Robin Rowland | Northwest Coast Energy News

New US pipeline safety report finds more problems with Enbridge, problems also found in other big pipeline companies

A new draft report for the U.S. Congress from the United States Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration takes new aim at Enbridge for failures in its pipeline leak detection and response system.

Not that the PHMSA is singling out Enbridge, the report is highly critical of leak detection systems on all petroleum and natural gas pipeline companies, saying as far as the United States is concerned, the current pipeline standards are inadequate.

The release of the “Leak Detection Report” written by Kiefner & Associates, Inc (KAI) a consulting firm based in Worthington, Ohio, comes at a critical time, just as Enbridge was defending how it detects pipeline leaks before the Joint Review Panel questioning hearings in Prince George, where today Enbridge executives were under cross-examination by lawyers for the province of British Columbia on how the leak detection system works.

In testimony on Wednesday, October 12, Enbridge engineers told the Joint Review Panel that the company’s pipelines are world-class and have a many prevention and detection systems.

Northern Gateway president John Carruthers testifed there is no way to eliminate all the risks but the company was looking for the best way of balancing benefits against the risk.

However, the KAI report points out that so far, all pipeline company cost-benefit analysis is limited by a short term, one to five year point of view, rather than looking at the entire lifecycle of a pipeline.

Two Enbridge spills, one the well-known case in Marshall Michigan which saw bitumen go into the Kalamazoo River and a second in North Dakota, both in 2010, are at the top of the list in the study for PHMSA by the consulting firm.

On the Marshall, Michigan spill the KAI report goes over and adds to many of the criticisms of Enbridge in the National Transportation Safety Report in July which termed the company’s response like the “Keystone Kops.”

The second spill, in Neche, North Dakota, which, unlike the Marshall spill, has had little attention from the media, is perhaps equally damning, because while Enbridge’s detection systems worked in that case–the KAI report calls it a “text book shutdown”– there was still a spill of 158,928 gallons (601,607 litres) of crude oil, the sixth largest hazardous liquid release reported in the United States [between 2010 and 2012] because Enbridge “did not plan adequately for containment.”

(The KAI report also examines problems with natural gas pipelines, including one by TransCanada Northern Border line at Campbell, Wyoming in February 2011. Northwest Coast Energy News will report on the natural gas aspects of the report in a future posting.)

The highly technical, 270-page draft report was released on September 28, as Enbridge was still under heavy criticism from the US National Transportation Safety Board report on the Marshall, Michigan spill and was facing penalties from the PHMSA for both the Marshall spill and a second in Ohio.

Looking at overall pipeline problem detection, KAI says the two standard industry pipeline Leak Detection Systems or LDS didn’t work very well. Between 2010 and 2012, the report found that Computational Pipeline Monitoring or CPMs caught just 20 per cent of leaks. Another system, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition or SCADAs caught 28 per cent.
Even within those acronym systems, the KAI report says major problem is a lack of industry standards. Different companies use different detector and computer systems, control room procedures and pipeline management.

The report also concludes that the pipeline industry as a whole depends far too much on internal detectors, both for economic reasons and because that’s what the industry has always done. External detectors, the report says, have a better track record in alerting companies to spills.

A significant number of spills are also first reported by the public or first responders, rather than through the pipeline company system and as KAI says of Enbridge, “Operators should not rely on the public to tell them a pipeline has ruptured.”

The consultants also say there are far too many false alarms in spill detection systems.

Although the KAI report concentrates on the United States, its report on Enbridge does raise serious questions about how the company could detect a pipeline breach or spill in the rugged northern British Columbia wilderness where the Northern Gateway Pipeline would be built, if approved by the federal government.

The report comes after the United States Congress passed The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act, which was signed into law by President Barack Obama on January 3, 2012. The law called on a new leak detection study to be submitted to Congress that examines the technical limitations of current leak detection systems, including the ability of the systems to detect ruptures and small leaks that are ongoing or intermittent. The act also calls on the US Department of Transportation to find out what can be done to foster development of better technologies and economically feasible ways of detecting pipeline leaks. The final report must be submitted to Congress by January 3, 2013.

(The draft report does note in some ways, Canadian standards for detecting pipeline leaks are better than those in the United States. For example, Canada requires some pipeline testing every year, the United States every five years. It also finds European pipeline monitoring regulations also surpass those in the United States).

The spills studied in the report all found weaknesses in one or more of those three areas: people, company procedures and the technology. It appears that the industry agrees, at least in principle, with executives telling the consultants:

The main identified technology gaps – including those identified by operators – include: reduction or management of false alarms; applicable technical standards and certifications; and value / performance indicators that can be applied across technologies and pipelines.

The report echoes many of the findings of the US National Transportation Safety Board in its examination of the Enbridge Marshall, Michigan spill but it applies to all pipeline companies, noting:

Integration using procedures is optimal when it is recognized that alarms from the technology are rarely black-and-white or on/off situations. Rather, at a minimum, there is a sequence: leak occurrence; followed by first detection; followed by validation or confirmation of a leak; followed by the initiation of a shutdown sequence. The length of time that this sequence should take depends on the reliability of the first detection and the severity of the consequences of the release. Procedures are critical to define this sequence carefully – with regard to the technology used, the personnel involved and the consequences – and carefully trained Personnel are needed who understand the overall system, including technologies and procedures.

We note that there is perhaps an over-emphasis of technology in LDS. A recurring theme is that of false alarms. The implication is that an LDS is expected to perform as an elementary industrial automation alarm, with an on/off state and six-sigma reliability. Any alarm that does not correspond to an actual leak is, with this thinking, an indicator of a failure of the LDS system.

Instead, multiple technical studies confirm that far more thought is required in dealing with leak alarms. Most technologies infer the potential presence of a leak via a secondary physical effect, for example an abnormal pressure or a material imbalance. These can often be due to multiple other causes apart from a leak.

The report takes a critical look at the culture of all pipeline companies which divides problems into leaks, ruptures and small seeps. Under both pipeline practice and the the way problems are reported to the PHMSA in the US a “rupture is a situation where the pipeline becomes inoperable.” While a rupture means that a greater volume of petroleum liquid or natural gas is released, and is a higher priority than a leak or seep, the use of language may mean that there is a lower priority given to those leaks and seeps than the crisis created by a rupture.

(Environmental groups in British Columbia have voiced concerns about the cumulative affect of small seeps from the Enbridge Northern Gateway that would be undetectable under heavy snow pack either by an internal system or by external observation)

Overall, the report finds serious flaws to the way pipeline companies are conducting leak detection systems at the moment, including:

Precisely the same technology, applied to two different pipelines, can have very different results.
Leak Detection Systems do not have performance measures that can be used universally across all pipelines. Compounding the problem are different computer systems where software, program configuration and parameter selection all contribute, in unpredictable ways, to overall performance.
Many performance measures present conflicting objectives. For example, leak detection systems that are highly sensitive to small amounts of lost hydrocarbons are also prone to generating more false alarms.
The performance of a leak detection system depends critically on the quality of the engineering design, care with installation, continuing maintenance and periodic testing.
Even though an internal technology may rely upon simple, basic principles, it is in fact, complex system that requires robust metering, robust SCADA and telecommunications, and a robust computer to perform the calculations. Each of these subsystems is individually complex.
Near the inlet and the outlet of the pipeline a leak leads to little or no change in pressure. Flow rates and pressures near any form of pumping or compression will generally be insensitive to a downstream leak
Differences in any one of these factors can have a dramatic impact on the ultimate value of a leak detection system.

The report goes on to say:

There is no technical reason why several different leak detection methods can not be implemented at the same time. In fact, a basic engineering robustness principle calls for at least two methods that rely on entirely separate physical principles.

The report strongly recommends that pipeline companies take a closer look at external leak detection systems. Even though the US Environmental Protection Agency began recommending the use of external detection as far back as 1988, the companies have resisted due to the cost of retrofitting the legacy pipeline network. (Of course if the pipeline companies had started retrofitting with external detectors in 1988 they would be now 24 years into the process).

KAI says:

External leak detection is both very simple – relying upon routinely installed external sensors that rely upon at most seven physical principles – and also confusing, since there is a wide range of packaging, installation options, and operational choices to be considered.
External leak detection sensors depend critically on the engineering design of their deployment and their installation.
External sensors have the potential to deliver sensitivity and time to detection far ahead of any internal system.
Most technologies can be retrofitted to existing pipelines. In general, the resistance to adopting external technologies is, nevertheless, that fieldwork on a legacy pipeline is relatively expensive.
The report goes on to identify major bureaucratic roadblocks within pipeline companies. Like many other big corporations, walls exist that prevent the system from working well
A particular organizational difficulty with leak detection is identifying who “owns” the leak detection system on a pipeline. A technical manager or engineer in charge is typically appointed, but is rarely empowered with global budgetary, manpower or strategic responsibilities. Actual ownership of this business area falls variously to metering, instrumentation and control, or IT.

The report calls for better internal standards at pipeline companies since with leak detection “one size does not necessarily fit all”.

It also notes that “flow metering is usually a central part of most internal leak detection systems,” but adds “flow meter calibration is by far the most laborious part of an internal system’s maintenance.

Also, the central computer and software technology usually has maintenance requirements far greater than most industrial automation and need special attention.”

While a company may do a cost benefit analysis of its leak detection system and risk reduction system it will generally emphasize the costs of the performance and engineering design of the leak detection system, the companies usually place less emphasis on the benefits of a robust system, especially the long term benefits.

At present the pipeline companies look at the benefit of leak detection as a reduction in risk exposure, or asset liability, “a hard, economic definition… understood by investors.” But the report adds that leak detection systems have a very long lifetime and over that life cycle, the cost-benefit approaches the reduction in asset liability caused by the system, when divided by annual operational costs. However, since pipeline companies budget on a one to five year system the long term benefit of robust, and possibly expensive spill detection is not immediately apparent.

Enbridge

The consultants studied 11 US oil spills, the top two with the greatest volume were from Enbridge pipelines. The others were from TE Products Pipeline, Dixie Pipeline, Sunoco, ExxonMobil, Shell, Amoco, Enterprise Products, Chevron and Magellan Pipeline. Not all US spills were used in the KAI report, the 11 were chosen for availability of data and documentation.

The largest spill in the KAI study was the pipeline rupture in Michigan at 843,444 gallon (3,158,714 litres) which has been the subject of continuing media, investigative and regulatory scrutiny. The second spill in North Dakota, has up to now received very little attention from the media. That will likely change once the US Congress gets the final report. Even though the Neche, North Dakota spill, has been described as “text book case” of a pipeline shutdown, there was still a large volume of oil released.

Marshall, Michigan spill

On the Marshall, Michigan spill that sent bitumen into the Kalamazoo River the report first goes over the facts of the 843,444 gallon spill and the subsequent release of a highly critical report from the US National Transportation Safety Board. It then looks at the failures of Enbridge’s detection system from the point of view mandated for the report to Congress:

The pipeline was shutting down when the ruptured occurred. Documentation indicates that a SCADA alarm did sound coincident with the most likely time of the rupture. It was dismissed. The line was shut down for around 10 hrs and crude oil would have drained from the line during this time.

On pipeline start up, alarms in the control room for the ruptured pipeline sounded. They were dismissed. This was repeated two more times. The pipeline was shut down when the control room was notified of the discharge of the crude oil by a member of the public. The time to shut down the pipeline is not relevant here because of the 17 hours that elapsed after the rupture occurred.

The review identified issues at Enbridge relevant to this Leak Detection Study:

1. Instrumentation on a pipeline that informs a controller what is happening to the pipeline must be definitive in all situations.
2. However, the instrumentation did provide warnings which went unheeded by controllers.
3. Instrumentation could be used to prevent a pump start up.
4. Operators should not rely on the public to tell them when a pipeline has ruptured.
5. Pipeline controllers need to be fully conversant with instrumentation response to different operations performed on the pipeline.
6. If alarms can be cancelled there is something wrong with the instrumentation feedback loop to the controller. This is akin to the low fuel warning on a car being turned off and ignored. The pipeline controller is part of an LDS and failure by a controller means the LDS has failed even if the instrumentation is providing correct alarms.
7. If the first SCADA alarm had been investigated, up to 10 hours of pipeline drainage to the environment might have been avoided. If the second alarm had been investigated, up to 7 hours of pumping oil at almost full capacity into the environment might have been avoided.
8. CPM systems are often either ignored or run at much higher tolerances during pipeline start ups and shutdowns, so it is probable that the CPM was inoperative or unreliable. SCADA alarms, on the other hand, should apply under most operating conditions.

Neche, North Dakota spill

At approximately 11:37 pm. local time, on January 8, 2010, a rupture occurred on Enbridge’s Line 2, resulting in the release of approximately 3000 barrels or 158,928 gallons of crude oil approximately 1.5 miles northeast of the town of Neche, North Dakota, creating the sixth largest spill in the US during the study period.

As the report notes, in this case, Enbridge’s detection system worked:

At 11:38 pm., a low-suction alarm initiated an emergency station cascade shutdown. At 11:40 pm., the Gretna station valve began closing. At 11:44 pm., the Gretna station was isolated. At 11:49 pm., Line 2 was fully isolated from the Gretna to Donaldson pump stations.

Documentation indicates a rapid shut down on a low suction alarm by the pipeline controller. From rupture to shut down is recorded as taking 4 minutes. The length of pipeline isolated by upstream and downstream remotely controlled valves was 220,862 feet. The inventory for this length of line of 26-inch diameter is 799,497 gallons. The release amount was around 20 per cent of the isolated inventory when the pipeline was shut down.

The orientation of the 50-inch long rupture in the pipe seam is not known. The terrain and elevation of the pipeline is not known. The operator took around 2 hours and 40 minutes to arrive on site. It is surmised that the rupture orientation and local terrain along with the very quick reactions by the pipeline controller may have contributed to the loss of around 20 per cent of the isolated inventory.

The controller was alerted by the SCADA. Although a CPM system was functional the time of the incident it did not play a part in detecting the release event. It did provide confirmation.

But the KAI review identified a number of issues, including the fact in item (7) Enbridge did not plan for for containment and that containment systems were “under-designed.”

1. This release is documented as a text book shut down of a pipeline based on a SCADA alarm.
2. The LDS did not play a part in alerting the pipeline controller according to
documentation. However, leak detection using Flow/Pressure Monitoring via SCADA
worked well.
3. Although a textbook shut down in 4 minutes is recorded, a large release volume still occurred.
4. The release volume of 158,928 gallons of crude oil is the sixth largest hazardous liquid release reported between January 1, 2010 and July 7, 2012.
5. The length of pipeline between upstream and downstream isolation valves is long at 41.8 miles.
6. If not already performed, the operator should review potential release volumes based on ruptures taking place at different locations on the isolated section.
7. The success of a leak detection system includes planning for the entire process: detection through shutdown through containment. In this case, the operator did not plan adequately for containment so that although the SCADA leak detection technology, the controller and the procedures worked well, the containment systems (isolation valves) were under-designed and placed to allow a very large spill.”

KAI Draft report on Leak Detection Systems at the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration website

Rio Tinto Alcan reopens access to Kitimat waterfront

Rio Tinto Alcan has reopened Hospital Beach, the nearby boat ramp and Moore Creek and the Moore Creek falls for public use.

RTA took out an ad in a local newspaper Wednesday, Oct. 12, 2012, to make the announcement which came after a meeting members of the District of Kitimat Council on Oct. 4.

The RTA statement reads, in part:

Both Rio Tinto Alcan and the District of Kitimat understand the value and importance of ocean access to residents of the area while at the same time, continuing to respect and ensure that safety is the number one priority.

Over the last few months, while hearing the disappointment and concern about Hospital Beach, the KMP [Kitimat Modernization Project] Construction Team took action to mitigate the public safety risk. The massive rock trucks hauling heavy loads will be re-routed; a new bridge over Anderson Creek has been installed; new traffic lights will be installed near the Construction Village; and an extra construction road has been built from the former Eurocan Haul Road. All these measures have enabled the decision to accommodate the wishes of the community to access Hospital Beach, the boat ramp and Moore Creek safely.

It is important to remind residents however, Rio Tinto Alcan is in the middle of constructing a mega project to modernize and sustain the aluminium smelter business in Kitimat for the benefit of us all. This is the highest priority with many demands and intense focus. To that end, Rio Tinto Alcan will continue to assess traffic patterns and will likely need to make short term closures again as construction dictates. It is imperative that residents respect the company’s right to manage activities on its private property as it deems in the best interest of its business, including the KMP and public safety.

Rio Tinto Alcan and the District of Kitimat have committed together to work toward finding long term solution to ocean access. Thank you all for your patience, support and cooperation.

As the members of District council were meeting in Kitimat, in Prince Rupert, the Northern View reported that CN was cutting off access to part of the town’s waterfront, again for safety issues: CN erects barriers, no trespassing signs along Prince Rupert waterfront

Prince Rupert residents wanting to walk along the road adjoining the ocean past Rotary Waterfront Park will notice new barriers and signs alerting them that they would be trespassing should they do so.
The barricades and signs were put up yesterday, and CN regional manager of public affairs Emily Hamer says it is due to safety concerns with the public on the railway’s property.

Prince Rupert acting mayor Anna Ashley told the Northern View the city expected some restrictions during construction and said the city planned to talk to CN about the issue.

In an e-mail to Northwest Coast Energy News after the October 4 meetingm Kitimat mayor Joanne Monaghan, while hinting then that a solution to the restrictions was coming, said that industry has been faced with so many lawsuits that safety is becoming a bigger issue.

Councillor Corinne Scott also said that the meeting with RTA stressed that “Large businesses are putting safety as a higher priority.” (She also noted that council agreed to have regular meetings with RTA “.communication lines are open and we look forward to a continued good working relationship between the District of Kitimat and RTA. “)

In both cases, it appears that waterfront access is a legacy issue, left over from an earlier era of industrial development that gave little thought to either the environment or community.
Now it is also apparent that liability lawyers, who probably live thousands of kilometres away from the northwest, have, so far, been driving this issue, with little regard for the needs of local residents.

Make no mistake, safety should be a high priority, but arbitrary restrictions that may look good on legal brief, could actually mean that people would simply try to get around the restrictions, to the determent of safety. It is well known that RTA Plant Protection was finding people at Hospital Beach during the summer, especially at night, despite the publicized restrictions, barriers and warning signs.

Today with a strong need for jobs in northwestern British Columbia, future community needs for access to waterfront and green space (even in such a wide green area as northern BC) must be taken into consideration in municipal and corporate planning. If that planning isn’t done, that will mean that while there could be jobs, the northwest could be in a situation as it was this summer, with no way to enjoy the advantages of waterfront life in northern BC.

Four energy giants update multi-billion dollar Alaska LNG development plans

An alliance of four energy companies has updated plans for a multi-billion dollar, ten-year liquefied natural gas megaproject that would take gas from Alaska’s North Slope for shipment to Asia through the oil port at Valdez.

Three of the companies, Exxon Mobile, ConocoPhillips and BP already have operations on the North Slope. TransCanada,which is already planning to build a gas pipeline for the Kitimat Shell project, would be the fourth partner and also work on the pipeline.

The four companies filed a letter on October 1 with Alaska Governor Sean Parnell outlining the plans, The governor’s office released the letter today.

The companies told Gov. Parnell that their efforts would result in “a megaproject of unprecedented scale and challenge; up to 1.7 million tons of steel, a peak construction workforce of up to 15,000, a permanent workforce of over 1,000 in Alaska, and an estimated total cost in today’s dollars of $45 to $65+ billion.”

The letter goes on to say that TransCanada’s recently completed non-binding solicitation of
interest in the project and that company “has publicly reported interest from potential shippers and major players from a broad range of industry sectors and geographic locations.” (An expression of interest, of course, doesn’t mean that buyers will actually sign contracts, as the Kitimat LNG partners are finding out)

It appears from the letter that the North Slope producers are, in the long term, worried about diminishing oil reserves and are now, like energy companies around the world, looking at cashing in on the natural gas boom.

This opportunity is challenged by its cost, scale, long project lead times, and reliance upon interdependent oil and gas operations with declining production. The facilities currently used for producing oil need to be available over the long-term for producing the associated gas for an LNG project. For these reasons, a healthy, long-term oil business, underpinned by a competitive fiscal framework and LNG project fiscal terms that also address AGIA issues [an Alaska state agency], is required to monetize North Slope natural gas resources. The producers look forward to working with the State to secure fiscal terms necessary to support the unprecedented commitments required for a project of this scope and magnitude and bring the benefits of North Slope gas development to Alaska.

Over the past few months, the partners have, according to the letter:

•Developing a design basis for the pipeline, including areas of continuous and discontinuous permafrost
•Investigating multiple ways to remove and dispose of CO2 and other contaminants
•Assessing use of existing and addition of new Prudhoe Bay field facilities
•Mapping multiple pipeline routing variations
•Assessing multiple pipeline sizes
•Providing for at least five in-state gas off-take points
•Completing preliminary geohazard and marine analysis of 22 LNG site locations
•Developing a design basis for the required LNG tanker fleet
•Evaluating multiple LNG process design alternatives
•Confirming a range of gas blends from the Prudhoe Bay and Point Thomson fields can generate a marketable LNG product

The letter concludes:

Our next steps are to complete the concept selection phase and work with the State to make meaningful progress on the items detailed above. This work is critical as we consider decisions to progress the next phases of an LNG development project.

Alaska’s North Slope natural gas resources must compete in the global energy markets in order to deliver state revenues, in-state energy supplies, new job opportunities and other economic benefits to Alaskans. While North Slope gas commercialization is challenging, working together, we can maintain the momentum toward our shared vision for Alaska. We will continue to keep you advised of our progress and stand committed to work with the State to responsibly develop its considerable resources.

Alaska LNG fact sheet — A fact sheet on the Alaska LNG project sent to the state governor by the project partners.

LNG partners letter to Alaska governor (PDF)

EPA orders Enbridge to do more cleanup on the Kalamazoo River

http://storify.com/nwcstenergynews/epa-orders-enbridge-to-do-more-cleanup-on-the-kala

TransCanada to hold community briefing in Kitimat October 15

TransCanada will hold a community briefing in Kitimat on October 15, 2012, at Riverlodge to inform residents of its plans for its subsidiary Coastal GasLink Pipeline, which would carry natural gas for the Royal Dutch Shell LNG project.

In a letter to District of Kitimat Council, TransCanada said it the Kitimat would be one of several sessions across northern British Columbia.

The public information session will include maps “showing our conceptual route as well as information on community benefits, environmental management and other aspects of our project. Coastal Gaslink project representatives will be available to answer questions and share information.”

The session will be a the Riverlodge Rescreation Centre from 4:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. On October 15.

Kitimat LNG progressing–or is it?

At the District of Kitimat Council meeting on Monday, October 1, as part of Mayor Joanne Monaghan’s regular “good news” briefing, she told council that the Kitimat LNG project continues to “progress positively.” The news from Calgary on Tuesday, however, was not as promising.

Both Bloomberg News and the Calgary Herald reported that Apache, which owns 40 per cent of the KM LNG partnership is worried about a recent decision by a rival gas company to sell natural gas to world markets at low North American prices rather than, as been customary up until now, as percentage of the world oil price. That differential gives the North American gas companies a profit in Asia and it is that profit difference that makes Kitimat attractive for LNG projects.

At the council meeting, Monaghan reported, quoting Apache’s Apache’s Manager of Public and Government Affairs Natalie Poole-Moffatt, as saying that Kitimat LNG will be opening a full time community office in downtown Kitimat near the City Centre mall in the near future. Apache says renovations are nearly complete and they will be holding an open house in the near future.

Monaghan said that work on the Kitimat LNG site at Bish Cove continues with blasting to create proper elevation, crushing and sorting of rock and constructing an access route to the forest service road. This summer work began on the two year $25 million upgrades to the old forest service road “which will improve conditions on the road.”

However, in Calgary, the Herald quoted KM LNG vice-president David Calvert as saying “things are going so well that it has been decided to risk spending on clearing ground before completion of the front end engineering and development study and final investment decision.”

But according to several media reports, Calvert told an Energy Roundtable in Calgary on Tuesday that a final go-ahead for Kitimat LNG is not a done deal. the Herald quoted Calvert as saying: “We remain convinced that oil-linked pricing is critical to the viability of our Canadian LNG industry.”

Bloomberg reported that a recent deal by Cheniere Energy Inc. to sell liquefied natural gas based on North American pricing (also known as Henry Hub pricing) means that it is difficult for Apache to find Asian customers to sign the long term LNG contracts needed to make the Kitimat project viable. (Asian LNG prices are based on the “Japan Customs Cleared Price” set by the Japanese government as a percentage of the price of crude oil).

Bloomberg quoted Calvert as saying: “It created quite a ripple through the marketplace,” and Bloomberg said, the Cheniere deal has created “unrealistic expectations.”

Related

Globe and Mail

Canadian gas producers dreaming big – again

Canada losing the race to sell LNG

Updated

The Haynesville Shale

Cheniere Deal Hurts Canadian LNG Project

Cheniere is less sensitive to prices given its role as a middleman, while Apache, Encana and EOG are producers, for whom the price is very important. One advantage of Kitimat is its west coast location, but that is only a minor cost advantage over Gulf Coast facilities.

The clock is ticking on Kitimat. It sounds like Asian buyers are sitting on the sidelines waiting for lower prices. Right now the U.S. government is sitting on future LNG approvals pending the release of a study around year-end. If the U.S. approves the pending applications, a proverbial flood of LNG will come to market with Henry Hub-based pricing. At that point Kitimat’s owners will be in a tough spot. Kitimat is vital to B.C., but the economics might not work.

Wall Street Journal

Cheniere Lights a Match in the Gas Market

Minor oil leak at Bish Cove

In a report to District of Kitimat Council, Apache’s Manager of Public and Government Affairs, Natalie Poole-Moffatt, also reported that on September 19, an oil leak was spotted on a piece of heavy equipment at Bish Cove. The report says;

WestCoast Marine was notified and booms were deployed as a preemptive measure in Bish Cove, no machine oil has migrated to Bish Cove. Environmental crews are on site executing a remediation plan. Both the [BC] Provincial Emergency PLan (PEP) and Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Canada were notified of the incident.

The piece of equipment is currently being repaired and will undergo operational tests to ensure the equipment can function without further concern. Environmental staff will remain on the site 24/7 until remediation is complete.

A lesson for BC: Michigan 911 system failed during the Kalamazoo spill, NTSB says

The 911 system failed during the 2010 Marshall, Michigan, Enbridge pipeline breach, according to the full report in the incident released by the US National Transportation Safety Board.

The NTSB report says the 911 operators in Michigan dismissed eight calls reporting gas or petroleum odours over a period of 14 hours between the initial report of a bad odour and the actual discovery of diluted bitumen polluting Talmadge Creek.

The report also says the local firefighters were unfamiliar at that point with potential problems from a bitumen pipeline as opposed to a leak of a consumer natural gas pipeline.

Although the NTSB report puts most of the onus on an inadequate Enbridge “Public Awareness Program” (PAP) which failed to familiarize first responders to potential problems, the report raises questions whether British Columbia, especially the north, is properly prepared for all the energy development that is occurring. Whether or not the Enbridge Northern Gateway project proceeds, there are three active and possibly as many as three or four planned liquified natural gas projects for the northwest, ongoing exploration and production in the northeast and the proposed Kinder Morgan expansion in the lower mainland.

The NTSB says that Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 pm. EDT, a segment of a 30 inch (7.62 cm) diameter pipeline (Line 6B) operated by Enbridge ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a pipeline shutdown planned by Enbridge. The leak was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours, largely due to problems in the Enbridge control room in Edmonton.

During the time lapse, the NTSB says, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two pipeline start ups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons or 3.192 million litres of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River.

According to the NTSB time line, at 8:56 pm., Michigan Gas Utilities dispatched a senior service technician after residents reported a natural gas odour. At 9:25 pm. on July 25, a local resident called the Calhoun County 911 dispatch:

I was just at the airport in Marshall and drove south on Old 27 [17 Mile Road]
and drove back north again and there’s a very, very, very strong odour, either
natural gas or maybe crude oil or something, and because the wind’s coming out
of the north, you can smell it all the way up to the tanks, right across from where
the airport’s at, and then you can’t smell it anymore.

By 9:32 pm., the Marshall City Fire Department had been dispatched in response to the 9:25 pm. call to 911. The 911 dispatcher told the responders there was a report of a bad smell of natural gas near the airport. The responding firefighters were also dispatched. The firefighters checked pipelines and industrial building near the airport. “using a combustible gas indicator” to try to locate the origin of the odour, but did not detect anything.

NTSB map of first responders at Kalamazoo spill — A map from the NTSB report showing where the fire department responded to the reports of a gas smell at Marshall, MIchigan, and the location of the actual pipeline break. (NTSB)

The NTSB says the service technician from Michigan Gas Utilities “crossed paths with some of the fire department personnel” but found no evidence of a gas leak.

The fire department personnel departed the scene at 10:54 pm. to return to the station.

The NTSB report says: “ a combustible gas indicator measures percentage of the lower explosive limit, it likely would not detect the oil unless it was very close to the source.”

At 11:33 pm, the area’s 911 system received the first of the seven additional calls when an employee at a business called to report a natural gas odour.

The 911 dispatcher told the caller that the fire department had already responded
to calls in the area, and no more personnel were dispatched.

A map of the incident response by the NTSB shows that the area near the airport where the firefighters responded was actually some distance from the pipeline rupture.

Over the next 14 hours, the NTSB says, 911 received seven more calls reporting strong natural gas or petroleum odours in the same vicinity. “The 911 dispatcher repeatedly informed the callers that the fire department had been dispatched to investigate the reported odours.”

Enbridge had been working on restarting the pipeline all night. In Edmonton, at 10:16 am, the Enbridge control room spoke to the regional manager based in Chicago to send someone to
walk along the pipeline, upstream and downstream of the Marshall pumping station.

According to the NTSB, the Chicago regional manager replied, “I wouldn’t think so. If it’s right at Marshall—you know, it seems like there’s something else going wrong either with the computer or with the instrumentation. …you lost column and things go haywire, right?” He went on to say, “…I’m not convinced. We haven’t had any phone calls. I mean it’s perfect weather out here—if it’s a rupture someone’s going to notice that, you know and smell it.” The Chicago regional manager told shift lead C1 that he was okay with the control centre starting Line 6B again.

At 11:17 am, a caller from a second gas utility, Consumers Energy, called the Enbridge emergency line telling the control room: “I work for Consumers Energy[30] and I’m in Marshall. There’s oil getting into the creek and I believe it’s from your pipeline. I mean there’s a lot. We’re getting like 20 gas leak calls and everything.”

At 11:18 am Enbridge closed the remote valves sealing off the rupture site within a 2.95-mile section. By 11:20 am., the shift lead had called the Chicago regional manager to tell him about the notification. By 11:37 am., another Consumers Energy employee notified 911 about the crude oil leak in a creek near Division Drive.

The Fredonia Township Fire Department was dispatched by the 911 centre shortly after the call. At 11:41 am., the Edmonton control centre received confirmation from an Enbridge crossing coordinator located at the Marshall pipeline maintenance shop confirming the oil on the ground.

The NTSB says:

The 911 operators repeatedly informed the callers that the fire department had been dispatched to investigate the issue, but the 911 operators did not contact the pipeline operator or advise the public of health and safety risks. The 911 operators never dispatched the fire department in response to the subsequent calls even though these calls occurred over several hours, indicating an ongoing problem. The actions of both the first responders and the 911 operators are consistent with a phenomenon known as confirmation bias,128 in which decision makers search for evidence consistent with their theories or decisions, while discounting contradictory evidence. Although there was evidence available to the first responders that something other than natural gas was causing noticeable odours in the Marshall area, they discounted that evidence, largely because it contradicted their own findings of no natural gas in the area. Similarly, the 911 operators, with the evidence from the first responders of no natural gas in the area, discounted subsequent calls regarding the strong odours in the Marshall area. Those calls were inconsistent with their own views that the problem causing the odours was either nonexistent or had been resolved.

The NTSB report then says:

Although Enbridge had provided training to emergency responders in the Marshall area in February 2010, the firefighters’ actions showed a lack of awareness of the nearby crude oil pipeline: they did not search along the Line 6B right-of-way, and they did not call Enbridge. The NTSB concludes that had the firefighters discovered the ruptured segment of Line 6B and called Enbridge, the two start ups of the pipeline might not have occurred and the additional volume might not have been pumped.

The NTSB reviewed Enbridge’s PAP, which was intended to inform the affected public,
emergency officials, and public officials about pipelines and facilitate their ability to recognize
and respond to a pipeline rupture.

The report says:

Although RP 1162 requires operators to communicate with audiences every 1 to 3 years, Enbridge mailed its public awareness materials to all audiences annually. However, even with more frequent mailings, this accident showed that emergency officials and the public lacked actionable knowledge.

The NTSB goes on to say:

Public knowledge of pipeline locations and the hazards associated with the materials
transported is critical for successful recognition and reporting of releases, as well as the safe response to pipeline ruptures. The transportation of hazardous materials by pipeline is unlike hazardous materials transportation by railroad or highway because a pipeline is a permanent fixture. A pipeline presents a unique challenge to awareness because it is often buried. When pipeline releases occur, a properly educated public can be the first to recognize and report the emergency.

A survey quoted by the NTSB says that of those who responded in the United States. only 23 percent of the affected public and 47 percent of emergency officials responded that they were “very well informed” about pipelines in their community.

The NTSB says Enbridge failed to properly conduct and monitor its public awareness program and management’s “review of its PAP was ineffective in identifying and correcting deficiencies. The NTSB further concludes that had Enbridge operated an effective PAP, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control centre staff tried to start the line.”

In May 2011, Enbridge revised its public awareness plan and created a public awareness
committee, but just months later, in July 2011, the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration conducted an audit of Enbridge’s plans and identified several
deficiencies in the company’s program evaluation and effectiveness reviews and required that
Enbridge correct the deficiencies.

Overall, the report says:

Although Enbridge and PHMSA have taken these actions, the NTSB is concerned that
pipeline operators do not provide emergency officials with specific information about their pipeline systems. The brochures that Enbridge mailed did not identify its pipeline’s location. Instead, the brochures directed the audiences to pipeline markers and to PHMSA’s National Pipeline Mapping System. In the NTSB’s 2011 report of the natural gas transmission pipeline rupture and fire in San Bruno, California, the NTSB made the following safety recommendation to PHMSA:

Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and
hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their
pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and
jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include
pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact
radius.

The report concludes:

The NTSB recommends that the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Emergency Number Association inform their members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge their members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions.

In Canada, the National Energy Board, which is responsible for overseeing pipeline operations did inspect the Enbridge control room after the NTSB report.

The NEB, of course, has nothing to do with the 911 system.

RCMP North District — RCMP map showing the extent of British Columbia’s “North District.” (RCMP)

One question for northern British Columbia is how prepared is the 911 system to handle a major pipeline incident now or in the future. For police and fire, the RCMP communications system must cover all of “North District” from Prince George. (The RCMP did not return a phone call requesting information on 911 training and procedures)

For BC Ambulance the dispatch centre is in Kamloops.

Fire departments in northwest British Columbia, so far, have had minimal training in potential pipeline problems, like the fire department in Michigan, enough to detect and deal with consumer and local industrial natural gas systems. It’s clear that the province of British Columbia, if it is going to promote liquified natural gas as a foundation of a new provincial economy, it must plan and budget for a major upgrade to the 911 system, with a new police, fire and ambulance dispatch centre.

Avian malaria found in Alaskan birds, another indication of climate change

A form of malaria that infects birds has been found in parts of Alaska, and scientists say the discovery is another indication of climate change in the north.

The spread could prove devastating to arctic bird species that have never encountered the disease and thus have no resistance to it, said San Francisco State University Associate Professor of Biology Ravinder Sehgal, one of the study’s co-authors. The study was published Wednesday, Sept. 19, 2012 in the journal PloS One.

The avian malaria parasite is related to the human form and so the bird study could help scientists track how climate change is affecting human malaria.

Researchers examined blood samples from both resident and migratory birds collected at four sites from 61°N to 67°N, with Anchorage as a southern point, Denali and Fairbanks as middle points. Coldfoot was the northern point, roughly 960 kilometres north of Anchorage. They found infected birds in Anchorage and Fairbanks as far north as 64°N, but not in Coldfoot

In migratory birds, samples were taken from both adults and hatchlings to see if the infection had occurred locally or during migration.

The study notes that the infected birds at 64°N were above the Arctic Circle commonly known to people across the region as “north of 60”)

Using satellite imagery and other data, researchers were able to predict how environments will change due to global warming — and where malaria parasites will be able to survive in the future. They found that by 2080, the disease will have spread north to Coldfoot and beyond.

“Right now, there’s no avian malaria above latitude 64 degrees, but in the future, with global warming, that will certainly change,” Sehgal said. The northerly spread is alarming, he added, because there are species in the North American arctic that have never been exposed to the disease and may be highly susceptible to it.

“For example, penguins in zoos die when they get malaria, because far southern birds have not been exposed to malaria and thus have not developed any resistance to it,” he said. “There are birds in the north, such as snowy owls or gyrfalcons, that could experience the same thing.”

Researchers are still unsure how the disease is being spread in Alaska and are currently collecting additional data to determine which mosquito species are transmitting the Plasmodium parasites that cause malaria.

The data may also indicate if and how malaria in humans will spread northward.

Modern medicine makes it difficult to track the natural spread of the disease, Sehgal said, but monitoring birds may provide clues as to how global climate change may effect the spread of human malaria.

The study is the fact that the malaria parasites were able to complete their transmission cycle in the North American Arctic” provides “empirical evidence that local hosts in the north of Alaska may be exposed to new parasites with impending global warming,” especially if there is increased variation of both day/night and season temperature changes. Rainfall is also a factor.

Both Anchorage and Fairbanks are likely to have suitable conditions for the avian malaria parasite “completion, other areas with high annual precipitation but mild precipitation and temperature seasonality would be predicted to also be suitable” for the parasite.

One form of the avian malaria parasite has been previously in four bird species: the Common Rosefinch (Carpodacus erythrinus) in South Korea, the Greater Scaup (Aythya marila), the Pacific Golden Plover (Pluvialis fulva) and the Common Yellowthroat (Geothlypis trichas) in the United States, and in six migratory species, meaning that form can tolerate cold temperatures.

The book Birds of British Columbia says the Greater Scaup is a common migrant on the BC coast and may winter in BC, and an abundant migrant in the BC interior in both spring and fall, and often winters in the Okanagan. The Pacific Golden Plover is rare in BC, because its migration route takes it toward the east coast. It is usually spotted in the Peace River region but has been seen occasionally near Massett and Boundary Bay. The Common Yellowthroat can be found through the BC mainland in the summer but is rare on Vancouver Island and Haida Gwaii.

A study in New Brunswick has shown that one form of mosquito that tolerates cold infects birds in that province. Although that mosquito is “rare” in Alaska, a close relative is common in the state and although the scientists were unable to find the source of the infection, that Alaskan mosquito could be a prime suspect.

Geological Survey of Canada identifies tsunami hazard, possible fault line on Douglas Channel

Fault zone map Douglas Chanel — A map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the line of a possible seismic fault on Douglas Channel (Geological Survey of Canada)

Updates with statement from Natural Resources Canada, new filings by Enbridge Northern Gateway and the Attorney General of Canada (in box below)

The Geological Survey of Canada has identified a tsunami hazard and a possible seismic fault in Douglas Channel near Kitimat. A scientific paper by the Geological Survey and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans says there were once two giant landslides on Douglas Channel that triggered major tsunamis and that the landslides were possibly caused by an earthquake on the fault line.

Kitimat is the proposed site of the Enbridge Northern Gateway project and at least three liquified natural gas projects.

If the projects go ahead, hundreds of supertankers with either bitumen or LNG will be sailing in the channel for years to come.

A filing by the Attorney General of Canada with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel is asking the JRP for leave to file late written evidence long after the original deadline of December 2011. The Attorney General’s motion was filed on August 17, but went unnoticed until the Kitimat environmental group Douglas Channel Watch brought the matter up with District of Kitimat Council tonight (Sept. 17).

Appended to the Attorney General’s motion is a copy of a scientific paper from the Geological Survey “Submarine slope failures and tsunami hazards in coast British Columbia: Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm” by Kim W Conway, J.V. Barrie of the Geological Survey and Richard E. Thomson of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

The report says the scientists discovered “evidence of large submarine slope failures in southern Douglas Channel.”

It goes on to say: “The failures comprise blocks of bedrock and related materials that appear to have been detached directly from the near shore off Hawkesbury Island.” Hawkesbury Island and many of the other islands in Douglas Channel are built up with material left over from the ice age glaciers and thus are vulnerable to displacement and landslides.

The research identified two slides, one estimated at 32 million cubic metres and a second of 31 million cubic metres. The report goes on to say that the discovery of an “apparently active fault presents the possibility that they may have been triggered by ground motion or surface rupture of the fault during past earthquake events.”

The slope failure landslides are covered with thick layers of mud, and that, the scientists say, could mean that the failures could be ancient, possibly occurring 5.000 to 10,000 years ago. Further research is needed to confirm the date of the giant slides.

What is worrying about the discovery is that fact that there were two recent submarine slope failures on the Kitimat Arm of Douglas Channel. both creating tsunamis. The first slope failure occurred on October 17, 1974, triggering a 2.4 metre tsunami at low tide. Then on April 27, 1975 there was a second slope failure near low tide on the northeast slope of the Kitimat Arm that generated an 8.2 metre tsunami. The 1975 tsunami destroyed the Northland Navigation dock near Kitimat and damaged the Haisla First Nation docks at Kitamaat Village.

The paper says that “Additional geological research is required to better delineate the age of the submarine failures, their triggers, and their mechanisms of emplacement.”

Urgent new research is underway and the filing by the Attorney General says when the Department of Justice requested leave to file late evidence says it anticipates that the further research by DFO is expected to be completed by November 1. The Natural Resources Canada Earth Sciences Sector began a national assessment of submarine slope failures in Canada in late 2011 and completion of the Pacific portion of this assessment is targeted for December of 2012.

The Attorney General’s filing says that DFO is now modelling “potential wave heights and speeds that may have resulted from the two previously unrecognized submarine slope failures in the Douglas Channel.” The model will use high resolution scans of the Douglas Channel seafloor to create the models.

The survey of Douglas Channel in 2010 suggests the possible existence of a fault immediately to the south of the second ancient slide on Hawkesbury Island.

The GSC paper says that evidence for a continuous fault was observed by aligned stream beds and fractures on the south end of Hawkesbury Island, about four kilometers from the site of the second ancient slide. The possible fault then appears to terminate far to the south near Aristazabal Island on the Inside Passage. The Geological Survey says that eleven small earthquakes, all less than magnitude three, have appeared with 20 kilometres of the suspected fault over the past 25 years.

The paper says that the scientists conclude that the slides appear to have left very steep slopes at or near the shoreline that could be susceptible to future failure events.

A large potential slope failure has been identified near one of the ancient slides….

in the absence of additional evidence, the fault must be considered a potential trigger for the submarine failure events….the triggers for the failures have not been defined; however, their proximity to a potentially active fault represents one potential source. The failures probably generated tsunamis during emplacement and conditions exist for similar failures and associated tsunamis to occur along this segment of Douglas Channel in the future.

The scientists say that detailed tsunami modelling is underway to

provide an improved understanding of the generation, propagation, attenuation, and likely coastal inundation of tsunami waves that would have been created by slides… or that could be generated from similar future events. Only through the development and application of this type of tsunami modelling will it be possible to gauge the level of hazard posed by the identified submarine slope failures to shore installations and infrastructure, or to devise ways to effectively mitigate the impacts of future such events.

The filing by the Attorney General offers to bring the scientists to the Joint Review Panel to appear as witnesses sometime during the final hearings.

The filing notes that the current evidence tendered to the JRP by Enbridge, and other parties does demonstrate the potential for marine geohazards and associated tsunami events. Enbridge’s design of the proposed Northern Gateway marine terminal and its operational plans took into consideration the current state of knowledge of geohazards including earthquakes and tsunamis at the time of filing. Enbridge has said it would undertake further geological survey during the detailed design phase for the terminal.

At the time Natural Resources Canada noted that the information provided for the Environmental Review was sufficient at that time, now the Attorney General says:

the geographic scope for potential landslide induced tsunami hazards is now better understood to extend beyond the Kitimat Arm. NRCan and DFO seek by this motion to ensure that this Panel, and the Parties before the Panel, have the most up to date information on geohazards in the Douglas Channel.

Updates: DFO report in October will clarify the tsunamis in Douglas Channel.

Statement from Natural Resources Canada

Natural Resources Canada sent this statement to Northwest Coast Energy News on September 20, 2012.

In reference to the opening paragraph of your September 18th editorial entitled Geological Survey of Canada identifies tsunami hazard: Possible fault line on Douglas Channel, we would like to clarify the following. Although the ancient large submarine slope failures which our scientists have identified may have caused tsunamis, this is not a certainty. It is important to note that Fisheries and Oceans Canada is currently studying this information to model potential wave heights and speeds.

As our report states, only through the development and application of this type of tsunami modelling will it be possible to gauge the level of hazard posed by the identified submarine slope failures to shore installations and infrastructure, or to devise ways to effectively mitigate the impacts of future such events.

Northern Gateway response filed on August 31, 2012

Enbridge Northern Gateway filed this response to the Attorney General’s motion on August 31.

This motion of the Federal Government Participants requests permission to file late evidence consisting of a report entitled “Submarine Slope Failures and
Tsunami Hazard in Coastal British Columbia: Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm” regarding tsunami hazard and additional modelling work based on that report.

Northern Gateway does not object to the filing of this late intervenor evidence.
It may be relevant and Northern Gateway accepts that theevidence could not be filed earlier. However, Northern Gateway would like the opportunity to conductits own additional modelling work which it would be prepared to provide to DFO for comment prior to the filing of any modelling work by DFO in this proceeding.

Attorney General response to Enbridge on September 10, 2012.

The Attorney General of Canada responded to Enbridge by saying:

Attorney General responds DFo is prepared to await filing its subseqent modelling work in these proceedings until such time as it has received, reviewed and commented upon additional modelling work as proposed by NGP Inc.

DFO nots howeverand wishes to alert the JRP that the NGP INc proposed may occasion a delay in the filing of the DFO moedling work which is now proposed for filing on or about October 31, 2012. Delivery of DFO comments as requested will depend on when DFO received the NGP Inc modelling work, the time and resources required by DFO to study and provide comments on the NGP modelling work and unforeseen factors which may have an impact upon completion the commentary. As such,

DFO is prepared to file its modeling work on or about October 31, 2012, but subject to any further direction or request by the panel.

Map of Douglas Channel — Geological Survey of Canada map of Douglas Channel showing the area surveyed which discovered the landslides and possible fault line. (Geological Survey of Canada)

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Map of slides at Kitimat — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the landslides on the Kitimat Arm which triggered tsunamis in 1974 and 1975 (Geological Survey of Canada)

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Slide at Hawkesbury Island — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the giant slide on the southern tip of Hawkesbury Island. (Geological Survey of Canada)

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Hawkesbury Island slide map — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the second giant slide on the coast of Hawkesbury Island on Douglas Channel (Geological Survey of Canada)

Department_of_Justice Notice of Motion of the Attorney General of Canada Seeking to Tender Supplementary Written Evidence (pdf)

Submarine Slope Failures and Tsunami Hazard in Coastal British Columbia Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm PDF

Kitimat-Stikine Regional District votes to oppose Enbridge Northern Gateway

Map Regional District Kitimat Stikine — Map showing the Regional District of Kitimat Stikine (RDKS)

The Regional District of Kitimat-Stikine voted on Sept. 14, 2012, to oppose the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline. Eight of the twelve Regional District Directors of Kitimat Stikine voted to both to oppose the Northern Gateway project and to support resolutions of the Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM) on the pipeline.

Telegraph Creek director David Brocklebank, who originally proposed the motion, was supported by Dease Lake alternate director Joey Waite, Terrace municipal directors Dave Pernarowski (mayor) and Bruce Bidgood (councillor), Nass director (and regional district chair) Harry Nyce, Hazelton village mayor Alice Maitland, the Hazeltons and Kispiox/Kitwanga director Linda Pierre and Diana Penner (who was sitting in for the director Doug McLeod) for the rural area around Terrace and Kitimat.

Brocklebank had proposed the motion at the August meeting. It was tabled to allow for the directors who represent the various regions and municipalities time for consultation.
Voting against were Kitimat municipal director Corinne Scott, New Hazelton mayor Gail Lowry, Thornhill’s Ted Ramsey and Stewart municipal director Billie Ann Belcher.

Scott said she was voting against the motion, continuing the Kitimat council’s position that it remain neutral until the report of the Northern Gateway Joint Review panel. Ramsey also said Thornhill wanted to also remain neutral.

Other directors pointed to what they called the politicization of the Joint Review and how they believed it had been influenced by Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

While the District of Kitimat remains neutral, the Skeena Queen Charlotte Regional District, Prince Rupert, Terrace and Smithers have all voted to oppose the Northern Gateway.