The Canadian Coast Guard says it will undertake “a significant environmental response operation” because more oil is leaking from the sunken Second World War United States Army Transport vessel, the Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski.
Hot tapping is a well-known and frequently used method of removing oil from the tanks of stricken vessels. Holes are carefully drilled into the side of the vessel to access fuel-tanks and then hot steam is pumped into the tanks. The steam increases the temperature of the oil and enables it to flow more easily. The oil is then pumped to the surface for safe disposal.
The procedure can be done with holes of very small sizes up to very large diameters. Hot tapping is used in both marine and land-based scenarios.
The red sections in the image above represent the fuel tanks of the Zalinski; the possible locations for hot tapping of the vessel. The yellow sections represent the cargo holds. (Canadian Coast Guard)
The Canadian Coast Guard says it “has engaged the Gitga’at First Nation and the Province of British Columbia to participate in the operation and maintain a presence at the wreck site” and will keep the Gitga’at First Nation informed of what is going on:
The Coast Guard recognizes that given their proximity to the Zalinski site and their interest in the oil recovery operation, the Gitga’at need to be informed on the progress of the operation and that they have important local knowledge and skill that will be beneficial to the operation.
The Coast Guard says that environmental monitoring in January and March of 2013, discovered “further upwelling” of oil and added new patches to the sunken vessel.
The Coast Guard says: “Although the patches from 2012 and 2013 remain in place, early patches have begun to leak and the Canadian Coast Guard has determined that the structural integrity of the vessel is deteriorating.”
USAT Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski (Canadian Coast Guard)
The USAT Brigadier General M.G. Zalinski was built in 1919 and served as a United States Army Transport vessel during the Second World War. It ran aground during a storm and sank in 1946 in the Grenville Channel about 100 kilometres south of Prince Rupert.
According to a Coast Guard News release, the wreck was “undetected” until the fall of 2003 in 34 metres of water near an underwater cliff about 20 metres from shore.
In September 2003, the United States Coast Guard Cutter Maple reported pollution in the Grenville Channel to the Canadian Coast Guard.
The CCGS Tanu investigated the source of the pollution and collected oil samples, but, the news release says, the vessel remained elusive and undetected.
A month later, more oil pollution was spotted so the Canadian Coast Guard used a remotely operated underwater vehicle which located the Zalinski.
New pollution was reported in the channel in October 2003 by a commercial airline pilot and at this time the Coast Guard suspected that the source of the upwelling of oil was an old wreck.
In 2003 and 2004, the Canadian Coast Guard contracted divers to patch the vessel to prevent the leak of oil.
The Coast Guard says it regularly monitored the site with the help of Transport Canada’s National Aerial Surveillance Program. Local First Nations Groups also monitored the wreck site.
More oil was spotted in April 2012, and at that time, contract divers patched the Zalinski with an epoxy that hardens underwater.
The Coast Guard says new dive footage has shown that metal rivets that hold the hull’s plates are corroding and that the hull is buckling.
as the state of the vessel deteriorates, the Coast Guard has determined that to prevent any harm to the environment, a significant operation should be undertaken to remove the oil from the vessel. The Canadian Coast Guard will be the on-scene commander for the duration of the operation, directing the recovery and the removal of marine pollutants from the vessel and actively monitoring the operation.
The Canadian Coast Guard has also engaged the province of British Columbia and local First Nations groups to solicit their feedback on the operation. On July 26, 2013, Public Works and Government Services Canada posted two requests for proposal seeking a third-party to conduct the oil removal operation and oil spill response services to assist in the case that any oil leaks from the vessel as the operation progresses.
Wreck sites for M.G. Zalinksi and Queen of the North (Canadian Coast Guard)
It is expected that the operation will begin in September 2013 and will conclude in December 2013. The Coast Guard says because the Grenville Channel is so narrow, some restrictions on vessel traffic in the Inland Passage will be needed.
The Grenville Channel is a narrow fjord-like waterway with significant tidal fluctuations and currents up to three knots. The shoreline is rocky and steep with little shoreline vegetation.
The Grenville Channel sees commercial fishing vessels, ferries, cruise ships, and pleasure craft transiting its waters on a regular basis, with increased frequency in the summer months. These waters, naturally shielded from stronger offshore winds and weather conditions, are the preferred route of many cruise ships.
The more mild sailing conditions and the stunning natural beauty of the area make the Grenville channel one of the scenic highlights of many marine travellers on Canada’s West Coast.
The government of British Columbia has filed a harsh assessment of Enbridge Northern Gateway in its final arguments submitted May 31 to the Joint Review Panel—much harsher than the government press release giving notice of the rejection suggests.
“‘Trust me’ is not good enough in this case,” the filing by BC government lawyer Christopher Jones says of Enbridge’s plans to handle any possible disaster from either a pipeline rupture or a tanker spill.
Some of the arguments from the province’s lawyers echo points about the Kitimat Valley raised by Douglas Channel Watch and the Haisla Nation, at one point, pointing directly to evidence from Douglas Channel Watch’s Dave Shannon.
The news release repeats Premier Christy Clark’s five conditions for the Northern Gateway and other projects, putting a positive spin on the much harsher legal argument.
“British Columbia thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence and submissions made to the panel and asked substantive questions about the project including its route, spill response capacity and financial structure to handle any incidents,” said Environment Minister Terry Lake. “Our questions were not satisfactorily answered during these hearings.”
“We have carefully considered the evidence that has been presented to the Joint Review Panel,” said Lake. “The panel must determine if it is appropriate to grant a certificate for the project as currently proposed on the basis of a promise to do more study and planning after the certificate is granted. Our government does not believe that a certificate should be granted before these important questions are answered.”
The provincial government has established, and maintains, strict conditions in order for British Columbia to consider the construction and operation of heavy-oil pipelines in the province.
Successful completion of the environmental review process. In the case of Northern Gateway, that would mean a recommendation by the National Energy Board Joint Review Panel that the project proceed;
World-leading marine oil spill response, prevention and recovery systems for B.C.’s coastline and ocean to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy-oil pipelines and shipments;
World-leading practices for land oil spill prevention, response and recovery systems to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy-oil pipelines;
Legal requirements regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights are addressed, and First Nations are provided with the opportunities, information and resources necessary to participate in and benefit from a heavy-oil project; and
British Columbia receives a fair share of the fiscal and economic benefits of a proposed heavy-oil project that reflect the level, degree and nature of the risk borne by the province, the environment and taxpayers.
Final argument
In its filing the province tells the JRP:
While the Joint Review Panel (“JRP”) may of course consider other factors in its recommendation, the Province submits that the JRP must accord very significant weight, in the case of this project, to the fact that NG’s plans for terrestrial and marine spill response remain preliminary and that it cannot, today, provide assurance that it will be able to respond effectively to all spills. Given the absence of a credible assurance in this regard, the Province cannot support the approval of or a positive recommendation from the JRP regarding, this project as it was presented to the JRP.
In the alternative, should the JRP recommend approval of the pipeline, the JRP must impose clear, measurable and enforceable conditions that require NG to live up to the commitments it has made in this proceeding.
Hazards from Kitimat’s geoglacial clay
The provincial government identifies a major potential hazard in the Kitimat valley, glacio-marine clay deposits that “threaten the integrity of the pipeline.”
Overall the province appears to accept the arguments from Douglas Channel Watch and other environmental groups that geo hazards along the pipeline route present a significant risk, one perhaps underestimated by Enbridge Northern Gateway.
NG does not dispute that spills from the pipeline may occur. While the project will be new, and built using modern technology, the fact remains that pipeline spills do happen. Indeed, Enbridge had 11 releases greater than 1000 barrels between 2002 and 2012…
The Province has concerns about the assertions NG has made regarding the probability for full-bore releases resulting from geohazards. NG asserts that full-bore spills will be very rare. However, this assertion must be considered in light of the fact that NG’s analysis of the geohazards that the pipeline could face is at a preliminary stage….
The rugged topography of West Central British Columbia is prone to slope failures.
Terrain instability may pose significant challenges for linear development.
Despite these challenging admits that its assessment of existing and potential geohazards along the pipeline route is not complete and that further investigations and more detailed geohazard mapping are required. For instance, although NG acknowledges that the potential presence of glacio-marine clays in the lower Kitimat Valley can threaten the integrity of a pipeline; its report on glacio-marine clay fails to identify a significant area of potential instability that had been previously reported in the relevant literature…
Since all geotechnical hazards have not been identified with the investigations carried out to date, and since comprehensive investigations will not be completed until the detailed design phase, NG has but a rough idea of the mitigation measures that may be employed in order to mitigate the geotechnical hazards that may be encountered…
Spill response
The province’s arguments also indicates that Enbridge Northern Gateway has not done a good enough job regarding spill response, whether from a full bore rupture or a pin hole leak.
it must be remembered that full-bore spills are less frequent than smaller spills, which could still have a significant environmental effect. Indeed, since risk equals consequence times probability, smaller spills could pose a higher risk as they are more frequent. While NG has produced considerable evidence with respect to the likelihood and effects of full-bore spills… the evidence concerning the potential for other spills is limited. While the Province supports assessing the effects of any spill based on a full-bore release, as it would allow for an analysis of the worst-case scenario, focus on full-bore releases should not eliminate consideration of the potential impact of smaller events…
NG stated that [a] table [in the evidence], which includes probabilities for medium sized spills, would be “replaced by. a detailed characterization of each pipeline kilometre and region as part of the ongoing risk assessment work,” but the province says, a later table that “now replaces the concept of large and medium spills”. focussed only on full-bore releases, a relatively rare event.
Similarly, NG also calculated spill return periods for pinhole and greater-than-pinhole events. Taking the figures NG for “greater-than-pinhole” releases results in a spill return figure of 76.7 years. The Province also has concerns about the information that NG has provided in this regard. First, because it focussed on spill events, there is no information about spill size, which, we submit is a critical issue in considering the risk posed by these kinds of events. Second, NG does not include the potential for spills that could occur as a result of “operating and maintenance procedures” that deviate from the norm. Finally, NG assumes that all geotechnical threats would result in a full-bore rupture. This assumption appears to be incorrect…
Premier Christy Clark has, as part of her five conditions, said there must be a world class spill response system. Enbridge responded by saying there will be. The province then turns around and says Enbridge has failed to do prove it.
Because of the potential for spills, and their impact, NG has committed to develop a comprehensive spill response capability. Indeed, NG has stated that it intends to have a “world-class response capability” for the Project. Given the real potential for spills to occur, and the devastating effect of a spill should a significant one take place, the Province submits that NG must show that it would be able to effectively respond to a spill. As set out below, the Province submits that it has failed to do so.
High stream flow, heavy snow at Kitimat
Again, the province appears to accept arguments from Douglas Channel Watch that Enbridge has underestimated the challenges of handling a spill in a remote area. The province also accepts the argument that booms are ineffective in high stream flow in the Kitimat River.
Although it asserts that it will be able to effectively respond to any spill, NG admits that responding to a spill from the pipeline will be challenging. In particular, it admits that a spill into a watercourse at a difficult to access location would present the greatest difficulty for clean-up and remediation…
Many parts of the pipeline will be located in remote areas, located some distance from road networks and population centres. For example, many of the rivers… are identified as remote or having no access. Road access to the pipeline and places where a spill might travel down a watercourse is important to allow for effective spill response…
In some cases, the steepness of the terrain will make responding to spills very challenging. NG acknowledges that the Coast Mountains’ topography is extreme…
As the JRP noted during cross examination by the Province of NG with respect to the Clore River, it has had the opportunity to take a view of the entire route. It will therefore know the steep and rugged terrain through which the pipeline would pass.
The presence of woody debris could also pose a challenge to spill response, requiring a shift of response activities to upstream locations…
If a spill were to occur during a period of high flow conditions, a common occurrence in British Columbia rivers, then some aspects of the response may have to be curtailed, or at least delayed until the high flow event recedes. At certain water velocities, booms become ineffective, and are potentially unsafe to operate.
The presence of heavy snow could also impede access during response operations, requiring use of snowmobiles, snow cats, and helicopters. In the Upper Kitimat and Hoult Creek Valleys, snow accumulation can reach 8-9 metres. However, weather may limit the ability of helicopters to aid in spill response…
Many of these challenges are recognized by NG. In the Preliminary Kitimat River Drainage Area Emergency Preparedness Report (“Kitimat Report”), NG refers to the challenges of winter conditions, avalanches and debris slides, heavy snow, spring melt, Fall freeze-up, patchy ice, and fast-flowing watercourses.
Sinking dilbit
The province also accepts the argument that under some circumstances that diluted bitumen can sink, arguments raised by David Shannon of Douglas Channel Watch.
These challenges are compounded by the fact that in certain conditions diluted bitumen (“dilbit”) can sink in a watercourse. This occurred in the case of Enbridge’s spill in Michigan. This was, as a result, an issue of significant importance to the parties in this proceeding…
The evidence presented by NG in this regard is inconsistent. For example, some evidence it presented suggests that dilbit may sink when it enters water, after a process of weathering; other evidence it has submitted suggests that dilbit will only sink if it combines with sediment. In its response to [a submission by the Haisla Nation] NG states that “If diluted bitumen becomes heavily weathered some oil may sink in fresh water environments.” Similarly, in its response to Dave Shannon’s IR No. 1, NG states that
Diluted bitumen emulsions will remain buoyant in waters with densities greater than approximately 1.015 g/cc. If the water density drops below approximately 1.015 g/cc,in zones of fresh-water intrusion, weathered and emulsified diluted bitumen products may sink to the depth where the density increases to above 1.015 g/cc.
Similar also is NG’s response to Dr. Weir’s IR No. 2.6, where NG states:
The weathered diluted bitumen would have a density approaching 1.0 g/cc, which indicates that once the diluted bitumen weathers it may be susceptible to sinking in fresh water.
Finally, in the Kitimat Report NG states that:
Examples that may lead to oil not remaining on the water surface include:
• Oils with specific gravities equal to or greater than the receiving medium (fresh- or saltwater)
• Oils that have weathered and, in losing lighter-end fractions, have reached a specific gravity equal to or greater than the receiving water
• Oil that is near the same density as the receiving water and that is characterized as a 3-dimensional flow (non-laminar to turbulent flow such as found in streams, rivers, areas with fast tidal currents, breaking waves)
• Oil with sediment (mixed into oil or adhered to oil droplets)…
…submerged oil may eventually sink with increased weathering, if in receiving water with lower density, or if sufficient sediment is incorporated.
Northern Gateway contradictory
The province’s argument goes on to point more inconsistencies with Northern Gateway’s submission on dilbit in rivers, telling the JRP “In short, what dilbit will do when it enters water remains unclear.”
On the other hand, another NG witness stated that dilbit cannot sink, as this would be contrary to an “immutable fact of physics”. In cross examination, Dr. Horn, Mr. Belore and other witnesses maintained that dilbit will only sink in the presence of suspended solids, or after a long period of weathering.
However, NG’s evidence with respect to the type of sediment that could combine with dilbit to form material that may sink in water is unclear. Dr. Horn testified that “fine grain sediments…provide the greatest amount of surface area which is one of the reasons that oil sank in [Michigan]”. On the other hand, Mr. Belore appeared to suggest that, in the marine context at least, finer sediments reduce the potential for oil to sink as they are lighter. The evidence with respect to the material that may bind to dilbit and contribute to its sinking is unclear…
NG’s views with respect to the flow conditions under which dilbit may sink is also contradictory. On the one hand, it states that “Higher flow rates and increased turbulence typically will entrain more oil into the water column leading to the potential for oil to enter pore spaces in permeable sediments.” On the other, it states that “Oil sinking is unlikely to occur in areas with fast currents…”
Evidence provided by other parties suggests that dilbit may sink when weathered. In particular, Environment Canada’s evidence in this proceeding contrasts sharply with NG’s. For example, Environment Canada states that:
Northern Gateway’s response planning model does not account for sinking oil or for oil suspended particulate matter interactions…For oils with densities close to that of water, like both the diluted bitumen and synthetic crude products, even small amounts of sediment can cause sinking. Environment Canada is concerned that oil sinking and oil-sediment interactions have been
underestimated in the provided scenarios. In the cases of both the Enbridge-Kalamazoo and the Kinder Morgan-Burnaby spills, significant oil-sediment interactions occurred.
The changes to dilbit as it ages in the environment may affect cleanup. Although initially buoyant in water, with exposure to wind and sun, as well as by mixing with water and sediment in the water, the density of dilbit can increase to the point that the oil may sink. Recovery and mitigation options for sunken oils are limited.
Not only has Environment Canada expressed the view that even small amounts of sediment may cause oil to sink, its witness also stated under cross-examination that high velocity rivers may carry high suspended sediment concentrations, and that, at certain times of the year, sediment load could enter the marine environment. Although NG acknowledges that sediment loads and oil-sediment interactions are a critical factor in predicting the behaviour of spilled oil, it has not, in Environment Canada’s opinion, provided a complete baseline data set on sediment loads, despite requests that such data be provided.
While NG has submitted information respecting the laboratory testing of dilbit, an Environment Canada expert testified that tests conducted in a laboratory setting provide only limited information that cannot be relied upon in isolation to predict the fate and behaviour of hydrocarbons spilled into the environment. Instead, information gathered from real spill events must inform the analysis, and consideration must be given to the conditions, including water temperature, suspended sediment concentrations and wind speed, to be encountered in the “real world”.
Environment Canada has also made it very clear that the evidence provided to date by NG does not allow for a full understanding of the behaviour of spilled dilbit. In the opinion of Environment Canada witnesses, the evidence has not provided sufficientclarity with respect to the weathering, evaporation or sedimentation processes dilbit may be subjected to in the environment. Given the unique nature of this product, further research is warranted before one can ascertain whether dilbit will sink or remain on the water surface. Those concerns were echoed by an expert retained by the Gitxaala Nation.
In addition, the evidence of other parties raises the possibility of the need to respond to submerged oil. NUKA research, on behalf of the Haisla Nation, opined that “submission documents overall still grossly underestimate the potential for sunken or submerged oil, particularly for pipeline spills to rivers.” EnviroEmerg Consulting, for the Living Oceans Society summarizes well the uncertainty that remains with respect to the behaviour of oil:
There are no definitive statements in the [Environmental Impact Statement] EIS to explain if bitumen diluted with condensate will emulsify, sink or do both if spilled. The supporting technical data analysis in the EIS is based on laboratory tests. There are no in-situ field tests, empirical studies, nor real incidents to validate these findings. This raises significant uncertainty that current spill response technologies and equipment designed for conventional oil can track and recover the diluted bitumen in temperate marine waters. In essence, the assumption that the diluted bitumen can be recovered on-water has yet to be tested.
In short, what dilbit will do when it enters water remains unclear. NG recognizes this lack of clarity itself. As was stated by one of its witnesses, “it’s extremely difficult to predict the behaviour of this product”.
NG admits that additional research needs to be done with respect to understanding how dilbit behaviour.
The provincial argument concludes:
The Province has serious concerns about the lack of clarity and certainty about what dilbit will do if it were to enter the water, the preliminary and indeed contradictory nature of the evidence with respect to NG’s remediation strategies and actions to address sunken oil, and the fact that its proposed tactics have not been evaluated for use in British Columbia. These factors, taken together, suggest that, at least as of today, NG is not yet prepared to deal with sunken oil in the event there were a spill of dilbit into a British Columbia watercourse. By itself this is a cause for serious concern in relation to the fundamental question in this proceeding, namely whether the JRP should recommend approval of this project. But at the very least, this means that a strong condition must be imposed requiring further research on the behaviour of dilbit.
Spill response only preliminary “All roads are driveable”
The provincial argument says, in italics, that the Northern Gateway’s spill response plans are “only preliminary” and adds Northern Gateway’s plan to provide detail operational plans six months before the beginning of the pipeline operations is not good enough. “It is not possible for NG to assert, nor for the JRP to conclude, that NG will be able to access all those places where a spill may travel, and to respond effectively.”
Despite the challenges to responding to a spill from the pipeline, including the challenge of responding to submerged and sunken oil, NG’s plans for responding to a spill have not yet been developed. NG has committed only to providing its detailed oil spill response plans to the National Energy Board 6 months in advance of operations. In the context of this project, the Province remains very concerned that NG has not yet demonstrated its ability to respond effectively to spills from the pipeline.
When specifically asked “In the absence of that planning…to address the challenges that we’ve been discussing, how is it we are to be confident that Northern Gateway will, in fact, be able to effectively respond to a spill?” NG replied that “There is a lot of work that needs to be done.”
Of particular concern, despite its admission that a spill into a watercourse in a remote location would pose a significant challenge, NG has not yet determined those locations it could access to respond to a spill, including the control points utilized for capturing and recovering oil passing that location. Such access will only be determined, if possible, during detailed planning. At this time, NG also does not know what portion of water bodies would be boat-accessible in the event of a spill. The 2010 Michigan spill, which was the subject of much questioning during the hearing, occurred in a populated area, where there were many potential access locations. This will of course not be the case if a spill were to occur in a remote river in British Columbia.
While NG has prepared a document showing some possible control points that might be used for spill response in the event of a spill in some rivers, NG concedes that its work in this regard is preliminary, and only pertains to some of the control points that would ultimately have to be established. NG helpfully provided additional information to that which was originally filed with respect to the travel distance between pump stations or the terminal and certain potential control points. However, travel times to the control points that have been identified do not take into account mobilization time, and assumes all roads are drivable.
Given the incompleteness of NG’s evidence in this regard, the Province submits that NG cannot currently assert that there would in fact be viable control points where a spill could travel to. In addition, even if accessibility to control points had been fully validated, in order for NG to assert that it could respond effectively to a spill, it would also have to know the means by which personnel and equipment would gain access to respond to oil that had come ashore or sunken to the sediment. Given the preliminary nature of the evidence presented by NG, this is of course not known.
The Province is very concerned that, in the event of a spill, some places where a spill could reach will be inaccessible, and therefore not amenable to spill recovery actions. While NG states that it will be able to access control points at any location along the pipeline, it has simply not provided the evidence in this proceeding to substantiate this assertion. The Province submits that, as of today, it is not possible for NG to assert, nor for the JRP to conclude, that NG will be able to access all those places where a spill may travel, and to respond effectively.
In addition to access, there are a number of other challenges to operating in British
Columbia in respect of which NG has completed only very preliminary work.
• The pipeline could be covered by heavy snow at different times of the year; NG states that it will have to review alternative methods of access to deal with this, but has presented no specific evidence on how this challenge will be addressed.
• NG has not yet developed specific plans about how it would deal with oil recovered from a spill, and has not yet determined disposal locations.
• NG has not yet determined the location or the contents of the equipment caches to be used to respond to spills.
• It has not determined year-round access to the pipeline, which will be evaluated as part of detailed planning.
Kitimat River response
The province takes a harsh look at Northern Gateway’s plan for a response on the Upper Kitimat River and Hunter Creek.
Similarly, the Province is concerned about the ability of NG to respond to a spill in the Upper Kitimat Valley. When asked by the Douglas Channel Watch
“…in the context of the Upper Kitimat Valley, does this mean because of the steepness of the terrain and limited road access to the river, that containment at some locations at the source will be impossible, and the majority of your efforts will be at the first accessible locations downstream?”
NG was only able to reply that:
“again it depends on the specific conditions. But as Dr. Taylor indicated, in the development of the response plans we would need to look at various scenarios, various times of year, develop plans so that it would identify the appropriate response locations at those times.”
NG’s targeted spill response time of 6-12 hours needs to be set against the reality that, in the case of a watercourse spill, oil may travel many kilometres downstream while NG is still mobilizing. In this proceeding NG has provided considerable information with respect to how far and fast oil can travel in a watercourse. For example, with a spill into Hunter Creek, NG has stated:
Based on water velocities, a release at this location could reach the Kitimat River estuary 60 km downstream within four to ten hours, depending on river discharge.
Dr. Horn has indicated that these figures are very conservative, and that the actual times to reach Kitimat would be a longer period. However, no other definitive evidence on these times was presented by NG.
Enbridge doesn’t learn from its mistakes
The provincial argument then goes on to say, again in italics, Enbridge does not follow procedures or learn from mistakes and concludes “while NG asserts that its spill detection systems will be world-class, it has not yet chosen to adopt spill detection technologies that would achieve that objective.”
The provincial argument goes over Enbridge’s spill record in detail, including the Marshall, Michigan spill which was harshly criticized by the US National Transportation Safety Board.
Concerns about NG’s inability to respond to a spill are magnified by Enbridge’s conduct with respect to the spill which took place in Michigan. NG concedes that, in that case, there were procedures in place that were not followed. NG asserts that it now has in place a number of “golden rules”, including that whenever there is a doubt with respect to whether the spill detection system has detected a leak, the pipeline must be shut down. However, NG concedes that this rule was in place before the Michigan spill; it self-evidently was not followed. In fact, the rule under which Enbridge would shut down its pipeline system within 10 minutes of an abnormal occurrence which could be immediately analyzed was put into place following a spill in 1991. At that time, similar commitments were made indicating that procedures would change and that a spill of that nature wouldn’t take place again….
despite the fact that the relevant technologies had been in existence for some
10 years, and despite the existence of crack-related failures that led to the development of such technologies, Enbridge had failed to put in place a program that would have detected the Marshall spill
The province wraps up the response saying by telling the JRP:
In short, if NG is relying on its ability to respond effectively to a spill for a positive recommendation from the JRP, then it must show that it will in fact have that ability. The Province submits that NG has not shown that ability in this proceeding.
The Province submits that requiring NG to show now that it will in fact have the ability to respond effectively to a spill is particularly important because there will be no subsequent public process in which that ability can be probed and tested. NG has pointed out that its oil spill response plans will be provided to the NEB for review, and has committed to a third party audit of its plans. However, it also acknowledges that there will be no means by which those plans could be tested through a public process.
On the pipeline project, BC concludes
The Province submits that the evidence on the record does not support NG’s contention that it will have a world-class spill response capability in place. The challenges posed by the pipeline route, the nature of the product being shipped, the conceptual nature of its plans to date and Enbridge’s track record mean that the Province is not able to support the project’s approval at this time. The Province submits that its concerns in this regard should be seriously considered by the JRP as it considers the recommendation it will be making to the federal government.
The Panama registered bulk carrier Azuma Phoenix is seen tied up at Kitimat harbour on the afternoon of Jan 9, 2012. In March 2013. the federal government announced it was making the private port of Kitimat into a public port. (Robin Rowland)
When the story of the Stephen Harper government is told, historians will say that the week of March 17 to 23, 2013, is remembered, not for the release of a lacklustre federal budget, but for day after day of political blunders that undermined Harper’s goal of making a Canada what the Conservatives call a resource superpower.
It was a week where spin overcame substance and spun out of control.
The Conservative government’s aim was, apparently, to increase support for the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline project with a spin campaign aimed at moving the middle ground in British Columbia from anti-project to pro-project and at the same time launching a divide and conquer strategy aimed at BC and Alberta First Nations.
It all backfired. If on Monday, March 17, 2013, the troubled and controversial Enbridge Northern Gateway project was on the sick list, by Friday, March 23, the Enbridge pipeline and tanker scheme was added to the Do Not Resuscitate list, all thanks to political arrogance, blindfolded spin and bureaucratic incompetence. The standard boogeymen for conservative media in Canada (who always add the same sentence to their stories on the Northern Gateway) “First Nations and environmentalists who oppose the project” had nothing to do with it.
Stephen Harper has tight control of his party and the government, and in this case the billion bucks stop at the Prime Minister’s Office. He has only himself to blame.
All of this happened on the northern coast of British Columbia, far out of range of the radar of the national media and the Ottawa pundit class (most of whom, it must be admitted, were locked up in an old railway station in the nation’s capital, trying interpret Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s spreadsheets).
The story begins early on that Monday morning, at my home base in Kitimat, BC, the proposed terminal for Northern Gateway, when a news release pops into my e-mail box, advising that Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver would be in nearby Terrace early on Tuesday morning for an announcement and photo op.
I started making calls, trying to find out if anyone in Kitimat knew about Oliver’s visit to Terrace and if the minister planned to come to Kitimat.
Visitors to Kitimat
I made those calls because in the past two years, Kitimat has seen a parade of visitors checking out the town and the port’s industrial and transportation potential. The visitors range from members of the BC provincial Liberal cabinet to the staff of the Chinese consulate in Vancouver to top executives of some of the world’s major transnational corporations (and not just in the energy sector). Most of these visits, which usually include meetings with the District of Kitimat Council and District senior staff as well as separate meetings with the Council of the Haisla Nation, are usually considered confidential. There are no photo ops or news conferences. If the news of a visit is made public, (not all are), those visits are usually noted, after the fact, by Mayor Joanne Monaghan at the next public council meeting.
It was quickly clear from my calls that no one in an official capacity in Kitimat knew that, by the next morning, Oliver would be Terrace, 60 kilometres up Highway 37. No meetings in Kitimat, on or off the record, were scheduled with the Minister of Natural Resources who has been talking about Kitimat ever since he was appointed to the Harper cabinet.
I was skeptical about that afternoon’s announcement/photo op in Vancouver by Transport Minister Denis Lebel and Oliver about the “world class” tanker monitoring.
After all, there had been Canadian Coast Guard cutbacks on the northwest coast even before Stephen Harper got his majority government. The inadequacy of oil spill response on the British Columbia coast had been condemned both by former Auditor General Sheila Fraser and in the United States Senate. The government stubbornly closed and dismantled the Kitsilano Coast Guard station. It’s proposing that ocean traffic control for the Port of Vancouver be done remotely from Victoria, with fixed cameras dotted around the harbour. Leaving controllers in Vancouver would, of course, be the best solution, but they must be sacrificed (along with any ship that get’s into trouble in the future, on the altar of a balanced budget).
The part of the announcement that said there would be increased air surveillance is nothing more than a joke (or spin intended just for the Conservative base in Alberta, Saskatchewan and the Toronto suburbs,that is not anyone familiar with BC coastal waters). Currently the Transport Canada surveillance aircraft are used on the coasts to look for vessels that are illegally dumping bilge or oil off shore. As CBC’s Paul Hunter reported in 2010, Transport Canada aircraft were used after the Gulf of Mexico oil disaster to map where the oil was going after it erupted from the Deepwater Horizon.
Given the stormy weather on the west coast (when Coast Guard radio frequently warns of “hurricane force winds”) it is highly unlikely that the surveillance aircraft would even be flying in the conditions that could cause a major tanker disaster. Aerial surveillance, even in good weather, will never prevent a tanker disaster caused by human error.
I got my first chance to look at the Transport Canada website in late afternoon and that’s when a seemingly innocuous section made me sit up and say “what is going on?” (I actually said something much stronger).
Public port
Public port designations: More ports will be designated for traffic control measures, starting with Kitimat.
(Transport Canada actually spelled the name wrong—it has since been fixed—as you can see in this screen grab).
Kitimat has been one of the few private ports in Canada since the Alcan smelter was built and the town founded 60 years ago (the 60th anniversary of the incorporation of the District of Kitimat is March 31, 2013).
The reasons for the designation of Kitimat as a private port go back to a complicated deal between the province of British Columbia and Alcan in the late 1940s as the two were negotiating about electrical power, the aluminum smelter, the building of the town and the harbour.
For 60 years, Alcan, later Rio Tinto Alcan, built, paid for and operated the port as a private sector venture. For a time, additional docks were also operated by Eurocan and Methanex. After Eurocan closed its Kitimat operation that dock was purchased by the parent company Rio Tinto. The Methanex dock was purchased by Royal Dutch Shell last year for its proposed LNG operation.
The announcement that Kitimat was to become a public port was also something that the national media would not recognize as significant unless they are familiar with the history of the port. That history is known only to current and former residents of Kitimat and managers at Rio Tinto Alcan.
The port announcement came so much out of left field; so to speak, that I had doubts it was accurate. In other words, I couldn’t believe it. I went to Monday evening’s meeting of District of Kitimat Council and at the break between the open and in-camera sessions, I asked council members if they had heard about Kitimat being redesignated a public port. The members of the district council were as surprised as I had been.
Back from the council meeting, I checked the Transport Canada news release and backgrounders. I also checked the online version of Bill C-57, the enabling act for the changes announced earlier that day. There was no mention of Kitimat in Bill C-57.
Tuesday morning I drove to Terrace for Joe Oliver’s 9 am photo op and the announcement at Northwest Community College (NWCC) that the government had appointed Douglas Eyford as a special envoy to First Nations for energy projects, an attempt on the surface to try and get First Nations onside for the pipeline projects, an appointment seen by some First Nations leaders as an attempt by the Harper government to divide and conquer.
As an on site reporter, I got to ask Oliver two questions before the news conference went to the national media on the phones.
In answer to my first question, Oliver confirmed that the federal government had decided to make Kitimat a public port, saying in his first sentence: “What the purpose is to make sure that the absolute highest standards of marine safety apply in the port of Kitimat.” He then returned to message track saying, “we have as I announced yesterday and I had spoken about before at the port of Vancouver we have an extremely robust marine safety regime in place but we want to make sure that as resource development continues and as technology improves, we are at the world class level. As I also mentioned there has never been off the coast of British Columbia a major tanker spill and we want to keep that perfect record.”
For my second question, I asked Oliver if he planned to visit Kitimat.
He replied. “Not in this particular visit, I have to get back [to Ottawa] There’s a budget coming and I have to be in the House for that but I certainly expect to be going up there.”
The question may not have registered with the national media on the conference call. For the local reporters and leaders in the room at Waap Galts’ap, the long house at Terrace’s Northwest Community College, everyone knew that Kitimat had been snubbed.
Back in Kitimat, I sent an e-mail to Colleen Nyce, the local spokesperson for Rio Tinto Alcan noting that Joe Oliver had confirmed that the federal government intended to make the RTA-run port a public port. I asked if RTA had been consulted and if the company had any comment.
Nyce replied that she was not aware of the announcement and promised to “look into this on our end.” I am now told by sources that it is believed that my inquiry to Nyce was the first time Rio Tinto Alcan, one of Canada’s biggest resource companies, had heard that the federal government was taking over its port.
The next day, Kitimat Mayor Joanne Monaghan told local TV news on CFTK the Kitimat community was never consulted about the decision and she added that she still hadn’t been able to get anyone with the federal government to tell her more about the plan.
Who pays for the navigation aids?
Meanwhile, new questions were being raised in Kitimat about two other parts of the Monday announcement.
New and modified aids to navigation: The CCG will ensure that a system of aids to navigation comprised of buoys, lights and other devices to warn of obstructions and to mark the location of preferred shipping routes is installed and maintained. Modern navigation system: The CCG will develop options for enhancing Canada’s current navigation system (e.g. aids to navigation, hydrographic charts, etc) by fall 2013 for government consideration.
Since its first public meeting in Kitimat, in documents filed with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel, in public statements and advertising, Enbridge has been saying for at least the past four years that the company would pay for all the needed upgrades to aids to navigation on Douglas Channel, Wright Sound and other areas for its tanker traffic. It is estimated that those navigation upgrades would cost millions of dollars.
Now days before a federal budget that Jim Flaherty had already telegraphed as emphasizing restraint, it appeared that the Harper government, in its desperation to get approval for energy exports, was going to take over funding for the navigation upgrades from the private sector and hand the bill to the Canadian taxpayer.
RTA not consulted
On Thursday morning, I received an e-mail from Colleen Nyce with a Rio Tinto Alcan statement, noting:
This announcement was not discussed with Rio Tinto Alcan in advance. We are endeavoring to have meetings with the federal government to gain clarity on this announcement as it specifically relates to our operations in Kitimat.
On Friday morning, Mayor Monaghan told Andrew Kurjata on CBC’s Daybreak North that she had had at that time no response to phone calls and e-mails asking for clarification of the announcement. Monaghan also told CBC that Kitimat’s development officer Rose Klukas had tried to “get an audience with minister and had been unable to.” (One reason may be that Oliver’s staff was busy. They ordered NWCC staff to rearrange the usual layout of the chairs at Waap Galts’ap, the long house, to get a better background for the TV cameras for Oliver’s statement).
Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver (front far right) answers questions after his news conference at the Northwest Community College Long House, March 19, 2013. (Robin Rowland)
Monaghan told Kurjata, “I feel like it’s a slap in the face because we’re always being told that we’re the instrument for the whole world right now because Kitimat is supposed to be the capital of the economy right now. So I thought we’d have a little more clout by now and they’d at least tell us they were going to do this. There was absolutely no consultation whatsoever.”
By Friday afternoon, five days after the announcement, Transport Canada officials finally returned the calls from Mayor Monaghan and Rose Klukas promising to consult Kitimat officials in the future.
Monaghan said that Transport Canada told her that it would take at least one year because the change from a private port to a public port requires a change in legislation.
Transport Canada is now promising “extensive public and stakeholder consultation will occur before the legislation is changed,” the mayor was told.
On this Mayor Monaghan commented, “It seems to me that now they want to do consultation….sort of like closing the barn door after all of the cows got out!”
Blunder No 1. Pulling the rug out from Northern Gateway
Joe Oliver and the Harper government sent a strong political signal to Kitimat on Tuesday; (to paraphrase an old movie) your little town doesn’t amount of a hill of beans in this crazy world.
There are a tiny handful of people in Kitimat openly in favour of the Northern Gateway project. A significant minority are on the fence and some perhaps leaning toward acceptance of the project. There is strong opposition and many with a wait and see attitude. (Those in favour will usually only speak on background, and then when you talk to them most of those “in favour” have lists of conditions. If BC Premier Christy Clark has five conditions, many of these people have a dozen or more).
Oliver was speaking in Terrace, 60 kilometres from Kitimat. It is about a 40 to 45 minute drive to Kitimat over a beautiful stretch of highway, with views of lakes, rivers and mountains.
Scenic Highway 37 is the route to the main location not only for the controversial Northern Gateway pipeline but three liquefied natural gas projects, not to mention David Black’s proposed refinery half way between Terrace and Kitimat.
Why wouldn’t Kitimat be a must stop on the schedule for the Minister of Natural Resources? In Terrace, Oliver declared that Kitimat was to become a public port, run by the federal government. Although technically that would be the responsibility of Denis Lebel, the Minister of Transport, one has to wonder why the Minister of Natural Resources would not want to see the port that is supposedly vital to Canada’s economy? You have to ask why he didn’t want to meet the representatives of the Haisla Nation, the staff and council of the District of Kitimat and local business leaders?
Oliver has been going across Canada, the United States and to foreign countries promoting pipelines and tanker traffic, pipelines that would terminate at Kitimat and tankers that would send either bitumen or liquefied natural gas to customers in Asia.
Yet the Minister of Natural Resources is too important, too busy to take a few hours out of his schedule, while he is in the region, to actually visit the town he has been talking about for years.
He told me that he had to be in Ottawa for the budget. Really? The budget is always the finance minister’s show and tell (with a little help from whomever the Prime Minister is at the time). On budget day, Oliver would have been nothing more than a background extra whenever the television cameras “dipped in” on the House of Commons, between stories from reporters and experts who had been in the budget lockup.
According to the time code on my video camera, Oliver’s news conference wrapped at 9:50 a.m., which certainly gave the minister and his staff plenty of time to drive to Kitimat, meet with the representatives of the District, the Haisla Nation and the Chamber of Commerce and still get to Vancouver for a late flight back to Ontario.
On Tuesday, Joe Oliver’s snub pulled the political rug out from under the Northern Gateway supporters and fence sitters in Kitimat. Oliver’s snub showed those few people in Kitimat that if they do go out on a limb to support the Northern Gateway project, the Conservatives would saw off that limb so it can be used as a good background prop for a photo op.
Prince Rupert, Terrace and Smithers councils have all voted against the Northern Gateway project. Kitimat Council, despite some clear divisions, has maintained a position of absolute neutrality. Kitimat Council will continue to be officially neutral until after the Joint Review report, but this week you could hear the air slowly leaking out of the neutrality balloon.
Oliver may still believe, as he has frequently said, that the only people who oppose Northern Gateway are dangerous radicals paid by foreign foundations.
What he did on Tuesday was to make the opposition to Northern Gateway in Kitimat into an even more solid majority across the political spectrum.
Blunder No 2. Rio Tinto Alcan
It doesn’t do much for the credibility of a minister of natural resources to thoroughly piss off, for no good reason, the world’s second largest mining and smelting conglomerate, Rio Tinto. But that’s just what Joe Oliver did this week.
I am not one to usually have much sympathy with rich, giant, transnational corporations.
But look at this way, over the past 60 years Alcan and now Rio Tinto Alcan have invested millions upon millions of dollars in building and maintaining the Kitimat smelter and the port of Kitimat. RTA is now completing the $3.3 billion Kitimat Modernization Project. Then without notice, or consultation, the Conservative government—the Conservative government—announces it is going to take over RTA’s port operations. What’s more, if what Transport Canada told Mayor Joanne Monaghan is correct, the federal government is going to start charging RTA fees to use the port it has built and operated for 60 years.
Too often RTA’s London headquarters acts like it is still the nineteenth century and the senior executives are like British colonialists dictating to the far reaches of the Empire on what do to do.
No matter what you think of RTA, it boggles the mind, whether you are right wing, left wing or mushy middle, that the federal government simply issues a press release–a press release– with not even a phone call, not even a visit (even to corporate headquarters) saying “Hey RTA, we’re taking over.”
There’s one thing that you can be sure of, Rio Tinto Alcan’s lobbyists are going to be earning their fees in the coming weeks.
(One more point, even if there wasn’t a single pipeline project planned for Kitimat you would think that the Minister of Natural Resources would want to see what is currently the largest and most expensive construction project in Canada, a project that comes under his area of political responsibility).
It took five days, from the time of the minister’s news conference on Monday until Friday afternoon, for officials in Transport Canada to return phone calls from Mayor Joanne Monaghan and Rose Klukas, to explain what was going to happen to the Port of Kitimat.
This week was yet another example of the decay of Canadian democracy under Stephen Harper. Executives from Tokyo to Houston to the City of London quickly return phone calls from the District of Kitimat, after all Kitimat is where the economic action is supposed to be. At the same time, the federal government doesn’t return those calls, it shows that something really is rotten in our state.
Blunder No 5. LNG
There are three liquefied natural gas projects slated for Kitimat harbour, the Chevron-Apache partnership in KM LNG, now under construction at Bish Cove; the Royal Dutch Shell project based on the old Methanex site and the barge based BC LNG partnership that will work out of North Cove.
None of these projects have had the final go ahead from the respective company board of directors. So has the federal government thrown the proverbial monkey wrench into these projects? Will making Kitimat a public port to promote Enbridge, help or hinder the LNG projects? Did the Ministry of Natural Resources even consider the LNG projects when they made the decision along with Transport Canada to take over the port?
And then there’s…..
Kitimat has a marina shortage, especially since RTA closed the Moon Bay Marina. The only one left, the MK Bay Marina, which is straining from overcapacity, is owned by the Kitimat-Stikine Regional District. That means there will be another level of government in any talks and decisions on the future of the Kitimat harbour. There are also the controversial raw log exports from nearby Minette Bay.
Although Transport Canada has promised “extensive public and stakeholder consultation,” one has to wonder how much input will be allowed for the residents of Kitimat and region, especially the guiding and tourism industries as well as recreational boaters. After all, the Harper government is determined to make Kitimat an export port for Alberta and the experience of the past couple of years has shown that people of northwest count for little in that process. Just look at the Northern Gateway Joint Review, which more and more people here say has no credibility.
Big blunder or more of the same?
I’ve listed five big blunders that are the result of the decision by the Harper government to turn Kitimat into a public port.
Are they really blunders or just more of the same policies we’ve seen from Stephen Harper since he became a majority prime minister?
This is a government that has muzzled scientific research and the exchange of scientific ideas. The minister who was in the northwest last week, who has demonized respect for the environment, is now squeezing the words “science” and “environment” anywhere into any message track or speech anyway he can.
That’s just the point. Joe Oliver’s fly-in, fly-out trip to Terrace was not supposed to have any substance. Changing the chairs at the Waap Galts’ap long house showed that it was more important to the Harper government to have some northwest coast wall art behind Joe Oliver for his photo op than it was to engage meaningfully with the northwest, including major corporations, First Nations and local civic and business leaders.
Joe Oliver’s visit to Terrace was an example of government by reality television. The decision to change the private port of Kitimat into a public port was another example of Harper’s government by decree without consulting a single stakeholder. The problem is, of course, that for decades to come, it will be everyone in northwest British Columbia who will be paying for those 30 second sound bites I recorded on Tuesday.
Epilogue: Alcan’s legacy for the socialist Prime Minister, Stephen Harper
If an NDP or Liberal government had done what Harper and Oliver did on Monday, every conservative MP, every conservative pundit, every conservative media outlet in Canada would be hoarse from screaming about the danger from the socialists to the Canadian economy.
That brings us to the legacy left by R. E. Powell who was president of Alcan in the 1940s and 50s as the company was building the Kitimat project.
As Global Mission, the company’s official history, relates, in 1951, Alcan signed an agreement with the British Columbia provincial government, that “called upon the company to risk a huge investment, without any government subsidy or financial backing and without any assured market for its product.”
According to the book, Powell sought to anticipate any future problems, given the tenor of the times, the possible or even likely nationalization of the smelter and the hydro-electric project.
So Powell insisted that the contract signed between Alcan and the province include preliminary clauses acknowledging that Alcan was paying for Kitimat without a single cent from the government:
Whereas the government is unwilling to provide and risk the very large amounts of money required to develop those water powers to produce power for which no market now exists or can be foreseen except through the construction of the facilities for the production of aluminum in the vicinity and….
Whereas the construction of the aluminum plant at or near the site of the said waterpower would accomplish without risk or to the GOVERNMENT the development power, the establishment of a permanent industry and the new of population and….
(Government in all caps in the original)
…the parties hereto agree as follows (the agreement, water licence and land permit)
Powell is quoted in the book as saying:
I asked the political leaders of BC if the government would develop the power and sell the energy to Alcan and they refused. We had to do it ourselves. Someday, perhaps, some politician will try to nationalize that power and grab it for the state. I will be dead and gone but some of you or your successors at Alcan may be here, and I hope the clauses in the agreement, approved by the solemn vote of the BC legislature, will give those future socialists good reason to pause and reflect.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the federal government had very little to do with the Kitimat project. With the declaration that Kitimat will be a public port, the federal government comes to the party 60 years late. But one has to wonder if the late Alcan president, R.E. Powell, ever considered that the “future socialists” he hoped would “pause and reflect” would be members of Canada’s Conservative party, Stephen Harper, Joe Oliver and Denis Lebel?
Coastal First Nations have launched a commercial aimed at the British Columbia electorate, using the call from the Exxon Valedez to US Coast Guard Valdez traffic control saying that the tanker had run aground.
The commercial makes the connection between the Exxon Valdez disaster and the possibility of a tanker disaster on the British Columbia coast if the Enbridge Northern Gateway project goes ahead.
The BC New Democrats, who are leading the polls have said they oppose Northern Gateway. The ruling BC Liberals have set out five conditions that must be met if the project is to go ahead.
Five days after the announcement that the private port of Kitimat will become a public port under federal jurisdiction, Transport Canada is now promising to consult District of Kitimat officials as the Douglas Channel waterfront transitions to a public port.
Both Kitimat Mayor Joanne Monaghan and Economic Development Officer Rose Klukas, after numerous calls and attempts over the past few days, finally spoke to different Transport Canada officials Friday.
According to the mayor, both were told that Kitimat will not become a public port for at least one year because the change from a private port to a public port requires a change in legislation. (Something Transport Canada may only just be realizing since Bill C-57, introduced Monday to cover all the changes for what the Harper government calls a “world-class” tanker policy makes no mention of Kitimat).
Transport Canada is now promising “extensive public and stakeholder consultation will occur before the legislation is changed,” the mayor was told.
On this Mayor Monaghan commented, “It seems to me that now they want to do consultation….sort of like closing the barn door after all of the cows got out!”
Transport Canada says that beause there are no federal lands in the Kitimat harbour, the amending legislation will only cover navigable waters in Kitimat.
Transport Canada will appoint a harbour master and the cost of that office will be “paid by offsetting fees charged to ships coming into the harbour.”
But it looks like the fees charged to incoming ships by the federal government could be causing a headache for Rio Tinto Alcan. Claudine Gagnon, an RTA spokesperson based in Shawnigan, Quebec, told Radio Canada, the French language network of the CBC, that the company is trying to assess the impact of the announcement on its operations in Kitimat. Among other things, the change in the port’s status could result in higher transportation costs for the company.
At this point, Transport Canada officials told the District is unlikely that there will be Port Authority in Kitimat like the one in Prince Rupert.
Cullen surprised
Asked about the port announcement during a post budget news conference on Thursday, Skeena Bulkley Valley MP and NDP House Leader Nathan Cullen said, “I’m as surprised as everybody in Kitimat is. I’ve been phoning around to local leaders to find out if anyone had been consulted or spoken to about this. And it’s a shock for everyone including people from Alcan.
“This doesn’t make any sense at all. The conversation around a public port is a good one and one we need to have and we’re open to the idea, but what a terrible start to the process, when a minister flies in from Ottawa, announces something, doesn’t tell any of the local government about it and then expects everyone to pop the champagne corks. You want to get this thing right. You want to make sure the public interests are met.
“There’s a real arrogant feeling, when a minister flies in from Toronto and says this is how it’s going to be and there’s no need to talk to anyone in the region about it.
Cullen was also asked about the provisions in the safe tankers announcement on Monday by Transport Minister Denis Lebel and Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver that the federal government appears to be taking over responsibility for navigation aids on the British Columbia coast, something that until now, Enbridge Northern Gateway has said they will pay for.
“Suddenly taking costs away from a multi-billion dollar oil company, seems to be what this Conservative Canadian government wants to do. It’s so wrong, I can’t describe it any better than that,”Cullen said, “that we’re supposed to be picking up the tab for Enbridge’s project, while all the while running huge deficits and not getting the training support and cuts to health care programs that continue.”
Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver answers a reporter’s question during a news conference in Terrace, March 19, 2013 (Robin Rowland)
Joe Oliver, the Minister of Natural Resources, has confirmed that the federal government intends to make Kitimat a public port.
Oliver was in Terrace, March 19, 2013, to announce the appointment of Vancouver lawyer Douglas Eyford as “Special Federal Representative on West Coast Energy Infrastructure.” Eyford’s job will be to “engage aboriginal communities in British Columbia and Alberta that are most likely to have an interest in West Coast energy infrastructure.”
Oliver replied: “The news release was accurate. What the purpose is to make sure that the absolute highest standards of marine safety apply in the port of Kitimat. And we have as I announced yesterday and I had spoken about before at the port of Vancouver we have an extremely robust marine safety regime in place but we want to make sure that as resource development continues and as technology improves, we are at the world class level. As I also mentioned there has never been off the coast of British Columbia a major tanker spill and we want to keep that perfect record.”
No visit to Kitimat
Oliver was also asked if he intended to visit Kitimat during his visit to the northwest (Kitimat is a 40 minute drive from Terrace). Oliver replied, “Not in this particular visit, I have to get back [to Ottawa] There’s a budget coming and I have to be in the House for that but I certainly expect to be going up there.”
The federal budget will be released on Thursday.
At Monday’s meeting of District of Kitimat council, some members quietly expressed frustration, to say the least, that Oliver, the man responsible for pushing the Northern Gateway pipeline through British Columbia to Kitimat had not bothered to include the town in his visit to the northwest.
Members of the District of Kitimat council, which on paper at least, is responsible for the port of Kitimat (even though it is really run by Rio Tinto Alcan) also expressed frustration that no one in Ottawa gave the council advance notice of the government decision to take the port public.
Asked for comment on Oliver’s statement, Rio Tinto Alcan officials in Kitimat also seemed unaware of the government announcement and promised a statement in the near future.
Oliver’s announcement in Vancouver Monday about a “world class” marine safety system and today’s announcement about the appointment of Douglas Eyford, appear to be a campaign by the Harper government to establish a stake in the middle ground in the pipeline debates, in hopes of undermining the opponents of the projects.
Skeena Bulkley Valley MP Nathan Cullen, in a news release, expressed reservations about Eyford’s appointment.
“The primary concern with the appointment, Cullen said, is that Mr. Eyford will report to the Prime Minister, not to Parliament or the public. “So, if Mr. Eyford’s report is in any way unfavourable to the Conservative pipeline agenda, what assurances do we have that his report will make its way into the public eye?
“It is also unclear how the appointment would affect Eyford’s work as the chief government negotiator for the federal government’s comprehensive land claims process, and what kind of effect his absence will have on that process.”
Here are edited portions of the EIS assessment for a major oil terminal at Prince Rupert
Environmental Setting
The EIS says “the local surface geology at the Prince Rupert site consists of bedrock (granitic rocks) overlain by glacial outwash and a thin soil cover.” and goes on to note that “Prince Rupert is located along the coastal region of Canada, which is seismically active.”
Potential Impacts
At Prince Rupert, depth to bedrock is expected to be relatively shallow, so rock ripping and some blasting could be necessary. The impacts of rock ripping and blasting are limited to the immediate area and would not result in any significant impacts to the underlying or nearby geology. Excavation activities, erosion of fossil beds exposed due to grading, and unauthorized collection can damage or destroy paleontological resources during construction.
(The report notes that The potential for finding paleontological resources in the areas that would be disturbed is unknown. But the area of the coast has been heavily metamorphisized and most fossils, so far, have been found further inland, largely along the Copper River near Terrace)
In terms of geologic hazards, the Prince Rupert terminals would be located along the coastal region of Canada, which is seismically active. In addition, the presence of steep slopes increases the risk of landslides and the port’s coastal location increases the risk of flooding…. The Prince Rupert rail terminals and port facilities would be designed to withstand potential seismic hazards and flooding…
Construction of the proposed terminals and port expansion in Prince Rupert would result in the disturbance of approximately 3,500 acres (1,400 hectares) of land for the construction of the rail terminal complex and approximately 1,200 acres (487 hectares) for the expansion of the port. Potential impacts to the soils resources of the area could result from vegetation clearance, landscape grading, and recontouring to ensure proper drainage, the installation of storm water drainage systems, construction of the required infrastructure, and other construction activities.
One of the primary concerns during construction activities is soil erosion and sedimentation.
Potential impacts to soils from erosion are expected to occur in areas where the slopes are greater than 20 per cent and where the erosion potential due to their nature is high. Based on available landscape and soils information, the soils found in the area are not highly erodible and the required infrastructure would be located in areas that are relatively flat. Therefore, the impact of the proposed terminal complex and port construction activities on soil erosion would be minor.
Groundwater Environmental Setting
The Prince Rupert Terminals and port expansion would occur in British Columbia on Kaien Island, which receives about 102 inches of rainfall per year. The terminals would be located on an inlet that is part of the eastern Pacific Ocean on the Venn Passage near the much larger Inland Passage, which extends from Washington State to Alaska along the islands and mainland of British Columbia, Canada. Venn and Inland Passages are marine (salt water) waterbodies. The islands consist of bedrock (granitic rocks) overlain by glacial outwash and a thin soil cover.
Groundwater is shallow, poor quality, and unused. Drinking water is derived from lakes on the mainland. Water quality in the terminal complex area is seawater and inland brackish.
Potential Impacts
During construction of the facilities at Prince Rupert, the primary potential impacts to groundwater would be spills or leaks from construction equipment. Mitigation for these impacts includes having in place appropriate plans in place and appropriate cleanup materials available.
During operations of the facilities at Prince Rupert, the primary potential impacts to groundwater would again most likely be spills or leaks from operation equipment or associated with crude oil unloading of railcars. Although the initial impacts of potential releases or spills may be contained or limited to soil, potential impacts to groundwater may occur depending on the depth to groundwater, soil characteristics (e.g., porosity, permeability), spill volume and extent, and whether the spill reaches surface water bodies, some of which are interconnected to groundwater.
Surface Water Environmental Setting
The upland character surrounding the potential Prince Rupert terminal area is dominated by bog forest uplands and the flowing surface water bodies are predominantly precipitation- and shallow groundwater-fed intermittent streams. Some open waterbodies are present in the southeast portion of Kaien Island. Tidal shore zones are of a rugged and rocky nature and receive wave energy generated by naturally occurring fetch and large wakes from marine traffic. Winter winds are strong and from the southeast to southwest, with surface currents predominantly northward from the Hecate Strait. Lighter summer winds have less influence on currents and allow freshwater runoff from land and deep water tidal effects to exert more control and provide variation in summer current patterns. Significant wind and tidal mixing tend to occur where waters are shallow and around islands and rocky points of land. The coastal landscape is predominantly fjords carved into the granitic Coast Mountains, created by the last of several glacial periods approximately 12,000 years ago. Shores tend to be rocky and steep with beaches restricted to sheltered areas adjacent to estuaries and the navigable straits and channels provide a wide variety of exposures and habitats.
Potential Impacts
Construction of the facilities at Prince Rupert would disturb approximately 4,700 acres. The primary potential impacts to surface waters include erosion and sedimentation and spills/leaks of hazardous materials. Mitigation for these impacts includes having in place appropriate SPCC plans in place and appropriate cleanup materials available.
During operations, the primary potential impacts to surface waters include storm water runoff, spills, or leaks from operation equipment or associated with crude oil unloading of railcars.
Provision of storm water management measures would mitigate the impacts of stormwater runoff.
Terrestrial Vegetation Environmental Setting
The Prince Rupert terminals and port facilities would be located in the Coastal Gap Level III Ecoregion. The vegetation immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean includes stunted, opengrowing western red cedar, yellow cedar, and western hemlock with some stunted shore pine and Sitka spruce . There are also open areas present within the affected areas. It is unclear if biologically unique landscapes or vegetation communities of concern exist within the proposed Prince Rupert terminal complex boundary.
Potential Impacts
The proposed rail terminal complex and port facilities at Prince Rupert would require the clearing of up to 4,700 acres of natural vegetation, most of which is forested based on aerial photo interpretation. There does not appear to be any biologically unique landscapes or communities of conservation concern within the terminal complex boundary. Nearly all of these impacts would be permanent as natural habitats are converted for use as rail terminals and port facilities.
Wildlife Environmental Setting
Many wildlife species use this coastal area for hunting, foraging, roosting, breeding, and nesting (Tourism Prince Rupert 2012). Wildlife characteristic of this ecoregion include grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horribilis), black bear (Ursus americanus), mountain goat (Oreamnos americanus), black-tailed deer (Odocoileus hemionus
columbianus), wolf (Canis lupus), moose (Alces alces), mink (Mustela sp.), bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus), seabirds, shorebirds, waterfowl, and grouse (Tetraoninae)
The Prince Rupert terminal complex would be located in the Northern Pacific Rainforest(Region 5) bird conservation region, which is an ecologically distinct region in North America…
The coast of the Northern Pacific Rainforest is characterized by river deltas
and pockets of estuarine and freshwater wetlands set within steep, rocky shorelines. These wetlands provide critical nesting, wintering, and migration habitat for internationally significant populations of waterfowl and other wetland-dependent species. The area includes major stopover sites for migrating shorebirds, especially western sandpipers (Calidris mauri) and dunlins (Calidris alpina). Black oystercatchers (Haematopus bachmani), rock sandpipers (Calidris
ptilocnemis), black turnstones (Arenaria melanocephala), and surfbirds (Aphriza virgata) are common wintering species. Nearshore marine areas support many nesting and wintering sea ducks. Many seabirds breed on offshore islands, including important populations of ancient murrelet (Synthliboramphus antiquus), rhinoceros auklet (Cerorhinca monocerata), tufted puffin (Fratercula cirrhata), common murre (Uria aalge), western gull (Larus occidentalis), glaucouswinged gull (Larus glaucescens), and Leach’s storm-petrel (Oceanodroma leucorhoa). Pelagic
waters provide habitat for large numbers of shearwaters (Calonectris spp. and Puffinus spp.), storm-petrels (Hydrobatidae), and black-footed albatross (Phoebastria nigripes)
Potential Impacts
Direct impacts could occur due to vegetation removal or conversion, obstructions to movement patterns, or the removal of native habitats that may be used for foraging, nesting, roosting, or other wildlife uses (Barber et al. 2010). Indirect impacts to wildlife are difficult to quantify and are dependent on the sensitivity of the species, individual, type and timing of activity, physical parameters (e.g., cover, climate, and topography), and seasonal use patterns of the species (Berger 2004). Most of these impacts would be essentially permanent.
Fisheries Environmental Setting
Prince Rupert is an important deepwater port and transportation hub of the northern coast of British Columbia. It is located on the northwest shore of Kaien Island, which is connected to the mainland by a short bridge. The town of Prince Rupert is just north of the mouth of the Skeena River, a major salmon-producing river. Key commercial fisheries include Pacific salmon, halibut, herring, and groundfish, which are processed from Prince Rupert.
Prince Rupert area supports a high density of streams and rivers that host an array of valuable recreational fisheries for salmon, steelhead (anadromous rainbow trout), rainbow trout, lake trout, cutthroat trout, char, Arctic grayling, and northern pike .
Potential Impacts
New impacts to commercial and recreational fisheries’ habitats from the construction and operation of the facilities in Prince Rupert could include marine intertidal zones as well as fish spawning zones (e.g., herring), if present. There would likely be short-term impacts to the benthic (bottom dwelling) community during construction of the berths and mooring facilities. Bottom-dwelling
fish (i.e., halibut, flounder, and rockfish) and marine invertebrates (i.e., clams, mussels, crabs, and other bivalves and crustaceans) could potentially be impacted during construction as well, but these affects are expected to be minor and temporary or short-term in duration.
Additional shipping traffic would increase underwater sound because large vessels, including tankers, put out relatively high noise levels. Fish and other aquatic organisms (including invertebrates and marine mammals) use sound as a means of communication and detection within the marine acoustic environment. Increased shipping traffic could mask natural sounds by increasing the ambient noise environment from Prince Rupert Harbor and along the marine route to the Gulf Coast area. Long-lasting sounds, such as those caused by continuous ship operation, can cause a general increase in background noise and there is a risk that such sounds, while not causing immediate injury, could mask biologically important sounds, cause hearing loss in affected organisms, and/or have an impact on stress levels and on the immune systems of aquatic species.
Exotic and invasive species are sometimes transferred in the ballast water of tanker ships.
Monitoring and controls would need to be implemented to treat ballast water discharged into Prince Rupert Harbor such that invasive or exotic species would not be released into the marine environment.
Threatened and Endangered Species
This section focuses on animal and plant species present in the Prince Rupert area that are Canada SARA protected. As a coastal area along the Pacific Migratory Bird Route, and an area that receives a lot of precipitation and is heavily forested, many wildlife species inhabit the area, as discussed in Section 5.1.3.6, Wildlife. According to the British Columbia (B.C.) Conservation Data Centre (2012), only one SARA threatened/endangered species is known to occur in Prince Rupert—the green sturgeon (Acipenser medirostris), a Pacific Ocean inhabitant. In addition, several SARA special concern species occur in Prince Rupert, including western toad (Anaxyrus boreas), coastal tailed frog (Ascaphus truei), North American racer (Coluber constrictor), grey whale (Eschrichtius robustus), and Stellar sea lion (Eumetopias jubatus)
Potential Impacts
The green sturgeon is typically found along nearshore marine waters, but is also commonly observed in bays and estuaries. The expansion of the proposed port facility could have minor adverse effects on the green sturgeon, but the sturgeon could readily avoid the port area.
Increased shipping traffic at Prince Rupert and as the vessels transit to the Gulf Coast area refineries may affect the feeding success of marine mammals (including threatened and endangered species) through disturbance, because the noise generated by tankers could reduce the effectiveness of echolocation used by marine mammals to forage for food. Whales use underwater vocalizations to communicate between individuals while hunting and while engaged in other behaviors. Increased underwater noise from additional shipping traffic could disrupt these vocalizations and alter the behavior of pods of whales. Moreover, additional boat and
tanker traffic could also increase the potential for collisions between marine mammals and shipping vessels. These effects would be additive in nature and could potentially add to existing disturbance effects and collision risks caused by the current level of shipping traffic, commercial and recreational fishing, and cruise ship passage.
Land Use, Recreation, and Visual Resources Environmental Setting
Land use, recreation, and visual resources for the Prince Rupert area where the new terminals and expanded port facilities would be built differ sharply from the other terminal sites. Prince Rupert is located on an inlet of the Pacific Ocean in a heavily forested area of British Columbia.
Urban land use is generally limited to the communities in and around the city of Prince Rupert, with some small outlying communities and villages in the area. Given Prince Rupert’s role as a terminus of the Alaska Ferry System, many people see the port and surrounding areas in a recreational context. The area is largely undeveloped and would be sensitive to changes in the visual landscape.
Potential Impacts
If constructed on previously undeveloped land, the new facilities would primarily impact mixed forest… The construction and operational impacts on land use, recreation, and visual resources at the Lloydminster, Epping, and Stroud terminal complex sites and along the Cushing pipeline route would be the same as for the Rail/Pipeline Scenario.
Socioeconomics Environmental Setting
Population/Housing
Construction and operations activities are not expected to have a significant effect on population and housing for this scenario. Because construction and operations job estimates have not yet been determined for this scenario, worker requirements for Prince Rupert, Lloydminster, and Epping are assumed to be minor..additional temporary housing could be needed in Prince Rupert… Prince Rupert only has about 740 hotel/motel rooms
Local Economic Activity
Tanker infrastructure and operations would be affected as ships transport crude oil from Prince Rupert through the Panama Canal to Texas ports near Houston.
Direct construction expenditures for facilities at Prince Rupert would be approximately $700 million, with approximately 1,400 annual construction jobs, based on the cost estimates of the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway marine terminal in Kitimat
Despite the large population of First Nations people in the Prince Rupert area, Canada does not have a similar definition to minorities as the Keystone report applied under US law and so it notes “Impacts to minority and low-income populations during construction and would be similar to those described for the proposed [Keystone] Project and could possibly result in increased competition for medical or health services in underserved populations. Canada does not define HPSA and MUA/P, so it is unknown whether or not the minority populations in Prince Rupert or Lloydminster exist in a medically underserved area.
Tax Revenues and Property Values
It says construction of a new terminal Prince Rupert would generate provincial sales taxes, goods and services taxes, and hotel taxes. Construction of the tank and marine terminals at Prince Rupert…would involve large numbers of road trips by heavy trucks to transport construction materials and equipment to and from the sites. Construction in Prince Rupert could also potentially involve vessel deliveries of material. This traffic could cause congestion on major roadways, and would likely require temporary traffic management solutions such as police escorts for oversize vehicles.
Cultural Resources
Despite the rich heritage of First Nations in the Prince Rupert area, the Keystone alternative study reported;
No cultural resources studies have been conducted for the Prince Rupert area. Review of aerial photographs shows that a small portion of the area that could potentially be developed has already been disturbed by development, including port facilities, structures, and roads. This preliminary review shows that most of the area appears undeveloped and would have the potential for intact buried cultural resources.
The report notes that “Any ground disturbance, especially of previously undisturbed ground, could potentially directly impact cultural resources.”
It goes on to note that the potential to
include intact buried cultural resources would require evaluation through research and cultural resources surveys. If cultural resources were identified, follow-up studies could be required. In general terms, the archaeological potential of heavily disturbed areas, such as might be found in active rail yards or within developed transportation corridors, is normally lower than in undisturbed areas.
Archaeological potential is also contingent upon factors such as access to water, soil type, and topography, and would have to be evaluated for each area to be disturbed. Aboveground facilities have the potential to indirectly impact cultural resources from which they may be visible or audible. The potential for increased rail traffic to contribute to indirect impacts would require consideration.
Air and Noise
The report also summarizes the possible green house gas emissions for the rail and tanker project as whole from Prince Rupert to the Gulf Coast refineres and notes that overall
On an aggregate basis, criteria pollutant emissions, direct and indirect GHG emissions, and noise levels during the operation phase for this scenario would be significantly higher than that of the proposed [Keystone XL] Project mainly due to the increased regular operation of railcars, tankers, and new rail and marine terminals.
Air Quality
The rail cars and tankers transporting the crudes would consume large amounts of diesel fuel and fuel oil each day….The criteria pollutant emissions would
vary by transportation segment, particularly during marine-based transit. Oil tankers traveling from the Prince Rupert marine terminal through the Panama Canal to Houston/Port Arthur pass through several different operational zones, including reduced speed zones leading into and out of the ports, North American Emission Control Areas where the use of low-sulfur marine fuel is mandated, and offshore areas where the tankers travel at cruise speeds.
During the return trip, tankers are filled with seawater (ballast) to achieve buoyancy necessary for proper operation, which affects the transit speeds of the vessel. Furthermore, the tankers spend several days loading or unloading cargo at each marine terminal with auxiliary engines running (an activity called hoteling). The tanker emissions accounted for return trips (i.e., both loaded cargo going south and unloaded cargo going north).
In aggregate, the total operational emissions (tons) estimated over the life of the project (50 years) are several times greater than those associated with the combined construction and operation of the proposed Keyston XL Project
Greenhouse Gases
Direct emissions of GHGs would occur during the construction and operation of the Rail/Tanker Scenario. GHGs would be emitted during the construction phase from several sources or activities, such as clearing and open burning of vegetation during site preparation, operation of on-road vehicles transporting construction materials, and operation of construction equipment for the new pipeline, rail segments, multiple rail and marine terminals, and fuel storage tanks.
Due to limited activity data, GHG emissions from construction of the Rail/Tanker Scenario were not quantified; however, these emissions would occur over a short-term and temporary period, so construction GHG impacts are expected to be comparable to the proposed [Keystone XL] Project.
During operation of the railcars and tankers that comprise this scenario, GHGs would be emitted directly from the combustion of diesel fuel in railcars traveling over 4,800 miles (7,725 km) and fuel oil in marine tankers traveling over 13,600 miles (21,887 km) round-trip.
The Rail/Tanker Scenario would also result in indirect emissions of GHGs due to the operation of 16 new rail terminals, an expanded port, and potential pumping stations. The new rail terminal in Prince Rupert would be projected to require 5 MW of electric power to operate, possibly bring indirect GHG emissions
Noise
Noise would be generated during the construction and operation of the Rail/Tanker Scenario. Noise would be generated during the construction phase from the use of heavy construction equipment and vehicles for the new pipeline, rail segments, and multiple rail and marine terminals, and fuel storage tanks. Due to limited activity/design data, noise levels from the construction of this scenario were not quantified; however, this noise would occur over a short term and temporary period, so construction noise impacts are expected to be comparable to those
of the proposed Project. During operation of the railcars and tanker ships that comprise this scenario, noise would be generated from the locomotives, movement of freight cars and wheels making contact with the rails as the train passes, train horns, warning bells (crossing signals) at street crossings, and tanker engines during hoteling and maneuverings at the new rail and marine terminals in Prince Rupert.
(Noise from ocean going vessels which is a concern for coastal First Nations and environmental groups is covered later on impact on wildlife)
Climate Change Effects on the Scenario Environmental Setting
The Keystone study looks at the affects of climate change, but concentrates largely on the Gulf Coast beause the most of the Rail/Tanker Scenario was outside of the boundaries of the study, but it does note that the sea levels are projected to rise due to glacial melting and thermal expansion of the water. The rate, total increase, and likelihood of the rise is in part dependent on how rapid the ice sheets warm and is a source of ongoing scientific uncertainty.
The United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) estimates that sea level rise could be between 3 to 4 feet by the end of the century.
Increasing sea level projected due to climate changes as described above shifts the impact of mean high tide, storm surge, and saltwater intrusion to occur further inland and this would negatively affect reliable operation of the port infrastrucure for tanker traffic. Mitigation of these climate effects could be addressed by making engineering and operational changes at the port.
Potential Risk and Safety Environmental Setting
The Rail/Tanker Option would combine the risk inherent in both pipeline and oil tanker
transport. However, the risks and consequences for using oil tankers to transport the hazardous materials are potentially greater than the proposed Project. Overall, crude oil transportation via oil tankers has historically had a higher safety incident rate than pipelines for fire/explosion, injuries, and deaths.
Spills have been reported while the vessel is loading, unloading, bunkering, or engaged in other operations
The main causes of oil tanker spills are the following:
• Collisions: impact of the vessel with objects at sea, including other vessels (allision);
• Equipment failure: vessel system component fault or malfunction that originated the release of crude oil;
• Fires and explosions: combustion of the flammable cargo transported onboard;
• Groundings: running ashore of the vessel; and
• Hull failures: loss of mechanical integrity of the external shell of the vessel.
From 1970 to 2011, historical data shows that collisions and groundings were the maincauses of oil tanker spills worldwide.
Potential Impacts
Loading and unloading of the railcars at tank farms near seaports could allow spills to migrate and impact seawaters and shorelines.
However, the loading and unloading are generally carried out under supervision and would be addressed promptly by the operators, limiting the potential migration and impacts of the spill to the immediate area.
Once the tanker is loaded and at sea, the propagation and impacts of a spill could become significant. Oil tankers may carry up to 2,000,000 bbl of oil
A release of oil at sea would be influenced by wind, waves, and current. Depending on the volume of the release, the spreading of oil on the surface could impact many square miles of ocean and oil birds, fish, whales, and other mammals and could eventually impact shorelines. Oil would also mix with particulates in sea water and degrade. As this occurs some oil will begin to sink and either be retained in the water column (pelagic) or settle to the ocean floor (sessile).
Pelagic oil could be consumed by fish or oil fauna passing though the submerged oil. Sessile oil could mix with bottom sediment and potentially consumed by bottom feeding fauna. Spills in ports-of-call could affect receptors similar to an open ocean release but also could temporarily affect vessel traffic and close ports for cleanup activities.
The identification of key receptors along the rail route alternative was not available for this evaluation. Therefore a comparison to the proposed project was not completed.
Surface Water
The Lloydminster to Prince Rupert portion of this route would begin in the western plains at the Saskatchewan/British Columbia border and travel west through an area of high-relief mountains with large valleys, referred to as the Cordillera region. From a water resource perspective, the plains region of Canada is characterized by relatively large rivers with low gradients. The plains rivers drain the Rocky Mountains to the Arctic Ocean. The Cordillera region is largely composed of northwest-southwest trending mountain ranges that intercept large volumes of Pacific
moisture traveling from the west towards the east. River systems in this region are supplied by a combination of seasonal rainfall, permanent snowfields, and glaciers.
The following are larger rivers crossed by the existing rail lines between Lloydminster and Prince Rupert:
• North Saskatchewan River, Alberta
• Pembina River, Alberta
• McLeod River, Alberta
• Fraser River, British Columbia
• Nechako River, British Columbia
• Skeena River, British Columbia
Wetlands
Spills within wetlands would most likely be localized, unless they were to occur in open, flowing water conditions such as a river or in the ocean. A crude oil spill in a wetland could affect vegetation, soils, and hydrology. The magnitude of impact would depend on numerous factors including but not limited to the volume of spill, location of spill, wetland type (i.e., tidal versus wet meadow wetland), time of year, and spill response effectiveness. The construction of additional passing lanes to accommodate increased train traffic resulting from this scenario could
result in permanent impacts to wetlands if passing lanes were constructed where wetlands occur.
However, as there is some leeway regarding the exact location of the passing lanes, it is expected that wetlands would be avoided by design.
Fisheries
The Rail/Tanker Scenario railroad route would cross numerous major streams and rivers in Canada, many of which support anadromous fish species such as salmon.
Anadromous species are those that spawn and rear in freshwater but migrate to the ocean at a certain size and age. Pacific salmon are large anadromous fish that support valuable commercial and recreational fisheries. Commercial fisheries for salmon occur in marine water and most recreational fishing for salmon occurs in freshwater. Salmon eggs are vulnerable to the effects of fine sediment deposition because female salmon deposit their eggs in stream bed gravels.
Despite this vulnerability, the overland railway route is not expected to present any new impacts to salmon unless there is a spill into its habitat, although the risk of spills does increase under this scenario due to the increase in the number of trains that would use the route.
Potential new impacts under the Rail/Tanker Scenario on commercially or recreationally significant fisheries along the route would be minor because the railroads that would be used are already built and in operation. However, the risk of an oil spill or release of oil or other materials still exists. The tanker portion of this route scenario is also subject to oil spill risk.
Threatened and Endangered Species
The rail route would cross over the Rocky Mountain region of western Alberta, which is inhabited by species such as the woodland caribou (Rangifer tarandus) (a SARA threatened species) and grizzly bear (a SARA special concern species). This region of British Columbia is home to a number of SARA threatened/endangered species, including the peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus anatum) (SARA threatened), salish sucker (Catostomus sp.) (SARA endangered), white sturgeon (Acipenser transmontanus) (SARA endangered), caribou (southern mountain population) (SARA threatened), northern goshawk (Accipiter gentilis laingi) (SARA threatened), and Haller’s apple moss (Bartramia halleriana) (SARA threatened).
A number of additional SARA special concern species inhabit the regions of Canada that would be traversed by the Rail/Tanker Scenario, including but not limited to those special concern species expected to occur in the Prince Rupert region, and discussed above (B.C. Conservation Centre 2012).
The Haisla Nation, the federal government and the province of British Columbia have signed an agreement that opens the way for liquified natural gas development on Haisla territory on Douglas Channel.
The federal government also announced new regulations under the the First Nations Commercial and Industrial Development Act (FNCIDA). The regulations are necessary because First Nations are still governed by provisions of the century old Indian Act and reserve land is outside of provincial jurisdiction.
The agreement was announced at a news conference in Vancouver today, January 22, 2013. At this point it mainly concerns the Kitimat LNG project (also known as KM LNG)
The tripartite agreement with the Government of Canada, Government of British Columbia and Haisla Nation “ensures administrative, monitoring and compliance activities for the LNG facility are performed and enforced by provincial officials.”
The news release also quotes Haisla Chief Counsellor Ellis Ross as saying: “Kitimat LNG offers new, important and sustainable economic opportunities which the Haisla people are eager to embrace. We have seen new jobs, business opportunities, and skills training come to our people since KM LNG signed its agreement with us, and we know that the agreement signed today with Canada and BC is a milestone in making the project a reality. On behalf of the 1,700 Haisla people, I thank both governments for their commitment to this important agreement and the better future it is bringing our people.”
The federal news release goes on to quote BC Community, Sport and Cultural Development Minister Bill Bennett as saying: “The BC Government is working with industry and First Nations to foster economic growth through the expansion of our province’s natural gas sector. I would like to thank the Government of Canada and the Haisla Nation for working with us to move the Kitimat LNG facility another step forward.”
The federal release also quotes executives from both major companies involved in the Kitimat LNG project, Apache and Chevron. Chevron recently took over operating control of the project from Apache when that company had difficulty finding customers in Asia for the LNG.
The Government of Canada, Government of BC and the Haisla Nation have shown exceptional leadership and support towards BC’s new LNG industry” said Tim Wall, President of Apache Canada. “This regulatory agreement builds on the many other agreements with the Haisla that has led to jobs, training, education and economic development in Kitimaat Village.”
“I want to congratulate the Haisla First Nation, the Governments of Canada and British Columbia, and Apache Canada for their shared leadership in finalizing the regulations governing the Kitimat LNG facility site,” said Jeff Lehrmann, president, Chevron Canada Limited. “We look forward to working with the Haisla First Nation, both governments, other First Nations and local communities to realize the project’s long-term economic potential.”
In remarks prepared for the meeting Canada’s Aboriginal Affairs minister John Duncan was quoted as saying
The proposed project will provide Canada’s energy producers with a doorway to overseas markets, in addition to creating jobs and economic development opportunities not just for the Haisla First Nation, but the entire northwest region of British Columbia.
That’s good news for members of the Haisla Nation, good news for British Columbia, and good news for all Canadians.
These regulations are passed under the First Nations Commercial and Industrial Development Act, known as FNCIDA, which allows the federal government to develop regulations for complex commercial and industrial development projects on reserve in partnership with First Nations and Provincial governments.
For First Nations, FNCIDA can remove the barriers they face in pursuit of economic development opportunities, while providing the certainty investors require, and assuring the community that the necessary oversight measures are in place.
Together with the Province of British Columbia and the Haisla Nation, the Government of Canada has also signed an agreement which ensures administrative, monitoring and compliance activities for the facility are performed and enforced by provincial officials who have the necessary experience and expertise.
As a result, the regulatory pieces are now in place for project to proceed.
Duncan added:
To protect the environment as it relates to natural gas production, together with the Province of British Columbia we have completed an environmental assessment pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. With our partners, we will ensure that the LNG plant is designed and built to industrial safety standards and that the operation is properly regulated
Ellis Ross, Chief Counsellor of the Haisla Nation tonight denied reports published in the Globe and Mail that the Haisla are softening their stand against the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline project.
Ross confirmed that the Haisla have withdrawn from its membership in Coastal First Nations, largely due to disagreements on liquified natural gas projects. The Haisla are a partner in the BC LNG project and have an agreement supporting the KM LNG project at Bish Cove which is in Haisla traditional territory.
The Haisla First Nation, an aboriginal group situated at the terminus on the B.C. coast of the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline, has pulled out of an organization that has stridently opposed the controversial project, and called for greener practices in the export of natural gas.
The Haisla said they have withdrawn from Coastal First Nations, effective immediately, amid a first nations debate about the environmental impact of West Coast industrial development that has now blown out into the open. The move also comes amid a softening Haisla stance toward oil exports from their traditional territory, which some see as evidence that the tide is turning on opposition to Gateway.
Ross strenuously denied that there has been any change in the Haisla opposition to the Northern Gateway project as the Globe and Mail is reporting. He says the disagreements with Coastal First Nations comes from the fact that the LNG project terminals are in Haisla traditional territory.
Another member of the Coastal First Nations, the Gitga’at First Nation at Hartley Bay told the Vancouver Sun it was worried about “huge volumes of pollutants could be pumped into the air associated with the development of a liquefied natural gas industry at Kitimat, affecting the health of the aboriginal community.” Gitga’at councillor Marven Robinson told the Sun that the First Nation is not opposed to LNG, but is questioning the risks and is seeking more information.
Ross said the Haisla Nation Council will likely issue a statement in the coming hours.
As part of the strengthened and modernized Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA 2012) put in place to support the government’s responsible resource development initiative, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency must determine whether a federal environmental assessment is required pursuant to the CEAA 2012 for the proposed Coastal GasLink Pipeline Project in British Columbia (B.C.). To assist it in making its decision, the Agency is seeking comments from the public on the project and its potential effects on the environment.
Coastal GasLink Pipeline Ltd. is proposing the construction and operation of an approximately 650-km pipeline to deliver natural gas from the area near the community of Groundbirch, B.C. (40 km west of Dawson Creek) to a proposed liquefied natural gas facility near Kitimat, B.C. The project will initially have the capacity to flow approximately 1.7 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day and could deliver up to approximately 5.0 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas after further expansion.
Written comments must be submitted by December 3, 2012.
Like the current Enbridge Northern Gateway project Joint Review Panel and the National Energy Board hearings in June 2011 on the Kitimat LNG project all comments received will be considered public.
The CEAA says after it has received the comments whether or not there should be an assessmet, it will post a decision on its website stating whether a federal environmental assessment is required.
The CEAA goes on to say:
If it is determined that a federal environmental assessment is required, the public will have three more opportunities to comment on this project, consistent with the transparency and public engagement elements of CEAA 2012.
Projects subject to CEAA 2012 are assessed using a science-based approach. If the project is permitted to proceed to the next phase, it will continue to be subject to Canada’s strong environmental laws, rigorous enforcement and follow-up, and increased fines.
If there is a federal assessment, the most likely course would be to create a new Joint Review Panel. However, this will not be a JRP with the National Energy Board, because the Coastal GasLink project does not cross a provincial boundary, thus it would not make it subject to scrutiny by the NEB.
Instead, if current practice is followed (and that is uncertain given the evolving role of the Harper government in environmental decisions) the new JRP would be in partnership with the British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission, which has jurisdiction over energy projects that are entirely within the province of BC.
The Jackpine Joint Review Panel is the first to held under the new rules from Bill C-38 that limit environmental assessment.
The lead up to the Alberta Jackpine Joint Review Panel hearings was mired in confusion, partly because of the restrictions imposed by the Harper government in Bill C-38 which limited the scope of environmental assessments.
According to initial media reports in The Financial Post, the Joint Review Panel excluded First Nations further downstream from the Jackpine project ruling and individual members of the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation that they were not “interested parties.” The Post cited rules on who can participate were tightened up when the Harper government changed the criterion for environmental assessment under Bill C-38. The Financial Post reported a French-owned oil company was permitted to participate.
A few days after the Financial Post report, Gary Perkins, counsel for the Jackpine Joint Review Panel released a letter to participants including Bill Erasmus, Dene National chief and Assembly of First Nations regional chief, who said he was denied standing. There appears to have been confusion over how people could register as intervenors for the Jackpine hearings, since according to the Perkins letter they apparently did so on a company website that no relation to the Jackpine JRP. Perkins also attempted to clarify its constitutional role with First Nations, saying it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether or not the Crown was consulting properly. (PDF copy below)
The Perkins letter also said that the Fort McKay First Nation, Fort McMurray First Nation #468, the Athabasca Cree First Nation, Fort McKay Metis Community Association and the Metis Association of Alberta Region 1 plus some individual members of First Nations are allowed to participate in the hearings.
The arcane rules of the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has caused months of confusion and frustration for many of those who participated, whether they from the BC provincial Department of Justice or other government participants, intervenors or those making ten minute comments.
Although most people in northwestern British Columbia support the liquified natural gas projects, the prospect of a new Joint Review Panel could likely quickly become controversial in this region. A Coastal GasLink JRP will be the first real test of the restrictions on environmental review imposed on Canada by the Harper government. Environmental groups, especially the few groups that oppose any pipeline projects, will be wary of precedents and likely to test the limits from Bill C-38. Both environmental groups and First Nations will be on alert for any limitations on who can participate in a review. First Nations, even if they support the LNG projects, as most do, will be wary of any attempt by the federal government to limit consultation, rights and title.
A Coastal Gaslink JRP will be a big hot potato for District of Kitimat Council, which has taken a controversial strictly neutral position on the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline project until after that Joint Review Panel reports sometime in 2014. Can the District Council now take a positive position on a natural gas pipeline, which from all appearances council supports, long before a Coastal GasLink JRP report (if there is a panel) without facing charges of hypocrisy?
