Technology | Northwest Coast Energy News

BC releases special report on LNG jobs and training

The BC Ministry of Jobs, Tourism and Skills Training today released a special report on the job prospects for the LNG industry and the policies needed on training, job mobility and use of temporary foreign workers.

A news release says:

Premier Christy Clark today accepted all recommendations in ‘The Premier’s Liquefied Natural Gas Working Group: Final Report’ as a road map to making sure British Columbia has the skilled labour force it needs to seize the opportunity of liquefied natural gas.

The report, produced by representatives of government, LNG proponents, organized labour, and the Haisla Nation, maps out 15 recommendations on planning, skills training, marketing and developing best practices within the LNG sector to attract a mobile workforce.

“To bring home the opportunity presented by LNG, we have to work together — government, industry, First Nations and labour,” said Premier Clark. “Everyone here today is working toward the same goal – making sure British Columbians benefit from this generational opportunity.”

Premier Clark called together the working group after her first meeting with representatives of organized labour in September 2013. At that historic meeting it was agreed that all parties would to work together to map out how they could work together to solve some of the complex challenges associated with the LNG opportunity.

“I want to thank the Premier for setting up the working group. I also want to thank the representatives of the Haisla Nation, industry, labour and government as it has been quite a process to come to agreement on the recommendations,” said Jim Sinclair, president of the BC Federation of Labour. “We were able to get beyond our differences by keeping our focus on what B.C. workers need to take advantage of the potential that lies in LNG. Now we have to ensure that the 15 recommendations are implemented. This investment in the workers of British Columbia will lead to good jobs. As we know, good jobs build a better B.C.”

The report includes one recommendation on developing a working group moving forward, four recommendations on skills training planning and implementation, two recommendations on marketing and promotions, three recommendations on apprenticeship trades and mentoring, two recommendations on a mobile workforce, one recommendation on timelines and two recommendations on the use of workers from other jurisdictions. The recommendations will be reflected in the 10-year skills training plan that will be released soon.

“Premier Clark recognized early the need for LNG workforce development in collaboration with industry, labour, and government,” said David Keane, vice president, policy and corporate affairs for BG Canada’s Prince Rupert LNG project. “Skills training is critical to ensure citizens of the province might realize the full economic benefits of LNG.”

From the report…..

Top 10 Construction-
Related Jobs with the
Greatest Demand

1.Steamfitters &
pipefitters
2.Construction traders
helpers & labourers
(including riggers)
3.Welders
4.Concrete finishers
5.Heavy equipment
operators
6.Carpenters
7.Truck drivers
8.Purchasing agents &
officers
9.Gas fitters
10.Crane operators

Read the full report

LNG_Final_Report

Kitimat votes: Ross calls Gateway plebsicite “late in the day” and “slap in the face”

Haisla Nation chief counsellor Ellis Ross has written a letter to Kitimat media sharply critizing the upcoming plebiscite on the Enbridge Northern Gateway project

Enbridge trying to buy Social Licence

This late in the day, a poll of its residents has no binding effect on the project. Next week, the District of Kitimat will seek the views of its residents on Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Pipeline Project. But to what end? If anything, it will lead to further uncertainty.

Deciding to hold a referendum at this late date is a slap in the face to all the work done by the Haisla Nation on this project. The Haisla Nation dedicated time and money toward testing Northern Gateway’s evidence and claims about safety and environmental protection, while the District stood by and did nothing.

The review process for this project has already left town, with the District taking no position on the project. Still undecided on what its views are on the project, the District now proposes to conduct a poll, instead of examining the facts in the JRP process. A poll to vote on a JRP report that we view as wrong to begin with including the flawed process itself!

Haisla Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)
Based on our participation, the Haisla Nation has determined the risks associated with Northern Gateway’s transport of diluted bitumen and condensate clearly outweighs any potential benefits. This is an informed conclusion, made after reviewing Northern Gateway’s application and evidence, and participating extensively in the Joint Review Panel process.

The Haisla Nation is doing what it can to protect what is left of its Territory. The Joint Review Panel Report has failed to properly address the concerns associated with the project, which is why the Haisla Nation has asked the Federal Court of Appeal to review the JRP’s Report. And the Haisla Nation is not alone in its challenge of the Report. Two other First Nations – Gitga’at and Git’xaala – and two environmental organizations have also challenged the Report.

Enbridge Northern Gateway is desperate for public support. That is why it is conducting a media and canvassing blitz in the District to sway voters. Will the District of Kitimat be able to form a position based on the outcome of such a plebiscite, which would have been bought by oil money, instead of based on participating in a fact finding process like the JRP? What is a yes vote that has been bought by Enbridge’s vast advertising machine worth? Does a purchased social licence hold any value at all? If it does have a price tag, it doesn’t come close to the value that the Haisla people place on what is left of Haisla Territory; especially if you look at what has happened in the Gulf of Mexico, at Kalamazoo and the effects lasting even to today in Prince William Sound (Exxon Valdez).

The Haisla Nation will not be swayed by a yes vote in the District of Kitimat plebiscite. If anything, our membership is angry that it is even happening at all. This project is wrong for the Haisla Nation and it is wrong for the Territory that Haisla’s and non Haisla’s call home. We have a choice. We have more than enough projects to sustain the region and we are already seeing the results.

There is also some controversy in Kitimat whether or not members of the Haisla Nation should be able to vote in the April 12 plebiscite. District officials noted that its has jurisdiction only within District boundaries. That means that members of the Haisla Nation who live within the boundaries of the District can vote, while Haisla who live in Kitamaat Village, which is a federally designated Indian Reserve cannot.

Earlier in the week, Ross was equally blunt in a Facebook posting aimed at the Haisla Nation where he said:

The Kitimat Council’s ‘vote’ is an insult to Haisla given the amount of time, effort and money we’ve spent since 09 and they come in at the last minute to cheer lead for Enbridge but he vote wont mean anything regardless of the outcome.

District of Kitimat can’t make this project happen even if its a yes vote. We will make our position known to both this vote and our reaffirmation of this project and its impacts to our rights and title.
Haisla members: remember what we’ve been saying about this in our membership meetings since 09.

On Monday, in an Op Ed in the Vancouver Sun, Clarence Innis, acting chief of the Gitxaala Nation, wrote, in part:

We, the Gitxaala Nation, are vehemently opposed to Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway pipeline project because of the disastrous effects the shipment of heavy oil through our territory would have on our traditional way of life, economy, spirituality, and governance system….
What’s especially concerning is that our people have not been properly consulted about the impacts of the Northern Gateway Project, despite openly participating and co‑operating with the federal joint review panel process. We went out of our way to participate in Canada’s regulatory system, yet our rights have been completely ignored.

Kitimat Votes: 25th anniversary of Exxon Valdez disaster looms over Northern Gateway plebiscite

On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez plowed into Bligh Reef in Alaska’s Prince William Sound, spilling 260,000 to 750,000 barrels or 41,000 to 119,000 cubic metres of crude oil.

That was 25 years ago. The media loves anniversary stories and the Exxon Valdez look-backs and updates are already ramping up—right in the middle of the Kitimat plebiscite on the Northern Gateway pipeline and terminal project.

The hashtag #ExxonValdez25 is beginning to trend, based on a Twitter chat for Monday sponsored by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The voters of Kitimat who will have to cast their ballots on the Joint Review Panel’s interpretation of the Northern Gateway proposal will find once again that the JRP tilted toward the industry and downplayed the lingering risks from a major tanker disaster—and that means neither the pro nor the anti side can be happy with the events that will be marked on March 24, 2014.

The Exxon Valdez accident is part of the Joint Review Panel findings that the economic benefits of Northern Gateway outweigh the risks. The JRP generally accepted the industry position, taken by both Northern Gateway and by ExxonMobil that Prince William Sound has recovered from the Exxon Valdez incident, something that is fiercely debated and disputed.

One area that is not in dispute is that the Exxon Valez disaster brought laws that forced energy companies to use double-hulled tankers. However, commercials that indicate that Northern Gateway will be using double-hulled tankers because the company respects the BC coast is pushing things a bit far, since those tankers are required by law.

Northern Gateway told the Joint Reivew Panel that

on a worldwide basis, all data sets show a steady reduction in the number
and size of oil spills since the 1970s. This decline has been even more apparent since regulatory changes in 1990 following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which required a phase-in of double-hulled tankers in the international fleet. No double-hulled tanker has sunk since 1990. There have been five incidents of double-hulled tankers that have had a collision or grounding that penetrated the cargo tanks. Resulting spills ranged from 700 to 2500 tonnes

The Haisla countered by saying:

The Haisla Nation said that, although there have been no major spills since the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound, there were 111 reported incidents involving tanker traffic in Prince William Sound between 1997 and 2007. The three most common types of incidents were equipment malfunctions, problems with propulsion, steering, or engine function, and very small spills from tankers at berth at the marine terminal. The Haisla Nation said that, in the absence of state-of-the-art prevention systems in Prince William Sound, any one of those incidents could have resulted in major vessel casualties or oil spills.

A local daily newspaper, The Anchorage Daily News sums it all up:

The herring of Prince William Sound still have not recovered. Neither have killer whales, and legal issues remain unresolved a quarter of a century later. Monday is the 25th anniversary of the disaster, in which the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef and spilled at least 11 million gallons of oil into the pristine waters of the sound.

Prince William Sound today looks spectacular, a stunning landscape of mountainous fjords, blue-green waters and thickly forested islands. Pick up a stone on a rocky beach, maybe dig a little, though, and it is possible to still find pockets of oil.

“I think the big surprise for all of us who have worked on this thing for the last 25 years has been the continued presence of relatively fresh oil,” said Gary Shigenaka, a marine biologist for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Britain’s Sunday Telegraph headlined: Exxon Valdez – 25 years after the Alaska oil spill, the court battle continues

The legal dispute over the spill is still ongoing, with the Telegraph’s Joanna Walters noting:

[S]tate senator Berta Gardner is pushing for Alaskan politicians to demand that the US government forces ExxonMobil Corporation to pay up a final $92 million (£57 million), in what has become the longest-running environmental court case in history. The money would primarily be spent on addressing the crippled herring numbers and the oiled beaches.
“There’s still damage from the spill. The oil on the beaches is toxic and hurting wildlife. We can’t just say we’ve done what we can and it’s all over – especially with drilling anticipated offshore in the Arctic Ocean – this is significant for Alaska and people around the world,” she told The Telegraph.

An ExxonMobil spokesman then told The Telegraph, the energy sector’s standard response:

Richard Keil, a senior media relations adviser at ExxonMobil, said: “The overwhelming consensus of peer-reviewed scientific papers is that Prince William Sound has recovered and the ecosystem is healthy and thriving.”
But federal scientists estimate that between 16,000 and 21,000 gallons of oil from the spill lingers on beaches in Prince William Sound and up to 450 miles away, some of it no more biodegraded than it was at the time of the disaster.

The Sunday Telegraph chronicles which species have recovered in Exxon Valdez: Animal populations in Prince William Sound, Alaska

Overall, the Exxon Valdez disaster was, as US National Public Radio reported, a spur to science. But NPR’s conclusion is the exact opposite of that from the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel—at least when it comes to fish embryos.

Why The Exxon Valdez Spill Was A Eureka Moment For Science

Twenty-five years of research following the Exxon Valdez disaster has led to some startling conclusions about the persistent effects of spilled oil.
When the tanker leaked millions of gallons of the Alaskan coast, scientists predicted major environmental damage, but they expected those effects to be short lived. Instead, they’ve stretched out for many years.
What researchers learned as they puzzled through the reasons for the delayed recovery fundamentally changed the way scientists view oil spills. One of their most surprising discoveries was that long-lasting components of oil thought to be benign turned out to cause chronic damage to fish hearts when fish were exposed to tiny concentrations of the compounds as embryos.

(NPR also reports on the The Lingering Legacy Of The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill)

It seems that some species recovered better than others from the oilspill.

For example, the recovery of the sea otter population has received widespread media coverage, but with widely divergent points of view. The more conservative and pro-industry writers point to the recovery of the otter population, while environmental coverage stresses the quarter century it took for the otter population to rebound.

Scientific American online and other media outlets reported 25 Years after Exxon Valdez Spill, Sea Otters Recovered in Alaska’s Prince William Sound quoting a report from the U.S. Geological Survey that said that spill killed 40 percent of the 6,500 sea otters living in the sound and more in 1990 and 1991.USGS reported that the main sea otter population in the sound was 4,277 in 2013.

Although recovery timelines varied widely among species, our work shows that recovery of species vulnerable to long-term effects of oil spills can take decades,” said lead author of the study, Brenda Ballachey, research biologist with the U.S. Geological Survey. “For sea otters, we began to see signs of recovery in the years leading up to 2009, two decades after the spill, and the most recent results from 2011 to 2013 are consistent with recovery

The Joint Review Panel generally accepted Northern Gateway’s and the energy industry’s evidence on the Exxon Valdez incident and concluded

The Panel’s finding regarding ecosystem recovery following a large spill is based on extensive scientific evidence filed by many parties, including information on recovery of the environment from large past spill events such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Panel notes that different parties sometimes referred to the same studies on environmental recovery after oil spills, and drew different conclusions.

In its consideration of natural recovery of the environment, the Panel focused on effects that are more readily measurable such as population level impacts, harvest levels, or established environmental quality criteria such as water and sediment quality criteria.

The Panel finds that the evidence indicates that ecosystems will recover over time after a spill and that the post-spill ecosystem will share functional attributes of the pre-spill one. Postspill ecosystems may not be identical to pre-spill ecosystems. Certain ecosystem components may continue to show effects, and residual oil may remain in some locations. In certain unlikely circumstances, the Panel finds that a localized population or species could potentially be permanently affected by an oil spill.

Scientific studies after the Exxon Valdez spill indicated that the vast majority of species recovered following the spill and that functioning ecosystems, similar to those existing pre-spill, were established.
Species for which recovery is not fully apparent, such as Pacific herring, killer whales, and pigeon guillemots, appear to have been affected by other environmental factors or human influences not associated with the oil spill. Insufficient pre-spill baseline data on these species contributed to difficulties in determining the extent of spill effects.

Based on the evidence, the Panel finds that natural recovery of the aquatic environment after an oil spill is likely to be the primary recovery mechanism, particularly for marine spills. Both freshwater and marine ecosystem recovery is further mitigated where cleanup is possible, effective, and beneficial to the environment.

Natural processes that degrade oil would begin immediately following a spill. Although residual oil could remain buried in sediments for years, the Panel finds that toxicity associated with that oil would decline over time and would not cause widespread, long-term impacts.

The Panel finds that Northern Gateway’s commitment to use human interventions, including available spill response technologies, would mitigate spill impacts to ecosystems and assist in species recovery..

It is clear, however, from the local coverage in Alaska and from the attention of the world’s media that Prince William Sound has not fully recovered from the Exxon Valdez incident (it may yet in who knows how many years). Anger and bitterness still remains among the residents of Alaska, especially since the court cases are dragging on after a quarter century.

Those are the kinds of issues that Kitimat residents will face when they vote in the plebiscite on April 12. Just who do the people of Kitimat believe, those who say the chances for a spill are remote and the environment and the economy will quickly recover? It probably depends on whether or not you consider 25 years quick. Twenty-five years is quick in geological time but it is a third or a half of a human life time.

As for the residents of Kitamaat Village, and probably many people in Kitimat, Haisla Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross summed it up in a Facebook posting on Sunday

If this happens in Kitamaat, all those campaigning for Enbridge will pack up and leave for another coastline to foul. Haisla don’t have much of a choice. We would have to stay and watch the court battles on who should pay what.

Ross is right. Whether it’s Prince William Sound or Douglas Channel, the people who live the region are stuck with the mess while the big companies walk away and the lawyers get rich.

Anniversary stories (as of March 23, 2000 PT)

Alaska Media

Valdez Star
First Associated Press story on Exxon Valdez Oil Spill reprinted

KTUU

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 25th Anniversary: Alaskans Remember

Alaska Dispatch

Exxon Valdez oil lingers on Prince William Sound beaches; experts debate whether to clean it up

While Alaska’s Prince William Sound is safer, questions linger about preventing oil spills

Recalling the shock and sadness of Exxon Valdez spill 25 years ago

How the Exxon Valdez spill gave birth to modern oil spill prevention plans

Seward City News
25 years later Exxon Valdez memories still stink

Bristol Bay Times
Exxon lesson: Prevention, RCACs the key to avoiding future disaster

Anchorage Daily News
Red Light to Starboard: Recalling the Exxon Valdez Disaster

Exxon Valdez photogallery

25 years later, oil spilled from Exxon Valdez still clings to lives, Alaska habitat

World Media
Al Jazeera
The legacy of Exxon Valdez spill
The tanker ran aground 25 years, but the accident continues to harm the environment and human health

Vancouver Sun
Opinion: Oil spills — the 10 lessons we must learn Reality check: Next incident would ruin coastal economy

Seattle Times

Promises broken by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 25 years later

SFGate

25 years since the Exxon Valdez spill

CNN
After 25 years, Exxon Valdez oil spill hasn’t ended

LNG Canada passes first step in BC environmental review, to hold LNG demonstration at Mt. Elizabeth Theatre

LNG Canada, the project led by Shell Canada Energy, has passed the first step in the environmental review process for the liquified natural gas plant and terminal.

LNG Canada said Tuesday that the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office has approved LNG Canada’s Application Information Requirements (AIR) for the proposed project.

The company says the AIR outlines the studies, methods, and information that will be required in LNG Canada’s Application for an Environmental Assessment Certificate.

The LNG Canada AIR was developed in consideration of comments submitted by the public, First Nations and regulators during a 30-day public comment period held in November/December 2013, including a public meeting at the Kitimat Rod & Gun, where documents were distributed and employees answered questions from politicians and the public.

LNG Canada says it will now continue to gather information and complete studies in support of developing our Environmental Assessment Application.

The company intends submit to the Environmental Assessment Application to the the B.C. EAO later this year.

LNG Canada will hold its next public meeting, an “LNG Demonstration and Presentation” on March 6, 2014 at the Mount Elizabeth Theatre starting at 6 p.m. The company says the event is to “to share information and answer questions about liquefied natural gas (LNG).” Starting at 7 pm there will be a a live demonstration using LNG to explain the science behind liquefaction and the properties of LNG.

For more information about the project’s EA process, www.eao.gov.bc.ca and look for our project under the “Proposed EAs” sections.

The other partners in the LNG Canada project are Diamond LNG Canada, an (“affiliate” of Mitsubishi), Korea Gas Corporation and Phoenix Energy (an “affiliate” of PetroChina).

Ottawa’s Northern Gateway consultation with First Nations limited to three simple questions and 45 days: documents

The federal government’s main consultation with First Nations on the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel report is limited to just three simple questions that had to be answered within 45 days, according to documents seen by Northwest Coast Energy News.

Joint Review Panel cover — Cover of Volume 1 of the Joint Review Panel ruling on Northern Gateway

That despite the fact that the first volume of the JRP report “Connections” is 76 pages and the second volume “Considerations” is 418 pages including the 209 recommendations and appendices and came after two years of hearings and tens of thousands of pages of evidence.

On Dec. 6 and again on Dec. 16, 2013, just prior to the release of the Joint Review Panel report, Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project wrote to the First Nations potentially affected by Northern Gateway, saying their response had to be filed within 45 days of the release of the JRP. Since the report was released on December 19, 2013, that made the initial deadline January 31, 2014.

The letter also told the First Nations that if they wanted their positions included in the “Crown Consultation Report” that would be part of the package on Northern Gateway presented to the federal cabinet, that position had to be limited to just two to three pages “given the number of groups involved” with a final deadline of April 16, 2014.

Maracle’s letters used the term Phase IV to define the post JRP consultations, implying there were three earlier stages of consultation, something many First Nations have disputed, especially since the Harper government had earlier maintained that the JRP itself was the constitutionally mandated consultation.

The cabinet has until June 19, 2014, 180 days after the release of the report to approve the issuing of the federal permits for the Northern Gateway project. Consultation with First Nations on projects such as the Northern Gateway is required by the Constitution and has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The three questions outlined in the letter were:

Does the Report appropriately character the concerns you raised during the JRP process?
Do the recommendations and conditions in the Panel Report address some/all of your concerns?
Are there any “outstanding” concerns that are not addressed in the Panel Report? If so, do you have recommendations (i.e proposed accommodation measures) how to address them?

Consultation on implementation

The third question appears to confirm what most political observers have said, approval of the Northern Gateway by the Harper cabinet is a a forgone conclusion, since Maracle speaks of “accommodation measures.” When the JRP approved the Northern Gateway project, the panel said that Enbridge’s proposed “mitigation” measures in case of a spill were adequate, something environmental groups and First Nations are now disputing in court.

It appears from the correspondence seen by Northwest Coast Energy News, that the federal government will only consider further specific consultations with First Nations after the approval of the Northern Gateway and only then on the implementation and construction process, rather than consulting on the project as a whole.

The Haisla have filed a document in response to the JRP that notes that

The Haisla Nation needs to understand Canada’s views of the role that future federal decisions might play for the proposed project. In its December 12, 2013 to Mr. Maracle, the Haisla Nation asked the federal government to provide a comprehensive list of the regulatory permits which would be issued the the federal government decision-makers in Haisla Nation Territory in the event the proposed project is approved and describe the consultation process that would occur prior to decisions being on those regulatory permits, within 45 days of the issuance of the JRP Report.

Mr. Maracle’s January 29, 2014 [reply] suggests that the only future federal decisions on the proposed project which may entail consultation are specific watercourse crossing and fish habitat destruction permits issued by Fisheries and Oceans Canada.

Whole-of-government

One of the problems reaching back to long before the Joint Review Panel hearings began is that the Harper government policy was what they called a “whole-of-government” approach in its consultations with First Nations, saying: “The Crown is open to discussing how consultation with the framework provided will be carried out.”

In their repose, the Haisla say the federal government never defined how the “whole-of-government” approach to First Nations was going to work and noted:

What Canada should have realized is that it has a very real obligation to consult with the Haisla Nation at the deepest end of the consultation spectrum that cannot be pigeon-holed into a one size fits all approach.

Further, the term whole-of-government is misleading, as this approach actually prohibits the majority of government from engaging in consultation.

The Haisla then say: “Documents we have obtained under an Access to Information Request clearly indicate individual departments were asked not to communicate directly with the Haisla Nation.”

The response goes on to say:

Further questions at federal government witnesses during the JRP process confirmed that federal departments had not met with the Haisla Nation since the commencement of the JRP process. While these witnesses were reluctant to confirm that they had been prohibited from meeting with us, they repeatedly referred to the “whole-of-government” approach to consultation as their reason for not meeting.

Canada’s “whole-of-government” approach clearly limited engagement to a strict process with no opportunity for real engagement.

Earliest stages

The Haisla are telling the Harper government:

It is clear that the Haisla Nation that we are the very earliest stages of consultation with Canada about the proposed project….It is clear to the Haisla Nation that the 45-day period within which Canada has unilaterally determined face-to-face meetings with all the Aboriginal groups potentially affected by the proposed project will occur is not an adequate amount of time to complete a meaningful consultation process.

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Haisla ask cabinet to postpone Northern Gateway decision to allow for adequate consultation with First Nations

The Haisla Nation are calling on the federal cabinet to postpone its decision on the Northern Gateway project to allow time for adequate consultations with First Nations, according to the Haisla response to the Joint Review Panel, seen by Northwest Coast Energy News.

The Joint Review Panel report and recommendations were released on Dec. 19, 2013 and the cabinet has 180 days from that point to recommend approval of the project.

The Haisla argue that Section 54 of the National Energy Board act allows the Governor-in-Council, the federal cabinet, to extend the timeline if it wants to, if recommended by the Minister of Natural Resources.

So far, the Harper government has refused to extend the deadline. The Haisla response document says Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross spoke to Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver on the telephone requesting the extension, but, according to the document, all Oliver did was point to the legislation that calls for the 180 day response to a joint review report.

The Haisla response document also has a long lists of what the Haisla say are flaws in the Joint Review Panel report.

Consultations

In correspondence with the Haisla, Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project, says:

the process set out by the Government of Canada in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework was finalized after receiving and carefully considering input from Aboriginal groups….The Government of Canada believes the process outlined in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework provides for a deep level of meaningful consultation with Aboriginal groups with Phase IV being the final step prior to a decision being made on the Project.

The Haisla dispute there has been any “deep level of meaningful consultation,” citing in the document a long list of attempts to engage the federal government with little or no response.

In their response, the Haisla Nation Council says:

Canada, has, to date, refused to engage in meaningful consultations with the Haisla Nation. Instead Canada has unilaterally imposed what it calls a “deep level meaningful consultation” process which is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons…

The document lists attempts by the Haisla to engage with ministers and government departments including requests for a meeting with then Environment Minister Peter Kent, prior to the opening of the JRP formal hearings in Kitamaat Village in January 2012. Although the Haisla requested a meeting with Kent, several times in 2011, no meeting ever occurred. It was not until April 19, 2012, four months later that Kent replied to the Haisla saying he had asked the President of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency to meet with the First Nation prior to the start of the JRP hearings. However, it was apparently impossible to schedule such a meeting in December, 2011.

To which the Haisla reply:

For over six years, Canada ignored Haisla Nations requests for meetings. Once the JRP’s oral hearings process commenced, Canada further closed the door on any opportunity for a meeting until the JRP Report was release. This refusal to consult was baseless. The ongoing JRP process was not a rational or justifiable basis for Canada’s refusal to consult…

Canada has yet to meet with the Haisla Nation to discuss the proposed project, other than to tell the Haisla Nation it is only engaging through the JRP process for now. This is not consultation. It is, perhaps, at best an initial step towards a consultation process.
Ignoring the Eyford report

In March 2013, Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver flew to Terrace for a photo op to announce the appointment of Douglas Eyford to consult First Nations on the Northern Gateway project. Oliver then flew back to Ottawa without meeting anyone in the region. Eyford’s report Forging Partnership Build Relationship was released in November, 2013.

The Haisla say:

Mr. Eyford’s Report recommended that Canada should consider undertaking early engagement to address Aboriginal interests that may not be dealt within a regulatory process. The Haisla Nation has been seeking such early engagement from Canada since the proposed project was first announced.

Mr. Eyford’s Report also recommended that Canada should engage and conduct consultations n addition to those in regulatory processes, as may be required, to address issues and facilitate resolutions in exceptional circumstances. The Haisla Nation also asked for this, identifying early that this proposed project was an exceptional circumstance due to the significant potential impacts on the Haisla Nation.

It is not too late for Canada to correct the deficiencies in its consultation process, but cannot realistically do so by adhering unilaterally by Canada and laid out in Mr. Maracle’s letter of December 16, 2013

The Haisla Nation Council response was sent to Brett Maracle, Crown Consultation Coordinator at the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency for the Northern Gateway project. The Haisla also sent copies of the response to Joe Oliver, the Minister of Natural Resources, Gaetan Caron, Chair of the National Energy Board, Leon Aqlukkaq, Minister of the Environment, Bernard Valcourt Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Gail Shea, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, BC Premier Christy Clark, Steve Thomson, BC Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources and Mary Polak, BC Minister of the Environment.

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

The Haisla Nation response to the federal government’s request for consultation on the Joint Review Panel report on the Northern Gateway lists what the First Nation sees as flaws in the panel’s assessment of the project. (The Haisla filed their first list of flaws in the JRP in a court challenge).

In the response, seen by Northwest Coast Energy News, the Haisla are objecting to both the government’s and the JRP’s attitude toward the idea of consultation as well as some of the specific findings by the panel. The Haisla also fault the JRP process for refusing to take into consideration reports and studies that were released after the evidentiary deadlines.

Overall, the Haisla say

The JRP report is written in a way that prevents an assessment of how or whether the JRP considered Haisla Nation concerns and of how whether the JRP purports to address the Haisla Nation’s concerns. Further the JRP Report is lacking n some of the fundamental justification required to understand how arrived at its recommendations.

So what are the Haisla concerns?

In the document filed with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, the Haisla say:

The proposed project carries with it an inordinate amount of risk to Haisla Nation Territory. The Haisla Nation is being asked to play host to this proposed project, despite the risk the proposed project poses to the land waters and resources relied on by the Haisla Nation for sustenance and cultural heritage. The risk includes a huge risk to Haisla Nation aboriginal rights to trap, hunt and fish, to gather seafood and gather plant materials. It could result in significant damage to the Haisla Nation cultural heritage—its traditional way of life…..

The terminal site is one of the few areas suitable for terminal development in our territory. It is also home to over 800 Haisla Nation Culturally Modified Trees (CMTs). Northern Gateway proposes to irrevocably alter the land, the use of the land and access to this land for the duration of the proposed project, which is anticipated to be at least 80 years. This irrevocable alteration includes the felling of our CMTS….

By seeking to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for the proposed project, Northern Gateway will be effectively expropriating the economic value of this land. Northern Gateway is proposing to use Haisla Nation aboriginal title land for a project with no benefit to the Haisla Nation and which is fundamentally at odds with Haisla Nation stewardship principles.

Obstructed clear understanding

The Haisla say that “Canada has failed to adhere is own framework” for the JRP because in the Aboriginal Consultation Framework says “Federal departments will be active participants in the JRP process to ensure the environmental assessment and consultation record, is as accurate and complete as possible.”

The Haisla say “Canada provided limited written evidence to the JRP” and goes on to say that the “federal governments not only failed to provide relevant information but also obstructed a clear understanding of project impacts.”

Among the evidence relevant to Northern Gateway that the federal government was “unable or unwilling to provide” includes:

Natural Resources had expertise on acid rock damage and metal leaching but did not include evidence on that in their evidence
Fisheries and Oceans did not have a mandate to conduct an assessment of the potential toxicological effects of an oil spill.
Environment Canada did not review or provide information on the spills from pipelines.
The federal government witnesses were unable to answer questions about the toxicity of dispersant.
Environment Canada was asked if it had studies of the subsurface currents and the movement of submerged oil. Environment Canada told the JRP did not measure hydrodynamic data but relies on DFO. DFO cold not provide any witnesses to the JRP with expertise on subsurface currents.

In the formal response on the JRP report, Haisla also say:

The JRP has concluded that the risk of a large spill form the pipeline in the Kitimat River Valley is not likely, despite very significant information gaps relating to geohazards, leak detection and spill response.
The JRP has concluded that a large spill would result in significant adverse environmental effects. However, the JRP appears to base a finding that these effects are unlikely to occur on an unreasonable assumptions about how widespread the effects could be or how long they would last. The JRP has not considered the extent to which a localized effect could impact Haisla Nation.
The JRP relies on the concept of “natural recovery” as mitigation of significant adverse effects. The Haisla Nation asked the JRP to compel information from Northern Gateway about the applicability of its evidence to species found in Haisla National Territory. The JRP, however, refused to compel this evidence from Northern Gateway.
The JRP has accepted at face value that Northern Gateway would shut down its pipeline within 13 minutes in the event of a rupture and has failed to consider the effects of a large spill that is not detected with this timeframe through the control centre (or was in the case of Kalamazoo, is detected by the control centre but is systematically mischaracterized and ignored).

As part of the consultation process the Haisla want 22 changes to the JRP report, changes which echo the Haisla Final Written Argument that was filed at the end of the hearings.

It says:

The Panel should find that potential impacts to asserted Haisla Nation aboriginal rights and title from the proposed project are such that project cannot be found to be in the public interest in the absence of meaningful consultation… The current status of engagement and the federal government imposition of a 6-month time limit to complete consultation raise serious concerns that meaningful consultation will not be possible. Therefore the proposed project is not in the public interest.

Among the others are:

The JRP should have determined the significant of adverse effects to rare ecological communities that cannot mitigated.
The JRP should have provided more information to allow a reasonable assessment of the risk of a spill from the pipelines.
The JRP would have considered all factors to contribute to the risk of a spill.
The JRP should have found that Northern Gateway’s assessment of the toxicity of an oil spill because it did not consider the full range of products to be shipped nor did it consider the potential pathways of the effect of a toxic spill, whether from a pipeline, at the marine terminal or in the case of a tanker spill
The evidence had not demonstrated that Northern Gateway’s spill response would be able to mitigate the effects of a spill either at the pipeline, at the Kitimat marine terminal or from a tanker spill.
The JRP did not consider the impact of the Kitimat Marine Terminal on their cultural and archaeological heritage, including culturally modified trees.

Haisla ask cabinet to postpone Northern Gateway decision to allow for adequate consultation with First Nations

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Haisla response lists evidence rejected by Northern Gateway Joint Review

Members of the Joint Review panel make notes at Kitamaat Village (Robin Rowland) — Members of the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel, left to right, Kenneth Bateman, chair Sheila Leggett and Hans Matthews make notes at the June 25, 2012 hearings at the Haisla Recreation Centre, Kitamaat Village. A map of Douglas Channel can be seen behind the panel. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

The Haisla Nation in their response to the Crown on the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel details four studies, three Canadian and one American that were released after the Joint Review evidentiary deadline had passed, evidence that the Haisla say should be considered in any consideration of the Northern Gateway pipeline, terminal and tanker project. (The American report from the National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration was released after the JRP final report)

JRP chair Sheila Leggett’s constant citing of rules of procedure and her stubborn refusal to consider new evidence and studies in a dynamic situation that was changing rapidly was one of the reasons that many people in the northwest said the JRP had lost credibility.

The Haisla say: “It is incumbent upon Canada to consider and discuss the information in these reports as part of a meaningful consultation process…” and then lists “key findings” that have potential impacts on aboriginal rights and title:

The West Coast Spill response for the government of British Columbia which found:

Most oil spilled into the marine environment cannot be cleaned up
There is a disconnect between planning and actual repose capability
Canada’s spill response is “far from world class.”

The Transport Canada Ship Oil Spill Preparedness and Response study:

Douglas Channel will go from low risk to high risk for pills if the project goes ahead
The study recommends preparation for a “true worst case discharge” rather than “the credible worst case discharge” as proposed by Northern Gateway
Canada needed a much more rigorous regulatory regime covering tankers.

The joint federal government technical report on the properties of bitumen from the Canadian Oil Sands:

There are uncertainties on how diluted bitumen would behave in a marine environment.
Northern Gateway did not provide adequate information about sediment levels to allow for proper study of interaction with diluted bitumen
Dispersant may not be effective.
Weathered diluted bitumen would “reach densities at which it will sink freshwater without mechanical or physical assistance.”

The US National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration report on Transporting Alberta Oil sands:

Diluted bitumen has “significant differences from conventional crudes.’ (The JRP used conventional crude as a benchmark in its findings)
The physical properties of diluted bitumen “fluctuate based on a number of factors.
Pipeline operators may not have detailed information related to products in the pipeline at the time of a spill
There is a lack of experimental data on the weathering behaviour of oil sands product which limits the ability of spill response organizations “to understand and predict the behaviour and fate of oil sands products in freshwater, estuarine and saltwater environments.”

Haisla ask cabinet to postpone Northern Gateway decision to allow for adequate consultation with First Nations

Haisla consultation reply outlines flaws in Northern Gateway Joint Review report

Canadian Standards Association quietly announces review of pipeline and LNG standards

With little fanfare, the Canadian Standards Association has announced on its website that it is conducting a review of the standards for pipelines and LNG facilities in this country, including marine terminals.

The CSA is asking for input in updating the standards, with the deadline for Liquefied natural gas (LNG) — Production, storage, and handling (New Edition) starting on January 20 and ending on March 21, 2014. The review of Oil and gas pipeline systems (New Edition) began on Dec.23,2013 with a deadline of Feb. 23, 2014.

There are more details and information on how to contact the CSA on the web pages.

LNG Standards
Draft Scope/Description:
1 Scope
1.1
This Standard applies to the
(a) design;
(b) location;
(c) construction;
(d) operation; and
(e) maintenance
of facilities for the liquefaction of natural gas and facilities for the storage, vaporization, transfer, handling, and truck transport of LNG. It also contains requirements for the training of personnel.

1.2 1
For facilities that load or unload LNG from a marine vessel, this Standard contains requirements for the interconnecting piping between the loading/unloading arm flange and the storage tank(s), and other piping and appurtenances on the pier or jetty itself.
1.3
This Standard applies to all containers for the storage of LNG, including those with insulation systems applying a vacuum.
1.4
This Standard does not apply to frozen ground containers.
1.5
This Standard includes non-mandatory guidelines for
(a) small LNG facilities (see the definition of “small facility” in Clause 3 and see Annex B); and
(b) LNG vehicle fuelling stations employed for fleet and public LNG vehicle fuel dispensing operations (see the definition of “fuelling station” in Clause D.2 and see Annex D).
1.6
This Standard does not apply to the following:
(a) the transportation of refrigerants by any means;
(b) the transportation of LNG by railcar or marine vessel;
(c) the transportation of LNG or regasified LNG by pipeline beyond the facility boundary, except as specified in Clause 1.2; and
(d) facilities designed to allow the use of LNG as a fuel for railroad locomotives, or marine vessels.
1.7
All references to pressure throughout this Standard refer to gauge pressures unless otherwise specified.
1.8
All pipe sizes refer to nominal pipe sizes (NPS).
1.9
The values given in SI units are the units of record for the purposes of this Standard. The values given in parentheses are for information and comparison only.
1.10
In CSA standards, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard.

Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material.
Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements.
Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (nonmandatory) to define their application.

Oil and gas pipeline systems

Draft Scope/Description:
1.1
This Standard covers the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipeline systems that convey
(a) liquid hydrocarbons, including crude oil, multiphase fluids, condensate, liquid petroleum products, natural gas liquids, and liquefied petroleum gas;
(b) oilfield water;
(c) oilfield steam;
(d) liquid or dense phase carbon dioxide; or
(e) gas.

Notes:
(1) Vapour phase carbon dioxide pipeline systems fall under item (e).
(2) Designers are cautioned that the requirements in this Standard might not be appropriate for gases other than natural gas, manufactured gas, or synthetic natural gas.
1.2
The scope of this Standard, as shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, includes
(a) for oil industry fluids, piping and equipment in offshore pipelines, onshore pipelines, tank farms, pump stations, pressure-regulating stations, and measuring stations;
(b) oil pump stations, pipeline tank farms, and pipeline terminals;
(c) pipe-type storage vessels;
(d) carbon dioxide pipeline systems;
(e) for gas industry fluids, piping and equipment in offshore pipelines, onshore pipelines, compressor stations, measuring stations, and pressure-regulating stations;
(f) gas compressor stations; and
(g) gas storage lines and pipe-type and bottle-type gas storage vessels.

1.3
This Standard does not apply to
(a) piping with metal temperatures below –70 °C;
(b) piping (except oilfield steam distribution piping) with metal temperatures above 230 °C;
(c) gas piping beyond the operating company’s gas distribution system (covered by CAN/CSA-B149.1);
(d) piping in natural gas liquids extraction plants, gas processing plants (except main gas stream piping in dehydration and all other processing plants installed as part of gas pipeline systems), gas manufacturing plants, industrial plants, and mines;
(e) oil refineries, terminals other than pipeline terminals, and marketing bulk plants;
(f) abandoned piping;
(g) in-plant piping for drinking, make-up, or boiler feed water;
(h) casing, tubing, or pipe in oil or gas wells, wellheads, separators, production tanks, and other production facilities;
(i) vent piping for waste gases of any kind operating at or near atmospheric pressure;
(j) heat exchangers;
(k) liquefied natural gas systems (covered by CSA Z276);
(l) liquid fuel distribution systems;
(m) loading/unloading facilities for tankers or barges;
(n) refuelling facilities; and
(o) hydrocarbon storage in underground formations and associated equipment (covered by CSA Z341 Series).

1.4
This Standard is intended to establish essential requirements and minimum standards for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of oil and gas industry pipeline systems. This Standard is not a design handbook, and competent engineering judgment should be employed with its use.
Note: For steel pipe of grade higher than Grade 555, requirements in addition to those specified in this Standard might be needed. Matters that should be considered include joining, thermal aging effects during coating application, strain capacity (including cold bending), pressure testing, assessment of imperfections, and repair.
1.5
1.5.1
The requirements of this Standard are applicable to the operation, maintenance, and upgrading of existing installations; however, it is not intended that such requirements be applied retroactively to existing installations insofar as design, materials, construction, and established operating pressures are concerned.
1.5.2
Where class locations change pipelines in such locations shall be subject to the requirements for design factor, location factor, valve spacing, depth of cover and clearance, materials, pressure testing, historical repair methods and repair criteria for the higher class location, or shall be subjected to an engineering assessment to determine the suitability of the pipeline for service in the changed class location (see Clause 10.7.1).
1.6
Unless otherwise stated, to determine conformance with the specified requirements, it is intended that observed or calculated values be rounded to the nearest unit in the last right-hand place of figures used in expressing the limiting value, in accordance with the rounding method of ASTM E29.
1.7
Where any requirements of this Standard are at variance with the requirements of other publications referenced in this Standard, it is intended that the requirements of this Standard govern.
1.8
It is not the intent of this Standard to prevent the development of new equipment or practices, or to prescribe how such innovations are to be handled.
1.9
In CSA standards, “shall” is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to comply with the standard; “should” is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required; and “may” is used to express an option or that which is permissible within the limits of the standard. Notes accompanying clauses do not include requirements or alternative requirements; the purpose of a note accompanying a clause is to separate from the text explanatory or informative material. Notes to tables and figures are considered part of the table or figure and may be written as requirements. Annexes are designated normative (mandatory) or informative (nonmandatory) to define their application

DFO clarifies relationship with NEB on fisheries protection along pipeline routes

On January 16, Fisheries and Oceans issued a statement “clarifying” its role after signing an agreement with the National Energy Board on fisheries protection along pipeline routes, saying DFO “remains responsible for fisheries protection, including the issuance of Fisheries Act authorizations.”

Fisheries and Oceans signed the agreement with the National Energy Board in mid-December.

DFO says there is little difference between its agreement with the NEB and collaborative agreements with the provinces.

Fisheries and Oceans Canada has established a collaborative agreement with the National Energy Board that will help eliminate overlap and duplication during regulatory reviews while maintaining a strong regime to manage threats to fish and fish habitat.

Fisheries and Oceans Canada remains responsible for fisheries protection, including the issuance of Fisheries Act authorizations.

Our collaborative arrangement builds on the decades of training, experience and expertise of NEB biologists in assessing the potential environmental impacts of development projects, including regarding fish and fish habitat.

These arrangements will yield a number of benefits:
• Ensuring regulators focus on the greatest threats to fish and fish habitat;
• Making the best use of available resources; and
• More efficient approval processes.

The Policy and Operational Guidelines that are followed by DFO staff and anyone else involved in these matters are available on Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s website.

The National Energy Board is best placed to deliver regulatory review responsibilities under the Fisheries Act for activities relating to federally regulated energy infrastructure (such as pipelines).

The Memorandum of Understanding between Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the National Energy Board will enable the NEB to:
• Review proponent applications for impacts to fish and fish habitat;
• Assess appropriate measures to avoid and mitigate impacts to fish and fish habitat;
• Include measures to avoid and mitigate impacts as conditions of licences, orders or certificates issued by the NEB; and
• Assess the acceptability of proponent offsetting plans when authorization is required.

Over the years, DFO has established similar arrangements with some Provinces and with Conservation Authorities.
In all cases, the standards for fisheries protection are established by DFO and the Fisheries Act Authorizations continue to be done by DFO.