fuel tanks of the Zalinski; the possible locations for hot tapping of the vessel. The yellow sections represent the cargo holds. (Canadian Coast Guard)
The red sections in the image above represent the fuel tanks of the Zalinski; the possible locations for hot tapping of the vessel. The yellow sections represent the cargo holds. (Canadian Coast Guard)

The Canadian Coast Guard says it “has engaged the Gitga’at First Nation and the Province of British Columbia to participate in the operation and maintain a presence at the wreck site” and will keep the Gitga’at First Nation informed of what is going on:

The Coast Guard recognizes that given their proximity to the Zalinski site and their interest in the oil recovery operation, the Gitga’at need to be informed on the progress of the operation and that they have important local knowledge and skill that will be beneficial to the operation.

 

Related:More oil leaking from sunken WWII US transport near Hartley Bay, Gitga’at warn

The Coast Guard says that environmental monitoring in January and March of 2013, discovered “further upwelling” of oil and added new patches to the sunken vessel.

The Coast Guard says: “Although the patches from 2012 and 2013 remain in place, early patches have begun to leak and the Canadian Coast Guard has determined that the structural integrity of the vessel is deteriorating.”

Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski
USAT Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski (Canadian Coast Guard)

The  USAT Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski was built in 1919 and served as a United States Army Transport vessel during the Second World War. It ran aground during a storm and sank in 1946 in the Grenville Channel about 100 kilometres south of Prince Rupert.

According to a Coast Guard News release, the wreck was “undetected” until the fall of 2003 in 34 metres of water near an underwater cliff about 20 metres from shore.

In September 2003, the United States Coast Guard Cutter Maple reported pollution in the Grenville Channel to the Canadian Coast Guard.

The CCGS Tanu  investigated the source of the pollution and collected oil samples, but, the news release says, the vessel remained elusive and undetected.

A month later, more oil pollution was spotted so the Canadian Coast Guard used a remotely operated underwater vehicle which located the Zalinski.

New pollution was reported in the channel in October 2003 by a commercial airline pilot and at this time the Coast Guard suspected that the source of the upwelling of oil was an old wreck.
In 2003 and 2004, the Canadian Coast Guard contracted divers to patch the vessel to prevent the leak of oil.

The Coast Guard says it regularly monitored the site with the help of Transport Canada’s National Aerial Surveillance Program. Local First Nations Groups also monitored the wreck site.
More oil was spotted in April 2012, and at that time, contract divers patched the Zalinski with an epoxy that hardens underwater.

The Coast Guard says new dive footage has shown that metal rivets that hold the hull’s plates are corroding and that the hull is buckling.

as the state of the vessel deteriorates, the Coast Guard has determined that to prevent any harm to the environment, a significant operation should be undertaken to remove the oil from the vessel. The Canadian Coast Guard will be the on-scene commander for the duration of the operation, directing the recovery and the removal of marine pollutants from the vessel and actively monitoring the operation.

The Canadian Coast Guard has also engaged the province of British Columbia and local First Nations groups to solicit their feedback on the operation. On July 26, 2013, Public Works and Government Services Canada posted two requests for proposal seeking a third-party to conduct the oil removal operation and oil spill response services to assist in the case that any oil leaks from the vessel as the operation progresses.

Map of Grenville Channel
Wreck sites for M.G. Zalinksi and Queen of the North (Canadian Coast Guard)

It is expected that the operation will begin in September 2013 and will conclude in December 2013. The Coast Guard says because the Grenville Channel is so narrow, some restrictions on vessel traffic in the Inland Passage will be needed.

The Grenville Channel is a narrow fjord-like waterway with significant tidal fluctuations and currents up to three knots. The shoreline is rocky and steep with little shoreline vegetation.
The Grenville Channel sees commercial fishing vessels, ferries, cruise ships, and pleasure craft transiting its waters on a regular basis, with increased frequency in the summer months. These waters, naturally shielded from stronger offshore winds and weather conditions, are the preferred route of many cruise ships.

The more mild sailing conditions and the stunning natural beauty of the area make the Grenville channel one of the scenic highlights of many marine travellers on Canada’s West Coast.

 

“Trust me is not good enough,” harsh BC government argument slams Enbridge, rejects Northern Gateway project

The government of British Columbia has filed a harsh assessment of Enbridge Northern Gateway in its final arguments submitted May 31 to the Joint Review Panel—much harsher than the government press release giving notice of the rejection suggests.

“‘Trust me’ is not good enough in this case,” the filing by BC government lawyer Christopher Jones says of Enbridge’s plans to handle any possible disaster from either a pipeline rupture or a tanker spill.

Some of the arguments from the province’s lawyers echo points about the Kitimat Valley raised by Douglas Channel Watch and the Haisla Nation, at one point, pointing directly to evidence from Douglas Channel Watch’s Dave Shannon.

The news release repeats Premier Christy Clark’s five conditions for the Northern Gateway and other projects, putting a positive spin on the much harsher legal argument.

“British Columbia thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence and submissions made to the panel and asked substantive questions about the project including its route, spill response capacity and financial structure to handle any incidents,” said Environment Minister Terry Lake. “Our questions were not satisfactorily answered during these hearings.”

“We have carefully considered the evidence that has been presented to the Joint Review Panel,” said Lake. “The panel must determine if it is appropriate to grant a certificate for the project as currently proposed on the basis of a promise to do more study and planning after the certificate is granted. Our government does not believe that a certificate should be granted before these important questions are answered.”

The provincial government has established, and maintains, strict conditions in order for British Columbia to consider the construction and operation of heavy-oil pipelines in the province.

  • Successful completion of the environmental review process. In the case of Northern Gateway, that would mean a recommendation by the National Energy Board Joint Review Panel that the project proceed;
  • World-leading marine oil spill response, prevention and recovery systems for B.C.’s coastline and ocean to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy-oil pipelines and shipments;
  • World-leading practices for land oil spill prevention, response and recovery systems to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy-oil pipelines;
  • Legal requirements regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights are addressed, and First Nations are provided with the opportunities, information and resources necessary to participate in and benefit from a heavy-oil project; and
  • British Columbia receives a fair share of the fiscal and economic benefits of a proposed heavy-oil project that reflect the level, degree and nature of the risk borne by the province, the environment and taxpayers.

Final argument

In its filing the province tells the JRP:

While the Joint Review Panel (“JRP”) may of course consider other factors in its recommendation, the Province submits that the JRP must accord very significant weight, in the case of this project, to the fact that NG’s plans for terrestrial and marine spill response remain preliminary and that it cannot, today, provide assurance that it will be able to respond effectively to all spills. Given the absence of a credible assurance in this regard, the Province cannot support the approval of or a positive recommendation from the JRP regarding, this project as it was presented to the JRP.

In the alternative, should the JRP recommend approval of the pipeline, the JRP must impose clear, measurable and enforceable conditions that require NG to live up to the commitments it has made in this proceeding.

Hazards from Kitimat’s geoglacial clay

The provincial government identifies a major potential hazard in the Kitimat valley, glacio-marine clay deposits that “threaten the integrity of the pipeline.”

Overall the province appears to accept the arguments from Douglas Channel Watch and other environmental groups that geo hazards along the pipeline route present a significant risk, one perhaps underestimated by Enbridge Northern Gateway.

NG does not dispute that spills from the pipeline may occur. While the project will be new, and built using modern technology, the fact remains that pipeline spills do happen. Indeed, Enbridge had 11 releases greater than 1000 barrels between 2002 and 2012…

The Province has concerns about the assertions NG has made regarding the probability for full-bore releases resulting from geohazards. NG asserts that full-bore spills will be very rare. However, this assertion must be considered in light of the fact that NG’s analysis of the geohazards that the pipeline could face is at a preliminary stage….

The rugged topography of West Central British Columbia is prone to slope failures.
Terrain instability may pose significant challenges for linear development.
Despite these challenging admits that its assessment of existing and potential geohazards along the pipeline route is not complete and that further investigations and more detailed geohazard mapping are required. For instance, although NG acknowledges that the potential presence of glacio-marine clays in the lower Kitimat Valley can threaten the integrity of a pipeline; its report on glacio-marine clay fails to identify a significant area of potential instability that had been previously reported in the relevant literature…

Since all geotechnical hazards have not been identified with the investigations carried out to date, and since comprehensive investigations will not be completed until the detailed design phase, NG has but a rough idea of the mitigation measures that may be employed in order to mitigate the geotechnical hazards that may be encountered…

Spill response

The province’s arguments also indicates that Enbridge Northern Gateway has not done a good enough job regarding spill response, whether from a full bore rupture or a pin hole leak.

it must be remembered that full-bore spills are less frequent than smaller spills, which could still have a significant environmental effect. Indeed, since risk equals consequence times probability, smaller spills could pose a higher risk as they are more frequent. While NG has produced considerable evidence with respect to the likelihood and effects of full-bore spills… the evidence concerning the potential for other spills is limited. While the Province supports assessing the effects of any spill based on a full-bore release, as it would allow for an analysis of the worst-case scenario, focus on full-bore releases should not eliminate consideration of the potential impact of smaller events…

NG stated that [a] table [in the evidence], which includes probabilities for medium sized spills, would be “replaced by. a detailed characterization of each pipeline kilometre and region as part of the ongoing risk assessment work,” but the province says, a later table that “now replaces the concept of large and medium spills”. focussed only on full-bore releases, a relatively rare event.

Similarly, NG also calculated spill return periods for pinhole and greater-than-pinhole events. Taking the figures NG for “greater-than-pinhole” releases results in a spill return figure of 76.7 years. The Province also has concerns about the information that NG has provided in this regard. First, because it focussed on spill events, there is no information about spill size, which, we submit is a critical issue in considering the risk posed by these kinds of events. Second, NG does not include the potential for spills that could occur as a result of “operating and maintenance procedures” that deviate from the norm. Finally, NG assumes that all geotechnical threats would result in a full-bore rupture. This assumption appears to be incorrect…

Premier Christy Clark has, as part of her five conditions, said there must be a world class spill response system. Enbridge responded by saying there will be. The province then turns around and says Enbridge has failed to do prove it.

Because of the potential for spills, and their impact, NG has committed to develop a comprehensive spill response capability. Indeed, NG has stated that it intends to have a “world-class response capability” for the Project. Given the real potential for spills to occur, and the devastating effect of a spill should a significant one take place, the Province submits that NG must show that it would be able to effectively respond to a spill. As set out below, the Province submits that it has failed to do so.

High stream flow, heavy snow at Kitimat

Again, the province appears to accept arguments from Douglas Channel Watch that Enbridge has underestimated the challenges of handling a spill in a remote area. The province also accepts the argument that booms are ineffective in high stream flow in the Kitimat River.

Although it asserts that it will be able to effectively respond to any spill, NG admits that responding to a spill from the pipeline will be challenging. In particular, it admits that a spill into a watercourse at a difficult to access location would present the greatest difficulty for clean-up and remediation…

Many parts of the pipeline will be located in remote areas, located some distance from road networks and population centres. For example, many of the rivers… are identified as remote or having no access. Road access to the pipeline and places where a spill might travel down a watercourse is important to allow for effective spill response…

In some cases, the steepness of the terrain will make responding to spills very challenging. NG acknowledges that the Coast Mountains’ topography is extreme…

As the JRP noted during cross examination by the Province of NG with respect to the Clore River, it has had the opportunity to take a view of the entire route. It will therefore know the steep and rugged terrain through which the pipeline would pass.

The presence of woody debris could also pose a challenge to spill response, requiring a shift of response activities to upstream locations…

If a spill were to occur during a period of high flow conditions, a common occurrence in British Columbia rivers, then some aspects of the response may have to be curtailed, or at least delayed until the high flow event recedes. At certain water velocities, booms become ineffective, and are potentially unsafe to operate.

The presence of heavy snow could also impede access during response operations, requiring use of snowmobiles, snow cats, and helicopters. In the Upper Kitimat and Hoult Creek Valleys, snow accumulation can reach 8-9 metres. However, weather may limit the ability of helicopters to aid in spill response…

Many of these challenges are recognized by NG. In the Preliminary Kitimat River Drainage Area Emergency Preparedness Report (“Kitimat Report”), NG refers to the challenges of winter conditions, avalanches and debris slides, heavy snow, spring melt, Fall freeze-up, patchy ice, and fast-flowing watercourses.

Sinking dilbit

The province also accepts the argument that under some circumstances that diluted bitumen can sink, arguments raised by David Shannon of Douglas Channel Watch.

These challenges are compounded by the fact that in certain conditions diluted bitumen (“dilbit”) can sink in a watercourse. This occurred in the case of Enbridge’s spill in Michigan. This was, as a result, an issue of significant importance to the parties in this proceeding…

The evidence presented by NG in this regard is inconsistent. For example, some evidence it presented suggests that dilbit may sink when it enters water, after a process of weathering; other evidence it has submitted suggests that dilbit will only sink if it combines with sediment. In its response to [a submission by the Haisla Nation] NG states that “If diluted bitumen becomes heavily weathered some oil may sink in fresh water environments.” Similarly, in its response to Dave Shannon’s IR No. 1, NG states that 

Diluted bitumen emulsions will remain buoyant in waters with densities greater than approximately 1.015 g/cc. If the water density drops below approximately 1.015 g/cc,in zones of fresh-water intrusion, weathered and emulsified diluted bitumen products may sink to the depth where the density increases to above 1.015 g/cc.

Similar also is NG’s response to Dr. Weir’s IR No. 2.6, where NG states:

The weathered diluted bitumen would have a density approaching 1.0 g/cc, which indicates that once the diluted bitumen weathers it may be susceptible to sinking in fresh water.

Finally, in the Kitimat Report NG states that:

Examples that may lead to oil not remaining on the water surface include:
• Oils with specific gravities equal to or greater than the receiving medium (fresh- or saltwater)
• Oils that have weathered and, in losing lighter-end fractions, have reached a specific gravity equal to or greater than the receiving water
• Oil that is near the same density as the receiving water and that is characterized as a 3-dimensional flow (non-laminar to turbulent flow such as found in streams, rivers, areas with fast tidal currents, breaking waves)
• Oil with sediment (mixed into oil or adhered to oil droplets)…

…submerged oil may eventually sink with increased weathering, if in receiving water with lower density, or if sufficient sediment is incorporated.

Northern Gateway contradictory

The province’s argument goes on to point more inconsistencies with Northern Gateway’s submission on dilbit in rivers, telling the JRP “In short, what dilbit will do when it enters water remains unclear.”

On the other hand, another NG witness stated that dilbit cannot sink, as this would be contrary to an “immutable fact of physics”. In cross examination, Dr. Horn, Mr. Belore and other witnesses maintained that dilbit will only sink in the presence of suspended solids, or after a long period of weathering.

However, NG’s evidence with respect to the type of sediment that could combine with dilbit to form material that may sink in water is unclear. Dr. Horn testified that “fine grain sediments…provide the greatest amount of surface area which is one of the reasons that oil sank in [Michigan]”. On the other hand, Mr. Belore appeared to suggest that, in the marine context at least, finer sediments reduce the potential for oil to sink as they are lighter. The evidence with respect to the material that may bind to dilbit and contribute to its sinking is unclear…

NG’s views with respect to the flow conditions under which dilbit may sink is also contradictory. On the one hand, it states that “Higher flow rates and increased turbulence typically will entrain more oil into the water column leading to the potential for oil to enter pore spaces in permeable sediments.” On the other, it states that “Oil sinking is unlikely to occur in areas with fast currents…”

Evidence provided by other parties suggests that dilbit may sink when weathered. In particular, Environment Canada’s evidence in this proceeding contrasts sharply with NG’s. For example, Environment Canada states that:

Northern Gateway’s response planning model does not account for sinking oil or for oil suspended particulate matter interactions…For oils with densities close to that of water, like both the diluted bitumen and synthetic crude products, even small amounts of sediment can cause sinking. Environment Canada is concerned that oil sinking and oil-sediment interactions have been
underestimated in the provided scenarios. In the cases of both the Enbridge-Kalamazoo and the Kinder Morgan-Burnaby spills, significant oil-sediment interactions occurred.

The changes to dilbit as it ages in the environment may affect cleanup. Although initially buoyant in water, with exposure to wind and sun, as well as by mixing with water and sediment in the water, the density of dilbit can increase to the point that the oil may sink. Recovery and mitigation options for sunken oils are limited.

Not only has Environment Canada expressed the view that even small amounts of sediment may cause oil to sink, its witness also stated under cross-examination that high velocity rivers may carry high suspended sediment concentrations, and that, at certain times of the year, sediment load could enter the marine environment. Although NG acknowledges that sediment loads and oil-sediment interactions are a critical factor in predicting the behaviour of spilled oil, it has not, in Environment Canada’s opinion, provided a complete baseline data set on sediment loads, despite requests that such data be provided.

While NG has submitted information respecting the laboratory testing of dilbit, an Environment Canada expert testified that tests conducted in a laboratory setting provide only limited information that cannot be relied upon in isolation to predict the fate and behaviour of hydrocarbons spilled into the environment. Instead, information gathered from real spill events must inform the analysis, and consideration must be given to the conditions, including water temperature, suspended sediment concentrations and wind speed, to be encountered in the “real world”.

Environment Canada has also made it very clear that the evidence provided to date by NG does not allow for a full understanding of the behaviour of spilled dilbit. In the opinion of Environment Canada witnesses, the evidence has not provided sufficientclarity with respect to the weathering, evaporation or sedimentation processes dilbit may be subjected to in the environment. Given the unique nature of this product, further research is warranted before one can ascertain whether dilbit will sink or remain on the water surface. Those concerns were echoed by an expert retained by the Gitxaala Nation.

In addition, the evidence of other parties raises the possibility of the need to respond to submerged oil. NUKA research, on behalf of the Haisla Nation, opined that “submission documents overall still grossly underestimate the potential for sunken or submerged oil, particularly for pipeline spills to rivers.” EnviroEmerg Consulting, for the Living Oceans Society summarizes well the uncertainty that remains with respect to the behaviour of oil:

There are no definitive statements in the [Environmental Impact Statement] EIS to explain if bitumen diluted with condensate will emulsify, sink or do both if spilled. The supporting technical data analysis in the EIS is based on laboratory tests. There are no in-situ field tests, empirical studies, nor real incidents to validate these findings. This raises significant uncertainty that current spill response technologies and equipment designed for conventional oil can track and recover the diluted bitumen in temperate marine waters. In essence, the assumption that the diluted bitumen can be recovered on-water has yet to be tested.

In short, what dilbit will do when it enters water remains unclear. NG recognizes this lack of clarity itself. As was stated by one of its witnesses, “it’s extremely difficult to predict the behaviour of this product”.

NG admits that additional research needs to be done with respect to understanding how dilbit behaviour.

The provincial argument concludes:

The Province has serious concerns about the lack of clarity and certainty about what dilbit will do if it were to enter the water, the preliminary and indeed contradictory nature of the evidence with respect to NG’s remediation strategies and actions to address sunken oil, and the fact that its proposed tactics have not been evaluated for use in British Columbia. These factors, taken together, suggest that, at least as of today, NG is not yet prepared to deal with sunken oil in the event there were a spill of dilbit into a British Columbia watercourse. By itself this is a cause for serious concern in relation to the fundamental question in this proceeding, namely whether the JRP should recommend approval of this project. But at the very least, this means that a strong condition must be imposed requiring further research on the behaviour of dilbit.

Spill response only preliminary “All roads are driveable”

The provincial argument says, in italics, that the Northern Gateway’s spill response plans are “only preliminary” and adds Northern Gateway’s plan to provide detail operational plans six months before the beginning of the pipeline operations is not good enough. “It is not possible for NG to assert, nor for the JRP to conclude, that NG will be able to access all those places where a spill may travel, and to respond effectively.”

Despite the challenges to responding to a spill from the pipeline, including the challenge of responding to submerged and sunken oil, NG’s plans for responding to a spill have not yet been developed. NG has committed only to providing its detailed oil spill response plans to the National Energy Board 6 months in advance of operations. In the context of this project, the Province remains very concerned that NG has not yet demonstrated its ability to respond effectively to spills from the pipeline.

When specifically asked “In the absence of that planning…to address the challenges that we’ve been discussing, how is it we are to be confident that Northern Gateway will, in fact, be able to effectively respond to a spill?” NG replied that “There is a lot of work that needs to be done.”

Of particular concern, despite its admission that a spill into a watercourse in a remote location would pose a significant challenge, NG has not yet determined those locations it could access to respond to a spill, including the control points utilized for capturing and recovering oil passing that location. Such access will only be determined, if possible, during detailed planning. At this time, NG also does not know what portion of water bodies would be boat-accessible in the event of a spill. The 2010 Michigan spill, which was the subject of much questioning during the hearing, occurred in a populated area, where there were many potential access locations. This will of course not be the case if a spill were to occur in a remote river in British Columbia.

While NG has prepared a document showing some possible control points that might be used for spill response in the event of a spill in some rivers, NG concedes that its work in this regard is preliminary, and only pertains to some of the control points that would ultimately have to be established. NG helpfully provided additional information to that which was originally filed with respect to the travel distance between pump stations or the terminal and certain potential control points. However, travel times to the control points that have been identified do not take into account mobilization time, and assumes all roads are drivable.

Given the incompleteness of NG’s evidence in this regard, the Province submits that NG cannot currently assert that there would in fact be viable control points where a spill could travel to. In addition, even if accessibility to control points had been fully validated, in order for NG to assert that it could respond effectively to a spill, it would also have to know the means by which personnel and equipment would gain access to respond to oil that had come ashore or sunken to the sediment. Given the preliminary nature of the evidence presented by NG, this is of course not known.

The Province is very concerned that, in the event of a spill, some places where a spill could reach will be inaccessible, and therefore not amenable to spill recovery actions. While NG states that it will be able to access control points at any location along the pipeline, it has simply not provided the evidence in this proceeding to substantiate this assertion. The Province submits that, as of today, it is not possible for NG to assert, nor for the JRP to conclude, that NG will be able to access all those places where a spill may travel, and to respond effectively.

In addition to access, there are a number of other challenges to operating in British
Columbia in respect of which NG has completed only very preliminary work.

• The pipeline could be covered by heavy snow at different times of the year; NG states that it will have to review alternative methods of access to deal with this, but has presented no specific evidence on how this challenge will be addressed.
• NG has not yet developed specific plans about how it would deal with oil recovered from a spill, and has not yet determined disposal locations.
• NG has not yet determined the location or the contents of the equipment caches to be used to respond to spills.
• It has not determined year-round access to the pipeline, which will be evaluated as part of detailed planning.

Kitimat River response

The province takes a harsh look at Northern Gateway’s plan for a response on the Upper Kitimat River and Hunter Creek.

Similarly, the Province is concerned about the ability of NG to respond to a spill in the Upper Kitimat Valley. When asked by the Douglas Channel Watch

“…in the context of the Upper Kitimat Valley, does this mean because of the steepness of the terrain and limited road access to the river, that containment at some locations at the source will be impossible, and the majority of your efforts will be at the first accessible locations downstream?”

NG was only able to reply that:

“again it depends on the specific conditions. But as Dr. Taylor indicated, in the development of the response plans we would need to look at various scenarios, various times of year, develop plans so that it would identify the appropriate response locations at those times.”

NG’s targeted spill response time of 6-12 hours needs to be set against the reality that, in the case of a watercourse spill, oil may travel many kilometres downstream while NG is still mobilizing. In this proceeding NG has provided considerable information with respect to how far and fast oil can travel in a watercourse. For example, with a spill into Hunter Creek, NG has stated:

Based on water velocities, a release at this location could reach the Kitimat River estuary 60 km downstream within four to ten hours, depending on river discharge.

Dr. Horn has indicated that these figures are very conservative, and that the actual times to reach Kitimat would be a longer period. However, no other definitive evidence on these times was presented by NG.

Enbridge doesn’t learn from its mistakes

The provincial argument then goes on to say, again in italics, Enbridge does not follow procedures or learn from mistakes and concludes “while NG asserts that its spill detection systems will be world-class, it has not yet chosen to adopt spill detection technologies that would achieve that objective.”

The provincial argument goes over Enbridge’s spill record in detail, including the Marshall, Michigan spill which was harshly criticized by the US National Transportation Safety Board.

Concerns about NG’s inability to respond to a spill are magnified by Enbridge’s conduct with respect to the spill which took place in Michigan. NG concedes that, in that case, there were procedures in place that were not followed. NG asserts that it now has in place a number of “golden rules”, including that whenever there is a doubt with respect to whether the spill detection system has detected a leak, the pipeline must be shut down. However, NG concedes that this rule was in place before the Michigan spill; it self-evidently was not followed. In fact, the rule under which Enbridge would shut down its pipeline system within 10 minutes of an abnormal occurrence which could be immediately analyzed was put into place following a spill in 1991. At that time, similar commitments were made indicating that procedures would change and that a spill of that nature wouldn’t take place again….

despite the fact that the relevant technologies had been in existence for some
10 years, and despite the existence of crack-related failures that led to the development of such technologies, Enbridge had failed to put in place a program that would have detected the Marshall spill

The province wraps up the response saying by telling the JRP:

In short, if NG is relying on its ability to respond effectively to a spill for a positive recommendation from the JRP, then it must show that it will in fact have that ability. The Province submits that NG has not shown that ability in this proceeding.

The Province submits that requiring NG to show now that it will in fact have the ability to respond effectively to a spill is particularly important because there will be no subsequent public process in which that ability can be probed and tested. NG has pointed out that its oil spill response plans will be provided to the NEB for review, and has committed to a third party audit of its plans. However, it also acknowledges that there will be no means by which those plans could be tested through a public process.

On the pipeline project, BC concludes

The Province submits that the evidence on the record does not support NG’s contention that it will have a world-class spill response capability in place. The challenges posed by the pipeline route, the nature of the product being shipped, the conceptual nature of its plans to date and Enbridge’s track record mean that the Province is not able to support the project’s approval at this time. The Province submits that its concerns in this regard should be seriously considered by the JRP as it considers the recommendation it will be making to the federal government.

From the Orange Coast: The pollsters lost big in the BC election–but not for the reason everyone is talking about

Updated with clarification

The pollsters were the biggest losers in the British Columbia provincial election on May 14—but not in the way everyone is talking about.

It’s clear to the Wednesday morning quarterbacks that the big issue in BC was the economy, and voters chose that economy over the environment.

That’s where the pollsters failed and have failed time and time again for the past decade. As long as the pollsters keep asking the stupid question “What’s more important the environment or the economy?” a majority of voters, especially in uncertain times, will choose the economy. Politicians will campaign, as Christy Clark did brilliantly, by promising that there are better economic days ahead, putting the environment far down the priority  list.

By the time Canadians and all human beings realize that a viable economy is based on a sustainable environment it may be too late to save either.

The Liberal majority under Christy Clark was a big surprise; the polling data indicated, at first, that there would be a big NDP majority and in the final days that the Adrian Dix and the NDP would sneak into the Legislature still in majority territory.

Instead, Christy Clark, who until (if) she finds a seat, will be running the province as premier from the legislature galleries.

The BC free-enterprise coalition is satisfied, for the moment. The usual cabal of University of Calgary economic pundits are cheering for their sponsors in the oil patch, with the National Post,  Globe and Mail  and Sunmedia acting as their echo chamber. (Why the eastern media insist on always having Calgary academics write about BC is rather mind boggling. If they want ultra conservative BC point of view, there’s always the Fraser Institute, but even the Fraser Institute is junior to Alberta it seems)

The trouble is that the eastern establishment mainstream media are as out of touch as the pollsters.  The Globe and Mail editorial, like most of the eastern media, once again sees British Columbia as nothing more than a junior partner in Confederation, existing to serve the interests of Alberta, with the concerns about our future secondary.

 It now falls to Ms. Clark, who was cagey about her position on the Trans Mountain project, to take an objective look at the proposal, let go of her populist, B.C.-first rhetoric, and ensure that her government is an open-minded partner with Alberta in its bid to get its oil to tidewaters for export. Any reviews of the pipeline project must be done quickly and with a deadline.

It’s just plain unmitigated arrogance, but rather typical,  to tell a premier who just won  a majority in the legislature and the popular vote to “let go of her populist BC-first rhetoric.”

 

Christy Clark
Christy Clark laughs at a joke at the Kitimat Valley Institute, April 4, 2013, where she announced her plan to eliminate the provincial debt in 15 years via taxes and other payments from LNG (Robin Rowland)

The liquifaction factor

There’s one big problem, a very big problem, with Clark’s promises. She opened her campaign in Kitimat by promising that the liquified natural gas developments will not only slay the deficit but pay down the BC provincial debt in 15 years.

I asked Clark in the media scrum after her announcement how she could make such a prediction when the LNG market is so volatile. She replied that her predictions were based on very conservative estimates. That was spin.

Clark based her election campaign on a promise that not only hopes to foretell the future for the next fifteen years but on liquifaction.

Now liquifaction has two meanings. First is the freezing of natural gas to LNG. Second is the problem that occurs during an earthquake when water saturated ground turns into a liquid, bringing about the collapse of countless buildings with the death and injury that follows.
Clark based her campaign on the hope that the LNG market will not liquify—as in the second meaning.

The LNG market looked so simple two years ago. Buy natural gas at low North American prices, pipeline it to the west coast, load it on tankers and sell it in Asia at the higher natural gas price there which is based on the price of oil. But, wait, the free market doesn’t work that way (sorry free enterprise coalition). Customers in Asia don’t want to pay the full oil-based price for natural gas if they can get it via the US Gulf ports at a cost plus North American price. If the export price of LNG falls, even if the BC projects proceed, the price will be a lot lower than Clark and the energy cheerleaders expect and there will be no new golden age for the BC economy.

Changes in the LNG market are happening at warp speed and it is hard to keep up (And many people in Kitimat are trying to keep up with the daily volatility since the future of the town may depend on LNG). Unfortunately, the dying mainstream media failed to explain, even in the simplest terms, that Christy Clark’s LNG promises might be as empty as a mothballed tanker. This is one case where concentrating on the horse race—and the grossly inaccurate polls—was a blunder, when there should have been reality checks on the LNG promise. The conservative cheerleaders in the media actually didn’t do their readers much good when they failed as  reporters to check out the real state of the energy industry or predicted economic catastrophe if there was an NDP victory.

The NDP failure

The NDP campaign under Adrian Dix was not up to its appointed task of explaining the need for both a viable economy and a sustainable environment.  Most pundits point to Dix’s  mid-campaign switch to opposing the Kinder Morgan pipeline expansion as the beginning of the NDP decline.

More telling, for me, was Dix’s failure to explain the proposed two-year moratorium on fracking. There are lots of moratoriums and holds on fracking in North America and around the world. The Canadian media, however, failed miserably (if it even bothered to check) that fracking moratoriums are becoming a standard, although controversial, practice worldwide. A moratorium on fracking today is prudent given the uncertainty over current practices.

Yes, fracking has been used for 50 years but on a much smaller scale. There are two new factors. First is the sheer volume of operations, with no idea what the massive increase in fracking will do to the environment, especially the ground water. Second is the stubborn refusal of companies to release proprietary information on the chemicals they use—the same “public be damned”  attitude toward environmental concerns that has got pipeline companies in trouble as well.

Christy Clark and the conservative commentators successfully painted the fracking moratorium as stopping all economic development in the province. Dix and the NDP completely failed to emphasize that their platform was that the party wanted industrial development in the province, but didn’t want to rush into development that will cost the province and its taxpayers down the road. (And taxpayers will eventually have to pay to clean up unfettered development long after the companies that profited have left town, something deficit and debt hawks always conveniently ignore.)

The Orange Coast

The Orange coast
BC election map shows the coastal areas where tankers and pipelines are the biggest issue went solidly for the NDP

As Tyler Noble (formerly with CFTK News and now with the District of Kitimat) pointed out in a Facebook post, the electoral map shows perhaps the real story of the election. The British Columbia coast is entirely NDP orange. The Interior of BC went Liberal. The fight over tankers and pipelines is not going to go away with the result of this election, it’s going to get louder and a lot nastier.

So the University of Calgary pundits, the conservative columnists and editorialists from Calgary to Toronto and the Globe and Mail editorial board will soon have to forget their cheers and go back to complaining about the BC peasants who have to be “educated” about how good pipelines are for the economy.

The polls

The pollsters are now trying to find out what went wrong, and beginning to ask how to find out who will actually turn up at the voting booth?

Even with the problems pollsters face with call display refusals, fewer landlines and the possible unreliability of internet panel polling, even with the flawed polling data some things are clear.

The turnout, as currently reported, was 52 per cent. The student vote (an actual vote) went heavily to the NDP and the Greens. Part of the student vote result is traditionally, younger people generally tend to vote “progressive” parties. Young people, increasingly disillusioned by partisan politics, are not turning out to actually vote. With high unemployment among millennials and teenagers, these potential voters want jobs, but they’re also worried about the future of the planet. They’re not turning out to vote because many say they have no one to vote for (despite the appeals of the NDP and the Greens.)

Many older people, both on the left and the right are trapped in an obsolete world view of progressive views versus big business or the dreaded socialism versus free enterprise. Older people, worried about their economic future do vote and are often more small c conservative.

Clark campaigned on that paradigm and she won.

Be careful for what you wish for.

The failure of the economy vs environment question

It may be that by the next federal election in 2015 and by the next BC election in 2017, there might be, it is hoped, a profound change in the political narrative. If the pollsters hadn’t asked that obsolete and stupid question about the environment verus the economy, business versus socialism, they might actually have had some good data in this election.

The times, as Bob Dylan sang, they are a changing. The paradigm is shifting. In just the past few months there are hints of the rise of a growing “green conservative” movement.

Preston Manning, the founder and first leader of the Reform Party is now promoting the “green conservative”

In the United States, green conservatives are adding to the ruptures in the Republican Party. There is even a branch of the Christian Coalition, that is splintering because it too supports the idea of green values because it sees green as supporting family values, helping the poor and the idea of stewardship.

We see lots of green conservatives here in northwest BC among the hunters, fishers and fishing guides and those who work in the industrial sector who like hunting, fishing, hiking and boating. Did they vote for the NDP or the Liberals?  Usually the sample size in northwest BC is too small, but drilling down might indicate that there were  enough green conservatives who voted for what should now be called the Orange Coast.

If Adrian Dix and the NDP had campaigned effectively with an eye on the green conservatives, there might actually be an NDP majority. If Christy Clark actually keeps her hints of a possible tilt toward green conservatism and moves away from the free enterprise at any cost faction of the Liberals (including that 801 coalition that died at 802), she might actually be in for a long run as BC premier.

If, on the other hand, as the Globe and Mail advocates this morning, if Clark does move,  bowing to Alberta’s demands, toward more unfettered development, as environmentalists fear and the aging free entrerprisers would love, the next provincial election will be one to watch, perhaps with the Greens filling a vacuum created by the Liberals and the NDP.

As for the pollsters, there have been two major failures in Canada, the BC and Alberta elections. The pollsters were wrong about the Israeli election as well, which means polling failure is not confined to Canadian politics. It’s time for the pollsters to stand down, go back to the beginning, and take a look at all their practices, including the basic questions they are asking and to wonder if the questions reflect an unconscious bias in favour of the party paying for the poll (good professional pollsters do usually try to avoid open bias question sequences).

If the polling companies don’t change, they too will soon follow the dying mainstream media into oblivion, so neither will be around to see a possible future where the concerns for the environment are a given and the debate is over the real solution to stave off catastrophe.

 

This post has been updated to clarify that those who I call Conservative cheerleaders failed to be clear about the energy industry, not the overall campaign.

 

 

 

 

 

 

“No need to scare people” about tanker disasters, Transport Minister tells Commons

“There is no need to scare people,” about tankers, Transport Minister Denis Lebel told the House of Commons on Thursday, March 28.

Lebel was answering a question from Skeena Bulkley Valley MP and NDP House Leader Nathan Cullen.

The official transcript from Hansard records Cullen’s question about the federal government’s unexpected declaration that Kitimat would become a public port.

Mr. Speaker, last week, in their panic to ram a bitumen pipeline through to British Columbia’s north coast, the Conservatives simply decreed that they would take over the Port of Kitimat. Rather than picking up the phone and talking with the local council or the Haisla Nation, the government parachuted in a minister from Toronto to make the announcement. There was no consultation, no respect, just bulldozers.
We see again the fundamental disrespect the government has for first nations here today. Now the Conservatives are scrambling, saying that they will consult after they have clearly made up their minds, the exact approach they take on the pipeline. When will the government start to respect the people of the northwest?

Lebel replied in French, and as is usual in Question Period did not answer Cullen’s question.

The official translation in Hansard reads.

Mr. Speaker, last week we announced the creation of an expert panel. These people will work together to think of how to improve things.
We have a very good system for dealing with oil spills. We will continue to move forward and keep everyone safe.
Canada has not had any major oil spills in its history. There is no need to scare people. We will continue to work on measures.
I thank all members of the panel led by Mr. Houston for their ability to find solutions.

This Youtube video shows Cullen’s question and Lebel’s response. The live translation is a little different, but the effect is the same.


Cullen later issued a news release commenting

Cullen’s question came on the heels of reports that neither Kitimat Council nor the Haisla Nation were consulted in advance of the federal government’s decision to take over the Kitimat port. The move represents an apparent ongoing tendency by the Conservative federal government to offer consultation with communities and First Nations, but only after they’ve already made their decision.

Cullen later reflected that, regardless of one’s position on the Northern Gateway pipeline, open and prior consultation is crucial to fostering good governance and the trust of the general public. By contrast, said Cullen, “the Conservatives are writing the book on how to ignore communities and First Nations, and damage public faith. This is just the latest chapter.”

Denis Lebel represents that land locked Quebec riding of  Roberval—Lac-Saint-Jean. The riding does have Lac St. Jean which is described in Wikipedia as

a large, relatively shallow lake in south-central Quebec, Canada, in the Laurentian Highlands. It is situated 206 kilometres north of the Saint Lawrence River, into which it drains via the Saguenay River. It covers an area of 1,053 km2 (407 sq mi), and is 63.1 m (207 ft) at its deepest point.

It is unlikely there will ever be a Very Large Crude Carrier on Lac St. Jean.

In its earliest statements the Harper Conservatives were careful to say that there had never been a tanker disaster on the west coast. Now, in its Orwellian fashion, the government is now saying “Canada has not had any major oil spills in its history.”

That statement, of course, ignores the Arrow tanker disaster off  Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia on  February 4, 1970, which the Environment Canada website, (as of April 1, 2013), describes this way

the calamity had reached catastrophic proportions. Out of the 375 statute miles of shoreline in the Bay area, 190 miles had been contaminated in varying degrees.

The Maritime Musem of the Atlantic wreck site describes a double barreled disaster where the oil was transferred to the Irving Whale, which later sank

There is also this report from a student at St Francis Xavier university.

 Related:

Analysis: The Harper government’s week of history-making blunders

Analysis: The Harper government’s week of history-making blunders

The Panama registered bulk carrier  Azuma Phoenix is seen tied up at Kitimat harbour seen on the afternoon of Jan 9, 201. In March 2013. the federal government announced it was making the private port of Kitimat into a public port,  (Robin Rowland)
The Panama registered bulk carrier Azuma Phoenix is seen tied up at Kitimat harbour on the afternoon of Jan 9, 2012. In March 2013. the federal government announced it was making the private port of Kitimat into a public port. (Robin Rowland)

When the story of the Stephen Harper government is told, historians will say that the week of March 17 to 23, 2013, is remembered, not for the release of a lacklustre federal budget, but for day after day of political blunders that undermined Harper’s goal of making a Canada what the Conservatives call a resource superpower.

It was a week where spin overcame substance and spun out of control.

The Conservative government’s aim was, apparently, to increase support for the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline project with a spin campaign aimed at moving the middle ground in British Columbia from anti-project to pro-project and at the same time launching a divide and conquer strategy aimed at BC and Alberta First Nations.

It all backfired. If on Monday, March 17, 2013, the troubled and controversial Enbridge Northern Gateway project was on the sick list, by Friday, March 23, the Enbridge pipeline and tanker scheme was added to the Do Not Resuscitate list, all thanks to political arrogance, blindfolded spin and bureaucratic incompetence. The standard boogeymen for conservative media in Canada (who always add the same sentence to their stories on the Northern Gateway) “First Nations and environmentalists who oppose the project” had nothing to do with it.

Stephen Harper has tight control of his party and the government, and in this case the billion bucks stop at the Prime Minister’s Office. He has only himself to blame.

All of this happened on the northern coast of British Columbia, far out of range of the radar of the national media and the Ottawa pundit class (most of whom, it must be admitted, were locked up in an old railway station in the nation’s capital, trying interpret Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s spreadsheets).

The story begins early on that Monday morning, at my home base in Kitimat, BC, the proposed terminal for Northern Gateway, when a news release pops into my e-mail box, advising that Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver would be in nearby Terrace early on Tuesday morning for an announcement and photo op.

I started making calls, trying to find out if anyone in Kitimat knew about Oliver’s visit to Terrace and if the minister planned to come to Kitimat.

Visitors to Kitimat

I made those calls because in the past two years, Kitimat has seen a parade of visitors checking out the town and the port’s industrial and transportation potential. The visitors range from members of the BC provincial Liberal cabinet to the staff of the Chinese consulate in Vancouver to top executives of some of the world’s major transnational corporations (and not just in the energy sector). Most of these visits, which usually include meetings with the District of Kitimat Council and District senior staff as well as separate meetings with the Council of the Haisla Nation, are usually considered confidential. There are no photo ops or news conferences. If the news of a visit is made public, (not all are), those visits are usually noted, after the fact, by Mayor Joanne Monaghan at the next public council meeting.

It was quickly clear from my calls that no one in an official capacity in Kitimat knew that, by the next morning, Oliver would be Terrace, 60 kilometres up Highway 37. No meetings in Kitimat, on or off the record, were scheduled with the Minister of Natural Resources who has been talking about Kitimat ever since he was appointed to the Harper cabinet.

I was skeptical about that afternoon’s announcement/photo op in Vancouver by Transport Minister Denis Lebel and Oliver about the “world class” tanker monitoring.

After all, there had been Canadian Coast Guard cutbacks on the northwest coast even before Stephen Harper got his majority government. The inadequacy of oil spill response on the British Columbia coast had been condemned both by  former Auditor General Sheila Fraser and in the United States Senate. The government stubbornly closed and dismantled the Kitsilano Coast Guard station. It’s proposing that ocean traffic control for the Port of Vancouver be done remotely from Victoria,  with fixed cameras dotted around the harbour.  Leaving controllers in Vancouver would, of course, be the best solution, but they must be sacrificed (along with any ship that get’s into trouble in the future, on the altar of a balanced budget).

The part of the announcement that said there would be increased air surveillance is nothing more than a joke (or spin intended just for the Conservative base in Alberta, Saskatchewan and the Toronto suburbs,that is not anyone familiar with BC coastal waters). Currently the Transport Canada surveillance aircraft are used on the coasts to look for vessels that are illegally dumping bilge or oil off shore. As CBC’s Paul Hunter reported in 2010, Transport Canada aircraft were used after the Gulf of Mexico oil disaster to map where the oil was going after it erupted from the Deepwater Horizon. 

Given the stormy weather on the west coast (when Coast Guard radio frequently warns of “hurricane force winds”) it is highly unlikely that the surveillance aircraft would even be flying in the conditions that could cause a major tanker disaster. Aerial surveillance, even in good weather, will never prevent a tanker disaster caused by human error.

I got my first chance to look at the Transport Canada website in late afternoon and that’s when a seemingly innocuous section made me sit up and say “what is going on?” (I actually said something much stronger).

Public port

Public port designations: More ports will be designated for traffic control measures, starting with Kitimat.

(Transport Canada actually spelled the name wrong—it has since been fixed—as you can see in this screen grab).

Screengrab from Transport Canada website

Kitimat has been one of the few private ports in Canada since the Alcan smelter was built and the town founded 60 years ago (the 60th anniversary of the incorporation of the District of Kitimat is March 31, 2013).

The reasons for the designation of Kitimat as a private port go back to a complicated deal between the province of British Columbia and Alcan in the late 1940s as the two were negotiating about electrical power, the aluminum smelter, the building of the town and the harbour.

For 60 years, Alcan, later Rio Tinto Alcan, built, paid for and operated the port as a private sector venture. For a time, additional docks were also operated by Eurocan and Methanex. After Eurocan closed its Kitimat operation that dock was purchased by the parent company Rio Tinto. The Methanex dock was purchased by Royal Dutch Shell last year for its proposed LNG operation.

The announcement that Kitimat was to become a public port was also something that the national media would not recognize as significant unless they are familiar with the history of the port. That history is known only to current and former residents of Kitimat and managers at Rio Tinto Alcan.

The port announcement came so much out of left field; so to speak, that I had doubts it was accurate. In other words, I couldn’t believe it. I went to Monday evening’s meeting of District of Kitimat Council and at the break between the open and in-camera sessions, I asked council members if they had heard about Kitimat being redesignated a public port. The members of the district council were as surprised as I had been.

Back from the council meeting, I checked the Transport Canada news release and backgrounders. I also checked the online version of Bill C-57, the enabling act for the changes announced earlier that day. There was no mention of Kitimat in Bill C-57.

Harper government outlines new tanker safety measures for west coast

Confirmation

Tuesday morning I drove to Terrace for Joe Oliver’s 9 am photo op and the announcement at Northwest Community College (NWCC) that the government had appointed Douglas Eyford as a special envoy to First Nations for energy projects, an attempt on the surface to try and get First Nations onside for the pipeline projects, an appointment seen by some First Nations leaders as an attempt by the Harper government to divide and conquer.

As an on site reporter, I got to ask Oliver two questions before the news conference went to the national media on the phones.

In answer to my first question, Oliver confirmed that the federal government had decided to make Kitimat a public port, saying in his first sentence: “What the purpose is to make sure that the absolute highest standards of marine safety apply in the port of Kitimat.” He then returned to message track saying, “we have as I announced yesterday and I had spoken about before at the port of Vancouver we have an extremely robust marine safety regime in place but we want to make sure that as resource development continues and as technology improves, we are at the world class level. As I also mentioned there has never been off the coast of British Columbia a major tanker spill and we want to keep that perfect record.”

For my second question, I asked Oliver if he planned to visit Kitimat.

He replied. “Not in this particular visit, I have to get back [to Ottawa] There’s a budget coming and I have to be in the House for that but I certainly expect to be going up there.”

The question may not have registered with the national media on the conference call. For the local reporters and leaders in the room at Waap Galts’ap, the long house at Terrace’s Northwest Community College, everyone knew that Kitimat had been snubbed.

Oliver confirms Kitimat to become a public port

Back in Kitimat, I sent an e-mail to Colleen Nyce, the local spokesperson for Rio Tinto Alcan noting that Joe Oliver had confirmed that the federal government intended to make the RTA-run port a public port. I asked if RTA had been consulted and if the company had any comment.

Nyce replied that she was not aware of the announcement and promised to “look into this on our end.” I am now told by sources that it is believed that my inquiry to Nyce was the first time Rio Tinto Alcan, one of Canada’s biggest resource companies, had heard that the federal government was taking over its port.

The next day, Kitimat Mayor Joanne Monaghan told local TV news on CFTK the Kitimat community was never consulted about the decision and she added that she still hadn’t been able to get anyone with the federal government to tell her more about the plan.

Who pays for the navigation aids?

Meanwhile, new questions were being raised in Kitimat about two other parts of the Monday announcement.

New and modified aids to navigation: The CCG will ensure that a system of aids to navigation comprised of buoys, lights and other devices to warn of obstructions and to mark the location of preferred shipping routes is installed and maintained.
Modern navigation system: The CCG will develop options for enhancing Canada’s current navigation system (e.g. aids to navigation, hydrographic charts, etc) by fall 2013 for government consideration.

Since its first public meeting in Kitimat, in documents filed with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel, in public statements and advertising, Enbridge has been saying for at least the past four years that the company would pay for all the needed upgrades to aids to navigation on Douglas Channel, Wright Sound and other areas for its tanker traffic. It is estimated that those navigation upgrades would cost millions of dollars.

Now days before a federal budget that Jim Flaherty had already telegraphed as emphasizing restraint, it appeared that the Harper government, in its desperation to get approval for energy exports, was going to take over funding for the navigation upgrades from the private sector and hand the bill to the Canadian taxpayer.

Kitimat harbour

RTA not consulted

On Thursday morning, I received an e-mail from Colleen Nyce with a Rio Tinto Alcan statement, noting:

This announcement was not discussed with Rio Tinto Alcan in advance. We are endeavoring to have meetings with the federal government to gain clarity on this announcement as it specifically relates to our operations in Kitimat.

Nyce also gave a similar statement to CFTK and other media. A Francophone RTA spokesperson in Quebec did the same for Radio Canada.

On Friday morning, Mayor Monaghan told Andrew Kurjata on CBC’s Daybreak North that she had had at that time no response to phone calls and e-mails asking for clarification of the announcement. Monaghan also told CBC that Kitimat’s development officer Rose Klukas had tried to “get an audience with minister and had been unable to.” (One reason may be that Oliver’s staff was busy. They ordered NWCC staff to rearrange the usual layout of the chairs at Waap Galts’ap, the long house, to get a better background for the TV cameras for Oliver’s statement).

Joe Oliver
Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver (front far right) answers questions after his news conference at the Northwest Community College Long House, March 19, 2013. (Robin Rowland)

Monaghan told Kurjata, “I feel like it’s a slap in the face because we’re always being told that we’re the instrument for the whole world right now because Kitimat is supposed to be the capital of the economy right now. So I thought we’d have a little more clout by now and they’d at least tell us they were going to do this. There was absolutely no consultation whatsoever.”

By Friday afternoon, five days after the announcement, Transport Canada officials finally returned the calls from Mayor Monaghan and Rose Klukas promising to consult Kitimat officials in the future.

Monaghan said that Transport Canada told her that it would take at least one year because the change from a private port to a public port requires a change in legislation.

Transport Canada is now promising “extensive public and stakeholder consultation will occur before the legislation is changed,” the mayor was told.

On this Mayor Monaghan commented, “It seems to me that now they want to do consultation….sort of like closing the barn door after all of the cows got out!”

Transport Canada promises consultation on Kitimat port five days after announcement it will become public

 

Blunder after blunder after blunder

Blunder No 1. Pulling the rug out from Northern Gateway

Joe Oliver and the Harper government sent a strong political signal to Kitimat on Tuesday; (to paraphrase an old movie) your little town doesn’t amount of a hill of beans in this crazy world.

Not that attitude is new for the people of Kitimat. The Northern Gateway Joint Review panel snubbed the town, bypassing Kitimat for Prince George and Prince Rupert for the current questioning hearings. Publisher David Black has been touting a refinery 25 kilometres north of Kitimat to refine the bitumen, but has never bothered to meet the people of Kitimat.

There are a tiny handful of people in Kitimat openly in favour of the Northern Gateway project. A significant minority are on the fence and some perhaps leaning toward acceptance of the project. There is strong opposition and many with a wait and see attitude. (Those in favour will usually only speak on background, and then when you talk to them most of those “in favour” have lists of conditions. If BC Premier Christy Clark has five conditions, many of these people have a dozen or more).

Oliver was speaking in Terrace, 60 kilometres from Kitimat. It is about a 40 to 45 minute drive to Kitimat over a beautiful stretch of highway, with views of lakes, rivers and mountains.

Scenic Highway 37 is the route to the main location not only for the controversial Northern Gateway pipeline but three liquefied natural gas projects, not to mention David Black’s proposed refinery half way between Terrace and Kitimat.

Why wouldn’t Kitimat be a must stop on the schedule for the Minister of Natural Resources? In Terrace, Oliver declared that Kitimat was to become a public port, run by the federal government. Although technically that would be the responsibility of Denis Lebel, the Minister of Transport, one has to wonder why the Minister of Natural Resources would not want to see the port that is supposedly vital to Canada’s economy? You have to ask why he didn’t want to meet the representatives of the Haisla Nation, the staff and council of the District of Kitimat and local business leaders?

Oliver has been going across Canada, the United States and to foreign countries promoting pipelines and tanker traffic, pipelines that would terminate at Kitimat and tankers that would send either bitumen or liquefied natural gas to customers in Asia.

Yet the Minister of Natural Resources is too important, too busy to take a few hours out of his schedule, while he is in the region,  to actually visit the town he has been talking about for years.

He told me that he had to be in Ottawa for the budget. Really? The budget is always the finance minister’s show and tell (with a little help from whomever the Prime Minister is at the time). On budget day, Oliver would have been nothing more than a background extra whenever the television cameras “dipped in” on the House of Commons, between stories from reporters and experts who had been in the budget lockup.

According to the time code on my video camera, Oliver’s news conference wrapped at 9:50 a.m., which certainly gave the minister and his staff plenty of time to drive to Kitimat, meet with the representatives of the District, the Haisla Nation and the Chamber of Commerce and still get to Vancouver for a late flight back to Ontario.

On Tuesday, Joe Oliver’s snub pulled the political rug out from under the Northern Gateway supporters and fence sitters in Kitimat. Oliver’s snub showed those few people in Kitimat that if they do go out on a limb to support the Northern Gateway project, the Conservatives would saw off that limb so it can be used as a good background prop for a photo op.

Prince Rupert, Terrace and Smithers councils have all voted against the Northern Gateway project. Kitimat Council, despite some clear divisions, has maintained a position of absolute neutrality.  Kitimat Council will continue to be officially neutral until after the Joint Review report, but this week you could hear the air slowly leaking out of the neutrality balloon.

Oliver may still believe, as he has frequently said, that the only people who oppose Northern Gateway are dangerous radicals paid by foreign foundations.

What he did on Tuesday was to make the opposition to Northern Gateway in Kitimat into an even more solid majority across the political spectrum.

Blunder No 2. Rio Tinto Alcan

It doesn’t do much for the credibility of a minister of natural resources to thoroughly piss off, for no good reason, the world’s second largest mining and smelting conglomerate, Rio Tinto. But that’s just what Joe Oliver did this week.

I am not one to usually have much sympathy with rich, giant, transnational corporations.

But look at this way, over the past 60 years Alcan and now Rio Tinto Alcan have invested millions upon millions of dollars in building and maintaining the Kitimat smelter and the port of Kitimat. RTA is now completing the $3.3 billion Kitimat Modernization Project. Then without notice, or consultation, the Conservative government—the Conservative government—announces it is going to take over RTA’s port operations. What’s more, if what Transport Canada told Mayor Joanne Monaghan is correct, the federal government is going to start charging RTA fees to use the port it has built and operated for 60 years.

Construction at Rio Tinto Alcan

There are problems between the people of Kitimat and RTA to be sure; the closing of the town’s only beach last summer was one problem (a problem that was eventually resolved.)

Too often RTA’s London headquarters acts like it is still the nineteenth century and the senior executives are like British colonialists dictating to the far reaches of the Empire on what do to do.

No matter what you think of RTA, it boggles the mind, whether you are right wing, left wing or mushy middle, that the federal government simply issues a press release–a press release– with not even a phone call, not even a visit (even to corporate headquarters) saying “Hey RTA, we’re taking over.”

There’s one thing that you can be sure of, Rio Tinto Alcan’s lobbyists are going to be earning their fees in the coming weeks.

(One more point, even if there wasn’t a single pipeline project planned for Kitimat you would think that the Minister of Natural Resources would want to see what is currently the largest and most expensive construction project in Canada, a project that comes under his area of political responsibility).

Blunder No 3. The Haisla Nation

Douglas Channel is in the traditional territory of the Haisla Nation. The KM LNG project at Bish Cove is on Haisla Reserve No. 6  legally designated an industrial development by the federal government. Any changes to that project and to the Kitimat waterfront as a whole will require intensive negotiations with the Haisla Nation.

Blunder No 4. The state of Canadian democracy

It took five days, from the time of the minister’s news conference on Monday until Friday afternoon, for officials in Transport Canada to return phone calls from Mayor Joanne Monaghan and Rose Klukas, to explain what was going to happen to the Port of Kitimat.

This week was yet another example of the decay of Canadian democracy under Stephen Harper. Executives from Tokyo to Houston to the City of London quickly return phone calls from the District of Kitimat, after all Kitimat is where the economic action is supposed to be. At the same time, the federal government doesn’t return those calls, it shows that something really is rotten in our state.

Blunder No 5. LNG

There are three liquefied natural gas projects slated for Kitimat harbour, the Chevron-Apache partnership in KM LNG, now under construction at Bish Cove; the Royal Dutch Shell project based on the old Methanex site and the barge based BC LNG partnership that will work out of North Cove.

None of these projects have had the final go ahead from the respective company board of directors. So has the federal government thrown the proverbial monkey wrench into these projects? Will making Kitimat a public port to promote Enbridge, help or hinder the LNG projects? Did the Ministry of Natural Resources even consider the LNG projects when they made the decision along with Transport Canada to take over the port?

And then there’s…..

Kitimat has a marina shortage, especially since RTA closed the Moon Bay Marina. The only one left, the MK Bay Marina, which is straining from overcapacity, is owned by the Kitimat-Stikine Regional District. That means there will be another level of government in any talks and decisions on the future of the Kitimat harbour. There are also the controversial raw log exports from nearby Minette Bay.

Although Transport Canada has promised “extensive public and stakeholder consultation,” one has to wonder how much input will be allowed for the residents of Kitimat and region, especially the guiding and tourism industries as well as recreational boaters. After all, the Harper government is determined to make Kitimat an export port for Alberta and the experience of the past couple of years has shown that people of northwest count for little in that process. Just look at the Northern Gateway Joint Review, which more and more people here say has no credibility.

Big blunder or more of the same?

I’ve listed five big blunders that are the result of the decision by the Harper government to turn Kitimat into a public port.

Are they really blunders or just more of the same policies we’ve seen from Stephen Harper since he became a majority prime minister?

This is a government that has muzzled scientific research and the exchange of scientific ideas. The minister who was in the northwest last week, who has demonized respect for the environment, is now squeezing the words “science” and “environment” anywhere into any message track or speech anyway he can.

The government closes the busiest and most effective coast guard station at Kitsilano without consulting a single municipal or provincial official in British Columbia. The government closes two of Canada’s crown jewels of scientific research, the Experimental Lakes Area in Ontario and the Polar Environmental Research Laboratory in Nunavut. Keeping the coast guard station and the two science projects open and funded would be a drop in the deficit bucket at a time that the government is spending countless millions of taxpayers’ dollars in promoting itself on every television channel in Canada.

That’s just the point. Joe Oliver’s fly-in, fly-out trip to Terrace was not supposed to have any substance. Changing the chairs at the Waap Galts’ap long house showed that it was more important to the Harper government to have some northwest coast wall art behind Joe Oliver for his photo op than it was to engage meaningfully with the northwest, including major corporations, First Nations and local civic and business leaders.

Joe Oliver’s visit to Terrace was an example of government by reality television. The decision to change the private port of Kitimat into a public port was another example of Harper’s government by decree without consulting a single stakeholder. The problem is, of course, that for decades to come, it will be everyone in northwest British Columbia who will be paying for those 30 second sound bites I recorded on Tuesday.


Epilogue: Alcan’s legacy for the socialist Prime Minister, Stephen Harper

If an NDP or Liberal government had done what Harper and Oliver did on Monday, every conservative MP, every conservative pundit, every conservative media outlet in Canada would be  hoarse from screaming about the danger from the socialists to the Canadian economy.

That brings us to the legacy left by R. E. Powell who was president of Alcan in the 1940s and 50s as the company was building the Kitimat project.

As Global Mission, the company’s official history, relates, in 1951, Alcan signed an agreement with the British Columbia provincial government, that “called upon the company to risk a huge investment, without any government subsidy or financial backing and without any assured market for its product.”

According to the book, Powell sought to anticipate any future problems, given the tenor of the times, the possible or even likely nationalization of the smelter and the hydro-electric project.

So Powell insisted that the contract signed between Alcan and the province include preliminary clauses acknowledging that Alcan was paying for Kitimat without a single cent from the government:

Whereas the government is unwilling to provide and risk the very large amounts of money required to develop those water powers to produce power for which no market now exists or can be foreseen except through the construction of the facilities for the production of aluminum in the vicinity and….

Whereas the construction of the aluminum plant at or near the site of the said waterpower would accomplish without risk or to the GOVERNMENT the development power, the establishment of a permanent industry and the new of population and….

(Government in all caps in the original)

…the parties hereto agree as follows (the agreement, water licence and land permit)

Powell is quoted in the book as saying:

I asked the political leaders of BC if the government would develop the power and sell the energy to Alcan and they refused. We had to do it ourselves. Someday, perhaps, some politician will try to nationalize that power and grab it for the state. I will be dead and gone but some of you or your successors at Alcan may be here, and I hope the clauses in the agreement, approved by the solemn vote of the BC legislature, will give those future socialists good reason to pause and reflect.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the federal government had very little to do with the Kitimat project. With the declaration that Kitimat will be a public port, the federal government comes to the party 60 years late. But one has to wonder if the late Alcan president, R.E. Powell, ever considered that the “future socialists” he hoped would “pause and reflect” would be members of Canada’s Conservative party, Stephen Harper, Joe Oliver and Denis Lebel?

Coastal First Nations launch election commercial with Exxon Valdez radio call

Coastal First Nations have launched a commercial aimed at the British Columbia electorate, using the call from the Exxon Valedez to US Coast Guard Valdez traffic control saying that the tanker had run aground.

 

The commercial makes the connection between the Exxon Valdez disaster and the possibility of a tanker disaster on the British Columbia coast if the Enbridge Northern Gateway project goes ahead.

According to the Vancouver Sun, Paul Simon personally approved the use of the song Sounds of Silence in the commercial.

The BC New Democrats, who are leading the polls have said they oppose Northern Gateway. The ruling BC Liberals have set out five conditions that must be met if the project is to go ahead.