Study | Northwest Coast Energy News

How oil spills kill fish: new study points to cardiac arrest; possible implications for humans

Oil spills kill fish. That’s well known. Now scientists say they have found out why oil spills kill adult fish. The chemicals in the oil often trigger an irregular heartbeat and cardiac arrest.

A joint study by Stanford University and the US National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration have discovered that crude oil interferes with fish heart cells. The toxic consequence is a slowed heart rate, reduced cardiac contractility and irregular heartbeats that can lead to cardiac arrest and sudden cardiac death.

The study was published Feb. 14, 2014 in the prestigious international journal Science and unveiled at the convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Chicago.

The study is part of the ongoing Natural Resource Damage Assessment of the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Scientists have known for some time that crude oil is known to be “cardiotoxic” to developing fish. Until now, the mechanisms underlying the harmful effects were unclear.

Exxon Valdez

Studies going back to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989 have shown that exposure to crude oil-derived chemicals disrupt cardiac function and impairs development in larval fishes. The studies have described a syndrome of embryonic heart failure, bradycardia (slow heart beat), arrhythmias (irregular heartbeats) and edema in exposed fish embryos.

After the Gulf of Mexico spill, studies began on young fish in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill. The two science teams wanted to find out how oil specifically impacts heart cells.

Crude oil is a complex mixture of chemicals, some of which are known to be toxic to marine animals.

Past research focused on “polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons” (PAHs), which can also be found in coal tar, creosote, air pollution and stormwater runoff from land. In the aftermath of an oil spill, the studies show PAHs can persist for many years in marine habitats and cause a variety of adverse environmental effects.

The scientists found that oil interferes with cardiac cell excitability, contraction and relaxation – vital processes for normal beat-to-beat contraction and pacing of the heart.

Low concentrations of crude

The study shows that very low concentrations of crude oil disrupt the specialized ion channel pores – where molecules flow in and out of the heart cells – that control heart rate and contraction in the cardiac muscle cell. This cyclical signalling pathway in cells throughout the heart is what propels blood out of the pump on every beat. The protein components of the signalling pathway are highly conserved in the hearts of most animals, including humans.

The researchers found that oil blocks the potassium channels distributed in heart cell membranes, increasing the time to restart the heart on every beat. This prolongs the normal cardiac action potential, and ultimately slows the heartbeat. The potassium ion channel impacted in the tuna is responsible for restarting the heart muscle cell contraction cycle after every beat, and is highly conserved throughout vertebrates, raising the possibility that animals as diverse as tuna, turtles and dolphins might be affected similarly by crude oil exposure. Oil also resulted in arrhythmias in some ventricular cells.

“The ability of a heart cell to beat depends on its capacity to move essential ions like potassium and calcium into and out of the cells quickly.” said Barbara Block, a professor of marine sciences at Stanford. She said, “We have discovered that crude oil interferes with this vital signalling process essential for our heart cells to function properly.”

Nat Scholz, leader of the Ecotoxicology Program at NOAA’s Northwest Fisheries Science Center in Seattle said.”We’ve known from NOAA research over the past two decades that crude oil is toxic to the developing hearts of fish embryos and larvae, but haven’t understood precisely why.”

Long term problems in fish hearts

He added: “These new findings more clearly define petroleum-derived chemical threats to fish and other species in coastal and ocean habitats, with implications that extend beyond oil spills to other sources of pollution such as land-based urban stormwater runoff.”

The new study also calls attention to a previously under appreciated risk to wildlife and humans, particularly from exposure to cardioactive PAHs that can also exist when there are high levels of air pollution.

“When we see these kinds of acute effects at the cardiac cell level,” Block said, “it is not surprising that chronic exposure to oil from spills such as the Deepwater Horizon can lead to long-term problems in fish hearts.”

The study used captive populations of bluefin and yellowfin tuna at the Tuna Research and Conservation Center, a collaborative facility operated by Stanford and the Monterey Bay Aquarium. That meant the research team was able to directly observe the effects of crude oil samples collected from the Gulf of Mexico on living fish heart cells.

“The protein ion channels we observe in the tuna heart cells are similar to what we would find in any vertebrate heart and provide evidence as to how petroleum products may be negatively impacting cardiac function in a wide variety of animals,” she said. “This raises the possibility that exposure to environmental PAHs in many animals – including humans – could lead to cardiac arrhythmias and bradycardia, or slowing of the heart.”

Tuna spawning

The Deepwater Horizon disaster released over 4 million barrels of crude oil during the peak spawning time for the Atlantic bluefin tuna in the spring of 2010. Electronic tagging and fisheries catch data indicate that Atlantic bluefin spawn in the area where the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig collapsed, raising the possibility that eggs and larvae, which float near the surface waters, were exposed to oil.

The spill occurred in the major spawning ground of the western Atlantic population of bluefin tuna in the Gulf of Mexico. The most recent stock assessment, conducted in 2012, estimated the spawning population of the bluefin tuna to be at only 36 percent of the 1970 baseline population. Additionally, many other pelagic fishes were also likely to have spawned in oiled habitats, including yellowfin tuna, blue marlin and swordfish.

Block and her team bathed isolated cardiac cells from the tuna in low dose crude oil concentrations similar to what fish in early life stages may have encountered in the surface waters where they were spawned after the April 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

They measured the heart cells’ response to record how ions flowed into and out of the heart cells to identify the specific proteins in the excitation-contraction pathway that were affected by crude oil chemical components.

Fabien Brette, a research associate in Block’s lab and lead author on the study said the scientists looked at the function of healthy heart cells in a laboratory dish and then used a microscope to measure how the cells responded when crude oil was introduced.

“The normal sequence and synchronous contraction of the heart requires rapid activation in a coordinated way of the heart cells,” Block said. “Like detectives, we dissected this process using laboratory physiological techniques to ask where oil was impacting this vital mechanism.”

Haisla ask cabinet to postpone Northern Gateway decision to allow for adequate consultation with First Nations

The Haisla Nation are calling on the federal cabinet to postpone its decision on the Northern Gateway project to allow time for adequate consultations with First Nations, according to the Haisla response to the Joint Review Panel, seen by Northwest Coast Energy News.

The Joint Review Panel report and recommendations were released on Dec. 19, 2013 and the cabinet has 180 days from that point to recommend approval of the project.

The Haisla argue that Section 54 of the National Energy Board act allows the Governor-in-Council, the federal cabinet, to extend the timeline if it wants to, if recommended by the Minister of Natural Resources.

So far, the Harper government has refused to extend the deadline. The Haisla response document says Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross spoke to Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver on the telephone requesting the extension, but, according to the document, all Oliver did was point to the legislation that calls for the 180 day response to a joint review report.

The Haisla response document also has a long lists of what the Haisla say are flaws in the Joint Review Panel report.

Consultations

In correspondence with the Haisla, Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project, says:

the process set out by the Government of Canada in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework was finalized after receiving and carefully considering input from Aboriginal groups….The Government of Canada believes the process outlined in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework provides for a deep level of meaningful consultation with Aboriginal groups with Phase IV being the final step prior to a decision being made on the Project.

The Haisla dispute there has been any “deep level of meaningful consultation,” citing in the document a long list of attempts to engage the federal government with little or no response.

In their response, the Haisla Nation Council says:

Canada, has, to date, refused to engage in meaningful consultations with the Haisla Nation. Instead Canada has unilaterally imposed what it calls a “deep level meaningful consultation” process which is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons…

The document lists attempts by the Haisla to engage with ministers and government departments including requests for a meeting with then Environment Minister Peter Kent, prior to the opening of the JRP formal hearings in Kitamaat Village in January 2012. Although the Haisla requested a meeting with Kent, several times in 2011, no meeting ever occurred. It was not until April 19, 2012, four months later that Kent replied to the Haisla saying he had asked the President of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency to meet with the First Nation prior to the start of the JRP hearings. However, it was apparently impossible to schedule such a meeting in December, 2011.

To which the Haisla reply:

For over six years, Canada ignored Haisla Nations requests for meetings. Once the JRP’s oral hearings process commenced, Canada further closed the door on any opportunity for a meeting until the JRP Report was release. This refusal to consult was baseless. The ongoing JRP process was not a rational or justifiable basis for Canada’s refusal to consult…

Canada has yet to meet with the Haisla Nation to discuss the proposed project, other than to tell the Haisla Nation it is only engaging through the JRP process for now. This is not consultation. It is, perhaps, at best an initial step towards a consultation process.
Ignoring the Eyford report

In March 2013, Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver flew to Terrace for a photo op to announce the appointment of Douglas Eyford to consult First Nations on the Northern Gateway project. Oliver then flew back to Ottawa without meeting anyone in the region. Eyford’s report Forging Partnership Build Relationship was released in November, 2013.

The Haisla say:

Mr. Eyford’s Report recommended that Canada should consider undertaking early engagement to address Aboriginal interests that may not be dealt within a regulatory process. The Haisla Nation has been seeking such early engagement from Canada since the proposed project was first announced.

Mr. Eyford’s Report also recommended that Canada should engage and conduct consultations n addition to those in regulatory processes, as may be required, to address issues and facilitate resolutions in exceptional circumstances. The Haisla Nation also asked for this, identifying early that this proposed project was an exceptional circumstance due to the significant potential impacts on the Haisla Nation.

It is not too late for Canada to correct the deficiencies in its consultation process, but cannot realistically do so by adhering unilaterally by Canada and laid out in Mr. Maracle’s letter of December 16, 2013

The Haisla Nation Council response was sent to Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project. The Haisla also sent copies of the response to Joe Oliver, the Minister of Natural Resources, Gaetan Caron, Chair of the National Energy Board, Leon Aqlukkaq, Minister of the Environment, Bernard Valcourt Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Gail Shea, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, BC Premier Christy Clark, Steve Thomson, BC Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources and Mary Polak, BC Minister of the Environment.

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

The Haisla Nation response to the federal government’s request for consultation on the Joint Review Panel report on the Northern Gateway lists what the First Nation sees as flaws in the panel’s assessment of the project. (The Haisla filed their first list of flaws in the JRP in a court challenge).

In the response, seen by Northwest Coast Energy News, the Haisla are objecting to both the government’s and the JRP’s attitude toward the idea of consultation as well as some of the specific findings by the panel. The Haisla also fault the JRP process for refusing to take into consideration reports and studies that were released after the evidentiary deadlines.

Overall, the Haisla say

The JRP report is written in a way that prevents an assessment of how or whether the JRP considered Haisla Nation concerns and of how whether the JRP purports to address the Haisla Nation’s concerns. Further the JRP Report is lacking n some of the fundamental justification required to understand how arrived at its recommendations.

So what are the Haisla concerns?

In the document filed with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, the Haisla say:

The proposed project carries with it an inordinate amount of risk to Haisla Nation Territory. The Haisla Nation is being asked to play host to this proposed project, despite the risk the proposed project poses to the land waters and resources relied on by the Haisla Nation for sustenance and cultural heritage. The risk includes a huge risk to Haisla Nation aboriginal rights to trap, hunt and fish, to gather seafood and gather plant materials. It could result in significant damage to the Haisla Nation cultural heritage—its traditional way of life…..

The terminal site is one of the few areas suitable for terminal development in our territory. It is also home to over 800 Haisla Nation Culturally Modified Trees (CMTs). Northern Gateway proposes to irrevocably alter the land, the use of the land and access to this land for the duration of the proposed project, which is anticipated to be at least 80 years. This irrevocable alteration includes the felling of our CMTS….

By seeking to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for the proposed project, Northern Gateway will be effectively expropriating the economic value of this land. Northern Gateway is proposing to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for a project with no benefit to the Haisla Nation and which is fundamentally at odds with Haisla Nation stewardship principles.

Obstructed clear understanding

The Haisla say that “Canada has failed to adhere is own framework” for the JRP because in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework says “Federal departments will be active participants in the JRP process to ensure the environmental assessment and consultation record, is as accurate and complete as possible.”

The Haisla say “Canada provided limited written evidence to the JRP” and goes on to say that the “federal governments not only failed to provide relevant information but also obstructed a clear understanding of project impacts.”

Among the evidence relevant to Northern Gateway that the federal government was “unable or unwilling to provide” includes:

Natural Resources had expertise on acid rock damage and metal leaching but did not include evidence on that in their evidence
Fisheries and Oceans did not have a mandate to conduct an assessment of the potential toxicological effects of an oil spill.
Environment Canada did not review or provide information on the spills from pipelines.
The federal government witnesses were unable to answer questions about the toxicity of dispersant.
Environment Canada was asked if it had studies of the subsurface currents and the movement of submerged oil. Environment Canada told the JRP did not measure hydrodynamic data but relies on DFO. DFO cold not provide any witnesses to the JRP with expertise on subsurface currents.

In the formal response on the JRP report, Haisla also say:

The JRP has concluded that the risk of a large spill form the pipeline in the Kitimat River Valley is not likely, despite very significant information gaps relating to geohazards, leak detection and spill response.
The JRP has concluded that a large spill would result in significant adverse environmental effects. However, the JRP appears to base a finding that these effects are unlikely to occur on an unreasonable assumptions about how widespread the effects could be or how long they would last. The JRP has not considered the extent to which a localized effect could impact Haisla Nation.
The JRP relies on the concept of “natural recovery” as mitigation of significant adverse effects. The Haisla Nation asked the JRP to compel information from Northern Gateway about the applicability of its evidence to species found in Haisla National Territory. The JRP, however, refused to compel this evidence from Northern Gateway.
The JRP has accepted at face value that Northern Gateway would shut down its pipeline within 13 minutes in the event of a rupture and has failed to consider the effects of a large spill that is not detected with this timeframe through the control centre (or was in the case of Kalamazoo, is detected by the control centre but is systematically mischaracterized and ignored).

As part of the consultation process the Haisla want 22 changes to the JRP report, changes which echo the Haisla Final Written Argument that was filed at the end of the hearings.

It says:

The Panel should find that potential impacts to asserted Haisla Nation aboriginal rights and title from the proposed project are such that project cannot be found to be in the public interest in the absence of meaningful consultation… The current status of engagement and the federal government imposition of a 6-month time limit to complete consultation raise serious concerns that meaningful consultation will not be possible. Therefore the proposed project is not in the public interest.

Among the others are:

The JRP should have determined the significant of adverse effects to rare ecological communities that cannot mitigated.
The JRP should have provided more information to allow a reasonable assessment of the risk of a spill from the pipelines.
The JRP would have considered all factors to contribute to the risk of a spill.
The JRP should have found that Northern Gateway’s assessment of the toxicity of an oil spill because it did not consider the full range of products to be shipped nor did it consider the potential pathways of the effect of a toxic spill, whether from a pipeline, at the marine terminal or in the case of a tanker spill
The evidence had not demonstrated that Northern Gateway’s spill response would be able to mitigate the effects of a spill either at the pipeline, at the Kitimat marine terminal or from a tanker spill.
The JRP did not consider the impact of the Kitimat Marine Terminal on their cultural and archaeological heritage, including culturally modified trees.

Haisla ask cabinet to postpone Northern Gateway decision to allow for adequate consultation with First Nations

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Members of the Joint Review panel make notes at Kitamaat Village (Robin Rowland) — Members of the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel, left to right, Kenneth Bateman, chair Sheila Leggett and Hans Matthews make notes at the June 25, 2012 hearings at the Haisla Recreation Centre, Kitamaat Village. A map of Douglas Channel can be seen behind the panel. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

The Haisla Nation in their response to the Crown on the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel details four studies, three Canadian and one American that were released after the Joint Review evidentiary deadline had passed, evidence that the Haisla say should be considered in any consideration of the Northern Gateway pipeline, terminal and tanker project. (The American report from the National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration was released after the JRP final report)

JRP chair Sheila Leggett’s constant citing of rules of procedure and her stubborn refusal to consider new evidence and studies in a dynamic situation that was changing rapidly was one of the reasons that many people in the northwest said the JRP had lost credibility.

The Haisla say: “It is incumbent upon Canada to consider and discuss the information in these reports as part of a meaningful consultation process…” and then lists “key findings” that have potential impacts on aboriginal rights and title:

The West Coast Spill response for the government of British Columbia which found:

Most oil spilled into the marine environment cannot be cleaned up
There is a disconnect between planning and actual repose capability
Canada’s spill response is “far from world class.”

The Transport Canada Ship Oil Spill Preparedness and Response study:

Douglas Channel will go from low risk to high risk for pills if the project goes ahead
The study recommends preparation for a “true worst case discharge” rather than “the credible worst case discharge” as proposed by Northern Gateway
Canada needed a much more rigorous regulatory regime covering tankers.

The joint federal government technical report on the properties of bitumen from the Canadian Oil Sands:

There are uncertainties on how diluted bitumen would behave in a marine environment.
Northern Gateway did not provide adequate information about sediment levels to allow for proper study of interaction with diluted bitumen
Dispersant may not be effective.
Weathered diluted bitumen would “reach densities at which it will sink freshwater without mechanical or physical assistance.”

The US National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration report on Transporting Alberta Oil sands:

Diluted bitumen has “significant differences from conventional crudes.’ (The JRP used conventional crude as a benchmark in its findings)
The physical properties of diluted bitumen “fluctuate based on a number of factors.
Pipeline operators may not have detailed information related to products in the pipeline at the time of a spill
There is a lack of experimental data on the weathering behaviour of oil sands product which limits the ability of spill response organizations “to understand and predict the behaviour and fate of oil sands products in freshwater, estuarine and saltwater environments.”

Haisla ask cabinet to postpone Northern Gateway decision to allow for adequate consultation with First Nations

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

Orcas’ genetic diversity low after Ice Age population “severe reduction”, study finds

The worldwide population of Orcas probably crashed during the last Ice Age, creating a “bottleneck” in the genetic diversity of the species around the world, a problem that could continue to affect killer whales today, according to a new genetic study published on February 4,2014.

Rus Hoelzel from the School of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, at Durham University, in the UK and colleagues used DNA sequencing from archive material from earlier studies, or from museum specimens to track the evolution of the Orcas.

One group of Orcas that lives off South Africa are an exception, with greater genetic diversity than others, the new study has revealed.

“Killer whales have a broad world-wide distribution, rivaling that of humans. At the same time, they have very low levels of genetic diversity,” Hoelzel said.

“Our data suggest that a severe reduction in population size during the coldest period of the last ice age could help explain this low diversity, and that it could have been an event affecting populations around the world.

The Orca population along the Northwest Pacific Coast has the same low genetic diversity as in other areas, the study showed.

The killer whale is as a top predator, feeding on everything from seals to sharks. That means from the top of the food chain, the Orca also serves as a sentinel species for past and future ocean ecosystems and environmental change.

In the study published in the journal Molecular Biology and Evolution, Hoelzel and his colleagues assembled 2.23 gigabytes of Northern Hemisphere killer whale genomic data and mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from 616 samples worldwide.

The scientists concluded that killer whales were stable in population size during most of the Pleistocene (2.5 million – 11,000 years ago) followed by a rapid decline and bottleneck during the last great period of the Ice Age (110,000-12,000 years ago).

“Our data supports the idea of a population bottleneck affecting killer whales over a wide geographic range and leading to the loss of diversity,” Hoelzel said. “The South African population stands out as an exception, which may be due to local conditions that were productive and stable over the last million years or so.”

They are pointing to the “Benguela upwelling” ocean system which delivers nutrient rich cold water to the oceans off South Africa. The Benguela system remained stable despite the last glacial period and the nutrient rich water would have been able to sustain the supplies of fish and dolphins that killer whales in this part of the world feed on.

The scientists believe that other major upwelling systems around the world – the California current off North America; Humboldt off South America; and the Canary current off the coast of North Africa – were either disrupted or collapsed altogether during the last glacial or Pleistocene periods. This could potentially have reduced the food supply to killer whales in these areas, leading to the fall in their numbers.

While it was likely that other factors affecting killer whale populations were “overlapping and complex”, the scientists ruled out hunting as an effect on the bottleneck in populations. Hunting by early man could not have happened on a sufficient enough scale to promote the global decline in killer whale numbers.

In an e-mail to Northwest Coast Energy News, Hoelzel said that the team sequenced the DNA from a male killer whale from the Southeast Alaska resident community. “This genome revealed the same pattern of historical population dynamics as we found for a whale from the North Atlantic, suggesting shared history across a very broad geographic range, and a shared population bottleneck around the time of the last glacial maximum,” Hoelzel said.

The scientists say looking at the genetic diversity of the ocean’s other top predators, such as sharks, might potentially suggest a negative impact on their numbers too during the Ice Age.

Canadian Standards Association quietly announces review of pipeline and LNG standards

With little fanfare, the Canadian Standards Association has announced on its website that it is conducting a review of the standards for pipelines and LNG facilities in this country, including marine terminals.

The CSA is asking for input in updating the standards, with the deadline for Liquefied natural gas (LNG) — Production, storage, and handling (New Edition) starting on January 20 and ending on March 21, 2014. The review of Oil and gas pipeline systems (New Edition) began on Dec.23,2013 with a deadline of Feb. 23, 2014.

There are more details and information on how to contact the CSA on the web pages.

LNG Standards
Draft Scope/Description:
1 Scope
1.1
This Standard applies to the
(a) design;
(b) location;
(c) construction;
(d) operation; and
(e) maintenance
of facilities for the liquefaction of natural gas and facilities for the storage, vaporization, transfer, handling, and truck transport of LNG. It also contains requirements for the training of personnel.

1.2 1
For facilities that load or unload LNG from a marine vessel, this Standard contains requirements for the interconnecting piping between the loading/unloading arm flange and the storage tank(s), and other piping and appurtenances on the pier or jetty itself.
1.3
This Standard applies to all containers for the storage of LNG, including those with insulation systems applying a vacuum.
1.4
This Standard does not apply to frozen ground containers.
1.5
This Standard includes non-mandatory guidelines for
(a) small LNG facilities (see the definition of “small facility” in Clause 3 and see Annex B); and
(b) LNG vehicle fuelling stations employed for fleet and public LNG vehicle fuel dispensing operations (see the definition of “fuelling station” in Clause D.2 and see Annex D).
1.6
This Standard does not apply to the following:
(a) the transportation of refrigerants by any means;
(b) the transportation of LNG by railcar or marine vessel;
(c) the transportation of LNG or regasified LNG by pipeline beyond the facility boundary, except as specified in Clause 1.2; and
(d) facilities designed to allow the use of LNG as a fuel for railroad locomotives, or marine vessels.
1.7
All references to pressure throughout this Standard refer to gauge pressures unless otherwise specified.
1.8
All pipe sizes refer to nominal pipe sizes (NPS).
1.9
The values given in SI units are the units of record for the purposes of this Standard. The values given in parentheses are for information and comparison only.
1.10
In CSA standards, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard.

Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material.
Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements.
Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (nonmandatory) to define their application.

Oil and gas pipeline systems

Draft Scope/Description:
1.1
This Standard covers the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipeline systems that convey
(a) liquid hydrocarbons, including crude oil, multiphase fluids, condensate, liquid petroleum products, natural gas liquids, and liquefied petroleum gas;
(b) oilfield water;
(c) oilfield steam;
(d) liquid or dense phase carbon dioxide; or
(e) gas.

Notes:
(1) Vapour phase carbon dioxide pipeline systems fall under item (e).
(2) Designers are cautioned that the requirements in this Standard might not be appropriate for gases other than natural gas, manufactured gas, or synthetic natural gas.
1.2
The scope of this Standard, as shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, includes
(a) for oil industry fluids, piping and equipment in offshore pipelines, onshore pipelines, tank farms, pump stations, pressure-regulating stations, and measuring stations;
(b) oil pump stations, pipeline tank farms, and pipeline terminals;
(c) pipe-type storage vessels;
(d) carbon dioxide pipeline systems;
(e) for gas industry fluids, piping and equipment in offshore pipelines, onshore pipelines, compressor stations, measuring stations, and pressure-regulating stations;
(f) gas compressor stations; and
(g) gas storage lines and pipe-type and bottle-type gas storage vessels.

1.3
This Standard does not apply to
(a) piping with metal temperatures below –70 °C;
(b) piping (except oilfield steam distribution piping) with metal temperatures above 230 °C;
(c) gas piping beyond the operating company’s gas distribution system (covered by CAN/CSA-B149.1);
(d) piping in natural gas liquids extraction plants, gas processing plants (except main gas stream piping in dehydration and all other processing plants installed as part of gas pipeline systems), gas manufacturing plants, industrial plants, and mines;
(e) oil refineries, terminals other than pipeline terminals, and marketing bulk plants;
(f) abandoned piping;
(g) in-plant piping for drinking, make-up, or boiler feed water;
(h) casing, tubing, or pipe in oil or gas wells, wellheads, separators, production tanks, and other production facilities;
(i) vent piping for waste gases of any kind operating at or near atmospheric pressure;
(j) heat exchangers;
(k) liquefied natural gas systems (covered by CSA Z276);
(l) liquid fuel distribution systems;
(m) loading/unloading facilities for tankers or barges;
(n) refuelling facilities; and
(o) hydrocarbon storage in underground formations and associated equipment (covered by CSA Z341 Series).

1.4
This Standard is intended to establish essential requirements and minimum standards for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipeline systems. This Standard is not a design handbook, and competent engineering judgment should be employed with its use.
Note: For steel pipe of grade higher than Grade 555, requirements in addition to those specified in this Standard might be needed. Matters that should be considered include joining, thermal aging effects during coating application, strain capacity (including cold bending), pressure testing, assessment of imperfections, and repair.
1.5
1.5.1
The requirements of this Standard are applicable to the operation, maintenance, and upgrading of existing installations; however, it is not intended that such requirements be applied retroactively to existing installations insofar as design, materials, construction, and established operating pressures are concerned.
1.5.2
Where class locations change pipelines in such locations shall be subject to the requirements for design factor, location factor, valve spacing, depth of cover and clearance, materials, pressure testing, historical repair methods and repair criteria for the higher class location, or shall be subjected to an engineering assessment to determine the suitability of the pipeline for service in the changed class location (see Clause 10.7.1).
1.6
Unless otherwise stated, to determine conformance with the specified requirements, it is intended that observed or calculated values be rounded to the nearest unit in the last right-hand place of figures used in expressing the limiting value, in accordance with the rounding method of ASTM E29.
1.7
Where any requirements of this Standard are at variance with the requirements of other publications referenced in this Standard, it is intended that the requirements of this Standard govern.
1.8
It is not the intent of this Standard to prevent the development of new equipment or practices, or to prescribe how such innovations are to be handled.
1.9
In CSA standards, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard. Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material. Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements. Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (nonmandatory) to define their application

Two JRP conditions are already outdated, Cullen says

Skeena Bulkley Valley MP Nathan Cullen says at least two of the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel’s 209 conditions may already be outdated.

In a news release January 15, 2013, Cullen said, “The requirement of $950 million in spill insurance was recently called into question as reports surfaced of cleanup costs at the sites of Enbridge’s 2010 Michigan spill surpassing $1.035 billion.”

The $1.035 billion figure was contained in Enbridge’s American arm, Enbridge Energy Partners, latest filing for the third quarter over 2013 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Cullen went to say that, “The JRP’s order for Enbridge to carry out new research on the behaviour of diluted in bitumen in a marine environment has been questioned following the publication of an Environment Canada study confirming that diluted bitumen will sink in saltwater in high waves and where sediment is present.”

Cullen is referring to a study by Environment Canada Emergencies Science and Technology,Fisheries and Oceans Canada Centre for Offshore Oil, Gas and Energy Research and Natural Resoures Canada on bitumen that was completed in November and released this week.

The study found

. Like conventional crude oil, both diluted bitumen products floated on saltwater (free of sediment), even after evaporation and exposure to light and mixing with water;
. When fine sediments were suspended in the saltwater, high-energy wave action mixed the sediments with the diluted bitumen, causing the mixture to sink or be dispersed as floating tarballs;
(The use of the term “tarball” in this report follows convention in the literature and refers to the consistency of floating, heavily-weathered oil. It does not describe the chemical composition of the product.)
. Under conditions simulating breaking waves, where chemical dispersants have proven effective with conventional crude oils, a commercial chemical dispersant (Corexit 9500) had quite limited effectiveness in dispersing dilbit;
. Application of fine sediments to floating diluted bitumen was not effective in helping to disperse the products;
. The two diluted bitumen products display some of the same behaviours as conventional petroleum products (i.e. fuel oils and conventional crude oils), but also significant differences, notably for the rate and extent of evaporation.

Read the report:Properties, Composition and Marine Spill Behaviour, Fate and Transport of Two Diluted Bitumen Products from the Canadian Oil Sands (pdf)
The Joint Review Panel found that dilbit was “ no more likely to sink to the bottom than other
heavier oils”

The Panel acknowledges the variety of opinions from experts regarding the behavior and fate of oil spilled in aquatic environments. These experts generally agreed that the ultimate behavior and fate of the oil would depend on a number of factors, including the volume of oil spilled, the physical and chemical characteristics of the product, and the environmental conditions at the time.

The Panel finds that likely oil behaviour and potential response options can be predicted from knowledge of the type of oil spilled and its physical and chemical characteristics. Details of oil behaviour and response options cannot be specified until the actual circumstances of a spill are known.

The Panel is of the view that, if placed along a spectrum of: tendency to submerge; persistence; and recovery difficulty, dilbit would be on the higher end of the spectrum, similar to other heavy oil products.

The Panel accepts evidence from previous spills showing that, in response to circumstances at the time, the behaviour of heavier oils, including conventional oils and synthetic crudes, can be dynamic. Some oil floats, some sinks, and some is neutrally buoyant and subject to submergence and overwashing.

Although the project would transport different types of oil, the majority of the evidence presented during the hearing process focussed on whether dilbit is likely to sink when spilled in an aquatic environment. In light of this, the Panel has chosen to focus its views on dilbit. The Panel heard that the fate and behaviour of dilbit has not been studied as much as that of other oils.

Although there is some uncertainty regarding the behavior of dilbit spilled in water, the Panel finds that the weight of evidence indicates that dilbit is no more likely to sink to the bottom than other heavier oils with similar physical and chemical properties.

The Panel finds that dilbit is unlikely to sink due to natural weathering processes alone, within the time frame in which initial, on-water response may occur, or in the absence of sediment or other particulate matter interactions. The Panel finds that a dilbit spill is not likely to sink as a continuous layer that coats the seabed or riverbed.

“It hasn’t even been a month since the JRP released their 209 conditions, and it seems like we’re already seeing some of them become obsolete,” Cullen said.

“Throughout the review process, the JRP continually ignored the situation in Michigan as it unfolded before our eyes. They saw the spill caused by Enbridge’s negligence, which was worsened by Enbridge’s incompetence, and how it brought untold damage to the local ecosystem and cost over $1 billion US. But the 209 conditions didn’t reflect what we learned about Enbridge’s history or its culture, or what we’ve learned about diluted bitumen at all.”

The Joint Review process was set up to deliver a positive verdict, according to Cullen, regardless of what the real life case studies in Michigan had already shown. “To say that it won’t cost as much – if not more – to respond to a spill in a remote corner of northwestern BC during winter than it was in Michigan in the middle of July is ridiculous,” Cullen said.

“What’s even more astonishing is that we asked repeatedly for these studies on the behaviour of diluted bitumen in the marine environment to be part of the Joint Review Panel’s assessment. That the government waited until after the JRP had given its conditional yes to release these findings is not only appalling but also highly suspect.

Cullen says there are two key questions that the Harper government now must answer. “What kind of protection is the government providing when it lowballs on the insurance for oil spills? And what kind of oversight is it giving Canadians when the verdict is given before the evidence is released?”

JRP refuses to consider latest DFO findings on Humpback Whales

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has refused to consider the latest findings from the Department of Fisheries and Ocean on humpback whale critical habitat on the coast of British Columbia, including areas of ocean that could be on the route of tankers carrying diluted bitumen from Kitimat.

On October 21, 2013, Fisheries and Oceans released a report called Recovery Strategy for the North Pacific Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Canada. The DFO report notes that humpback whales are a species of “special concern” by the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada.

It is DFO policy to assist the humpback whale population to recover from the century of whaling that almost drove the species to extinction. The report identified four areas of “critical habitat” for humpbacks. One critical habitat zone is Gil Island at the mouth of Douglas Channel.

DFO map of humpback habitat — DFO map of humpback sightings on the BC coast. (DFO)

Last week, on November 13, Smithers based environmental activist Josette Weir filed a notice of motion with the JRP requesting that the panel consider the DFO report as late evidence.

Weir acknowledged that the JRP proceedings closed on June 24, after final arguments in Terrace, but she noted that rules allow the Board to override the final closure. She argued that the humpback report fell within the JRP’s mandate since the DFO report is “is likely to assist the Panel.”

Weir noted in her motion that there was insufficient information before the JRP that would identify critical humpback habitat.

She argued:

Three of the four critical known habitats are on the proposed tanker routes, and the Recovery Strategy acknowledges that other areas have not been identified. Without such information, it is impossible to assess the potential effects of the marine transport of bitumen on this endangered species.Activities likely to destroy or degrade critical habitat include vessel traffic, toxic spills, overfishing, seismic exploration, sonar and pile driving (i.e., activities that cause acoustic disturbance at levels that may affect foraging or communication, or result in the displacement of whales).

The report clearly identifies vessel traffic and toxic spills, which are associated with the Project as potential causes for destruction or degradation of the Humpback Whales’ critical habitat.

Weir went on to argue that the JRP had “insufficient information to develop relevant protection measures” because the humpback studies are ongoing, “meaning their results will not be available before decision.”

The Panel must consider this significant risk to an endangered listed species for which no meaningful protection measure can be offered against the risks associated with the Project.

Weir also noted that “No similar submission has been made by others, but I cannot predict if others will not see fit to do so.”

The JRP didn’t take long to reject Weir’s request, replying the next day, November 14.

In its response, the JRP cited the amended Joint Review Panel Agreement, signed after the passage of of the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, the Omnibus Bill C-38, that “provides that the Panel’s recommendation report is to be submitted to the Minister of Natural Resources by 31 December 2013.”

The JRP then told Weir it didn’t have jurisdiction over endangered species (even if those species inhabit the tanker route) saying:

The Panel notes that the Recovery Strategy has been released in accordance with the provisions of the Species At Risk Act, as part of a legislative scheme that operates independently of this joint review process.

It goes on to say: “In this case, the Panel also notes that the Recovery Strategy was not authored by or for Ms. Wier.”

Map of Gil Island — Humpback whale sightings at the Gil Island critical habitat. (DFO)

The executive summary of the DFO report noted:

Critical habitat for Humpback Whales in B.C. has been identified to the extent possible, based on the best available information. At present, there is insufficient information to identify other areas of critical habitat or to provide further details on the features and attributes present within the boundaries of identified critical habitat. Activities likely to destroy or degrade critical habitat include vessel traffic, toxic spills, overfishing, seismic exploration, sonar and pile driving (i.e., activities that cause acoustic disturbance at levels that may affect foraging or
communication, or result in the displacement of whales). A schedule of studies has been included to address uncertainties and provide further details on the critical habitat feature(s), as well as identify additional areas of critical habitat. It is anticipated that results from these studies will also assist in development of relevant protection measures for the critical habitat feature(s).

In the part of the report on the danger of toxic spills to humpbacks, the DFO report mentions that sinking of the BC ferry Queen of the North:

Toxic spills have occurred impacting marine habitat along the B.C. coast. For example, the Nestucca oil spill (1988) resulted in 875 tonnes of oil spilled in Gray’s Harbor, Washington. Oil slicks from this spill drifted into Canadian waters, including Humpback Whale habitat. In 2006, a tanker ruptured in Howe Sound, B.C. spilling approximately 50 tonnes of bunker fuel into coastal waters. In 2007, a barge carrying vehicles and forestry equipment sank near the Robson Bight-Michael Bigg Ecological Reserve within the critical habitat for Northern Resident Killer Whales, spilling an estimated 200 litres of fuel. The barge and equipment (including a 10,000L
diesel tank) were recovered without incident. When the Queen of the North sank on March 22, 2006, with 225,000 L of diesel fuel, 15,000 L of light oil, 3,200 L of hydraulic fluid, and 3,200 of stern tube oil, it did so on the tanker route to Kitimat, which is currently the subject of a pipeline and port proposal and within the current boundaries of Humpback Whale critical habitat

The DFO report also takes a crtical look at vessel strikes

In B.C. waters, Humpback Whales are the most common species of cetacean struck by vessels, as reported to the Marine Mammal Response Network. Between 2001 and 2008, there were 21 reports of vessel strikes involving Humpback Whales. Of these, 15 were witnessed collision events while the remaining 6 were of live individuals documented with fresh injuries consistent with recent blunt force trauma or propeller lacerations from a vessel strike.

Overall, vessel strikes can cause injuries ranging from scarring to direct mortality of individual whales. Some stranded Humpback Whales that showed no obvious external trauma, have been shown from necropsy to have internal injuries consistent with vessel strikes… It is unknown how many whales have died as a result of vessel strikes in B.C. waters. To date, only one reported dead Humpback Whale presented with evidence consistent with blunt force trauma and lacerations resulting from a vessel strike…

There are no confirmed reports of Humpback Whale collisions in B.C. waters attributed to shipping, cruise ship or ferry traffic. However, larger ships are far less likely to detect the physical impact of a collision than smaller vessels, and this could account for the lack of reported strikes. Collisions with large vessels may be more common than reported, especially in areas where larger vessel traffic is concentrated.

Despite the fact that collisions may only affect a small proportion of the overall Humpback Whale population, vessel strikes may be a cause for concern for some local and seasonal areas of high ship traffic.. In B.C., areas of high probability of humpback-vessel interaction include Johnstone Strait off northeast Vancouver Island, Juan de Fuca Strait off southwest Vancouver Island, Dixon Entrance and the “Inside Passage” off the northern B.C. mainland which include portions of two of the identified critical habitat areas..

The JRP also said

As the Panel has mentioned previously during the hearing, the later in the joint review process that new evidence is sought to be filed the greater the likelihood of the prejudice to parties. The Panel is of the view that permitting the Recovery Strategy to be filed at this late stage in the hearing process would be prejudicial to the joint review process.

Weir’s submission to the JRP did not mention an academic study published on September 11, 2013, that also identified Gil Island as critical humpback habitat.

DOCUMENTS:

DFO report on Humpback Recovery strategy (PDF)

Josette Weir notice of motion on Humpback Whales (PDF)

Panel Commission Ruling on Humpback Whales (PDF)

New Fisheries Regulations further gut habitat protection in Canada, study says

Population density — Blacked out fishery. A new study says that fisheries protection in Canada is now tied to economics, meaning areas with lower populations, like the BC northwest, get less fisheries protection. (Fisheries magazine)

New regulations under the Fisheries Act that was revised by the Harper government’s omnibus bills go even further in gutting protection for fish habitat in Canada, according to an analysis by scientists released Friday.

The changes to Canada’s fisheries legislation “have eviscerated” the ability to protect habitat for most of the country’s fish species, the scientists, John Post, at the University of Calgary and Jeffrey Hutchings of Dalhousie University say their new study.

The study says with the Conservative government’s emphasis on prioritizing economic importance over the habitat ecology is “contrary to responsible management practices for the protection of native fishes, the act now inadvertently prioritizes habitat protection for some nonnative species—even hatchery-produced hybrids.” The study says as long as those introduced or other species are part of what the new act and regulations define as “part of a fishery,” those fish are protected, while nearby native species, not part of a fishery, have no protection.

The same economic emphasis downgrades protection for sparsely inhabitated regions (which make up most of Canada) through what the scientists call:

NO HUMANS . NO FISHERY; NO FISHERY . NO PROTECTION; NO PROTECTION . NO STEWARDSHIP

The stipulation that fish be part of, or support, a fishery will have particularly egregious consequences for species that inhabit pristine or near-pristine habitat in Canada’s vast wilderness.

Under the revised FA, fish that inhabit lakes, rivers, and streams that are not regularly visited by humans do not warrant protection. Humans are necessary to render a fish part of a fishery. No humans, no fishery, and no fish habitat protection. This can only be interpreted as meaning that the vast majority of Canada’s freshwater fishes will be deemed to not warrant habitat protection under the revised FA, even if those species are considered part of a fishery elsewhere in their range.

The changes were “politically motivated,” unsupported by scientific advice – contrary to the policy of previous governments – and are inconsistent with ecosystem-based management, fisheries biologists Post and Hutchings say.

Their comprehensive assessment, in a peer-reviewed paper titled “Gutting Canada’s Fisheries Act: No Fishery, No Fish Habitat Protection,” is published in the November edition of Fisheries, a journal of the 10,000-member American Fisheries Society.

The 2012 omnibus bill redefined fish habitat to a fishery in this clause:

No person shall carry on any work, undertaking or activity that results in serious harm to fish that are part of a commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fishery, or to fish that support such a fishery.

The two authors interpret that as meaning, that while you may be forbidden from harming the fish, there are no barriers to harming fish habitat.

… it will no longer be illegal to harmfully alter or disrupt fish habitat. The revised act only renders it illegal to cause serious harm to fish that are part of a commercial, recreational, or Aboriginal fishery or to fish that support such a fishery. “Serious harm” is defined by the act as “the death of fish or any permanent alteration to, or destruction of, fish habitat” (Fisheries Act 2013). A legal opinion prepared for the Environmental Managers Association of British Columbia concluded that serious harm does not prohibit the disruption or temporary alteration of fish habitat, concluding that many situations prohibited under the previous legislation will no longer be covered by the revised act

The new regulations proclaimed in the Canada Gazette in April 2013.

“The biggest change is that habitat protection has been removed for all species other than those that have direct economic or cultural interests, through recreational, commercial and Aboriginal fisheries,” Post says.

Before, “there used to be a blanket habitat protection for all fish species,” he says. “Now there’s a projection just for species of economic importance which, from an ecological standpoint, makes no sense.”

The study goes on to say:

The near elimination of fish habitat protection represents a clear signal that protection of habitat—the single greatest factor responsible for the decline and loss of commercial and noncommercial species on land and in water —no longer merits explicit protection under Canadian fisheries management law.

And later:

The multitude of aquatic systems that do not support a fishery, coupled with the extensive distributions of many Canadian fishes, will mean that habitat protection will not be provided for most fish species in most places.

By applying the “no humans, no fishery” criterion, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans will have an easy time expediting applications for fish habitat destruction resulting from all manner of development. The lack of foresight inherent in the “no humans, no fishery” stipulation is also manifest by the likelihood that aquatic systems that do not support a fishery today (e.g., much of Arctic and northern Canada) might well do so in the future. But investment in future fisheries requires investment in appropriate habitat protection today. How is a fishery to develop down the road if the habitat is already gone?

Although it is well known that the Harper government muzzles scientists from speaking to the media, that apparently doesn’t mean that there isn’t “chatter” (to use the intelligence term) among fisheries scientists themselves. As the study authors report:

based on personal communications with DFO scientists and divisional managers, it appears that scientists were not consulted at all. By all accounts, DFO scientists and managers were surprised by the degree and types of changes in the revised act. According to one very highly placed science director (in a confidential communication to one of the authors), he was unaware of the March 2012 provisions in the legislation until he heard of the government’s finalized revisions on a news broadcast.

The scientists also quote earlier studies that showed the old Fisheries Act was not unduly holding up development projects.

a key reason for revising the act—a perceived need to expedite or “streamline” environmental reviews (Canada Gazette 2013)—has been shown to lack an empirical basis. There was a perception among some politicians that the act needed to be changed because it was deemed unduly obtrusive and prevented any number of activities from occurring.

The analysis by the environmental group Ecojustice showed that between 2006 and 2011, only one proposal among thousands was denied by the DFO, and only 1.6% of 1,283 convictions under the FA between 2007 and 2011 pertained to the destruction of fish habitat.

Post and Hutchings go on to say:

These scientific analyses run counter to the political discourse, which argues that environmental reviews are unduly lengthy and are bad for economic growth. In fact, review times in Canada were found to be faster, under the previous Fisheries Act, than they were in the United States. The absence of a scientific basis for statutory change in this case is a telling example of how scientific advice can constructively assist decision makers before they revise legislation.

Proponent gets to gather the data

University of Calgary fisheries biologist John Post.
(Riley Brandt, University of Calgary)

Under the new regulations proclaimed in April, when an individual or company applies for an “application to undertake an activity that requires authorization by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans” …”the primary—if not sole—responsibility for providing accurate information and data rests with the applicant, rather than with DFO habitat scientists and biologists.”

The proponent of a project has to identify whether or not “fish that are part of a commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fishery,” or “fish that support such a fishery,” at the location of the proposed work, will be the responsibility of the proponent/applicant to identify.

The two scientists say there is no way to ask what scientific standards, DFO’s or others will be applied in identifying fish that support a fishery.

There are also questions about who “will determine the scientific validity and appropriateness of each proponent’s assessment.” It could be, the paper says, the proponent themselves determining the validity of their own studies because:

There does not appear to be a requirement for the DFO to undertake an on-site inspection by DFO scientific staff to verify information provided by an applicant. This change in responsibility explains the 33% reduction in DFO staff responsible for habitat protection reported by various Canadian media in 2012. This reduction in staff can only diminish the scientific integrity and scientific credibility of DFO’s assessments of applications for the authorization of activities under 35(2)(b) of the FA that will result in the destruction of fish and fish habitat.

The study goes on to say:

The regulations confirm that the revised FA will not protect any particular species of fish. Rather, protection will be provided only to “fish that are part of a commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fishery” or “fish that support such a fishery.” This means, to take one of many examples, that Largemouth Bass (Micropterus salmoides) will be protected at a particular location if, and only if, those Largemouth Bass are considered to be part of a fishery at that location. Otherwise, Largemouth Bass will not be protected.

The scientists do acknowledge that:

It can be argued that there are positive elements to the FA revisions, such as (1) statutory recognition of the importance of recreational and Aboriginal fisheries, (2) provision for the establishment of regulations to control aquatic invasive species and prohibit their import, and (3) increased penalties and fines for contravention of the act.

They then add:

But, in our opinion, the negative consequences to Canada’s aquatic ecosystems generated by the revisions to the act outweigh these benefits, none of which actually required changes to the existing habitat protection provisions of the FA.

The scientists conclude the article by saying

Being the second largest country in the world, Canada is responsible for 20% of the globe’s fresh water, one third of its boreal forests and associated aquatic environment, and the world’s longest coastline. However, this geographical wealth comes with a responsibility to be internationally respected stewards of this vast environment. Politically motivated abrogation of the country’s national and international responsibilities to protect fish and fish habitat suggests to us that Canada might no longer be up to the task.

As pods recover from whaling, more whales come back to Douglas Channel, researcher believes

Fin whale in Squally Channel (Courtesy Chris Picard)

Whales are coming back to Douglas Channel.

In 2013, many Kitimat residents with long experience on the water have reported and are still reporting more sightings of both orcas and humpback whales.

Add to this a recently published scientific study that shows the number of humpbacks at the mouth of the channel near Gil Island has doubled in the past decade, with the study saying there were 137 identifiable whales in 2011.

So why are the whales returning? Chris Picard, Science Director for the Gitga’at First Nation and one of the co-authors of the study believes that answer is simple. There are, so far, three species of whales seen in the area, humpbacks, orcas and fin whales. It is only now, Picard believes, that the humpback and fin whale populations are recovering from a century of whaling.

The study estimates there were once about 15,000 humpback whales in the North Pacific when whalers began hunting the animals. That number was down to 1,400 when whale hunting was stopped in Canada in 1966.

As whale numbers increase, they are searching for the rich food sources found in the Channel, both at the mouth around near Gil Island where the study took place and as far north as the Kildala Arm and Clio Bay.

“One of the things the humpbacks like to do when they are on our coast or the Alaskan coast and that is they feed,” Picard said, “So they are really targeting areas that there is a high density of their preferred prey, krill or herring or other schooling fish, sardines in some years.”

So far the study has concentrated in Gitga’at traditional territory around the mouth of Douglas Channel near Gil Island. Picard says increasing the study area to include more of Douglas Channel is a good idea, but would require more resources than are currently available. “We’d like to continue with the study consistent with the work that we have been doing. Considering what we’re seeing in the local Douglas Channel area, Wright Sound, Gil Island, it can be very worthwhile.

“We are going to continue with our current study which involve getting to know how many humpbacks are using the area and continue with the study that we just published to see if numbers continue to increase or to see whether or if they do start to stabilize at some number,” Picard said. “With more and more proposals for increased shipping, we get to see any changes with humpback numbers that may be linked to increased shipping. We’ll continue to monitor the humpback population; not just their numbers but also their distribution in the area. We’ll continue to monitor that, again in relation to the various shipping proposals and activities that are proposed.”

It was during that study on humpbacks that the researchers from the Gitga’at Nation and the Cetacean Lab noticed the appearance of fin whales, another species that had been hit hard by whaling. (“We’ve worked very closely with the Cetacean Lab group and frankly without their help we would never have published any of this work because their data certainly was instrumental in getting the overall data set that made possible a publishable study,” Picard said.)

“We have observed is that fin whales have increased in their abundance in the area quite a bit, “ Picard said. “I can remember when we first started doing surveys, there were not too many. We’ve gone from seeing a couple over the course of an entire year. Now when we do our marine mammal surveys in the area the fin whales you pretty much see in every survey and in more and more numbers. So it’s quite encouraging to see that fin whales are becoming more abundent in the area. They were also hunted, so if you factor in the days of commercial whaling operations, that of course has stopped, so its encouraging to see that their numbers are coming back too.

The fin whales tend to be found in many of the same areas at the humpack whales are using, Caamaño Sound, Campania Sound and areas south of Gil Island. “we’ve also seen them more in the interior waters like Squally Channel, Wright Sound, Whale Channel, similar to the areas where we see the humpbacks.

“We haven’t done the same level of detailed analysis on the fin whale distribution as we have with the humpback, so it’s just my overall impression that they’re using similar habitats.

“It’s unique for fin whales to be using these more confined waters. It is my understanding that they are more of an open water species. I think that makes the area fairly unique,” he said.
Picard added it would be interesting to do a historic study to see how many fin whales were taken by whalers in the previous decades, especially in Caamaño Sound, Squally Channel and Wright Sound.

“The fact that we saw so many humpbacks relative to the size of the area, which is pretty small relative to the whole coast, so there must be a high abundance of food in the area,” Picard said.

“I’d like to get a better understanding of what is really driving the food abundance in the area. What is the oceanography in the area, what are the currents, what is driving that high area of biological activity that the whales seeming to be homing in on.”

Humpback whale in the Kildala Arm, September 14, 2013. (Robin Rowland)

That means, Picard believes, that there could be krill and juvenile herring schooling in the upper Douglas Channel and that is what is attracting the whales.

One of the next steps, Picard said, is to study social interaction among whales. “We do take identification photographs, so we get a sense of who’s hanging out with who; who is bringing their calves into the area to introduce them into what seems to be very good whale habitat,” Picard.

So one aim of a future study would be to se what role social interactions play in the increased whale sightings in the Douglas Channel. He also wants to know what role are the potential negative impacts on that whale social interaction comes noise impacts, or being struck by ships, and the potential environmental affects of oil spills. “So do these social interactions decrease as the impacts increase, does that mean there are going to be fewer whales that come into this area? Those are some of the questions we want to address.”