Category: hearing

Editorial: Once again the National Energy Board shows its contempt for British Columbia

Second Update December 10- NEB refuses to release JRP report in BC

The Globe and Mail reports Dec. 10, 2013

The National Energy Board says releasing its decisions in Calgary is standard practice regardless of where in Canada the project is located, and it will not make an exception for its report on the controversial $6.5-billion Northern Gateway pipeline proposal.

Apparently the NEB doesn’t trust reporters in BC to act as professionals. Also, as usual the stock market is more important than the people of BC.

NEB spokesperson Sarah Kiley told the Globe the board ruled out simultaneous lock-ups in Alberta and British Columbia.

“As far as hosting multiple media lock-ups, we need to make absolutely sure that the report is not inadvertently released before the markets close,” Ms. Kiley said. “This becomes more challenging if there are multiple events due to things like the need to ship reports.”

Because the ruling will affect markets, she said the report must be kept confidential until they close on the day of release.

 

A couple of years ago, on a visit to the Lower Mainland, I was speaking to man who was considering making a 10 minute comment before the Northern Gateway Joint Review panel. In the end, this man, who is by no means a radical environmentalist, just someone worried about the future, decided not to testify, telling me: “The National Energy Board is nothing more than an extension of the Petroleum Club.”

Once again today, the National Energy Board showed its contempt for British Columbia and proved my source’s belief that it is nothing more than an extension of the Petroleum Club.

Vancouver radio station News 1130 made a routine inquiry to the NEB about a reporters’ “lockup” on the day that the JRP decision is released. A “lockup” allows the media to read an embargoed report a few hours in advance so that  at the moment it is officially released, it can print or broadcast an accurate account of a government report.

News 1130 was told by the NEB that there would be no lockup in British Columbia, only reporters in Calgary, the home of the NEB, will have that opportunity, because “logistics did not work out for a lock-up” in Vancouver.

(Reporters who work along the actual pipeline route in the north are even farther off the NEB radar. The Calgary lockup will leave northerners to figure out what the JRP decision actually means from reports from Alberta-based journalists. The history of the past few years has proven that most Alberta-based reporters have little interest or knowledge of the concerns of northwest British Columbia.)

Before the JRP hearings began in January, 2012, a well-known northern First Nations leader predicted all this in a background conversation. He noted that there was no representation from British Columbia on the Joint Review Panel. The JRP had two members from Alberta, chair Sheila Leggett, and member Kenneth Bateman, while the “First Nations member,” Hans Matthews, was from Ontario. The First Nations leader, who would have to appear before the JRP, privately called them “flatlanders” with no knowledge of B.C.

He was right.

Even before that conversation, the Joint Review Panel blundered in its first appearance in Kitimat, the preliminary hearing at Riverlodge on August 30, 2010, by offending the Haisla Nation with a schedule of appearances crafted in Calgary that ignored that Kitimat is on Haisla traditional territory and put then Chief Counsellor Dolores Pollard well down on the schedule. That hearing was held up for about half an hour while the JRP scrambled to undo their mistake.

While the JRP did finally learn to respect the customs of BC’s First Nations, and the panel was often hamstrung by arcane and obsolete rules of procedure, the panel too often proved far too inflexible in understanding the issues along the pipeline route and up and down the coast.

The most recent example was the JRP’s refusal to consider the recent evidence from both scientists and Fisheries and Oceans about the growing importance of humpback whales in Douglas Channel. The JRP’s excuse was that the window for evidence had closed. If the Northern Gateway actually goes ahead, Enbridge speaks about the 30-year-life of the project. Yet the JRP’s continuing inflexibility acts as if all the key issues can be decided by the December 30 deadline and after that everything will be just fine.

In the past few weeks, report after report has been released on projects that will change the lives of the people of the northwestern British Columbia. The media of the northwest, all with very limited budgets, have been ignored time and time again.

Take another example from today. In March, the federal government flew its First Nations negotiator Douglas Eyford and Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver to Terrace to announce the beginning of the Eyford’s meetings with BC First Nations (while at the same time Oliver didn’t bother to visit Kitimat). This morning, the Eyford report was released at a press event in media-rich Vancouver. For the release of the report, the northwest didn’t count.

On Tuesday, the federal government also used Vancouver to release a report on tanker traffic. While Vancouver is also vulnerable to tanker problems, the feds considered their message could be carried best by the mainstream major metro media. Again, no one bothered with the northwest, where the tankers will be sailing along the coast and up and down Douglas Channel.

A few weeks ago, BC Premier Christy Clark announced her agreement with Alberta Premier Alison Redford on the compensation issue, one of her five conditions for heavy oil development in the province. Clark solved the political dispute with Alberta by handing off the compensation issue from the province to the energy industry with absolutely no guarantee that the energy companies will actually offer compensation for crossing BC. Northern reporters could listen in to an audio feed of the news conference from the BC government website, but could not ask questions.

In the 21st century, of course, these news conferences are not about presenting factual information; the news conferences are about getting out a government message track, so questions from reporters who actually know about issues are not wanted.

The Joint Review Panel (with the NEB one of the “joint” partners) is supposedly, on paper, a quasi-judicial body, independent of the government.

If the JRP wants to salvage even a bit of its crumbling credibility for its Northern Gateway decision, it will show that it respects British Columbia. The means holding two additional lockups. If Terrace was good enough for the final arguments, and a central location for the northwest, one lockup should be held in Terrace, so northerners can read reporting by northwest-based reporters. The second, of course, should be in Vancouver for the province’s major media centre.

Given the record of the past two years, don’t hold your breath, time and time again the bureaucratic priorities and the fact that the NEB is thoroughly embedded in the energy culture of Alberta, it is likely that the release of the report sometime in the coming weeks will be Alberta-centric and will prove my source right, that the NEB is nothing more than that extension of the Petroleum Club.

 

Update: The Globe and Mail has confirmed News1130’s report in National Energy Board sidestepping B.C. on Northern Gateway.

The board plans to hold a media lock-up in Calgary, but does not have similar plans to brief reporters in British Columbia, says an official with the independent federal agency established to regulate international and interprovincial issues around the electrical utility, gas and oil sectors.

Board spokesperson Sarah Kiley said Thursday that the board recognizes there is an interest in B.C. in the subject, and said there is no final plan yet.

The Globe was unable to get a statement from the Liberal government of BC but for the opposition,Spencer Chandra Herbert (Vancouver-West End) said, the energy board should not be hiding out in Calgary when they announce what they are going to do, regardless of whether they approve or reject the project.

“You would think they would have the ability and respect for B.C. to host it here and explain whatever decision they make here to B.C. media and intervenors,” he said.

“We’re worthy of that respect.”

JRP refuses to consider latest DFO findings on Humpback Whales

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has refused to consider the latest findings from the Department of Fisheries and Ocean on humpback whale critical habitat on the coast of British Columbia, including areas of ocean that could be on the route of tankers carrying diluted bitumen from Kitimat.

On October 21, 2013, Fisheries and Oceans released a report called Recovery Strategy for the North Pacific Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Canada. The DFO report notes that humpback whales are a species of “special concern” by the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada.

It is DFO policy to assist the humpback whale population to recover from the century of whaling that almost drove the species to extinction. The report identified four areas of “critical habitat” for humpbacks. One critical habitat zone is Gil Island at the mouth of Douglas Channel.

DFO map of humpback habitat
DFO map of humpback sightings on the BC coast. (DFO)

Last week, on November 13, Smithers based environmental activist Josette Weir filed a notice of motion with the JRP requesting that the panel consider the DFO report as late evidence.

Weir acknowledged that the JRP proceedings closed on June 24, after final arguments in Terrace, but she noted that rules allow the Board to override the final closure. She argued that the humpback report fell within the JRP’s mandate since the DFO report is “is likely to assist the Panel.”

Weir noted in her motion that there was insufficient information before the JRP that would identify critical humpback habitat.

She argued:

Three of the four critical known habitats are on the proposed tanker routes, and the Recovery Strategy acknowledges that other areas have not been identified. Without such information, it is impossible to assess the potential effects of the marine transport of bitumen on this endangered species.Activities likely to destroy or degrade critical habitat include vessel traffic, toxic spills, overfishing, seismic exploration, sonar and pile driving (i.e., activities that cause acoustic disturbance at levels that may affect foraging or communication, or result in the displacement of whales).

The report clearly identifies vessel traffic and toxic spills, which are associated with the Project as potential causes for destruction or degradation of the Humpback Whales’ critical habitat.

Weir went on to argue that the JRP had “insufficient information to develop relevant protection measures” because the humpback studies are ongoing, “meaning their results will not be available before decision.”

The Panel must consider this significant risk to an endangered listed species for which no meaningful protection measure can be offered against the risks associated with the Project.

Weir also noted that “No similar submission has been made by others, but I cannot predict if others will not see fit to do so.”

The JRP didn’t take long to reject Weir’s request, replying the next day, November 14.

In its response, the JRP cited the amended Joint Review Panel Agreement, signed after the passage of of the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, the Omnibus Bill C-38, that “provides that the Panel’s recommendation report is to be submitted to the Minister of Natural Resources by 31 December 2013.”

The JRP then told Weir it didn’t have jurisdiction over endangered species (even if those species inhabit the tanker route) saying:

The Panel notes that the Recovery Strategy has been released in accordance with the provisions of the Species At Risk Act, as part of a legislative scheme that operates independently of this joint review process.

It goes on to say: “In this case, the Panel also notes that the Recovery Strategy was not authored by or for Ms. Wier.”

Map of Gil Island
Humpback whale sightings at the Gil Island critical habitat. (DFO)

The executive summary of the DFO report noted:

Critical habitat for Humpback Whales in B.C. has been identified to the extent possible, based on the best available information. At present, there is insufficient information to identify other areas of critical habitat or to provide further details on the features and attributes present within the boundaries of identified critical habitat. Activities likely to destroy or degrade critical habitat include vessel traffic, toxic spills, overfishing, seismic exploration, sonar and pile driving (i.e., activities that cause acoustic disturbance at levels that may affect foraging or
communication, or result in the displacement of whales). A schedule of studies has been included to address uncertainties and provide further details on the critical habitat feature(s), as well as identify additional areas of critical habitat. It is anticipated that results from these studies will also assist in development of relevant protection measures for the critical habitat feature(s).

In the part of the report on the danger of toxic spills to humpbacks, the DFO report mentions that sinking of the BC ferry Queen of the North:

Toxic spills have occurred impacting marine habitat along the B.C. coast. For example, the Nestucca oil spill (1988) resulted in 875 tonnes of oil spilled in Gray’s Harbor, Washington. Oil slicks from this spill drifted into Canadian waters, including Humpback Whale habitat. In 2006, a tanker ruptured in Howe Sound, B.C. spilling approximately 50 tonnes of bunker fuel into coastal waters. In 2007, a barge carrying vehicles and forestry equipment sank near the Robson Bight-Michael Bigg Ecological Reserve within the critical habitat for Northern Resident Killer Whales, spilling an estimated 200 litres of fuel. The barge and equipment (including a 10,000L
diesel tank) were recovered without incident. When the Queen of the North sank on March 22, 2006, with 225,000 L of diesel fuel, 15,000 L of light oil, 3,200 L of hydraulic fluid, and 3,200 of stern tube oil, it did so on the tanker route to Kitimat, which is currently the subject of a pipeline and port proposal and within the current boundaries of Humpback Whale critical habitat

The DFO report also takes a crtical look at vessel strikes

In B.C. waters, Humpback Whales are the most common species of cetacean struck by vessels, as reported to the Marine Mammal Response Network. Between 2001 and 2008, there were 21 reports of vessel strikes involving Humpback Whales. Of these, 15 were witnessed collision events while the remaining 6 were of live individuals documented with fresh injuries consistent with recent blunt force trauma or propeller lacerations from a vessel strike.

Overall, vessel strikes can cause injuries ranging from scarring to direct mortality of individual whales. Some stranded Humpback Whales that showed no obvious external trauma, have been shown from necropsy to have internal injuries consistent with vessel strikes… It is unknown how many whales have died as a result of vessel strikes in B.C. waters. To date, only one reported dead Humpback Whale presented with evidence consistent with blunt force trauma and lacerations resulting from a vessel strike…

There are no confirmed reports of Humpback Whale collisions in B.C. waters attributed to shipping, cruise ship or ferry traffic. However, larger ships are far less likely to detect the physical impact of a collision than smaller vessels, and this could account for the lack of reported strikes. Collisions with large vessels may be more common than reported, especially in areas where larger vessel traffic is concentrated.

Despite the fact that collisions may only affect a small proportion of the overall Humpback Whale population, vessel strikes may be a cause for concern for some local and seasonal areas of high ship traffic.. In B.C., areas of high probability of humpback-vessel interaction include Johnstone Strait off northeast Vancouver Island, Juan de Fuca Strait off southwest Vancouver Island, Dixon Entrance and the “Inside Passage” off the northern B.C. mainland which include portions of two of the identified critical habitat areas..

The JRP also said

As the Panel has mentioned previously during the hearing, the later in the joint review process that new evidence is sought to be filed the greater the likelihood of the prejudice to parties. The Panel is of the view that permitting the Recovery Strategy to be filed at this late stage in the hearing process would be prejudicial to the joint review process.

Weir’s submission to the JRP did not mention an academic study published on September 11, 2013, that also identified Gil Island as critical humpback habitat.

RELATED:

“Conservatives’ hatred for science intentional part of their environmental policy,” Cullen says

DOCUMENTS:

DFO report on Humpback Recovery strategy  (PDF)

Josette Weir notice of motion on Humpback Whales (PDF)

Panel Commission Ruling on Humpback Whales (PDF)

 

 

Has Enbridge “moved to the dark side?”

So far, Enbridge’s public and community relations efforts on issues like Northern Gateway and Kalamazoo, have for, the most part, been a disaster. In BC, since the Joint Review hearings wrapped in June, Enbridge has been on a full out campaign to convince British Columbians to support Northern Gateway.

Now, at least to me and my geeky sense of humour, it appears, that Enbridge has another PR fiasco in the making.

A few minutes ago, as I was scanning my Tweetdeck feed, a Tweet from Enbridge popped up. Given that the default background for Tweetdeck is black, I thought, that Enbridge logo looks very dark.

Enbridge tweet Sept. 20, 2013
Enbridge tweet Sept. 20, 2013

Now since I’ve been monitoring Enbridge tweets since I started this site, normally the company logo is white and stands out against the black of the Tweetdeck feed.

Is it a mistake I wondered?

Or is it a new logo and therefore has Enbridge, I wondered,  “moved to the dark side?”

So I checked the company webpage. It’s a new logo and new web design. In the lead picture, the old logo is clearly visible under the new logo on top.
Enbridge landing page screen grab

For the record here is the new logo and the old one.

 

new Enbridge logo

Enbridge logo

So I can’t resist reporting, Enbridge has moved to the dark side. 🙂

SFU study says spill hazards for Kitimat from tankers and pipelines much greater than Enbridge estimate

A study by two scholars at Simon Fraser University says that the Enbridge Northern Gateway project is much more hazardous to Kitimat harbour, Douglas Channel and the BC Coast than Enbridge has told the Joint Review Panel.

The study by Dr. Thomas Gunton, director of the School of Resource and Environmental Management at SFU and Phd student Sean Broadbent, released Thursday May 2, 2013 says there are major methodological flaws in the way Enbridge has analyzed the risk of a potential oil spill from the bitumen and condensate tankers that would be loaded (bitumen) or unloaded (condensate) at the proposed terminal at Kitimat.

Enbridge Northern Gateway responded a few hours after the release of the SFU study with a statement of its own attacking the methedology used by the two SFU scholars and also calling into question their motivation since Gunton has worked for Coastal First Nations on their concerns about the tanker traffic.

Combination of events

One crucial factor stands out from the Gunton and Broadbent study (and one which should be confirmed by independent analysis). The two say that Enbridge, in its risk and safety studies for the Northern Gateway project and the associated tanker traffic, consistently failed to consider the possibility of a combination of circumstances that could lead to either a minor or a major incident.

Up until now, critics of the Northern Gateway project have often acknowledged that Enbridge’s risk analysis is robust but has consistently failed to take into consideration the possibilty of human error.

As most accidents and disasters happen not due to one technical event, or a single human error, the SFU finding that Enbridge hasn’t taken into consideration a series of cascading events is a signficant criticism.

Overall the SFU study says there could be a tanker spill every 10 years, not once in 250 years, as calculated by Enbridge.

It also says there could be 776 oil and condensate spills from pipelines over 50 years, not 25 spills over 50 years as projected by Enbridge. (And the life of the project is estimated at just 30 years, raising the question of why the 50 year figure was chosen)

Enbridge track record

The study also bases its analysis of the possibility of a spill not on Enbridge’s estimates before the Joint Review Panel but on the company’s actual track record of pipeline spllls and incidents and concludes that there could be between one and 16 spills (not necessarily major) each year along the Northern Gateway pipeline.

 

Findings for Kitimat

Among the key findings for Kitimat from the SFU study are:

  • Enbridge said the possibility of tanker spill was 11.3 to 47.5 per cent over the 30 year life of project. The SFU study says the possibility of a spill within the 30 years is 99.9 per cent.
  • The SFU study says it is likely there will be a small spill at the Kitimat Enbridge terminal every two years.
  • The SFU study estimates that there will be eight tanker transits each week on Douglas Channel if the Northern Gateway project goes ahead and more if it is expanded.  (This, of course, does not include LNG tankers or regular traffic of bulk carriers and tankers for Rio Tinto Alcan)
  • The SFU study says that while Endridge did study maneuverability of tankers, it paid little attention to stopping distance required for AfraMax, SuezMax tankers and Very Large Crude Carriers.
  • The SFU study says Enbridge inflated effectiveness of the proposed tethered tugs and maintains the company did not study ports and operations that use tethered tugs now to see how effective tethering is.
  • The SFU says Enbridge’s risk analysis covered just 233 nautical miles of the British Columbia coast, where as it should have covered entire tanker route both to Asia and California, raising the possibility of a tanker disaster outside British Columbia that would be tied to the Kitimat operation.
  • Based on data on tanker traffic in Valdez, Alaska, from 1978 to 2008, the SFU study estimates probability of a 1,000 barrel spill in Douglas Channel at 98.1 per cent and a 10,000 barrel spill at 74.2 per cent over 30 year Gateway life. The Valdez figures account for introduction of double hulls after Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 and notes that spill frequency is much lower since the introduction of double hulled tankers.
  • According to a study by Worley Parsons for Enbridge in 2012, the Kitimat River is the most likely area affected by an unconstrained rupture due to geohazards in the region. According to the Worley Parsons study, geohazards represent the most significant threat to the Northern Gateway pipeline system.

Flawed studies

The SFU scholars list a series of what they say are major methological or analytic flaws in the information that Enbridge has presented to the Joint Review Panel, concluding that “Enbridge significantly understates the risk of of spills from the Northern Gatway.

Enbridge’s spill risk analysis contains 28 major deficiencies. As a result of these deficiencies, Enbridge underestimates the risk of the ENGP by a significant margin.
Some of the key deficiencies include:

  • Failure to present the probabilities of spills over the operating life of the ENGP
  • Failure to evaluate spill risks outside the narrowly defined BC study area
  • Reliance on LRFP data that significantly underreport tanker incidents by between 38 and 96%.
  • Failure to include the expansion capacity shipment volumes in the analysis
  • Failure to provide confidence ranges of the estimates
  • Failure to provide adequate sensitivity analysis
  • Failure to justify the impact of proposed mitigation measures on spill likelihood
  • Potential double counting of mitigation measures
  • Failure to provide an overall estimate of spill likelihood for the entire ENGP
  • Failure to disclose information and data supporting key assumptions that were used to reduce spill risk estimates
  • Failure to use other well accepted risk models such as the US OSRA model

 

SFU reports that Enbridge provides separate estimates of the likelihood of spills for each of the three major components of the project:

      • tanker operations,
      • terminal operations,
      • the oil and condensate pipelines.

The SFU scholars say Enbridge does not combine the separate estimates to provide an overall estimate of the probability of spills for the entire project and therefore does not provide sufficient information to determine the likelihood of adverse environmental effects……

It notes that “forecasting spill risk is challenging due to the many variables impacting risk and the uncertainties in forecasting future developments affecting risk. To improve the accuracy of risk assessment, international best practices have been developed.”

Part of the problem for Enbridge may be that when the company appeared before the Joint Review Panel it has repeatedly said that will complete studies long after approval (if the project is approved), leaving large gaps in any risk analysis.

The SFU study may have one example of this when it says Enbridge did not complete any sensitivity analysis for condensate spills at Kitimat Terminal or the condensate pipeline.

Enbridge response

Enbridge responded by saying

Our experts have identified a number of omissions, flawed assumptions and modeling errors in the study and have serious concerns with its conclusions:
The spill probability numbers are inflated: The author uses oil throughput volumes that are nearly 40 per cent higher than those applied for in this project which also inflates the number of tanker transits using these inflated volumes
The pipeline failure frequency methodology adopted by Mr. Gunton is flawed, and does not approximate what would be deemed a best practices approach to the scientific risk analysis of a modern pipeline system
Mr. Gunton based his failure frequency analysis on a small subset of historical failure incident data. Why would he limit the source of his data to two pipelines with incidents not reflective of the industry experience and not reflective of the new technology proposed for Northern Gateway?
The study results are not borne out by real world tanker spill statistics. Based on Mr. Gunton’s estimates we should expect 21 to 77 large tanker spills every year worldwide while in reality after 2000 it has been below 3 per year and in 2012 there were zero.

Most of Enbridge’s rebuttal is a personal attack on Gunton, noting

We are very concerned about the misleading report released by Mr. Gunton, who was a witness for the Coastal First Nations organization during the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel process.
Mr. Gunton should have made his study available to the JRP process, the most thorough review of a pipeline that’s ever taken place in Canada. All of Northern Gateway’s conclusions have been subject to peer review, information requests and questioning by intervenors and the Joint Review Panel.

In response, Gunton told the Globe and Mail “the report took over a year to complete and it was not ready in time to be submitted as evidence before the federal Joint Review Panel which is now examining the proposed pipeline.”

Enbridge’s statement also ignores the fact under the arcane rules of evidence, any study such as  the  one from Simon Fraser had to be submitted to the JRP early in the process, while evidence was still being submitted.

The recent ruling by the JRP for closing arguments also precludes anyone using material that was not entered into evidence during the actual hearings.

That means that the SFU study will be ignored in the final round of the Joint Review Panel, which can only increase the disillusionment and distrust of the process that is already common throughout northwest British Columbia.

PART ONE: What the State Department Keystone EIS says about Kitimat

The United States Department draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) not only had to evaluate the main subject, the controversial Keystone XL pipeline project, but possible alternatives as well.

So that’s why the EIS took a couple of looks at Kitimat, with two possibilities for replacing the Keystone XL with a Kitimat terminal.

• Rail to Vancouver or Kitimat, British Columbia and tanker to the Gulf Coast area refineries
• The proposed Nothern Gateway Pipeline project.

The study doesn’t just include various forms of diluted bitumen from the Alberta bitumen sands, but  petroleum products from the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) and crude oil from the Bakken shale shipped to the refineries on the US Gulf Coast which would be served by the Keystone XL pipeline if it was not approved.

The EIS examined the Northern Gateway project and rejected the Enbridge pipeline as a possibility for Alberta bitumen and crude because of the continuing controversy.

However, a reading of the report shows that there could be pressure in the future for a bitumen or crude export terminal at Kitimat that would be served by the existing CN rail line (even though the State Department report prefers Prince Rupert as the best choice as an alternative to Keystone).

Enbridge is proposing to construct the Northern Gateway pipeline, which would transport up to 525,000 bpd of crude oil 1,177 km from Bruderheim, Alberta, to the Port of Kitimat, British Columbia. The port would be improved with two dedicated ship berths and 14 storage tanks for crude oil and condensate. Enbridge intends for the pipeline to be operational around 2017. A regulatory application was submitted in 2010, which is undergoing an independent review process led by the Canadian National Energy Board and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. The pipeline would traverse First Nation traditional lands and important salmon habitat. The project has been controversial and has encountered opposition from some
First Nation bands and other organizations. Opposition to the project remains strong as evidenced by media reports of the January 2013 public hearings in Vancouver on the permit application. It remains uncertain at this time if the project would receive permits and be constructed, and therefore the option of moving additional crude to Kitimat was eliminated from detailed analysis.

The report goes on to say that Enbridge is moving the target for the Northern Gateway due the controversy and the longer than expected Joint Review Panel hearings

Enbridge is now stating in investor presentations that the Northern Gateway pipeline
(525,000 bpd expandable to 800,000 bpd) may be operational by “2017+”

However the State Department report does seriously consider transportation of WCSB crude by rail to Vancouver, Kitimat and Prince Rupert. The report takes an in-depth look at the railway to Prince Rupert option.

One reason is that even if it is transported by rail, the market in Asia is still more attractive to the energy industry than using Kitimat or Prince Rupert as a possible terminal for export to the US Gulf.

The transportation costs of shipping to Asia via the Canadian or U.S. West Coasts
would be significantly cheaper than trying to export it via the U.S. Gulf Coast.

The total per barrel cost of export to Asia via pipeline to the Canadian West Coast and onward on a tanker is less than just the estimated pipeline tariff to the U.S. Gulf Coast for the proposed Project, and is less than half the cost of the Gulf Coast route to Asia. If pipelines to the Canadian West coast are not expanded or approved, even incurring the additional cost of rail transport to the West Coast ports (Vancouver, Kitimat, or Prince Rupert), estimated at $6 per barrel, results in a total transport cost to Asia that is still 40 percent cheaper than going via the Gulf Coast Absent a complete block on crude oil exports from the Canadian West Coast, there would be little economic incentive to use the proposed project as a pass through. The high costs of onward transport to other potential destinations tend to mitigate against WCSB heavy/oil sands crudes being exported in volume from the Gulf Coast.

The EnSys 2011 study found that the rail systems of the United States and Canada were not at that time running at capacity, that there is significant scope to expand capacity on existing tracks through such measures as advanced signaling, and that adequate cross-border Canada/U.S. capacity exists to accommodate growth in rail traffic that would be associated with movements at the level of 100,000 bpd cross-border increase per year or appreciably higher. In addition, rail lines exist to ports on the British Columbia coasts (notably Prince Rupert, Kitimat, and Vancouver), which could be used for export of Western Canadian crudes.

And later in the report:

both of these proposed pipeline projects to Canada’s West Coast face significant
resistance and uncertainty, but there are strong cost advantages when compared with moving WCSB crude to the Gulf Coast even if rail were used to access the Canadian West Coast In fact, using rail and tanker to ship crude oil from the WCSB via the West Coast to China is comparable to the pipeline rate to reach the U.S. Gulf Coast. An increase in the transport costs to the Gulf Coast (utilizing alternative transport options such as rail) would have a tendency to increase the
economic incentive to utilize any West Coast export options, if they are available.

The report also notes the change in Canadian laws in the omnibus bills pushed through by Stephen Harper’s Conservative government:

Also not examined above, are more speculative political impacts that might occur as a result of a decision on the permit application for the proposed Project. In 2012, the Canadian government enacted new laws changing the way some major infrastructure projects, such as pipelines, are reviewed. Among the changes made were limits on the amount of time for such reviews. A declared intent was to promote alternative routes for the export of WCSB crude oils, especially
ones that would reduce reliance on the United States as, essentially, the sole market option.

In other words, even if Northern Gateway is stopped, there could be considerable pressure to export bitumen and crude oil from Alberta not only through Prince Rupert, the site preferred by the State Department EIS, but though Kitimat as well.

That might just open the door for David Black’s proposed $16 billion refinery at Onion Flats near Kitimat. As noted elsewhere on the site Black has possible investors for construction of a new oil refinery approximately 25 kilometers to the north of Kitimat BC on a 3,000 hectare site.

Black’s Kitimat Clean website says the refinery would process 550,000 barrels per day (87,445 cubic meters per day) of diluted bitumen from the oilsands region of Alberta delivered to the site by pipeline or by rail. The diluent will be extracted at the refinery and returned to Alberta if needed there. If not, it would be processed into gasoline. The bitumen will be converted into fuel products, primarily for export.

Black’s plans call for connecting the Northern Gateway bitumen Pipeline to the site. From the refinery six dedicated product pipelines will run to a marine terminal on the Douglas Channel. The Douglas Channel is a wide and deep fjord. VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) tankers will transport the refined fuels to markets around the Pacific Rim.

If the Northern Gateway is stopped, Black’s plans call for 12 additional 120 car trains running through every day. (Six in each direction)
Northwest Coast Energy News Special report links

What the Keystone Report says about Kitimat and Northern Gateway
What the Keystone Report says about the Kinder Morgan pipeline to Vancouver.
What the Keystone Report says about CN rail carrying crude and bitumen to Prince Rupert.
The State Department Environmental Impact Study of the railway to Prince Rupert scenario.

State Department news release

State Department Index to Supplemental Environmental Impact Study on the Keystone XL pipeline

 

PART THREE: Keystone EIS looks in-depth at the railway to Prince Rupert option for bitumen and crude

There have always been commentators who believe that if the Northern Gateway Pipeline is rejected by the Joint Review Panel or stopped by other means, that the bitumen from Alberta should be carried by rail to Prince Rupert.

A pipeline to Prince Rupert has already been rejected by Enbridge as impractical given the mountainous terrain and the narrow footprint along the Skeena River from Terrace to Prince Rupert.

That means taking bitumen by rail to Prince Rupert has not been seriously studied—until now.

The State Department Environmental Impact Study (EIS) on the controversial Keystone XL pipeline from Alberta to the US Gulf, does give serious consideration to the rail to Rupert option.

That’s because under its mandate the State Department had to consider alternatives to Keystone. The detailed look at carrying crude to the west coast is contained in the “No Action Alternatives” section of the Keystone report (that is telling President Barack Obama what might happen if he takes no action on Keystone)

The EIS took a brief look at the possibilities of rail to Kitmat, but concentrates mostly on Prince Rupert.

As for sending bitumen to the Gulf,via rail and tanker, the Keystone report concludes, as have most analysts that even if bitumen was shipped by rail to Prince Rupert, it would be cheaper to send it to markets in Asia than through the Panama Canal to the US Gulf Coast.

If pipelines to the Canadian West coast are not expanded or approved, even incurring the additional cost of rail transport to the West Coast ports (Vancouver, Kitimat, or Prince Rupert), estimated at $6 per barrel, results in a total transport cost to Asia that is still 40 percent cheaper than going via the Gulf Coast.

Absent a complete block on crude oil exports from the Canadian West Coast, there would belittle economic incentive to use the proposed project as a pass through. The high costs of onward transport to other potential destinations tend to mitigate against WCSB [Western Canada Sedimentary Basin] heavy/oil sands crudes being exported in volume from the Gulf Coast.

As an alternative to Keystone, the State Department examined a scenario where bitumen and possibly Bakken shale crude oil would be:

• Loaded onto rail in Lloydminster and transported to Prince Rupert, British Columbia;

• Transferred to a new/expanded marine terminal at Prince Rupert; and

• Shipped via Suezmax vessels to the Gulf Coast area (Houston/Port Arthur) through the Panama Canal.

If the tanker cars are hauling bitumen, they would be actually loading “railbit” which the report says is “similar to dilbit but with less diluent added” (Dilbit is the standard diluted bitumen in pipelines) There is also, according to the EIS, a possibility that the tank cars would carry raw bitumen without dilutent (although this requires insulated rail cars with steam coils)

New facilities in Prince Rupert would consist of a large rail terminal complex, most likely on themainland, where off-loaded crude oil would be stored until it could be loaded onto tankers, and an expanded port. The entire facility would cover 4,700 acres (1,900 hectares), including 3,500 acres (1,400 hectares) for storage and off-loading/on-loading facilities at the rail terminal and approximately 1,200 acres (487 hectares) of land at the expanded port.

The new tank terminal construction would consist of the following:

• Fourteen petroleum storage tanks (11 oil and three condensate);

• A security fence to encompass the tank terminal;

• A 180-foot-wide (55 metre) firebreak area around the outside perimeter of the terminal;

• Electrical supply and distribution (this terminal would be serviced by the Texada Island

Reactor substation); and

• Buildings (control center and civil infrastructure including roads).

Related Link Prince Rupert Port Authority Performance Report

 

The scenario calls for adding approximately 13 trains with 100 tanker cars per day on the 1,100 miles (1,770 kilometres) of CN and Canadian Pacific rail lines between Lloydminster and Prince Rupert.

(On the other hand, media mogul David Black who has proposed a refinery at Onion Flats half way between Kitimat and Terrace is considering a rail link to Kitimat if the Northern Gateway pipeline is stopped. Black estimates there would be six trains per day, 120 cars in each direction. While there is usually only one train a day to Kitimat or less, that idea would increase traffic along the Skeena and in his news release Black says 

If BC remains set against a pipeline the oil will come to the refinery by rail. CN and the oil companies are keen on this. A great deal of crude in North America is being moved by rail now. The costs are not that different in this case and no permits are required. Rail tankering is, however, not as safe and it is more disruptive. Small towns along the route with level crossings would rue having 12 more trains running through every day.

The State Department scenario says that if the Prince Rupert option actually happened there would be “one to two additional Suezmax tanker vessels per day (430 tankers per year) would travel between Prince Rupert and the Gulf Coast area refinery ports via the Panama Canal.”

The concept of the Suezmax tankers is critical to the west coast, even if none of the scenarios eventually happen, because the State Department report notes that the Panama Canal is now being expanded, so that larger ships, including tankers, can go through the canal after 2014.

The current size is Panamax (maximum size for the current Panama Canal) to Suezmax (the maximum size for the Suez Canal), and, according to the State Department that means even if the even bigger Very Large Crude Carriers are not calling at west coast ports, the newer, larger Suezmax tankers may  be.

It should be noted, however, that if WCSB crude oil reaches a Pacific port, regardless of whether by rail or by pipeline, the economics for movement via tanker would favor shipping the oil to Asia rather than the Gulf Coast area. The cost of transporting crude oil via tanker from Prince Rupert to Houston and Port Arthur is estimated to be approximately $4.70/bbl, whereas the transport cost via tanker from Prince Rupert to refinery ports in Asia (e.g., Ulsan, South Korea and Dalian, China), is estimated to be only approximately $1.70 and $2.00/bbl, respectively. The lower transport cost to Asia versus the Gulf Coast area is attributable to shorter trip duration (30 to 37 days to Asia versus about 45 days to the Gulf Coast area), avoiding the Panama Canal toll(about $0.70/bbl), and being able to use a larger tanker because it would not be constrained by the Panama Canal (a VLCC tanker to China would have a capacity of almost 2 million bbl versus a Suezmax tanker to the Gulf Coast area with a capacity of about 884,000 bbl).

So what would happen if there was a scheme to truck bitumen and crude to Prince Rupert and ship via the Panama Canal to the Gulf?

The State Department EIS says:

 the transport of the crude oil via tankers from Prince Rupert to the Gulf Coast area refineries would not have any effects on geology, soils, groundwater, wetlands, vegetation, land use, socioeconomics, noise, or cultural resources, other than in the event of a spill.

It goes on to note:

The Gulf Coast area refineries already receive crude oil shipments via tankers from Mexico, Venezuela, and other locations; the Rail/Tanker Scenario is expected to simply displace these sources of crude oil with WCSB crude oil. Therefore, no new construction or new operational impacts are expected to occur as a result of this scenario at the Gulf Coast area refineries or surrounding habitats or communities.

In its study of a possible expanded Prince Rupert terminal that would welcome tankers, the State Department says:

The proposed Northern Gateway terminal at Kitimat, British Columbia was used as a surrogateto estimate the marine facilities needed at Prince Rupert. The Northern Gateway facility isdesigned to handle about 525,000 bpd of crude delivered by pipeline for loading on vessels to theWest Coast and Asia. In addition, it is designed to receive about 193,000 bpd of diluent (a verylight oil obtained from natural gas production) from cargoes arriving by water and discharging into storage at the terminal and moving back to Alberta via a parallel pipeline. The total volumeof about 718,000 bpd approximates the volume of WCSB heavy crude oil that would be loaded at Prince Rupert.

 

 

More Details:
Northwest Coast Energy News Special report links

What the Keystone Report says about Kitimat and Northern Gateway
What the Keystone Report says about the Kinder Morgan pipeline to Vancouver.
What the Keystone Report says about CN rail carrying crude and bitumen to Prince Rupert.
The State Department Environmental Impact Study of the railway to Prince Rupert scenario.

State Department news release

State Department Index to Supplemental Environmental Impact Study on the Keystone XL pipeline

 

PART FOUR: State Department assessment of the railway to Rupert route for bitumen

Here are edited portions of the EIS assessment for a major oil terminal at Prince Rupert

Environmental Setting

The EIS says “the local surface geology at the Prince Rupert site consists of bedrock (granitic rocks) overlain by glacial outwash and a thin soil cover.” and goes on to note that “Prince Rupert is located along the coastal region of Canada, which is seismically active.”

Potential Impacts

At Prince Rupert, depth to bedrock is expected to be relatively shallow, so rock ripping and some blasting could be necessary. The impacts of rock ripping and blasting are limited to the immediate area and would not result in any significant impacts to the underlying or nearby geology. Excavation activities, erosion of fossil beds exposed due to grading, and unauthorized collection can damage or destroy paleontological resources during construction.

(The report notes that The potential for finding paleontological resources in the areas that would be disturbed is unknown. But the area of the coast has been heavily metamorphisized and most fossils, so far, have been found further inland, largely along the Copper River near Terrace)

In terms of geologic hazards, the Prince Rupert terminals would be located along the coastal region of Canada, which is seismically active. In addition, the presence of steep slopes increases the risk of landslides and the port’s coastal location increases the risk of flooding…. The Prince Rupert rail terminals and port facilities would be designed to withstand potential seismic hazards and flooding…

Construction of the proposed terminals and port expansion in Prince Rupert would result in the disturbance of approximately 3,500 acres (1,400 hectares) of land for the construction of the rail terminal complex and approximately 1,200 acres (487 hectares) for the expansion of the port. Potential impacts to the soils resources of the area could result from vegetation clearance, landscape grading, and recontouring to ensure proper drainage, the installation of storm water drainage systems, construction of the required infrastructure, and other construction activities.
One of the primary concerns during construction activities is soil erosion and sedimentation.
Potential impacts to soils from erosion are expected to occur in areas where the slopes are greater than 20 per cent and where the erosion potential due to their nature is high. Based on available landscape and soils information, the soils found in the area are not highly erodible and the required infrastructure would be located in areas that are relatively flat. Therefore, the impact of the proposed terminal complex and port construction activities on soil erosion would be minor.

 

Groundwater
Environmental Setting

The Prince Rupert Terminals and port expansion would occur in British Columbia on Kaien Island, which receives about 102 inches of rainfall per year. The terminals would be located on an inlet that is part of the eastern Pacific Ocean on the Venn Passage near the much larger Inland Passage, which extends from Washington State to Alaska along the islands and mainland of British Columbia, Canada. Venn and Inland Passages are marine (salt water) waterbodies. The islands consist of bedrock (granitic rocks) overlain by glacial outwash and a thin soil cover.
Groundwater is shallow, poor quality, and unused. Drinking water is derived from lakes on the mainland. Water quality in the terminal complex area is seawater and inland brackish.

Potential Impacts

During construction of the facilities at Prince Rupert, the primary potential impacts to groundwater would be spills or leaks from construction equipment. Mitigation for these impacts includes having in place appropriate plans in place and appropriate cleanup materials available.
During operations of the facilities at Prince Rupert, the primary potential impacts to groundwater would again most likely be spills or leaks from operation equipment or associated with crude oil unloading of railcars. Although the initial impacts of potential releases or spills may be contained or limited to soil, potential impacts to groundwater may occur depending on the depth to groundwater, soil characteristics (e.g., porosity, permeability), spill volume and extent, and whether the spill reaches surface water bodies, some of which are interconnected to groundwater.

Surface Water
Environmental Setting

The upland character surrounding the potential Prince Rupert terminal area is dominated by bog forest uplands and the flowing surface water bodies are predominantly precipitation- and shallow groundwater-fed intermittent streams. Some open waterbodies are present in the southeast portion of Kaien Island. Tidal shore zones are of a rugged and rocky nature and receive wave energy generated by naturally occurring fetch and large wakes from marine traffic. Winter winds are strong and from the southeast to southwest, with surface currents predominantly northward from the Hecate Strait. Lighter summer winds have less influence on currents and allow freshwater runoff from land and deep water tidal effects to exert more control and provide variation in summer current patterns. Significant wind and tidal mixing tend to occur where waters are shallow and around islands and rocky points of land. The coastal landscape is predominantly fjords carved into the granitic Coast Mountains, created by the last of several glacial periods approximately 12,000 years ago. Shores tend to be rocky and steep with beaches restricted to sheltered areas adjacent to estuaries and the navigable straits and channels provide a wide variety of exposures and habitats.

Potential Impacts

Construction of the facilities at Prince Rupert would disturb approximately 4,700 acres. The primary potential impacts to surface waters include erosion and sedimentation and spills/leaks of hazardous materials. Mitigation for these impacts includes having in place appropriate SPCC plans in place and appropriate cleanup materials available.
During operations, the primary potential impacts to surface waters include storm water runoff, spills, or leaks from operation equipment or associated with crude oil unloading of railcars.
Provision of storm water management measures would mitigate the impacts of stormwater runoff.

Terrestrial Vegetation
Environmental Setting

The Prince Rupert terminals and port facilities would be located in the Coastal Gap Level III Ecoregion. The vegetation immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean includes stunted, opengrowing western red cedar, yellow cedar, and western hemlock with some stunted shore pine and Sitka spruce . There are also open areas present within the affected areas. It is unclear if biologically unique landscapes or vegetation communities of concern exist within the proposed Prince Rupert terminal complex boundary.

Potential Impacts

The proposed rail terminal complex and port facilities at Prince Rupert would require the clearing of up to 4,700 acres of natural vegetation, most of which is forested based on aerial photo interpretation. There does not appear to be any biologically unique landscapes or communities of conservation concern within the terminal complex boundary. Nearly all of these impacts would be permanent as natural habitats are converted for use as rail terminals and port facilities.

Wildlife
Environmental Setting

Many wildlife species use this coastal area for hunting, foraging, roosting, breeding, and nesting (Tourism Prince Rupert 2012). Wildlife characteristic of this ecoregion include grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horribilis), black bear (Ursus americanus), mountain goat (Oreamnos americanus), black-tailed deer (Odocoileus hemionus
columbianus), wolf (Canis lupus), moose (Alces alces), mink (Mustela sp.), bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus), seabirds, shorebirds, waterfowl, and grouse (Tetraoninae)
The Prince Rupert terminal complex would be located in the Northern Pacific Rainforest(Region 5) bird conservation region, which is an ecologically distinct region in North America…

The coast of the Northern Pacific Rainforest is characterized by river deltas
and pockets of estuarine and freshwater wetlands set within steep, rocky shorelines. These wetlands provide critical nesting, wintering, and migration habitat for internationally significant populations of waterfowl and other wetland-dependent species. The area includes major stopover sites for migrating shorebirds, especially western sandpipers (Calidris mauri) and dunlins (Calidris alpina). Black oystercatchers (Haematopus bachmani), rock sandpipers (Calidris
ptilocnemis), black turnstones (Arenaria melanocephala), and surfbirds (Aphriza virgata) are common wintering species. Nearshore marine areas support many nesting and wintering sea ducks. Many seabirds breed on offshore islands, including important populations of ancient murrelet (Synthliboramphus antiquus), rhinoceros auklet (Cerorhinca monocerata), tufted puffin (Fratercula cirrhata), common murre (Uria aalge), western gull (Larus occidentalis), glaucouswinged gull (Larus glaucescens), and Leach’s storm-petrel (Oceanodroma leucorhoa). Pelagic
waters provide habitat for large numbers of shearwaters (Calonectris spp. and Puffinus spp.), storm-petrels (Hydrobatidae), and black-footed albatross (Phoebastria nigripes)

Potential Impacts

Direct impacts could occur due to vegetation removal or conversion, obstructions to movement patterns, or the removal of native habitats that may be used for foraging, nesting, roosting, or other wildlife uses (Barber et al. 2010). Indirect impacts to wildlife are difficult to quantify and are dependent on the sensitivity of the species, individual, type and timing of activity, physical parameters (e.g., cover, climate, and topography), and seasonal use patterns of the species (Berger 2004). Most of these impacts would be essentially permanent.

Fisheries
Environmental Setting

Prince Rupert is an important deepwater port and transportation hub of the northern coast of British Columbia. It is located on the northwest shore of Kaien Island, which is connected to the mainland by a short bridge. The town of Prince Rupert is just north of the mouth of the Skeena River, a major salmon-producing river. Key commercial fisheries include Pacific salmon, halibut, herring, and groundfish, which are processed from Prince Rupert.

Prince Rupert area supports a high density of streams and rivers that host an array of valuable recreational fisheries for salmon, steelhead (anadromous rainbow trout), rainbow trout, lake trout, cutthroat trout, char, Arctic grayling, and northern pike .

Potential Impacts

New impacts to commercial and recreational fisheries’ habitats from the construction and operation of the facilities in Prince Rupert could include marine intertidal zones as well as fish spawning zones (e.g., herring), if present. There would likely be short-term impacts to the benthic (bottom dwelling) community during construction of the berths and mooring facilities. Bottom-dwelling
fish (i.e., halibut, flounder, and rockfish) and marine invertebrates (i.e., clams, mussels, crabs, and other bivalves and crustaceans) could potentially be impacted during construction as well, but these affects are expected to be minor and temporary or short-term in duration.

Additional shipping traffic would increase underwater sound because large vessels, including tankers, put out relatively high noise levels. Fish and other aquatic organisms (including invertebrates and marine mammals) use sound as a means of communication and detection within the marine acoustic environment. Increased shipping traffic could mask natural sounds by increasing the ambient noise environment from Prince Rupert Harbor and along the marine route to the Gulf Coast area. Long-lasting sounds, such as those caused by continuous ship operation, can cause a general increase in background noise and there is a risk that such sounds, while not causing immediate injury, could mask biologically important sounds, cause hearing loss in affected organisms, and/or have an impact on stress levels and on the immune systems of aquatic species.

Exotic and invasive species are sometimes transferred in the ballast water of tanker ships.
Monitoring and controls would need to be implemented to treat ballast water discharged into Prince Rupert Harbor such that invasive or exotic species would not be released into the marine environment.

Threatened and Endangered Species

This section focuses on animal and plant species present in the Prince Rupert area that are Canada SARA protected. As a coastal area along the Pacific Migratory Bird Route, and an area that receives a lot of precipitation and is heavily forested, many wildlife species inhabit the area, as discussed in Section 5.1.3.6, Wildlife. According to the British Columbia (B.C.) Conservation Data Centre (2012), only one SARA threatened/endangered species is known to occur in Prince Rupert—the green sturgeon (Acipenser medirostris), a Pacific Ocean inhabitant. In addition, several SARA special concern species occur in Prince Rupert, including western toad (Anaxyrus boreas), coastal tailed frog (Ascaphus truei), North American racer (Coluber constrictor), grey whale (Eschrichtius robustus), and Stellar sea lion (Eumetopias jubatus)

Potential Impacts

The green sturgeon is typically found along nearshore marine waters, but is also commonly observed in bays and estuaries. The expansion of the proposed port facility could have minor adverse effects on the green sturgeon, but the sturgeon could readily avoid the port area.
Increased shipping traffic at Prince Rupert and as the vessels transit to the Gulf Coast area refineries may affect the feeding success of marine mammals (including threatened and endangered species) through disturbance, because the noise generated by tankers could reduce the effectiveness of echolocation used by marine mammals to forage for food. Whales use underwater vocalizations to communicate between individuals while hunting and while engaged in other behaviors. Increased underwater noise from additional shipping traffic could disrupt these vocalizations and alter the behavior of pods of whales. Moreover, additional boat and
tanker traffic could also increase the potential for collisions between marine mammals and shipping vessels. These effects would be additive in nature and could potentially add to existing disturbance effects and collision risks caused by the current level of shipping traffic, commercial and recreational fishing, and cruise ship passage.

Land Use, Recreation, and Visual Resources
Environmental Setting

Land use, recreation, and visual resources for the Prince Rupert area where the new terminals and expanded port facilities would be built differ sharply from the other terminal sites. Prince Rupert is located on an inlet of the Pacific Ocean in a heavily forested area of British Columbia.
Urban land use is generally limited to the communities in and around the city of Prince Rupert, with some small outlying communities and villages in the area. Given Prince Rupert’s role as a terminus of the Alaska Ferry System, many people see the port and surrounding areas in a recreational context. The area is largely undeveloped and would be sensitive to changes in the visual landscape.

Potential Impacts

If constructed on previously undeveloped land, the new facilities would primarily impact mixed forest… The construction and operational impacts on land use, recreation, and visual resources at the Lloydminster, Epping, and Stroud terminal complex sites and along the Cushing pipeline route would be the same as for the Rail/Pipeline Scenario.

Socioeconomics
Environmental Setting

Population/Housing

Construction and operations activities are not expected to have a significant effect on population and housing for this scenario. Because construction and operations job estimates have not yet been determined for this scenario, worker requirements for Prince Rupert, Lloydminster, and Epping are assumed to be minor..additional temporary housing could be needed in Prince Rupert… Prince Rupert only has about 740 hotel/motel rooms

Local Economic Activity

Tanker infrastructure and operations would be affected as ships transport crude oil from Prince Rupert through the Panama Canal to Texas ports near Houston.

Direct construction expenditures for facilities at Prince Rupert would be approximately $700 million, with approximately 1,400 annual construction jobs, based on the cost estimates of the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway marine terminal in Kitimat

Despite the large population of First Nations people in the Prince Rupert area, Canada does not have a similar definition to minorities as the Keystone report applied under US law and so it notes “Impacts to minority and low-income populations during construction and would be similar to those described for the proposed [Keystone] Project and could possibly result in increased competition for medical or health services in underserved populations. Canada does not define HPSA and MUA/P, so it is unknown whether or not the minority populations in Prince Rupert or Lloydminster exist in a medically underserved area.

Tax Revenues and Property Values

It says construction of a new terminal Prince Rupert would generate provincial sales taxes, goods and services taxes, and hotel taxes. Construction of the tank and marine terminals at Prince Rupert…would involve large numbers of road trips by heavy trucks to transport construction materials and equipment to and from the sites. Construction in Prince Rupert could also potentially involve vessel deliveries of material. This traffic could cause congestion on major roadways, and would likely require temporary traffic management solutions such as police escorts for oversize vehicles.

Cultural Resources

Despite the rich heritage of First Nations in the Prince Rupert area, the Keystone alternative study reported;

No cultural resources studies have been conducted for the Prince Rupert area. Review of aerial photographs shows that a small portion of the area that could potentially be developed has already been disturbed by development, including port facilities, structures, and roads. This preliminary review shows that most of the area appears undeveloped and would have the potential for intact buried cultural resources.

The report notes that “Any ground disturbance, especially of previously undisturbed ground, could potentially directly impact cultural resources.”

It goes on to note that the potential to

include intact buried cultural resources would require evaluation through research and cultural resources surveys. If cultural resources were identified, follow-up studies could be required. In general terms, the archaeological potential of heavily disturbed areas, such as might be found in active rail yards or within developed transportation corridors, is normally lower than in undisturbed areas.

Archaeological potential is also contingent upon factors such as access to water, soil type, and topography, and would have to be evaluated for each area to be disturbed. Aboveground facilities have the potential to indirectly impact cultural resources from which they may be visible or audible. The potential for increased rail traffic to contribute to indirect impacts would require consideration.

Air and Noise

The report also summarizes the possible green house gas emissions for the rail and tanker project as whole from Prince Rupert to the Gulf Coast refineres and notes that overall

On an aggregate basis, criteria pollutant emissions, direct and indirect GHG emissions, and noise levels during the operation phase for this scenario would be significantly higher than that of the proposed [Keystone XL] Project mainly due to the increased regular operation of railcars, tankers, and new rail and marine terminals.

Air Quality

The rail cars and tankers transporting the crudes would consume large amounts of diesel fuel and fuel oil each day….The criteria pollutant emissions would
vary by transportation segment, particularly during marine-based transit. Oil tankers traveling from the Prince Rupert marine terminal through the Panama Canal to Houston/Port Arthur pass through several different operational zones, including reduced speed zones leading into and out of the ports, North American Emission Control Areas where the use of low-sulfur marine fuel is mandated, and offshore areas where the tankers travel at cruise speeds.

During the return trip, tankers are filled with seawater (ballast) to achieve buoyancy necessary for proper operation, which affects the transit speeds of the vessel. Furthermore, the tankers spend several days loading or unloading cargo at each marine terminal with auxiliary engines running (an activity called hoteling). The tanker emissions accounted for return trips (i.e., both loaded cargo going south and unloaded cargo going north).

In aggregate, the total operational emissions (tons) estimated over the life of the project (50 years) are several times greater than those associated with the combined construction and operation of the proposed Keyston XL Project

Greenhouse Gases

Direct emissions of GHGs would occur during the construction and operation of the Rail/Tanker Scenario. GHGs would be emitted during the construction phase from several sources or activities, such as clearing and open burning of vegetation during site preparation, operation of on-road vehicles transporting construction materials, and operation of construction equipment for the new pipeline, rail segments, multiple rail and marine terminals, and fuel storage tanks.

Due to limited activity data, GHG emissions from construction of the Rail/Tanker Scenario were not quantified; however, these emissions would occur over a short-term and temporary period, so construction GHG impacts are expected to be comparable to the proposed [Keystone XL] Project.
During operation of the railcars and tankers that comprise this scenario, GHGs would be emitted directly from the combustion of diesel fuel in railcars traveling over 4,800 miles (7,725 km) and fuel oil in marine tankers traveling over 13,600 miles (21,887 km) round-trip.

The Rail/Tanker Scenario would also result in indirect emissions of GHGs due to the operation of 16 new rail terminals, an expanded port, and potential pumping stations. The new rail terminal in Prince Rupert would be projected to require 5 MW of electric power to operate, possibly bring indirect GHG emissions

Noise

Noise would be generated during the construction and operation of the Rail/Tanker Scenario. Noise would be generated during the construction phase from the use of heavy construction equipment and vehicles for the new pipeline, rail segments, and multiple rail and marine terminals, and fuel storage tanks. Due to limited activity/design data, noise levels from the construction of this scenario were not quantified; however, this noise would occur over a short term and temporary period, so construction noise impacts are expected to be comparable to those
of the proposed Project. During operation of the railcars and tanker ships that comprise this scenario, noise would be generated from the locomotives, movement of freight cars and wheels making contact with the rails as the train passes, train horns, warning bells (crossing signals) at street crossings, and tanker engines during hoteling and maneuverings at the new rail and marine terminals in Prince Rupert.

(Noise from ocean going vessels which is a concern for coastal First Nations and environmental groups is covered later on impact on wildlife)

 

Climate Change Effects on the Scenario
Environmental Setting

The Keystone study looks at the affects of climate change, but concentrates largely on the Gulf Coast beause the most of the Rail/Tanker Scenario was outside of the boundaries of the study, but it does note that the sea levels are projected to rise due to glacial melting and thermal expansion of the water. The rate, total increase, and likelihood of the rise is in part dependent on how rapid the ice sheets warm and is a source of ongoing scientific uncertainty.

The United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) estimates that sea level rise could be between 3 to 4 feet by the end of the century.

Increasing sea level projected due to climate changes as described above shifts the impact of mean high tide, storm surge, and saltwater intrusion to occur further inland and this would negatively affect reliable operation of the port infrastrucure for tanker traffic. Mitigation of these climate effects could be addressed by making engineering and operational changes at the port.

Potential Risk and Safety
Environmental Setting

The Rail/Tanker Option would combine the risk inherent in both pipeline and oil tanker
transport. However, the risks and consequences for using oil tankers to transport the hazardous materials are potentially greater than the proposed Project. Overall, crude oil transportation via oil tankers has historically had a higher safety incident rate than pipelines for fire/explosion, injuries, and deaths.

Spills have been reported while the vessel is loading, unloading, bunkering, or engaged in other operations

The main causes of oil tanker spills are the following:
• Collisions: impact of the vessel with objects at sea, including other vessels (allision);
• Equipment failure: vessel system component fault or malfunction that originated the release of crude oil;
• Fires and explosions: combustion of the flammable cargo transported onboard;
• Groundings: running ashore of the vessel; and
• Hull failures: loss of mechanical integrity of the external shell of the vessel.

From 1970 to 2011, historical data shows that collisions and groundings were the maincauses of oil tanker spills worldwide.

Potential Impacts

Loading and unloading of the railcars at tank farms near seaports could allow spills to migrate and impact seawaters and shorelines.

However, the loading and unloading are generally carried out under supervision and would be addressed promptly by the operators, limiting the potential migration and impacts of the spill to the immediate area.

Once the tanker is loaded and at sea, the propagation and impacts of a spill could become significant. Oil tankers may carry up to 2,000,000 bbl of oil

A release of oil at sea would be influenced by wind, waves, and current. Depending on the volume of the release, the spreading of oil on the surface could impact many square miles of ocean and oil birds, fish, whales, and other mammals and could eventually impact shorelines. Oil would also mix with particulates in sea water and degrade. As this occurs some oil will begin to sink and either be retained in the water column (pelagic) or settle to the ocean floor (sessile).

Pelagic oil could be consumed by fish or oil fauna passing though the submerged oil. Sessile oil could mix with bottom sediment and potentially consumed by bottom feeding fauna. Spills in ports-of-call could affect receptors similar to an open ocean release but also could temporarily affect vessel traffic and close ports for cleanup activities.

The identification of key receptors along the rail route alternative was not available for this evaluation. Therefore a comparison to the proposed project was not completed.

Surface Water

The Lloydminster to Prince Rupert portion of this route would begin in the western plains at the Saskatchewan/British Columbia border and travel west through an area of high-relief mountains with large valleys, referred to as the Cordillera region. From a water resource perspective, the plains region of Canada is characterized by relatively large rivers with low gradients. The plains rivers drain the Rocky Mountains to the Arctic Ocean. The Cordillera region is largely composed of northwest-southwest trending mountain ranges that intercept large volumes of Pacific
moisture traveling from the west towards the east. River systems in this region are supplied by a combination of seasonal rainfall, permanent snowfields, and glaciers.

The following are larger rivers crossed by the existing rail lines between Lloydminster and Prince Rupert:

• North Saskatchewan River, Alberta
• Pembina River, Alberta
• McLeod River, Alberta
• Fraser River, British Columbia
• Nechako River, British Columbia
• Skeena River, British Columbia

Wetlands

Spills within wetlands would most likely be localized, unless they were to occur in open, flowing water conditions such as a river or in the ocean. A crude oil spill in a wetland could affect vegetation, soils, and hydrology. The magnitude of impact would depend on numerous factors including but not limited to the volume of spill, location of spill, wetland type (i.e., tidal versus wet meadow wetland), time of year, and spill response effectiveness. The construction of additional passing lanes to accommodate increased train traffic resulting from this scenario could
result in permanent impacts to wetlands if passing lanes were constructed where wetlands occur.
However, as there is some leeway regarding the exact location of the passing lanes, it is expected that wetlands would be avoided by design.

Fisheries

The Rail/Tanker Scenario railroad route would cross numerous major streams and rivers in Canada, many of which support anadromous fish species such as salmon.

Anadromous species are those that spawn and rear in freshwater but migrate to the ocean at a certain size and age. Pacific salmon are large anadromous fish that support valuable commercial and recreational fisheries. Commercial fisheries for salmon occur in marine water and most recreational fishing for salmon occurs in freshwater. Salmon eggs are vulnerable to the effects of fine sediment deposition because female salmon deposit their eggs in stream bed gravels.

Despite this vulnerability, the overland railway route is not expected to present any new impacts to salmon unless there is a spill into its habitat, although the risk of spills does increase under this scenario due to the increase in the number of trains that would use the route.

Potential new impacts under the Rail/Tanker Scenario on commercially or recreationally significant fisheries along the route would be minor because the railroads that would be used are already built and in operation. However, the risk of an oil spill or release of oil or other materials still exists. The tanker portion of this route scenario is also subject to oil spill risk.

Threatened and Endangered Species

The rail route would cross over the Rocky Mountain region of western Alberta, which is inhabited by species such as the woodland caribou (Rangifer tarandus) (a SARA threatened species) and grizzly bear (a SARA special concern species). This region of British Columbia is home to a number of SARA threatened/endangered species, including the peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus anatum) (SARA threatened), salish sucker (Catostomus sp.) (SARA endangered), white sturgeon (Acipenser transmontanus) (SARA endangered), caribou (southern mountain population) (SARA threatened), northern goshawk (Accipiter gentilis laingi) (SARA threatened), and Haller’s apple moss (Bartramia halleriana) (SARA threatened).

A number of additional SARA special concern species inhabit the regions of Canada that would be traversed by the Rail/Tanker Scenario, including but not limited to those special concern species expected to occur in the Prince Rupert region, and discussed above (B.C. Conservation Centre 2012).

Northwest Coast Energy News Special report links

What the Keystone Report says about Kitimat and Northern Gateway
What the Keystone Report says about the Kinder Morgan pipeline to Vancouver.
What the Keystone Report says about CN rail carrying crude and bitumen to Prince Rupert.
The State Department Environmental Impact Study of the railway to Prince Rupert scenario.

State Department news release

State Department Index to Supplemental Environmental Impact Study on the Keystone XL pipeline

 

Environment agency calls for comments on Prince Rupert LNG pipeline

The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency is calling for comments on the proposed LNG project at Prince Rupert.

An agency news release says:

As part of the strengthened and modernized Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA 2012) put in place to support the government’s Responsible Resource Development Initiative, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency must decide whether a federal environmental assessment is required for the proposed Pacific Northwest LNG Project in British Columbia. To assist it in making its decision, the Agency is seeking comments from the public on the project and its potential effects on the environment.

Progress Energy Canada Ltd. is proposing to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility and marine terminal near Prince Rupert, within the District of Port Edward. The Pacific Northwest LNG facility would be located on Lelu Island. The proposed project would convert natural gas to LNG for export to Pacific Rim markets in Asia.

The agency says written comments must be submitted by March 11, 2013.

The CEAA says it will post its decision on the website if a federal environmental assessment is required.

It goes on to say:

If it is determined that a federal environmental assessment is required, the public will have three more opportunities to comment on this project, consistent with the transparency and public engagement elements of CEAA 2012.
Projects subject to CEAA 2012 are assessed using a science-based approach. If the project is permitted to proceed to the next phase, it will continue to be subject to Canada’s strong environmental laws, rigorous enforcement and follow-up, and increased fines.

nwpipemapBy “CEAA 2012,” the agency is referring to the omnibus bill, best known as C-38, which actually weakened the CEAA’s ability to review projects. “Science-based approach” has become a stock phrase used by the government of Stephen Harper on resource issues, while it weakened environmental review procedures, terminated the jobs of hundreds of scientists and restricted those who are left in the government from speaking to the media or commenting on issue.

In December,the CEAA called for similar input for the Coastal GasLink project to Kitimat, with a deadline of January 30. No decision has been announced for that project. which would be built by TransCanada for the Shell LNG Canada project.

Expansion of proposed Kitimat bitumen terminal urgent to get offshore markets, Enbridge tells JRP

Enbridge Northern Gateway has told the Joint Review Panel that expansion of the proposed bitumen and condensate terminal in Kitimat is urgent so the company can access offshore markets for Alberta bitumen sands crude.

Northern Gateway filed an update on its plans for the Kitimat in response to a ruling from the JRP, after Smithers-based activist Josette Weir questioned how Enbridge filed a route update with the panel which included the plans to expand the terminal.

The JRP ruled against two of Weir’s motions but upheld, in part, her objection that the terminal plans were not part of a route revision.

In the Motion, Ms. Wier argues that there are a number of completely unrelated documents embedded within the route revision changes including, for example, a “noticeable increase in the number of oil tanks at the Kitimat terminal” with “significant size increases included.” There is no discussion in the update documents on how these changes are related to the proposed routing change. Ms. Wier further notes that this evidence was submitted after the completion of questioning on engineering (including regarding the Kitimat tank farm) in Prince George last
November.

The Panel notes that it may be of use to parties for Northern Gateway to identify which of the exhibits submitted on 28 December, 2012, were: (i) directly related to Route Revision V; (ii)corollary to Route Revision V; or (iii) unrelated to Route Revision V. Accordingly, the Panelorders Northern Gateway to submit, on or before 1 February 2013, a chart setting out this information for each of the exhibits submitted in the 28 December 2012 update. Further, where the documents are listed as “unrelated to Route Revision V”, Northern Gateway is to provide a
brief description as to why this evidence is being filed at this time.

 

In response, Northern Gateway filed a spreadsheet with the JRP to clarify the reasons for including the expansion of the tank farm. As the JRP requested, the explanation is brief, but significant.

Northern Gateway stated that “the size and spacing of tanks will be optimized during detailed design.”

In recognition of the urgency of accessing offshore markets, Northern Gateway and its Funding Participants have recently agreed to proceed with engineering and design activities.

Brief description as to why this evidence is being filed at this time required:

…for preparation of a Class III Cost Estimate, at an expected cost of over $150 million. Discussions with the Funding Participants in late 2012 resulted in a more detailed analysis of the tankage required by shippers, with particular emphasis on ensuring an adequate degree of commodity segregation within the tank farm. That analysis, which concluded in December 2012, revealed that additional tankage would be required to satisfy commodity segregation requirements.

Northern Gateway included this information along with its Route V filing as a matter of convenience to all involved.

In respone to Weir’s objection that the Enbridge Northern Gateway filed a major change to the project and noted that most intervenors are limited to the deadlines set by the JRP, and that the engineering hearings in Prince George had already concluded.

In response, the panel ruled that Enbridge could present the evidence at the marine hearings in Prince Rupert that resumed today.

In its letter enclosing the 28 December 2012 update on Route Revision V, Northern Gateway noted that, “to the extent that there are questions regarding this filing that have not been previously addressed, members of the Northern Gateway Kitimat River Valley engineering design and emergency preparedness witness panel will be available to answer same when they appear in Prince Rupert.”

The Panel is of the view that any substantive questions on the updated evidence could best be
addressed through questioning in Prince Rupert, as suggested.

At the opening of the hearings in Prince Rupert, Coastal First Nations withdrew from the process, citing the cost and complexity of the hearings. Both events once again call into question the fairness of the Joint Review Process and whether or not there is a double standard, with one set of standards for Enbridge Northern Gateway and another for intervenors.

Northern Gateway Response to JRP Ruling 141 Route_Rev_V

Ruling No. 141 Notice of Motion by Josette Weir

 

 

DFO study on ancient Douglas Channel tsunamis shows minimal impact on Kitimat, devastation at Hartley Bay

A follow up study by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans on the discovery of prehistoric slope failure tsunamis in Douglas Channel concludes that the events would have had minimal impact on Kitimat but would have destroyed Hartley Bay.

The studies were filed by DFO with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel on Friday, November 16, following an earlier study the Geological Survey of Canada that reported the discovery of the submarine slope failures. The filing comes just three weeks after the region was shaken by a 7.7 magnitude earthquake off Haida Gwaii and a subsequent coast-wide tsunami warning.

The DFO follow up study was aimed at better understanding the dynamics of tsunamis during the two slope failure events on the southern end of Hawkesbury Island during the mid-Holecene period, between 5,000 and10,000 years ago.

The wave dynamic model study does not address the discovery by the Geological Survey of Canada of a possible fault line along Hawkesbury Island which could have been the cause of the slope failures.

The study estimates that the wave amplitude of the first tsunami reaching the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway terminal site near Kitimat would have been about .09 to .12 metres. Since the actual wave height hitting land from a tsunami is one half of the amplitude, the height of tsunami waves reaching Kitimat at the time would have been about 60 centimetres or 23 inches. At Hartley Bay, on the other hand, the maximum estimated wave amplitude from the second tsunami would have been 15 metres, meaning a wave height of 7.5 metres or about 25 feet.

The main reason for the difference is that both the submarine slope failures occurred south of  the dogleg in Douglas Channel at Gertrude Point. That meant the configuration of the channel from Gertrude Point up to Kitimat would lessen the amplitude whereas because Hartley Bay was so close, it would be hit by a higher amplitude. The report says that because of their relatively short wavelengths, the tsunami waves undergo multiple reflections that the “high degree of scattering from the complex shoreline and bottom topography in Douglas Channel” would “combined with the flux of tsunami energy through adjoining waterways and channels” have caused a rapid decrease in the energy of the waves with distance south and north of the slide area.

The study also points out a crucial difference between the ancient slides and the two that occurred near Kitimat in 1974 and 1975, while the land near the head of the Kitimat arm were largely composed of material laid down by the glaciers, the large slope failures on Hawkesbury Island were blocks of an extremely hard igneous rock called diorite. Each of the prehistoric slides would have consisted of about 65 million cubic metres of rock.

The DFO report says

Coastal British Columbia is an area of steep slopes, extreme seasonal variations in soil moisture, large tidal ranges, and the highest seismicity in Canada. Hazards of this form have been well documented for the coastal region of British Columbia, and other fjord regions of the world’s oceans, including Alaska and Norway. These factors increase the potential for both submarine and subaerial slope failures in the region. Such events generally take place in relatively shallow and confined inner coastal waterways, and can present hazards in terms of tsunami wave generation.

The two prehistoric submarine slides are located about 10 kilometres apart on the
slope of southern Douglas Channel, near the southern end of Hawkesbury Island

The report says:

The failures are defined by scallop-shaped hollows located along the edge of the fiord wall and appear to be associated with detached blocks that extend out several hundred metres into the channel. The two block slides identified in Douglas Channel are characteristic of rigid-body submarine landslides, which differ considerably from the well-documented viscous submarine landslides with a lower specific gravity (density relative to water) of about 1.5 that occurred to the north of Douglas Channel along the inner slope of Kitimat Arm in 1974 and 1975.

The report’s modelling is “considered minimum values” because the do not include debris that would have spread into the fiord after initial slide. That debris is now buried by a thick layer of post-slide sediment.

DFO diagram of the model of Slide A on Hawkesbury Island (DFO)

The reconstruction model shows that the head of the more northern slide began at a depth of around 60 to 100 metre, while that of the more southern slide began at a depth of 75 to 120 metres.

The slides would have moved down slope at about 25 metres per second, coming to rest after about 30 seconds, 250 to 350 metres from the slope at a depth of 400 metres.

The northern slide, called by the scientists Slide A:

would have generated extremely large waves in the immediate vicinity of the failure
region within a minute of the submarine landslide. Waves in the numerical simulations reach amplitudes of 30 to 40 metres at the coast near the slide area

Submarine landslides cause delays between the arrival of the first waves and the arrival of subsequent higher waves, increasing in distance from the slide, because of “reflections and non-linear interaction” along the shoreline. For Slide A, the maximum wave amplitudes at Hartley Bay would have been six metres (meaning three metre waves) “Large amplitude waves with typical periods of around 50 seconds would continue for several tens of minutes.”

The leading tsunami waves generated by Slide A reach Kitimat Arm in roughly 20 min and have small amplitudes of only a few centimetres. Although later waves have higher amplitudes, the maximum wave amplitudes (which occur 50-55 minnutes after the failure event) are still only around 0.09 to 0.12 metres.

The southern slide on Hawkesbury, called Slide B by the scientists, would have moved 400 metres before stopping. It stared at a greater depth than Slide A, with not as much vertical displacement than Slide A. That means Slide B was slower than Slide A.

Slide B:

would have generated large waves in the vicinity of the failure region. Simulated waves reach the coast adjacent to the slide region within a minute of the failure event, with wave amplitudes of up to 10 metres. The waves also hit the opposite site of the channel within a minute of the failure event and then take an additional minute to reach Hartley Bay where waves reach amplitudes of 15 metres/ Powerful oscillations in the bay last for tens of minutes.
Waves with high amplitudes (more than 2 metres) also occur in the southern part of Douglas Channel, and in certain locations of Verney Passage.

According to the models, the leading tsunami waves would have reached the Kitimat Arm 22 minutes after the start of the slide. The maximum waves would have had amplitudes of 0.08 metres to 0.3 metres (6 inches), reach the Kitimat Arm 45 to 60 minutes after the start of the failure event.

The the tsunami waves generated by Slide B that impact Kitimat Arm,  although still of low amplitude, were somewhat higher than those generated by Slide A, despite the fact that Slide B was located further to the south and generated less energetic waves in the source region than Slide A.

This seeming paradox is explained by the slower motion of Slide B, which causes it to generate more wave energy in the low frequency band…Due to their reduced scattering and reflection, the relatively long and lower frequency waves generated by Slide B propagate more readily through the complex fjord system than the relatively short and higher frequency waves generated by Slide A.

Specifically addressing the proposed site of the Enbridge bitumen terminal, as well as potential tanker traffic in Douglas Channel, the detailed explanation of the modelling accompanying the DFO report says:

If similar submarine slides were to occur again somewhere in the same general area, they could present a significant risk to navigation and to nearby shore installations and coastal communities….

As with the tsunami generation regions, the highest waves and strongest currents in any particular region of the coastal waterway would occur near the shoreline. Based on the numerical findings, tsunamis generated by submarine landslides of the form identified for the southern end of Douglas Channel would have heights and currents that could have major impacts on the coastline and vessel traffic at the time of the event throughout much of Douglas Channel, but a minor impact on water levels, currents and hence vessel traffic in Kitimat Arm. Hartley Bay, at the southern end of Douglas Channel, would be impacted by high waves and strong currents, whereas Kitimat, at the northern end of Kitimat Arm, would experience negligible wave effects. Additional modelling would be required to assess the characteristics of possible tsunamis originating beyond the area of the two identified slope failures.

At the estimated propagation speeds of about 65 metres per second, the detailed model says it takes roughly 10 to 15 minutes for the simulated waves to propagate approximately 40 to 45 kilometres to the intersection of Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm, where peak wave amplitudes would be diminished to less than one metre. It takes another 15 minutes for the waves to reach sites near the proposed Enbridge facilities in Kitimat Arm where wave amplitudes would be reduced to a few tens of centimetres and associated currents to speeds less than a few tens of centimetres per second.

 

 

Slide tsunami area map
Slide tsunami area study map (DFO)

 

Fisheries and Oceans-Modelling Tsunamis Associated with Recently Identified Slope Failures in Douglas Channel  (pdf)

Numerical data for DFO tsunami study (link to JRP)