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SPECIAL REPORT: Keystone study looks at increased BC west coast tanker traffic, oil terminal at Prince Rupert

The future of tankers sailing along the British Columbia coast, and the export of crude through BC could change drastically by the end of 2014.

By some time in 2014, the planned expansion of the Panama Canal will be complete, allowing more large ships, including tankers, to pass through the Canal and ply up and down the west coast.
It is also possible that British Columbia coastal ports could not only be used for export of bitumen from the Alberta oil sands and liquified natural gas from northeast BC, but also for oil shale crude found in the Bakken Shale formation in North Dakota and Montana, possibly later shale oil from Saskatchewan and Manitoba.

Those startling conclusions are found in the full draft supplementary Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the Keystone XL pipeline project issued last week by the United States States Department. (Most media reports concentrated on the EIS executive summary, the details on British Columbia are contained in the actual report).

The Keystone EIS surprisingly contains a number of scenarios in British Columbia, even though BC is thousands of kilometres from the proposed TransCanada pipeline from the bitumen sands to the refineries on the US Gulf Coast.

The State Department report had to give President Barack Obama all possible options and that it why the EIS report included what it calls “no action alternatives” –what would happen to the bitumen and oil if Obama rejects the Keystone pipeline. Assuming that the oil, whether bitumen or Bakken oil shale has to get to the Gulf refineries by other means, the EIS takes a close look at one case, via CN rail to Prince Rupert, from Prince Rupert by tanker down to the expanded Panama Canal, then through the Panama Canal to the oil ports of Texas and Louisiana.

Another possibility, although less detailed in the EIS, also considers scenarios where bitumen from the Alberta oilsands or shale crude from the Bakken formation was shipped to Vancouver via the Kinder Morgan pipeline system, to Kitimat via the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline.

The State Department rejected the Kinder Morgan and Northern Gateway options for detailed analysis because of the controversy over both projects.

The Keystone EIS was released by the State Department on Friday, March 1, 2013, and is seen as generally favouring TransCanada’s Keystone XL pipeline project. Despite the EIS report conclusions that the Keystone project would have little adverse impact, the final decision by President Obama will be largely political.

The Prince Rupert scenario

The State Department “Supplementary Enviromental Impact Statement” on the Prince Rupert and several other scenarios were undertaken

In developing alternative transport scenarios, efforts were made to focus on scenarios that would be practical (e.g., economically competitive), take advantage of existing infrastructure to the extent possible, used proven technologies, and are similar to transport options currently being utilized.

The State Department studied a scenario that would

Use of approximately 1,100 miles (1,770 kilometres) of existing rail lines from the proposed Lloydminster rail terminal complex to a new approximately 3,500-acre (1,400 hectare) rail terminal complex where the oil would be offloaded from the rail cars, with a short pipeline connection to the port at Prince Rupert.

That possible replacement for Keystone scenario calls for adding approximately 13 trains with 100 tanker car per day on the CN and Canadian Pacific rail lines between Lloydminster and Prince Rupert. (There is also a separate scenario for a rail route from Alberta to the US Gulf Coast. That scenario is not examined in this report)

That, of course, would be in addition to the already heavy rail traffic to Prince Rupert with grain and coal trains outbound and container trains inbound, as well as the VIA Skeena passenger train.

(David Black who is planning a possible refinery at Onion Flats, north of Kitimat, has said that if the Northern Gateway pipeline is stopped, the Kitimat refinery could be serviced by six trains per day, 120 cars in each direction.)

The railway to Prince Rupert is evaluated using the same criterion under US law that was used to evaluate the Keystone project, including affects on surface water, wetlands, the coast, wildlife, threatened and endangered species, fisheries, landuse, construction, green house gases and even sea level rise.

The EIS for Prince Rupert, however, dodges one of the key questions that is plaguing the Northern Gateway Joint Review panel. While it points out the possible dangers of an oil spill, the report does not go into any great detail,

The overall EIS view of the impact of a Prince Rupert project would likely bring protests from those who already oppose the Northern Gateway pipeline project.

the transport of the crude oil via tankers from Prince Rupert to the Gulf Coast area
refineries would not have any effects on geology, soils, groundwater, wetlands, vegetation, land use, socioeconomics, noise, or cultural resources, other than in the event of a spill.

The State Department scenario says there would be

one to two additional Suezmax tanker vessels per day (430 tankers per year) would travel between Prince Rupert and the Gulf Coast area refinery ports via the Panama Canal.

That, of course, could be in addition to any tankers from the Northern Gateway project, if it is approved, as well as tankers from the liquified natural gas projects at both Kitimat and Prince Rupert.

Expanded Panama Canal

The concept of the Suezmax tankers is critical to the west coast, even if none of the scenarios eventually happen.

The State Department report notes that the Panama Canal is now being expanded, and that beginning sometime in 2014, larger ships, including tankers, can go through the canal. The current size is Panamax (maximum size for the current Panama Canal) to Suezmax (the maximum size for the Suez Canal).

(The Panama Canal expansion program began in 2006 and is scheduled for completion in 2014.
Latest Panama Canal progress report (pdf)

The Vancouver Kinder Morgan Scenario

According to the State Department that means even if the even bigger Very Large Crude Carriers are not calling at west coast ports to take petroleum products to Asia, the Suezmax tankers might likely be calling in Vancouver at the terminal for the existing (and possibly expanded) Kinder Morgan pipeline.

Both Kinder Morgan and Port Metro Vancouver have said that the ships that call at the Kinder Morgan Westridge Terminal are Aframax tankers, and even they are not loaded to capacity, because of the relatively short draft in the Burnaby area of Vancouver harbour. Both Kinder Morgan and Port Metro Vancouver say that there are no current plans for larger tankers to call at Westridge.

Port Metro Vancouver tanker diagram — Port Metro Vancouver diagram showing the tankers that are permitted and not allowed in Vancouver harbour. (Port Metro Vancouver)

So one question would be is the State Department report pure speculation or is there, perhaps, somewhere in the energy industry, a hope that one of Vancouver’s deeper draft ports could be the terminal for a pipeline?

Rails to Rupert

The Keystone EIS for the first time outlines the railway to Rupert senario, which has long been touted by some supporters as an alternative to the Northern Gateway project, but without the detailed analysis provided for Northern Gateway by both Enbridge and those opposed to the project. Although based largely on published documents and in some ways somewhat superficial (the State Department can’t find any cultural resources in Prince Rupert), the EIS largely parallels the concerns that are being debated by in Prince Rupert this month by the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel.

Northwest Coast Energy News Special report links

What the Keystone Report says about Kitimat and Northern Gateway
What the Keystone Report says about the Kinder Morgan pipeline to Vancouver.
What the Keystone Report says about CN rail carrying crude and bitumen to Prince Rupert.
The State Department Environmental Impact Study of the railway to Prince Rupert scenario.

State Department news release

State Department Index to Supplemental Environmental Impact Study on the Keystone XL pipeline

Intervenor files challenge after Enbridge tells JRP it wants major expansion of Kitimat Gateway terminal

Revised Enbridge map of Kitimat harbour. — Enbridge filed a revised map of Kitimat harbour with the revised route for the Northern Gateway Pipeline and terminal in December 2012.

Enbridge Northern Gateway wants a much larger tank farm at its proposed Kitimat terminal, the company says in documents filed with the Joint Review Panel on December 28, 2012.

On that date, Enbridge filed its fifth revision of the Northern Gateway pipeline route and plans with the JRP. While for Enbridge engineers the filing may be a routine update, as surveys and planning continue, Smithers based enviromentalist Josette Weir has filed an objection with the JRP challenging the revised plans because, she says, the JRP has closed off any opportunity for intenvenors to make their own updates, calling into question once again the fairness of the JRP process.

From the documents filed with the JRP, it appears that Enbridge wants not only to expand the tank farm and adjacent areas but also to have a potentially much larger area on the shores of Douglas Channel for even more expansion in the future.

At the Kitimat terminal, Enbridge says there will now be 16 oil tanks, up from the original 11. The company also says: “The terminal site will also have some limited additional civil site development to allow for potential future site utilization.” While Enbridge proposes to keep the number of condensate tanks at three, their capacity would be increased.

In addition, Enbridge wants an enlarged “remote impoundment reservoir” to comply with the BC Fire Code, so that it would be:

• 100% of the volume of the largest tank in the tank farm, plus
• 10% of the aggregate volume of the 18 remaining tanks, plus
• an allowance for potential future tanks, plus
• 100% of the runoff from the catchment area for a 1 in 100 year, 24 hour storm event, plus
• the amount of fire water generated from potential firefighting activities at the tank farm.

Enbridge goes on to note:

An update to 16 oil tanks at the Kitimat Terminal is not expected to alter overall visibility of the marine terminal and therefore impact visual or aesthetic resources.

In her news release, Josette Wier, who describes herself as “an independent not funded intervenor in the hearing process,” says she filed a notice of motion on January 17, 2013, noting “there are numerous embedded proposed changes which have nothing to do with the route revision,” including the fact that “the tank farm in Kitimat is considerably increased from 11 to 16 tanks for the oil tanks with an almost doubled working capacity, while the condensate tanks capacity is increased by 29 per cent.”

“What does this have to do with a route revision?” she asks in the news release.

In the news release, Wier says: “that this is an abuse of process when engineering and design question period ended in Prince George last November. Not withstanding the underhanded way of presenting new evidence, re-questioning on those issues doubles the amount of work and expenses for intervenors.

“Abuse of process”

She asked the Joint Review Panel to order Northern Gateway to re-submit their proposed changes indicating clearly the ones unrelated to the route changes and describing them along with their rationale.

Wier goes on to say: “It is everyone’s guess why there is a doubling of the tank farm capacity, but certainly points out to the larger pipeline shipping volumes the company had indicated would be a possible Phase II of the project.” She says: “It looks like Northern Gateway is quietly moving into the 850,000 barrels a day proposal, twice the volume the application has been cross-examined about. It is clearly an abuse of process.”

In her actual notice of motion, Wier goes further by taking aim at the JRP itself by saying that “the Applicant [Enbridge] can make changes to the Application whenever they want. We have already seen in their July submissions inclusion of new evidence which conveniently escaped information requests. The added work and cost imposed on intervenors and the Panel seem irrelevant to the Applicant.” She complains that her requests for more information in an earlier notice of motion “was dismissed by the Panel on the grounds that my request ‘would require an unreasonable amount of effort (both by Northern Gateway and other parties reviewing the material’ …. If this argument applied to my Notice of Motion, I suggest it should apply to embedded changes buried in the Applicant’s filings of December 28, 2012.”

Rerouting at Burns Lake

A number of the other changes appear to show continued strained relations between Enbridge and First Nations, for example it says:

There is a possibility of relocating the pipeline route… further north of the Burns
Lake area to avoid proposed Indian Reserve lands that would overlap the pipeline route,.. This revision will be evaluated when further information on the proposed Indian Reserve lands is available and when further consultation with the relevant Aboriginal groups has taken place.

On the other hand the revisions also show that the pipeline will be now routed through an existing right of way through the Alexander First Nation, near Morinville, Alberta, as part of an agreement with the Alexander First Nation.

Another route change is near the Morice River, where Enbridge says

The Morice River Area alternate will generally have less effect on wildlife riparian habitat since it is located away from the Morice River and floodplain. This revision is also farther from the proposed Wildlife Habitat Area for the Telkwa caribou herd and no longer intersects any primary and secondary goat ungulate winter range polygons. However, this revision no longer parallels the Morice West Forestry Service Road (FSR) and Crystal Creek FSR and offers fewer opportunities to use existing rights-of-way. This may increase linkages between cutblock road networks and increase human access locally but does not preclude Northen Gateway from applying other methods to minimize linear feature density in this region.

Wier also complains that the Enbridge did not properly file its latest documents, asking the panel to rule that it order Northern Gateway to re-submit their last revisions submitted in December
using proper JRP evidence numbering system and “Adobe pages numbers.” The huge number of documents in the JRP system is confusing and improper filing makes it harder for intervenors and others to sort their way through new information.

Enbridge map of Kitimat harbour — A revised map of the Kitimat harbour as filed by Enbridge with the JRP in December 2012.

Revised Northern Gateway pipeline route map — Revised route map for the Northern Gateway pipeline as filed with Enbridge with the JRP on Dec. 28, 2012.

Northern Gateway NEB Application Update Dec. 2012

DFO study on ancient Douglas Channel tsunamis shows minimal impact on Kitimat, devastation at Hartley Bay

A follow up study by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans on the discovery of prehistoric slope failure tsunamis in Douglas Channel concludes that the events would have had minimal impact on Kitimat but would have destroyed Hartley Bay.

The studies were filed by DFO with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel on Friday, November 16, following an earlier study the Geological Survey of Canada that reported the discovery of the submarine slope failures. The filing comes just three weeks after the region was shaken by a 7.7 magnitude earthquake off Haida Gwaii and a subsequent coast-wide tsunami warning.

The DFO follow up study was aimed at better understanding the dynamics of tsunamis during the two slope failure events on the southern end of Hawkesbury Island during the mid-Holecene period, between 5,000 and10,000 years ago.

The wave dynamic model study does not address the discovery by the Geological Survey of Canada of a possible fault line along Hawkesbury Island which could have been the cause of the slope failures.

The study estimates that the wave amplitude of the first tsunami reaching the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway terminal site near Kitimat would have been about .09 to .12 metres. Since the actual wave height hitting land from a tsunami is one half of the amplitude, the height of tsunami waves reaching Kitimat at the time would have been about 60 centimetres or 23 inches. At Hartley Bay, on the other hand, the maximum estimated wave amplitude from the second tsunami would have been 15 metres, meaning a wave height of 7.5 metres or about 25 feet.

The main reason for the difference is that both the submarine slope failures occurred south of the dogleg in Douglas Channel at Gertrude Point. That meant the configuration of the channel from Gertrude Point up to Kitimat would lessen the amplitude whereas because Hartley Bay was so close, it would be hit by a higher amplitude. The report says that because of their relatively short wavelengths, the tsunami waves undergo multiple reflections that the “high degree of scattering from the complex shoreline and bottom topography in Douglas Channel” would “combined with the flux of tsunami energy through adjoining waterways and channels” have caused a rapid decrease in the energy of the waves with distance south and north of the slide area.

The study also points out a crucial difference between the ancient slides and the two that occurred near Kitimat in 1974 and 1975, while the land near the head of the Kitimat arm were largely composed of material laid down by the glaciers, the large slope failures on Hawkesbury Island were blocks of an extremely hard igneous rock called diorite. Each of the prehistoric slides would have consisted of about 65 million cubic metres of rock.

The DFO report says

Coastal British Columbia is an area of steep slopes, extreme seasonal variations in soil moisture, large tidal ranges, and the highest seismicity in Canada. Hazards of this form have been well documented for the coastal region of British Columbia, and other fjord regions of the world’s oceans, including Alaska and Norway. These factors increase the potential for both submarine and subaerial slope failures in the region. Such events generally take place in relatively shallow and confined inner coastal waterways, and can present hazards in terms of tsunami wave generation.

The two prehistoric submarine slides are located about 10 kilometres apart on the
slope of southern Douglas Channel, near the southern end of Hawkesbury Island

The report says:

The failures are defined by scallop-shaped hollows located along the edge of the fiord wall and appear to be associated with detached blocks that extend out several hundred metres into the channel. The two block slides identified in Douglas Channel are characteristic of rigid-body submarine landslides, which differ considerably from the well-documented viscous submarine landslides with a lower specific gravity (density relative to water) of about 1.5 that occurred to the north of Douglas Channel along the inner slope of Kitimat Arm in 1974 and 1975.

The report’s modelling is “considered minimum values” because the do not include debris that would have spread into the fiord after initial slide. That debris is now buried by a thick layer of post-slide sediment.

The reconstruction model shows that the head of the more northern slide began at a depth of around 60 to 100 metre, while that of the more southern slide began at a depth of 75 to 120 metres.

The slides would have moved down slope at about 25 metres per second, coming to rest after about 30 seconds, 250 to 350 metres from the slope at a depth of 400 metres.

The northern slide, called by the scientists Slide A:

would have generated extremely large waves in the immediate vicinity of the failure
region within a minute of the submarine landslide. Waves in the numerical simulations reach amplitudes of 30 to 40 metres at the coast near the slide area

Submarine landslides cause delays between the arrival of the first waves and the arrival of subsequent higher waves, increasing in distance from the slide, because of “reflections and non-linear interaction” along the shoreline. For Slide A, the maximum wave amplitudes at Hartley Bay would have been six metres (meaning three metre waves) “Large amplitude waves with typical periods of around 50 seconds would continue for several tens of minutes.”

The leading tsunami waves generated by Slide A reach Kitimat Arm in roughly 20 min and have small amplitudes of only a few centimetres. Although later waves have higher amplitudes, the maximum wave amplitudes (which occur 50-55 minnutes after the failure event) are still only around 0.09 to 0.12 metres.

The southern slide on Hawkesbury, called Slide B by the scientists, would have moved 400 metres before stopping. It stared at a greater depth than Slide A, with not as much vertical displacement than Slide A. That means Slide B was slower than Slide A.

Slide B:

would have generated large waves in the vicinity of the failure region. Simulated waves reach the coast adjacent to the slide region within a minute of the failure event, with wave amplitudes of up to 10 metres. The waves also hit the opposite site of the channel within a minute of the failure event and then take an additional minute to reach Hartley Bay where waves reach amplitudes of 15 metres/ Powerful oscillations in the bay last for tens of minutes.
Waves with high amplitudes (more than 2 metres) also occur in the southern part of Douglas Channel, and in certain locations of Verney Passage.

According to the models, the leading tsunami waves would have reached the Kitimat Arm 22 minutes after the start of the slide. The maximum waves would have had amplitudes of 0.08 metres to 0.3 metres (6 inches), reach the Kitimat Arm 45 to 60 minutes after the start of the failure event.

The the tsunami waves generated by Slide B that impact Kitimat Arm, although still of low amplitude, were somewhat higher than those generated by Slide A, despite the fact that Slide B was located further to the south and generated less energetic waves in the source region than Slide A.

This seeming paradox is explained by the slower motion of Slide B, which causes it to generate more wave energy in the low frequency band…Due to their reduced scattering and reflection, the relatively long and lower frequency waves generated by Slide B propagate more readily through the complex fjord system than the relatively short and higher frequency waves generated by Slide A.

Specifically addressing the proposed site of the Enbridge bitumen terminal, as well as potential tanker traffic in Douglas Channel, the detailed explanation of the modelling accompanying the DFO report says:

If similar submarine slides were to occur again somewhere in the same general area, they could present a significant risk to navigation and to nearby shore installations and coastal communities….

As with the tsunami generation regions, the highest waves and strongest currents in any particular region of the coastal waterway would occur near the shoreline. Based on the numerical findings, tsunamis generated by submarine landslides of the form identified for the southern end of Douglas Channel would have heights and currents that could have major impacts on the coastline and vessel traffic at the time of the event throughout much of Douglas Channel, but a minor impact on water levels, currents and hence vessel traffic in Kitimat Arm. Hartley Bay, at the southern end of Douglas Channel, would be impacted by high waves and strong currents, whereas Kitimat, at the northern end of Kitimat Arm, would experience negligible wave effects. Additional modelling would be required to assess the characteristics of possible tsunamis originating beyond the area of the two identified slope failures.

At the estimated propagation speeds of about 65 metres per second, the detailed model says it takes roughly 10 to 15 minutes for the simulated waves to propagate approximately 40 to 45 kilometres to the intersection of Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm, where peak wave amplitudes would be diminished to less than one metre. It takes another 15 minutes for the waves to reach sites near the proposed Enbridge facilities in Kitimat Arm where wave amplitudes would be reduced to a few tens of centimetres and associated currents to speeds less than a few tens of centimetres per second.

Slide tsunami area map — Slide tsunami area study map (DFO)

Fisheries and Oceans-Modelling Tsunamis Associated with Recently Identified Slope Failures in Douglas Channel (pdf)

Numerical data for DFO tsunami study (link to JRP)

Where was the big aftershock? East of Haida Gwaii, USGS, west of Haida Gwaii, Natural Resources Canada

USGS map of Oct 31 aftershock — A map from the USGS shows that the latest 5.1 aftershock from the Oct. 27 earthquake occurred east of Haida Gwaii, in Hecate Straight. (USGS)

The latest aftershock from the 7.7 magnitude earthquake off Haida Gwaii occurred east of the islands, according to preliminary data released by the US Geological Survey. Canadian data, however, shows the quake west of Haida Gwaii.

The USGS marked the aftershock at 52.500°N 131.100°W at a depth of one kilometre or .6 mile. No tsunami warning was issued.

Natural Resouces Canada data puts the quake at 52.4 North 132.4 West, adding the earthquake “was felt at Queen Charlotte City and Skidegate. There are no reports of damage, and none would be expected.”

The NRC map shows the aftershock on the Queen Charlotte fault line. However, if the USGS map is correct, an aftershock on the east side of Haida Gwaii could raise questions of the potential hazard for Douglas Channel.

Both services said the aftershock occurred at 3:15 am November 1, using Universal Time. An automatic bulletin from the Canadian earthquake centre recorded the quake as 5.0 20:15 PDT. Oct, 31, 97 km SSW of Queen Charlotte City.

No tsunami warning was issued.

According to the USGS the aftershock was

181km (112mi) SSE of Masset, Canada
208km (129mi) SSW of Prince Rupert, Canada
278km (173mi) SW of Terrace, Canada
493km (306mi) NW of Campbell River, Canada
679km (422mi) SSE of Juneau, Alaska

USGS link to add aftershock location to Google Maps

USGS earthquake report

Natural Resources Canada earthquake report

Northwest Coast Energy News will update this story if newer data is available Thursday morning. Although no tsunami warning was issued, tonight’s event is another example of the confusion that can result from automatically generated earthquake data. If the event east of Haida Gwaii is confirmed, it means that the level of tsunami hazard for Douglas Channel will have to be reconsidered.

After the earthquake: Kitimat must immediately upgrade its emergency communications

As a 7.7 magnitude earthquake hit off Haida Gwaii shortly after eight o’clock on Saturday, I was at the Haisla Recreation Centre as the Haisla Nation marked the return of the G’ps Golox totem pole. Like a boat being lifted by gentle waves, the Rec Centre began to quietly roll up and down, then the rolling seemed to accelerate just a bit. I realized that it was an earthquake. As I told CBC’s Ian Hanomansing later in the evening, I have been in a number of earthquakes, and for me at least, this quake, at least at Kitamaat Village, the rec centre was not shaking as badly as in some of the others I have felt.

The subsequent events of the evening show that the emergency communication system in Kitimat needs immediate improvement.

Cell service

Cell phone service at the village is poor and after the rolling stopped neither myself nor my Kitimat Daily colleague Walter McFarlane was able to get “bars.”

Now as a former network producer for both CBC and CTV I have handled a large number of earthquake stories from around the world over the past quarter century (sitting at a desk, I should add). With that experience, I was hoping to get a cell hit at the village so I could bring up Twitter. I already subscribe to the US Geological Survey and Canadian earthquake alert feeds. The US and Canadian computers automatically report earthquakes within seconds of detection and send out a Twitter bulletin as the same time as those computers are alerting their human masters. If I had been able to get cell service I would have known within minutes that the Haida Gwaii earthquake was a major event. (I did follow the alerts from my computer once I got back to Kitimat itself).

Recommendation One. Cell service in Kitimat, Kitamaat Village, the harbour area must be upgraded as soon as possible. Telus has applied to council to erect a new cell tower here. Given the events of the past 24 hours, District Council should make sure that all parts of the District of Kitimat and the Haisla Nation have proper cell coverage no matter what service one subscribes to, not just for the convenience of subscribers but for emergency situations.

Automatic alerts

With experience one knows that in a situation such as Saturday night, the official websites such as the US Geological Survey and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center as well as Natural Resources Canada are often overwhelmed. That is why the media use RSS feeds, Twitter feeds and e-mail alerts. It is also important to realize that these emergency organizations have their own language and procedures. It appears that a lot of the confusion on Saturday came from misinterpretation of the various Canadian and US warning systems.

Recommendation Two. If Kitimat emergency services are not familiar with how the US based earthquake and tsunami centres work, they should be trained in those systems, simply because the Americans are well ahead of Canada in these areas because the alerts go out by computer automatically and are constantly updated and as Saturday night showed, are often quicker and farther ahead than the Canadian systems.

Once I was back in Kitimat, it was clear that communications were breaking down, and this was at a time the tsunami warning was still active. There were numerous messages on Twitter and Facebook, from residents of Kitimat either trying to find out what was going on or retweeting/reposting rumours including one that the Kildala neighbourhood was being evacuated. I am told that residents were calling the RCMP to ask what was going on. This was another breakdown since North District HQ in Prince George handles all police services in this region and were likely busy with quake calls on Haida Gwaii, so that information calls in Kitimat that should have been handled by an emergency services public communications person were being handled the Mounties.

There were reports that one man was going door to door in Kildala telling people to evacuate. Whether this person was well intentioned but misinformed or a imposter intent on mischief doesn’t matter, there was an information vacuum.

It was clear from Twitter that other districts and municipalities were using that service to spread official information. (I don’t follow other areas on Facebook so it is unclear if information was being posted on Facebook. There was certainly no official presence from Kitimat on Facebook Saturday night.) It appears from reports in the Kitimat Daily and tweets about the Northern Sentinel that Kitimat emergency services was sending information out by fax. While faxing information was an advance in the 1980s, faxes are obsolete in 2012. Many major newsrooms no longer use fax machines after being inundated by junk faxes and after they laid off all the editorial assistants who would have cleared those fax machines (even by the late 90s most faxes were dumped in the garbage unless the EA had been told to look for a specific fax). Also though it is now more than two years since I returned to Kitimat and I regularly freelance for Global, CBC and Canadian Press, I had no contact from anyone in emergency services (also I don’t have a fax machine).

Recommendation Three: The District of Kitimat must immediately bring its emergency communications into the 21st century, with Twitter accounts, a Facebook page and an emergency e-mail or text message plan for media and other officials who can get the messages. ( A number of jurisdictions already use text messages for emergency alerts at various graduated levels, official, media, public). When the main means of communication today is social media, an emergency organization can no longer follow outdated procedures, an organization must be on social media immediately it becomes clear that there is an emergency (as we are seeing with all the official tweets with the Hurricane Sandy crisis on the east coast)

CFTK

In an emergency situation, local radio and television are vital to communications and letting people know what is going on.

CFTK did a much better job on March 27. 1964 after Kitimat felt the magnitude 9.2 Good Friday Anchorage earthquake than it did on the weekend with the Haida Gwaii earthquake.

The inadequate coverage of the quake was certainly not the fault the of the current CFTK news staff who were working hard (probably on their own time and unpaid) keeping Twitter updated with what they knew. The fault lies with corporate management across the media which these days doesn’t want to spend the money and resources and training to fulfill the public service portion of their broadcast licence mandate.

(There was a similar breakdown in the May 2000, Walkerton, Ontario e-coli crisis where the local medical officer of health was initially unable to alert the public because local radio wasn’t staffed on the weekends–the local stations were taking satellite feeds from their corporate headquarters)

In 1964, long before satellites, when the microwave towers that joined CFTK to the Canadian networks were still being built, the staff of CFTK, then, of course under local management, went to a live special within an hour of the Anchorage quake being felt far off from Alaska in Kitimat. The CFTK anchors were keeping its audience updated with “rip and read” wire copy, a camera on an atlas for a map and phone interviews.

In contrast, on this Saturday night, CFTK was taking the CBC BC network feed which was a hockey rerun (hardly a show that attracts major audience numbers and certainly not a vital broadcast) until the CBC management in Vancouver decided to go to full network news special.

Since CFTK is the station that broadcasts not only to Kitimat, but to Haida Gwaii as well, CFTK should have been ahead of Vancouver on this story, called in its staff and mounted their own live special, joining the CBC feed when it began but, as on an election night, breaking away for local news when justified. CFTK has a responsibility under its licence from the CRTC to provide that service to the northwestern region, not just sending what ad revenue it generates back to Astral.

Rio Tinto Alcan

Another question that must be asked in this situation is where was Rio Tinto Alcan on Saturday night? In all areas that were under a tsunami warning the first scrutiny and clue if there was to be a problem is that region would be found by observing what has happening between the low tide line and the maximum hide tide line. In Prince Rupert, from the Twitter feeds I saw, public officials were monitoring the waterfront and the tide lines and updating the public. RTA has all the advantages of the private port of Kitimat. It appears that monitoring the water level at the tide lines at the port of Kitimat was the responsibility of Plant Protection. Was RTA communicating what was happening with emergency services? Since RTA runs the private port, unlike in other jurisdictions, RTA had a responsibility to the people of Kitimat to report promptly to the public the conditions on the waterfront. Corporate public relations cannot just be sending out news releases with “good news.” That means that RTA public relations should have used its corporate Twitter account which usually sends out a news release every few weeks, to keep Kitimat updated on a minute-by-minute basis. If RTA communications staff in Kitimat do not have access to the RTA corporate Twitter account, they should establish their own local Twitter feed.

Both in 1964 and in 2012, the tsunami that came up Douglas Channel was minimal. But we know that this region does have a record of major quakes and that Douglas Channel has also experienced major landslides that can, in some circumstances, trigger a tsunami without an earthquake. The next few years will be seeing more industrial development along Douglas Channel which can also bring other hazards to the Kitimat region. While there are always communications breakdowns in situations like happened on Saturday, it is clear that the Kitimat emergency communications system needs a major upgrade to make sure the public is informed quickly and accurately of what is going on.

Rio Tinto Alcan reopens access to Kitimat waterfront

Rio Tinto Alcan has reopened Hospital Beach, the nearby boat ramp and Moore Creek and the Moore Creek falls for public use.

RTA took out an ad in a local newspaper Wednesday, Oct. 12, 2012, to make the announcement which came after a meeting members of the District of Kitimat Council on Oct. 4.

The RTA statement reads, in part:

Both Rio Tinto Alcan and the District of Kitimat understand the value and importance of ocean access to residents of the area while at the same time, continuing to respect and ensure that safety is the number one priority.

Over the last few months, while hearing the disappointment and concern about Hospital Beach, the KMP [Kitimat Modernization Project] Construction Team took action to mitigate the public safety risk. The massive rock trucks hauling heavy loads will be re-routed; a new bridge over Anderson Creek has been installed; new traffic lights will be installed near the Construction Village; and an extra construction road has been built from the former Eurocan Haul Road. All these measures have enabled the decision to accommodate the wishes of the community to access Hospital Beach, the boat ramp and Moore Creek safely.

It is important to remind residents however, Rio Tinto Alcan is in the middle of constructing a mega project to modernize and sustain the aluminium smelter business in Kitimat for the benefit of us all. This is the highest priority with many demands and intense focus. To that end, Rio Tinto Alcan will continue to assess traffic patterns and will likely need to make short term closures again as construction dictates. It is imperative that residents respect the company’s right to manage activities on its private property as it deems in the best interest of its business, including the KMP and public safety.

Rio Tinto Alcan and the District of Kitimat have committed together to work toward finding long term solution to ocean access. Thank you all for your patience, support and cooperation.

As the members of District council were meeting in Kitimat, in Prince Rupert, the Northern View reported that CN was cutting off access to part of the town’s waterfront, again for safety issues: CN erects barriers, no trespassing signs along Prince Rupert waterfront

Prince Rupert residents wanting to walk along the road adjoining the ocean past Rotary Waterfront Park will notice new barriers and signs alerting them that they would be trespassing should they do so.
The barricades and signs were put up yesterday, and CN regional manager of public affairs Emily Hamer says it is due to safety concerns with the public on the railway’s property.

Prince Rupert acting mayor Anna Ashley told the Northern View the city expected some restrictions during construction and said the city planned to talk to CN about the issue.

In an e-mail to Northwest Coast Energy News after the October 4 meetingm Kitimat mayor Joanne Monaghan, while hinting then that a solution to the restrictions was coming, said that industry has been faced with so many lawsuits that safety is becoming a bigger issue.

Councillor Corinne Scott also said that the meeting with RTA stressed that “Large businesses are putting safety as a higher priority.” (She also noted that council agreed to have regular meetings with RTA “.communication lines are open and we look forward to a continued good working relationship between the District of Kitimat and RTA. “)

In both cases, it appears that waterfront access is a legacy issue, left over from an earlier era of industrial development that gave little thought to either the environment or community.
Now it is also apparent that liability lawyers, who probably live thousands of kilometres away from the northwest, have, so far, been driving this issue, with little regard for the needs of local residents.

Make no mistake, safety should be a high priority, but arbitrary restrictions that may look good on legal brief, could actually mean that people would simply try to get around the restrictions, to the determent of safety. It is well known that RTA Plant Protection was finding people at Hospital Beach during the summer, especially at night, despite the publicized restrictions, barriers and warning signs.

Today with a strong need for jobs in northwestern British Columbia, future community needs for access to waterfront and green space (even in such a wide green area as northern BC) must be taken into consideration in municipal and corporate planning. If that planning isn’t done, that will mean that while there could be jobs, the northwest could be in a situation as it was this summer, with no way to enjoy the advantages of waterfront life in northern BC.

Geological Survey of Canada identifies tsunami hazard, possible fault line on Douglas Channel

Fault zone map Douglas Chanel — A map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the line of a possible seismic fault on Douglas Channel (Geological Survey of Canada)

Updates with statement from Natural Resources Canada, new filings by Enbridge Northern Gateway and the Attorney General of Canada (in box below)

The Geological Survey of Canada has identified a tsunami hazard and a possible seismic fault in Douglas Channel near Kitimat. A scientific paper by the Geological Survey and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans says there were once two giant landslides on Douglas Channel that triggered major tsunamis and that the landslides were possibly caused by an earthquake on the fault line.

Kitimat is the proposed site of the Enbridge Northern Gateway project and at least three liquified natural gas projects.

If the projects go ahead, hundreds of supertankers with either bitumen or LNG will be sailing in the channel for years to come.

A filing by the Attorney General of Canada with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel is asking the JRP for leave to file late written evidence long after the original deadline of December 2011. The Attorney General’s motion was filed on August 17, but went unnoticed until the Kitimat environmental group Douglas Channel Watch brought the matter up with District of Kitimat Council tonight (Sept. 17).

Appended to the Attorney General’s motion is a copy of a scientific paper from the Geological Survey “Submarine slope failures and tsunami hazards in coast British Columbia: Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm” by Kim W Conway, J.V. Barrie of the Geological Survey and Richard E. Thomson of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

The report says the scientists discovered “evidence of large submarine slope failures in southern Douglas Channel.”

It goes on to say: “The failures comprise blocks of bedrock and related materials that appear to have been detached directly from the near shore off Hawkesbury Island.” Hawkesbury Island and many of the other islands in Douglas Channel are built up with material left over from the ice age glaciers and thus are vulnerable to displacement and landslides.

The research identified two slides, one estimated at 32 million cubic metres and a second of 31 million cubic metres. The report goes on to say that the discovery of an “apparently active fault presents the possibility that they may have been triggered by ground motion or surface rupture of the fault during past earthquake events.”

The slope failure landslides are covered with thick layers of mud, and that, the scientists say, could mean that the failures could be ancient, possibly occurring 5.000 to 10,000 years ago. Further research is needed to confirm the date of the giant slides.

What is worrying about the discovery is that fact that there were two recent submarine slope failures on the Kitimat Arm of Douglas Channel. both creating tsunamis. The first slope failure occurred on October 17, 1974, triggering a 2.4 metre tsunami at low tide. Then on April 27, 1975 there was a second slope failure near low tide on the northeast slope of the Kitimat Arm that generated an 8.2 metre tsunami. The 1975 tsunami destroyed the Northland Navigation dock near Kitimat and damaged the Haisla First Nation docks at Kitamaat Village.

The paper says that “Additional geological research is required to better delineate the age of the submarine failures, their triggers, and their mechanisms of emplacement.”

Urgent new research is underway and the filing by the Attorney General says when the Department of Justice requested leave to file late evidence says it anticipates that the further research by DFO is expected to be completed by November 1. The Natural Resources Canada Earth Sciences Sector began a national assessment of submarine slope failures in Canada in late 2011 and completion of the Pacific portion of this assessment is targeted for December of 2012.

The Attorney General’s filing says that DFO is now modelling “potential wave heights and speeds that may have resulted from the two previously unrecognized submarine slope failures in the Douglas Channel.” The model will use high resolution scans of the Douglas Channel seafloor to create the models.

The survey of Douglas Channel in 2010 suggests the possible existence of a fault immediately to the south of the second ancient slide on Hawkesbury Island.

The GSC paper says that evidence for a continuous fault was observed by aligned stream beds and fractures on the south end of Hawkesbury Island, about four kilometers from the site of the second ancient slide. The possible fault then appears to terminate far to the south near Aristazabal Island on the Inside Passage. The Geological Survey says that eleven small earthquakes, all less than magnitude three, have appeared with 20 kilometres of the suspected fault over the past 25 years.

The paper says that the scientists conclude that the slides appear to have left very steep slopes at or near the shoreline that could be susceptible to future failure events.

A large potential slope failure has been identified near one of the ancient slides….

in the absence of additional evidence, the fault must be considered a potential trigger for the submarine failure events….the triggers for the failures have not been defined; however, their proximity to a potentially active fault represents one potential source. The failures probably generated tsunamis during emplacement and conditions exist for similar failures and associated tsunamis to occur along this segment of Douglas Channel in the future.

The scientists say that detailed tsunami modelling is underway to

provide an improved understanding of the generation, propagation, attenuation, and likely coastal inundation of tsunami waves that would have been created by slides… or that could be generated from similar future events. Only through the development and application of this type of tsunami modelling will it be possible to gauge the level of hazard posed by the identified submarine slope failures to shore installations and infrastructure, or to devise ways to effectively mitigate the impacts of future such events.

The filing by the Attorney General offers to bring the scientists to the Joint Review Panel to appear as witnesses sometime during the final hearings.

The filing notes that the current evidence tendered to the JRP by Enbridge, and other parties does demonstrate the potential for marine geohazards and associated tsunami events. Enbridge’s design of the proposed Northern Gateway marine terminal and its operational plans took into consideration the current state of knowledge of geohazards including earthquakes and tsunamis at the time of filing. Enbridge has said it would undertake further geological survey during the detailed design phase for the terminal.

At the time Natural Resources Canada noted that the information provided for the Environmental Review was sufficient at that time, now the Attorney General says:

the geographic scope for potential landslide induced tsunami hazards is now better understood to extend beyond the Kitimat Arm. NRCan and DFO seek by this motion to ensure that this Panel, and the Parties before the Panel, have the most up to date information on geohazards in the Douglas Channel.

Updates: DFO report in October will clarify the tsunamis in Douglas Channel.

Statement from Natural Resources Canada

Natural Resources Canada sent this statement to Northwest Coast Energy News on September 20, 2012.

In reference to the opening paragraph of your September 18th editorial entitled Geological Survey of Canada identifies tsunami hazard: Possible fault line on Douglas Channel, we would like to clarify the following. Although the ancient large submarine slope failures which our scientists have identified may have caused tsunamis, this is not a certainty. It is important to note that Fisheries and Oceans Canada is currently studying this information to model potential wave heights and speeds.

As our report states, only through the development and application of this type of tsunami modelling will it be possible to gauge the level of hazard posed by the identified submarine slope failures to shore installations and infrastructure, or to devise ways to effectively mitigate the impacts of future such events.

Northern Gateway response filed on August 31, 2012

Enbridge Northern Gateway filed this response to the Attorney General’s motion on August 31.

This motion of the Federal Government Participants requests permission to file late evidence consisting of a report entitled “Submarine Slope Failures and
Tsunami Hazard in Coastal British Columbia: Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm” regarding tsunami hazard and additional modelling work based on that report.

Northern Gateway does not object to the filing of this late intervenor evidence.
It may be relevant and Northern Gateway accepts that theevidence could not be filed earlier. However, Northern Gateway would like the opportunity to conductits own additional modelling work which it would be prepared to provide to DFO for comment prior to the filing of any modelling work by DFO in this proceeding.

Attorney General response to Enbridge on September 10, 2012.

The Attorney General of Canada responded to Enbridge by saying:

Attorney General responds DFo is prepared to await filing its subseqent modelling work in these proceedings until such time as it has received, reviewed and commented upon additional modelling work as proposed by NGP Inc.

DFO nots howeverand wishes to alert the JRP that the NGP INc proposed may occasion a delay in the filing of the DFO moedling work which is now proposed for filing on or about October 31, 2012. Delivery of DFO comments as requested will depend on when DFO received the NGP Inc modelling work, the time and resources required by DFO to study and provide comments on the NGP modelling work and unforeseen factors which may have an impact upon completion the commentary. As such,

DFO is prepared to file its modeling work on or about October 31, 2012, but subject to any further direction or request by the panel.

Map of Douglas Channel — Geological Survey of Canada map of Douglas Channel showing the area surveyed which discovered the landslides and possible fault line. (Geological Survey of Canada)

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Map of slides at Kitimat — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the landslides on the Kitimat Arm which triggered tsunamis in 1974 and 1975 (Geological Survey of Canada)

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Slide at Hawkesbury Island — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the giant slide on the southern tip of Hawkesbury Island. (Geological Survey of Canada)

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Hawkesbury Island slide map — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the second giant slide on the coast of Hawkesbury Island on Douglas Channel (Geological Survey of Canada)

Department_of_Justice Notice of Motion of the Attorney General of Canada Seeking to Tender Supplementary Written Evidence (pdf)

Submarine Slope Failures and Tsunami Hazard in Coastal British Columbia Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm PDF

How “On the Waterfront” could decide the fate of Enbridge’s Kitimat terminal

There’s one question about the Enbridge Northern Gateway project that many people ask and few can answer: Who is responsible for the port of Kitimat? Who would be liable should there be a disaster in the port? Nobody really knows.

Unlike many harbours in Canada, the port of Kitimat is “private,” although as the District of Kitimat says, “Transport Canada and other federal agencies continue to regulate navigation, security and environmental safety.” Kitimat has promoted that private status as an economic advantage.

If there’s a dispute, the question of responsibility and liability would probably end up in the Supreme Court of Canada, with the justices sorting out a historic puzzle. Or perhaps that historical puzzle could mean that the future of the port of Kitimat might be decided by the next B.C. provincial election.

Most of the other harbours in Canada are the responsibility of Ports Canada, a branch of Transport Canada or run by (usually not-for-profit) semi-public port corporations or local harbour commissions.

To find out why Kitimat is one of the few private ports in Canada, the first thing to do is watch Eliza Kazan and Bud Schulberg’s classic 1954 multiple Oscar winning movie, On the Waterfront, starring Marlon Brando, about how the mob ran the New York docks.

What has On the Waterfront got to do with Kitimat? It goes back to when the then Aluminum Company of Canada/Alcan (now Rio Tinto Alcan) was planning the Kitimat project; much of that work was done in New York both by employees and consultants. It was in 1949, that Malcolm Johnson, a New York Sun reporter, wrote a Pulitzer Prize winning series of investigative reports called “Crime on the Waterfront,” exposing corruption and Mafia involvement with the docks and the longshoremans’ union. The movie was based, in part, on that investigative series.

So in its planning, Alcan was determined that the longshore unions would not be involved in running the docks in Kitimat. The publicly stated reason has always been that Alcan wanted a seamless 24/7 operation that would be integrated with the aluminum smelter. Alcan would sign a collective agreement with the United Steelworkers that covered both the smelter and the docks. (CAW 2301 now represents most of the workers at the Kitimat smelter.)

When the Kitimat project was being finalized in 1949 and 1950 at the height of the Cold War, aluminum was a strategic commodity, security was high on the agenda, and it was not just the Soviet bloc but the mob as well that worried the authorities.

Add two factors. First, in 1949 the province of British Columbia was anxious to promote what would today be called a “mega-project.” Second, in the post-war era when corporations were relatively enlightened compared to today, Alcan was determined not to create the traditional “company town.”

To promote private-sector development of both hydro-electricity and aluminum, B.C. signed a rather loosely worded agreement with Alcan, noting that the project was going on “without investment by or risk to the government.” That agreement was implemented by the Legislative Assembly of B.C. by an equally wide open Industrial Development Act. One aim of both was try to ensure that future “socialists” would not expropriate the project.

Industrial township

With the province handing over the Crown land at the head of Douglas Channel at a very nominal price to Alcan, next came the creation of the District of Kitimat. With the town under construction, with few buildings and a small population, under normal B.C. practice, the area would be “unincorporated” and would not have a municipal government. But Alcan and the province came up with a new concept, which they called “an industrial township,” which would allow a municipal government to be established in anticipation of future growth.

The act that established the District of Kitimat put the boundaries outside the land owned by Alcan (excluding land reserved for the Haisla Nation).

Alcan began selling off the land in the planned areas of the town and other land it didn’t need. Individuals bought houses and businesses bought the land for their own use. Alcan retained ownership of the harbour and estuary lands and the small “Hospital Beach.”

The District of Kitimat has some legal responsibility for “wharfs” at the port of Kitimat. At council meetings, the environmental group, Douglas Channel Watch, has raised the question of the district’s responsibility and liability in case of an Enbridge incident but there’s been no definitive response from district staff. There is no municipal harbour commission as there is in other jurisdictions.

Up until recently, it was a convenient arrangement for everyone involved. Alcan, Eurocan and Methanex ran their dock operations without any interference, beyond standard Transport Canada oversight.

Things began to change in 2007, when the Rio Tinto Group bought Alcan, creating Rio Tinto Alcan. A couple of years ago, a senior staff source in the Canadian Auto Workers explained it to me it this way. “Alcan was a big corporation, but Alcan was a corporation with a big stake in Canada. As a union, we could do business with them. Rio Tinto is a transnational corporation with businesses in lots of countries but no stake in any of them. So it’s a lot harder now.”

With the Rio Tinto acquisition of Alcan, things tightened up in Kitimat. Negotiations between the District and RTA for the District to obtain more land stalled. Access to the estuary and other RTA lands that had been somewhat open under Alcan became more restrictive. In 2010, the Eurocan paper mill shut down along with its dock. In 2011, Rio Tinto bought the dock from West Fraser, owner of Eurocan. The Kitimat community noted that when the dock was repainted, it said just “Rio Tinto.” not “Rio Tinto Alcan” and that led to lots of gossip and wondering about what the Rio Tinto Group really plans for Kitimat. Last fall, Shell Canada purchased the former Methanex dock for part of its liquified natural gas operations.

With the Enbridge Northern Gateway project, the BC LNG project at North Cove and the KM LNG project at Bish Cove all along the shore of Douglas Channel and within the boundaries of the District of Kitimat which extends as far south as Jesse Lake, the question that has to be asked is, what happens now? If the Enbridge project is built, it will start just beyond the boundaries of the land owned by Rio Tinto Alcan.

That old arrangement between Alcan and the District of Kitimat is facing many new challenges.

The district once had a harbour master, but the position was eliminated because he had nothing to do. Alcan owned its docks, Alcan managed the docks and Alcan union employees worked on the docks. Later came the Eurocan (now owned by Rio Tinto) and Methanex (now owned by Shell) docks, again owned and operated by private corporations.

The District of Kitimat, nominally in charge, was content to sit back and collect taxes.

With the Enbridge Northern Gateway project, the B.C. LNG project at North Cove and the KM LNG project at Bish Cove all along the shore of Douglas Channel and within the boundaries of the District of Kitimat, the question that has to be asked is, what happens now? If the Enbridge project is built, it will start just beyond the boundaries of the land owned by Rio Tinto Alcan.

In Canada, ports and harbours are normally under federal jurisdiction and Transport Canada has oversight. But Alcan’s “private port” and the District of Kitimat were created by acts passed by the B.C. government.

The original agreement between the province and Alcan mentions an “aluminum plant” and “low-cost electrical power,” it doesn’t mention bitumen or liquified natural gas. Those provincial acts do not cover bitumen, supertankers and liquified natural gas.

B.C. Opposition Leader Adrian Dix has made it clear that his New Democratic Party opposes the Northern Gateway project. The federal government has said the province can’t really do anything to stop Enbridge Northern Gateway once Stephen Harper has decided that the pipeline project is in the national interest.

At this moment, Dix is a “contender” for the premiership, with Christy Clark and the B.C. Liberals dropping in the polls and with key members of her government deciding not to run in the election next spring.

So, if, as expected, Adrian Dix becomes the next B.C. premier, he has one very strong hand to play. Any act can, with proper legal advice, be amended by the B.C. legislature. That means the “socialists” so feared by Alcan and the premier of the day, Byron “Boss” Johnson, could alter the 1949 law. That in turn may upset the decades-old arrangement that created the private port which Enbridge is banking on.

Douglas Channel in Black and White

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Photogallery. For full screen mode with captions, click on the box to the right of the bottom menu bar.

The long, magnificent fjord known as Douglas Channel was carved by a glacier thousands of years ago, some of the islands are rock uplifted by tectonic forces, others piled up by retreating glaciers.

So far, since I returned to Kitimat, I have had few chances to “go down the Channel,” as the people of Kitimat say.

Of course, when I do go, I always have a camera with me, even in the roughest weather–and the Channel can be rough most of the year.

It is in these waters that the energy industry, both the Enbridge Northern Gateway and the Liquefied Natural Gas projects want to use supertankers to send their products to markets in Asia. Many of the photographers who come to Douglas Channel in high summer choose to capture the brilliant colours of ocean, forest and mountain, as I have on several assignments.

For this gallery, I have chosen to use black and white to show the stark beauty of the mountains, the often menacing seas and the clouds, ever changing, as the westerly winds from the Pacific drive those clouds against the mountains.

Images from this gallery are available for purchase for personal, editorial and commercial use on Photoshelter. Simply click on the image above.

Christy Clark’s Gateway conditions overturn west coast tanker moratorium, Dix tells reporters

Adrian Dix and Rob Goffinet — BC NDP leader Adrian Dix, right, speaks to Kitimat Councillor Rob Goffinet, left, after a breakfast meeting with District of Kitimat Council members on July 30, 2012. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

B.C. premier Christy Clark’s five conditions for the Northern Gateway Pipeline, in effect, overturn the west coast tanker moratorium, NDP and Opposition leader Adrian Dix told reporters in Kitimat, Monday, July 30, 2012.

Dix made the remarks after a breakfast meeting with members of District of Kitimat Council prior to embarking on a three day trip down Douglas Channel and the Inside Passage to see the proposed tanker route for himself.

The second of the five conditions for the pipeline, set out last Monday by Premier Clark calls for:

World-leading marine oil spill response, prevention and recovery systems for B.C.’s coastline and ocean to manage and mitigate the risks and costs of heavy oil pipelines and shipments

“It is an overturning of what’s been a government of BC policy for a long time, which is for a moratorium for super tankers on this part of the coast. That’s not a condition, that’s an overturning,” Dix said in a brief scrum with reporters after the breakfast and before heading to Kitamaat Village to start his boat trip.

“The frustration is that our premier’s position is that we should sell our coast got for money. The premier has a report that says the projects bad for the province, it’s bad for the economy, it’s bad for the environment, that’s the concluson of her report and now she says ‘we’ll forget about that if you give us a few bucks.’

“I don’t think most people agree with that in British Columbia and so what we’ve tried to do is to take a more serious approach. In this case, the province gave up our jurisdiction. If people are concerned about spills and concerned about the environmental impact as the Liberal purport to be, they wouldn’t have handed over the right to decide on environmental assessment fully to the federal government, which, by the way supports, the project.”

The Clark had government had declined to take part in the Northern Gateway Joint Review process and so did not produce any evidence for the panel prior to the filing deadline.

Dix said the Liberal policy on the JRP was, “Like a student who misses a deadline for a term paper, they missed the deadline to produce evidence in the process and now after the debate has gone on, the Premier wants to get into the debate.”

He concluded by saying, “This isn’t about her, it isn’t about me, it’s about the economy and the environment of this province for decades to come. And that’s the approach we’ve [the NDP Opposition] taken.”

The “informal” tanker “moratorium” has been in effect since 1972 and requires oil tankers transiting the west coast to remain fire out to sea and away from Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, and the Queen Charlotte Sound.

In 2009, Stephen Harper’s Conservative government said there was no moratorium on tanker traffic on the coast of British Columbia and have maintained that position ever since.

In December 2010, the House of Commons passed a non-binding motion to ban bulk oil tanker traffic in the Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait and Queen Charlotte Sound.

Dix said he was, “In Kitimat to meet with the community and of course in Kitimat village with the Haisla. Later today he will go “for a trip down where the tankers will go if the Enbridge project succeeds, go down the Channel to Hartley Bay and then over the next couple of days to Bella Bella. Dix said hew as in the northwest to “take note of that in person. I always like to see things for myself, meet with people and hear what they have to say.”