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Northern Gateway JRP increases time for maritime hearings in Prince Rupert

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has released an updated schedule for the “Questioning Hearings” in Prince Rupert,which will cover maritime issues and for the public comment sessions in Vancouver, Victoria and Kelowna.

The comment hearings in Victoria will take place from January 3 to January 12, 2013, in Vancouver from January 14 to January 18 and January 30 to February 1, with a hearing in Kelowna on January 28.

The questioning hearings in Prince Rupert have been expanded due to demand, according to the JRP, opening on February 4, 2013, going to February 9, then from February 18 to 23, February 25 to March 5; March 11 to March 16; March 18 to March 22; April 2 to April 6; April 8 to April 12; April 22 to April 27; April 29 to May 3; May 13 to May 18.

Final arguments will begin on May 20 and continue to late June. The Joint Review Panel has not yet announced the location for final arguments. The JRP refused to hold the questioning hearings in Kitimat, but some supporters of hearings in the larger locations did support that the idea that the final arguments be held, at least in part, in Kitimat. The final arguments just be completed by June 29, according to the JRP.

The JRP will begin its deliberations in July with the final report due on December 29, 2013.

Panel Commission Updated Hearing Schedule for 2013 (pdf)

New US pipeline safety report finds more problems with Enbridge, problems also found in other big pipeline companies

A new draft report for the U.S. Congress from the United States Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration takes new aim at Enbridge for failures in its pipeline leak detection and response system.

Not that the PHMSA is singling out Enbridge, the report is highly critical of leak detection systems on all petroleum and natural gas pipeline companies, saying as far as the United States is concerned, the current pipeline standards are inadequate.

The release of the “Leak Detection Report” written by Kiefner & Associates, Inc (KAI) a consulting firm based in Worthington, Ohio, comes at a critical time, just as Enbridge was defending how it detects pipeline leaks before the Joint Review Panel questioning hearings in Prince George, where today Enbridge executives were under cross-examination by lawyers for the province of British Columbia on how the leak detection system works.

In testimony on Wednesday, October 12, Enbridge engineers told the Joint Review Panel that the company’s pipelines are world-class and have a many prevention and detection systems.

Northern Gateway president John Carruthers testifed there is no way to eliminate all the risks but the company was looking for the best way of balancing benefits against the risk.

However, the KAI report points out that so far, all pipeline company cost-benefit analysis is limited by a short term, one to five year point of view, rather than looking at the entire lifecycle of a pipeline.

Two Enbridge spills, one the well-known case in Marshall Michigan which saw bitumen go into the Kalamazoo River and a second in North Dakota, both in 2010, are at the top of the list in the study for PHMSA by the consulting firm.

On the Marshall, Michigan spill the KAI report goes over and adds to many of the criticisms of Enbridge in the National Transportation Safety Report in July which termed the company’s response like the “Keystone Kops.”

The second spill, in Neche, North Dakota, which, unlike the Marshall spill, has had little attention from the media, is perhaps equally damning, because while Enbridge’s detection systems worked in that case–the KAI report calls it a “text book shutdown”– there was still a spill of 158,928 gallons (601,607 litres) of crude oil, the sixth largest hazardous liquid release reported in the United States [between 2010 and 2012] because Enbridge “did not plan adequately for containment.”

(The KAI report also examines problems with natural gas pipelines, including one by TransCanada Northern Border line at Campbell, Wyoming in February 2011. Northwest Coast Energy News will report on the natural gas aspects of the report in a future posting.)

The highly technical, 270-page draft report was released on September 28, as Enbridge was still under heavy criticism from the US National Transportation Safety Board report on the Marshall, Michigan spill and was facing penalties from the PHMSA for both the Marshall spill and a second in Ohio.

Looking at overall pipeline problem detection, KAI says the two standard industry pipeline Leak Detection Systems or LDS didn’t work very well. Between 2010 and 2012, the report found that Computational Pipeline Monitoring or CPMs caught just 20 per cent of leaks. Another system, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition or SCADAs caught 28 per cent.
Even within those acronym systems, the KAI report says major problem is a lack of industry standards. Different companies use different detector and computer systems, control room procedures and pipeline management.

The report also concludes that the pipeline industry as a whole depends far too much on internal detectors, both for economic reasons and because that’s what the industry has always done. External detectors, the report says, have a better track record in alerting companies to spills.

A significant number of spills are also first reported by the public or first responders, rather than through the pipeline company system and as KAI says of Enbridge, “Operators should not rely on the public to tell them a pipeline has ruptured.”

The consultants also say there are far too many false alarms in spill detection systems.

Although the KAI report concentrates on the United States, its report on Enbridge does raise serious questions about how the company could detect a pipeline breach or spill in the rugged northern British Columbia wilderness where the Northern Gateway Pipeline would be built, if approved by the federal government.

The report comes after the United States Congress passed The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act, which was signed into law by President Barack Obama on January 3, 2012. The law called on a new leak detection study to be submitted to Congress that examines the technical limitations of current leak detection systems, including the ability of the systems to detect ruptures and small leaks that are ongoing or intermittent. The act also calls on the US Department of Transportation to find out what can be done to foster development of better technologies and economically feasible ways of detecting pipeline leaks. The final report must be submitted to Congress by January 3, 2013.

(The draft report does note in some ways, Canadian standards for detecting pipeline leaks are better than those in the United States. For example, Canada requires some pipeline testing every year, the United States every five years. It also finds European pipeline monitoring regulations also surpass those in the United States).

The spills studied in the report all found weaknesses in one or more of those three areas: people, company procedures and the technology. It appears that the industry agrees, at least in principle, with executives telling the consultants:

The main identified technology gaps – including those identified by operators – include: reduction or management of false alarms; applicable technical standards and certifications; and value / performance indicators that can be applied across technologies and pipelines.

The report echoes many of the findings of the US National Transportation Safety Board in its examination of the Enbridge Marshall, Michigan spill but it applies to all pipeline companies, noting:

Integration using procedures is optimal when it is recognized that alarms from the technology are rarely black-and-white or on/off situations. Rather, at a minimum, there is a sequence: leak occurrence; followed by first detection; followed by validation or confirmation of a leak; followed by the initiation of a shutdown sequence. The length of time that this sequence should take depends on the reliability of the first detection and the severity of the consequences of the release. Procedures are critical to define this sequence carefully – with regard to the technology used, the personnel involved and the consequences – and carefully trained Personnel are needed who understand the overall system, including technologies and procedures.

We note that there is perhaps an over-emphasis of technology in LDS. A recurring theme is that of false alarms. The implication is that an LDS is expected to perform as an elementary industrial automation alarm, with an on/off state and six-sigma reliability. Any alarm that does not correspond to an actual leak is, with this thinking, an indicator of a failure of the LDS system.

Instead, multiple technical studies confirm that far more thought is required in dealing with leak alarms. Most technologies infer the potential presence of a leak via a secondary physical effect, for example an abnormal pressure or a material imbalance. These can often be due to multiple other causes apart from a leak.

The report takes a critical look at the culture of all pipeline companies which divides problems into leaks, ruptures and small seeps. Under both pipeline practice and the the way problems are reported to the PHMSA in the US a “rupture is a situation where the pipeline becomes inoperable.” While a rupture means that a greater volume of petroleum liquid or natural gas is released, and is a higher priority than a leak or seep, the use of language may mean that there is a lower priority given to those leaks and seeps than the crisis created by a rupture.

(Environmental groups in British Columbia have voiced concerns about the cumulative affect of small seeps from the Enbridge Northern Gateway that would be undetectable under heavy snow pack either by an internal system or by external observation)

Overall, the report finds serious flaws to the way pipeline companies are conducting leak detection systems at the moment, including:

Precisely the same technology, applied to two different pipelines, can have very different results.
Leak Detection Systems do not have performance measures that can be used universally across all pipelines. Compounding the problem are different computer systems where software, program configuration and parameter selection all contribute, in unpredictable ways, to overall performance.
Many performance measures present conflicting objectives. For example, leak detection systems that are highly sensitive to small amounts of lost hydrocarbons are also prone to generating more false alarms.
The performance of a leak detection system depends critically on the quality of the engineering design, care with installation, continuing maintenance and periodic testing.
Even though an internal technology may rely upon simple, basic principles, it is in fact, complex system that requires robust metering, robust SCADA and telecommunications, and a robust computer to perform the calculations. Each of these subsystems is individually complex.
Near the inlet and the outlet of the pipeline a leak leads to little or no change in pressure. Flow rates and pressures near any form of pumping or compression will generally be insensitive to a downstream leak
Differences in any one of these factors can have a dramatic impact on the ultimate value of a leak detection system.

The report goes on to say:

There is no technical reason why several different leak detection methods can not be implemented at the same time. In fact, a basic engineering robustness principle calls for at least two methods that rely on entirely separate physical principles.

The report strongly recommends that pipeline companies take a closer look at external leak detection systems. Even though the US Environmental Protection Agency began recommending the use of external detection as far back as 1988, the companies have resisted due to the cost of retrofitting the legacy pipeline network. (Of course if the pipeline companies had started retrofitting with external detectors in 1988 they would be now 24 years into the process).

KAI says:

External leak detection is both very simple – relying upon routinely installed external sensors that rely upon at most seven physical principles – and also confusing, since there is a wide range of packaging, installation options, and operational choices to be considered.
External leak detection sensors depend critically on the engineering design of their deployment and their installation.
External sensors have the potential to deliver sensitivity and time to detection far ahead of any internal system.
Most technologies can be retrofitted to existing pipelines. In general, the resistance to adopting external technologies is, nevertheless, that fieldwork on a legacy pipeline is relatively expensive.
The report goes on to identify major bureaucratic roadblocks within pipeline companies. Like many other big corporations, walls exist that prevent the system from working well
A particular organizational difficulty with leak detection is identifying who “owns” the leak detection system on a pipeline. A technical manager or engineer in charge is typically appointed, but is rarely empowered with global budgetary, manpower or strategic responsibilities. Actual ownership of this business area falls variously to metering, instrumentation and control, or IT.

The report calls for better internal standards at pipeline companies since with leak detection “one size does not necessarily fit all”.

It also notes that “flow metering is usually a central part of most internal leak detection systems,” but adds “flow meter calibration is by far the most laborious part of an internal system’s maintenance.

Also, the central computer and software technology usually has maintenance requirements far greater than most industrial automation and need special attention.”

While a company may do a cost benefit analysis of its leak detection system and risk reduction system it will generally emphasize the costs of the performance and engineering design of the leak detection system, the companies usually place less emphasis on the benefits of a robust system, especially the long term benefits.

At present the pipeline companies look at the benefit of leak detection as a reduction in risk exposure, or asset liability, “a hard, economic definition… understood by investors.” But the report adds that leak detection systems have a very long lifetime and over that life cycle, the cost-benefit approaches the reduction in asset liability caused by the system, when divided by annual operational costs. However, since pipeline companies budget on a one to five year system the long term benefit of robust, and possibly expensive spill detection is not immediately apparent.

Enbridge

The consultants studied 11 US oil spills, the top two with the greatest volume were from Enbridge pipelines. The others were from TE Products Pipeline, Dixie Pipeline, Sunoco, ExxonMobil, Shell, Amoco, Enterprise Products, Chevron and Magellan Pipeline. Not all US spills were used in the KAI report, the 11 were chosen for availability of data and documentation.

The largest spill in the KAI study was the pipeline rupture in Michigan at 843,444 gallon (3,158,714 litres) which has been the subject of continuing media, investigative and regulatory scrutiny. The second spill in North Dakota, has up to now received very little attention from the media. That will likely change once the US Congress gets the final report. Even though the Neche, North Dakota spill, has been described as “text book case” of a pipeline shutdown, there was still a large volume of oil released.

Marshall, Michigan spill

On the Marshall, Michigan spill that sent bitumen into the Kalamazoo River the report first goes over the facts of the 843,444 gallon spill and the subsequent release of a highly critical report from the US National Transportation Safety Board. It then looks at the failures of Enbridge’s detection system from the point of view mandated for the report to Congress:

The pipeline was shutting down when the ruptured occurred. Documentation indicates that a SCADA alarm did sound coincident with the most likely time of the rupture. It was dismissed. The line was shut down for around 10 hrs and crude oil would have drained from the line during this time.

On pipeline start up, alarms in the control room for the ruptured pipeline sounded. They were dismissed. This was repeated two more times. The pipeline was shut down when the control room was notified of the discharge of the crude oil by a member of the public. The time to shut down the pipeline is not relevant here because of the 17 hours that elapsed after the rupture occurred.

The review identified issues at Enbridge relevant to this Leak Detection Study:

1. Instrumentation on a pipeline that informs a controller what is happening to the pipeline must be definitive in all situations.
2. However, the instrumentation did provide warnings which went unheeded by controllers.
3. Instrumentation could be used to prevent a pump start up.
4. Operators should not rely on the public to tell them when a pipeline has ruptured.
5. Pipeline controllers need to be fully conversant with instrumentation response to different operations performed on the pipeline.
6. If alarms can be cancelled there is something wrong with the instrumentation feedback loop to the controller. This is akin to the low fuel warning on a car being turned off and ignored. The pipeline controller is part of an LDS and failure by a controller means the LDS has failed even if the instrumentation is providing correct alarms.
7. If the first SCADA alarm had been investigated, up to 10 hours of pipeline drainage to the environment might have been avoided. If the second alarm had been investigated, up to 7 hours of pumping oil at almost full capacity into the environment might have been avoided.
8. CPM systems are often either ignored or run at much higher tolerances during pipeline start ups and shutdowns, so it is probable that the CPM was inoperative or unreliable. SCADA alarms, on the other hand, should apply under most operating conditions.

Neche, North Dakota spill

At approximately 11:37 pm. local time, on January 8, 2010, a rupture occurred on Enbridge’s Line 2, resulting in the release of approximately 3000 barrels or 158,928 gallons of crude oil approximately 1.5 miles northeast of the town of Neche, North Dakota, creating the sixth largest spill in the US during the study period.

As the report notes, in this case, Enbridge’s detection system worked:

At 11:38 pm., a low-suction alarm initiated an emergency station cascade shutdown. At 11:40 pm., the Gretna station valve began closing. At 11:44 pm., the Gretna station was isolated. At 11:49 pm., Line 2 was fully isolated from the Gretna to Donaldson pump stations.

Documentation indicates a rapid shut down on a low suction alarm by the pipeline controller. From rupture to shut down is recorded as taking 4 minutes. The length of pipeline isolated by upstream and downstream remotely controlled valves was 220,862 feet. The inventory for this length of line of 26-inch diameter is 799,497 gallons. The release amount was around 20 per cent of the isolated inventory when the pipeline was shut down.

The orientation of the 50-inch long rupture in the pipe seam is not known. The terrain and elevation of the pipeline is not known. The operator took around 2 hours and 40 minutes to arrive on site. It is surmised that the rupture orientation and local terrain along with the very quick reactions by the pipeline controller may have contributed to the loss of around 20 per cent of the isolated inventory.

The controller was alerted by the SCADA. Although a CPM system was functional the time of the incident it did not play a part in detecting the release event. It did provide confirmation.

But the KAI review identified a number of issues, including the fact in item (7) Enbridge did not plan for for containment and that containment systems were “under-designed.”

1. This release is documented as a text book shut down of a pipeline based on a SCADA alarm.
2. The LDS did not play a part in alerting the pipeline controller according to
documentation. However, leak detection using Flow/Pressure Monitoring via SCADA
worked well.
3. Although a textbook shut down in 4 minutes is recorded, a large release volume still occurred.
4. The release volume of 158,928 gallons of crude oil is the sixth largest hazardous liquid release reported between January 1, 2010 and July 7, 2012.
5. The length of pipeline between upstream and downstream isolation valves is long at 41.8 miles.
6. If not already performed, the operator should review potential release volumes based on ruptures taking place at different locations on the isolated section.
7. The success of a leak detection system includes planning for the entire process: detection through shutdown through containment. In this case, the operator did not plan adequately for containment so that although the SCADA leak detection technology, the controller and the procedures worked well, the containment systems (isolation valves) were under-designed and placed to allow a very large spill.”

KAI Draft report on Leak Detection Systems at the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration website

Geological Survey of Canada identifies tsunami hazard, possible fault line on Douglas Channel

Fault zone map Douglas Chanel — A map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the line of a possible seismic fault on Douglas Channel (Geological Survey of Canada)

Updates with statement from Natural Resources Canada, new filings by Enbridge Northern Gateway and the Attorney General of Canada (in box below)

The Geological Survey of Canada has identified a tsunami hazard and a possible seismic fault in Douglas Channel near Kitimat. A scientific paper by the Geological Survey and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans says there were once two giant landslides on Douglas Channel that triggered major tsunamis and that the landslides were possibly caused by an earthquake on the fault line.

Kitimat is the proposed site of the Enbridge Northern Gateway project and at least three liquified natural gas projects.

If the projects go ahead, hundreds of supertankers with either bitumen or LNG will be sailing in the channel for years to come.

A filing by the Attorney General of Canada with the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel is asking the JRP for leave to file late written evidence long after the original deadline of December 2011. The Attorney General’s motion was filed on August 17, but went unnoticed until the Kitimat environmental group Douglas Channel Watch brought the matter up with District of Kitimat Council tonight (Sept. 17).

Appended to the Attorney General’s motion is a copy of a scientific paper from the Geological Survey “Submarine slope failures and tsunami hazards in coast British Columbia: Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm” by Kim W Conway, J.V. Barrie of the Geological Survey and Richard E. Thomson of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

The report says the scientists discovered “evidence of large submarine slope failures in southern Douglas Channel.”

It goes on to say: “The failures comprise blocks of bedrock and related materials that appear to have been detached directly from the near shore off Hawkesbury Island.” Hawkesbury Island and many of the other islands in Douglas Channel are built up with material left over from the ice age glaciers and thus are vulnerable to displacement and landslides.

The research identified two slides, one estimated at 32 million cubic metres and a second of 31 million cubic metres. The report goes on to say that the discovery of an “apparently active fault presents the possibility that they may have been triggered by ground motion or surface rupture of the fault during past earthquake events.”

The slope failure landslides are covered with thick layers of mud, and that, the scientists say, could mean that the failures could be ancient, possibly occurring 5.000 to 10,000 years ago. Further research is needed to confirm the date of the giant slides.

What is worrying about the discovery is that fact that there were two recent submarine slope failures on the Kitimat Arm of Douglas Channel. both creating tsunamis. The first slope failure occurred on October 17, 1974, triggering a 2.4 metre tsunami at low tide. Then on April 27, 1975 there was a second slope failure near low tide on the northeast slope of the Kitimat Arm that generated an 8.2 metre tsunami. The 1975 tsunami destroyed the Northland Navigation dock near Kitimat and damaged the Haisla First Nation docks at Kitamaat Village.

The paper says that “Additional geological research is required to better delineate the age of the submarine failures, their triggers, and their mechanisms of emplacement.”

Urgent new research is underway and the filing by the Attorney General says when the Department of Justice requested leave to file late evidence says it anticipates that the further research by DFO is expected to be completed by November 1. The Natural Resources Canada Earth Sciences Sector began a national assessment of submarine slope failures in Canada in late 2011 and completion of the Pacific portion of this assessment is targeted for December of 2012.

The Attorney General’s filing says that DFO is now modelling “potential wave heights and speeds that may have resulted from the two previously unrecognized submarine slope failures in the Douglas Channel.” The model will use high resolution scans of the Douglas Channel seafloor to create the models.

The survey of Douglas Channel in 2010 suggests the possible existence of a fault immediately to the south of the second ancient slide on Hawkesbury Island.

The GSC paper says that evidence for a continuous fault was observed by aligned stream beds and fractures on the south end of Hawkesbury Island, about four kilometers from the site of the second ancient slide. The possible fault then appears to terminate far to the south near Aristazabal Island on the Inside Passage. The Geological Survey says that eleven small earthquakes, all less than magnitude three, have appeared with 20 kilometres of the suspected fault over the past 25 years.

The paper says that the scientists conclude that the slides appear to have left very steep slopes at or near the shoreline that could be susceptible to future failure events.

A large potential slope failure has been identified near one of the ancient slides….

in the absence of additional evidence, the fault must be considered a potential trigger for the submarine failure events….the triggers for the failures have not been defined; however, their proximity to a potentially active fault represents one potential source. The failures probably generated tsunamis during emplacement and conditions exist for similar failures and associated tsunamis to occur along this segment of Douglas Channel in the future.

The scientists say that detailed tsunami modelling is underway to

provide an improved understanding of the generation, propagation, attenuation, and likely coastal inundation of tsunami waves that would have been created by slides… or that could be generated from similar future events. Only through the development and application of this type of tsunami modelling will it be possible to gauge the level of hazard posed by the identified submarine slope failures to shore installations and infrastructure, or to devise ways to effectively mitigate the impacts of future such events.

The filing by the Attorney General offers to bring the scientists to the Joint Review Panel to appear as witnesses sometime during the final hearings.

The filing notes that the current evidence tendered to the JRP by Enbridge, and other parties does demonstrate the potential for marine geohazards and associated tsunami events. Enbridge’s design of the proposed Northern Gateway marine terminal and its operational plans took into consideration the current state of knowledge of geohazards including earthquakes and tsunamis at the time of filing. Enbridge has said it would undertake further geological survey during the detailed design phase for the terminal.

At the time Natural Resources Canada noted that the information provided for the Environmental Review was sufficient at that time, now the Attorney General says:

the geographic scope for potential landslide induced tsunami hazards is now better understood to extend beyond the Kitimat Arm. NRCan and DFO seek by this motion to ensure that this Panel, and the Parties before the Panel, have the most up to date information on geohazards in the Douglas Channel.

Updates: DFO report in October will clarify the tsunamis in Douglas Channel.

Statement from Natural Resources Canada

Natural Resources Canada sent this statement to Northwest Coast Energy News on September 20, 2012.

In reference to the opening paragraph of your September 18th editorial entitled Geological Survey of Canada identifies tsunami hazard: Possible fault line on Douglas Channel, we would like to clarify the following. Although the ancient large submarine slope failures which our scientists have identified may have caused tsunamis, this is not a certainty. It is important to note that Fisheries and Oceans Canada is currently studying this information to model potential wave heights and speeds.

As our report states, only through the development and application of this type of tsunami modelling will it be possible to gauge the level of hazard posed by the identified submarine slope failures to shore installations and infrastructure, or to devise ways to effectively mitigate the impacts of future such events.

Northern Gateway response filed on August 31, 2012

Enbridge Northern Gateway filed this response to the Attorney General’s motion on August 31.

This motion of the Federal Government Participants requests permission to file late evidence consisting of a report entitled “Submarine Slope Failures and
Tsunami Hazard in Coastal British Columbia: Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm” regarding tsunami hazard and additional modelling work based on that report.

Northern Gateway does not object to the filing of this late intervenor evidence.
It may be relevant and Northern Gateway accepts that theevidence could not be filed earlier. However, Northern Gateway would like the opportunity to conductits own additional modelling work which it would be prepared to provide to DFO for comment prior to the filing of any modelling work by DFO in this proceeding.

Attorney General response to Enbridge on September 10, 2012.

The Attorney General of Canada responded to Enbridge by saying:

Attorney General responds DFo is prepared to await filing its subseqent modelling work in these proceedings until such time as it has received, reviewed and commented upon additional modelling work as proposed by NGP Inc.

DFO nots howeverand wishes to alert the JRP that the NGP INc proposed may occasion a delay in the filing of the DFO moedling work which is now proposed for filing on or about October 31, 2012. Delivery of DFO comments as requested will depend on when DFO received the NGP Inc modelling work, the time and resources required by DFO to study and provide comments on the NGP modelling work and unforeseen factors which may have an impact upon completion the commentary. As such,

DFO is prepared to file its modeling work on or about October 31, 2012, but subject to any further direction or request by the panel.

Map of Douglas Channel — Geological Survey of Canada map of Douglas Channel showing the area surveyed which discovered the landslides and possible fault line. (Geological Survey of Canada)

;

Map of slides at Kitimat — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the landslides on the Kitimat Arm which triggered tsunamis in 1974 and 1975 (Geological Survey of Canada)

;

Slide at Hawkesbury Island — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the giant slide on the southern tip of Hawkesbury Island. (Geological Survey of Canada)

;

Hawkesbury Island slide map — Map from the Geological Survey of Canada showing the second giant slide on the coast of Hawkesbury Island on Douglas Channel (Geological Survey of Canada)

Department_of_Justice Notice of Motion of the Attorney General of Canada Seeking to Tender Supplementary Written Evidence (pdf)

Submarine Slope Failures and Tsunami Hazard in Coastal British Columbia Douglas Channel and Kitimat Arm PDF

Enbridge faces $68,000 fine for not inspecting pipeline branch in Ohio

Enbridge is facing a new penalty from the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration for not inspecting a pipeline branch in Ohio and Michigan. The decision by the PHMSA comes just after a couple of days after the agency acknowledged that Enbridge had paid the civil penalty for the Marshall, Michigan oil spill with a wire transfer to the US Treasury of $3,699,200 on August 12. It was the Marshall pipeline breach and spill that led to bitumen entering the Kalamazoo River.

The new proposed penalty is much lower, just $68,000. It relates to the PHMSA inspection of Enbridge’s Toledo pipeline between July 12 and July 15, 2010.

The PHMSA says it found three alleged violations of federal pipeline safety regulations.

As well as the proposed civil penalty of $68,000, Enbridge Toledo is required to submit past records for inspections of subsequent overpressure safety devices and out-of-service tanks
The agency lists the violations as:

1. Failure to adequately inspect the right-of-way at a mainline valve location in Toledo as required by 49 CFR §195.412.
No proposed penalty — Warning Item.
1. Exceeding the maximum interval for inspection of 12 overpressure safety devices as required by 49 CFR §195.428.
Proposed penalty is $39,000 + PCO.
1. Exceeding the maximum interval for API 653 internal inspections of two breakout tanks located at Stockbridge, MI as required by 49 CFR §195.432.
Proposed penalty is $29,600 + PCO.

Enbridge can, if it wishes, challenge the NOPV (Notice of Possible Violation) in court. In the case of the original Marshall, Michigan, spill NOPV, Enbridge did not challenge the findings of the PHMSA and paid the penalty.

The new document sent to Enbridge by David Barrett, PHMSA Director, Central Region says that the company failed to perform internal inspections or establish a corrosion rate for the bottom plates of its tanks within the 10 year period as required by US regulations. It also says Enbridge failed to demonstrate that they had established a basis for the corrosion rate for the tank bottoms and exceeded the 10 year maximum internal inspection interval for unknown corrosion rates.

Additionally, Enbridge did not have similar service experience, or procedures to apply similar service experience available to make this inspection interval determination.

The PHMSA also says that Enbridge Enbridge failed to inspect its overpressure safety devices at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year. The inspection intervals exceeded the maximum 15 month interval by 14-24 days for the overpressure safety devices listed int the order.

The compliance order calls for Enbridge to submit documentation of all inspections performed on
each of the tanks and overpressure devices listed in the PHMSA order from 2010 to present. Enbridge has to internally inspect each of the tanks and to submit to the PHMSA documentation on the “safety improvement costs” needed to comply with the order.

As for the Marshall, Michigan spill, while Enbridge promptly paid the civil penalty, the PHMSA order notes

This Order does not resolve any existing or potential civil or criminal liability that Enbridge may have for any other violations of the federal Pipeline Safety Laws, or any regulations or orders issued thereunder, not specifically enumerated herein. Further, this Order does not resolve any existing or potential civil or criminal liability that Enbridge may have for violations ofany other federal laws arising from or otherwise related to the events or conduct giving rise to this Order or
to the consequences or damages resulting from the Failure.

Link: PHMSA Inspection of Enbridge (Toledo) Pipeline Results in NOPV and Civil Penalty

PHMSA Final Order Marshall Michigan spill PDF

What is it about Douglas Channel islands? Now a US agency has added a “Douglas Island”

US FERC Map of LNG terminals in North America — Map from the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission showing LNG export terminal projects in North America (FERC)

What is it about the islands in Douglas Channel? First, Enbridge gets in to a lot of hot water, so to speak, for erasing the islands in Douglas Channel in an animation promoting the Northern Gateway Pipeline. See for example The Vancouver Sun on back on Aug. 16, 2012, when it picked up a story from the Times Colonist – Enbridge map sinks islands, angers critics. The controversial video segment showed Douglas Channel wide open for navigation, rather than marked with about one thousand square kilometres of mountainous islands. This map, created by the Leadnow.ca and Sumofus.org websites was widely used by the media to show the difference. Enbridge later amended its video with a disclaimer that it is “broadly representational.” A video by Shortt and Epic Productions “This is Not An Enbridge animation” showing the beauty of northwestern BC quickly went viral.

As this was happening, the United States government Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a map that shows Liquified Natural Gas import and export terminals across North America, a map that adds an island to the Channel–“Douglas Island.”

In fact, the map manages to get a lot about Canadian LNG projects wrong. It locates the BC LNG project on the non-existent Douglas Island. The company’s name Douglas Channel Energy Partnership actually gives the proper location this way

south of the Moon Bay Marina, within the District of Kitimat and the asserted traditional territory of the Haisla Nation. The site is approximately 10 km southwest of Kitimat and 7 km north of Bees Cove Indian Reserve 6 (Bish Cove)

The small cove where BCLNG will put its barges to create the LNG is often locally called North Cove.

The FERC map also misplaces the Shell LNG project, now known as LNGCanada, in Prince Rupert, even though Shell confirmed the Kitimat location on May 15, 2012. It also calls it Prince Rupert Island, although the town of Prince Rupert is actually located on Kaien Island.

The map does apparently get the KM LNG project somewhat correct, attributing it to Apache Canada, but leaving off Apache’s partners, Encana and EOG.

The map recently also appeared on the website of Oregon Public Broadcasting in an article Five Keys To The Pacific Northwest’s Natural Gas Export Debate by reporter Amelia Templeton, which outlines the growing controversy over the plans to export US LNG through Coos Bay, Oregon via the Jordan Cove Project.

It appears that in Oregon, the Coos Bay LNG project is becoming as controversial as the Northern Gateway project is in Canada.

The issues outlined by Templeton include the threat of expropriation (called “eminent domain” in the US and also a key issue in the debate over the Keystone XL pipeline on the plains). There are arguments on jobs versus the environment, especially the perceived threat to wild rivers and salmon spawning grounds. Finally one issue that is lower on the agenda in northwestern BC but a big worry in Oregon, the potential for a devastating earthquake along the Cascadia fault.

During the NEB hearings on the KM LNG (Apache/EOG/Encana) project in June, 2011, many of the “expert” witnesses urged that that first Kitimat project go ahead quickly because of perceived competition from Oregon.

Unlike in Oregon, LNG projects are generally perceived positively in the northwest and all three are going ahead, although not as quickly as originally planned due to market volatility among prime potential customers in Asia.

Harper government reserves Gateway environmental decision for the cabinet, sets Dec. 31, 2013 deadline for JRP

The future of the Northern Gateway project is now completely in the hands of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s cabinet.

Today, Friday, August 3, 2012, Environment Minister Peter Kent used the provisions of what the Harper government calls the Jobs, Growth and Long Term Prosperity Act (former Bill C-38) to set a final deadline for a report from the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel on December 31, 2013 and reserve the final environmental decision for the Governor-in-Council.

Today’s move, in effect, is the final gutting of the Joint Review Process, making it irrelevant, since, as long suspected, the government will now make the decision on its own.

The Joint Review Panel no longer has the power to reject the Northern Gateway on environmental grounds, that is now solely up to the Harper cabinet. Once the Gateway project is approved, as expected, the NEB has been ordered to issue the approval certificate within seven days.

By releasing the news on a Friday afternoon before a holiday weekend, the Harper government spin doctors through Environment Minister Peter Kent have also pulled the classic government move of releasing bad news when it will least be noticed.

There is also the new agreement between the Ministry of Environment and the National Energy Board. The revised memorandum of agreement says:

The Governor in Council will make the decision on the environmental assessment (whether the project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects and if, so whether such effects are justified in the circumstances). The Governor in Council will decide, by order, whether the board should issue a certificate and will give reasons for the order.

Under the act, the NEB now has to file its environmental assessments within 543 days of the act coming into force, hence the imposed deadline.

If there are no excluded periods this would mean that the environmental assessment and report must be submitted no later than Dec. 31, 2013.

The final paragraph of Kent’s letter also says

If the Project is approved by the Governor in Council, the NEB will issue the certificate of public convenience and necessity within seven days of the Governor in Council’s order.

That’s a clear indication that the Harper government still intends at this point to fast track the Northern Gateway project.

Apart from giving the most environment unfriendly cabinet in Canadian history the decision power, most of the memorandum of agreement are legalistic changes necessary to bring the former agreement into compliance with the new law.

The environmental sections of the agreement, based on the amendments to the Environmental Assessment act have a couple of interesting points

any change that the project may cause in the environment, including any change it may cause in listed wildlife species as critical habitat or residences of that species….

Although the memo goes on to say

any change to the project that may be caused by the environment whether such change or effect occurs within or outside Canada

While this may be simply legalistic language, given the overall tone of the Harper government’s policy, especially the changes in the Fisheries Act that only protects fish habitat when it affects commercial species, one has to wonder if the emphasis on listed (that is threatened or endangered) species is again a narrowing of the criterion for approving the pipeline.

The second phrase is also ambiguous, seemingly to imply that the environment could be to blame for any problems the project may face. Opponents have long pointed out that the environmental conditions and risks such as geologic instability along the pipeline route and the heavy weather in the waters off British Columbia are factors that increase the danger of an oil spill event whether on land or sea. However, the new agreement presents an almost Orwellian scenario that would blame the environment, an “Act of God” in insurance terms, rather than the company or the government for any future disaster.

The main phrase in the agreement “whether such effects are justified in the circumstances” clearly indicates that the Harper government is fully prepared to ignore the environmental fallout of the Northern Gateway project and so the stage is set for a much wider political battle.

Peter Kent letter to JRP concerning the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project (pdf)

Amendment to the Agreement concerning the Joint Review of the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project (pdf)

US pipeline agency slams Enbridge, calls for independent oversight of Wisconsin cleanup

The US agency that looks after pipelines, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, has issued an updated “Corrective Action Order” on the oil spill at Grand Marsh in Wisconsin, slamming Enbridge because the company’s “integrity management program may be inadequate.”

The order goes on to say:

PHMSA has communicated its longstanding concerns about this pattern of failures with Respondent [Enbridge] over the past several years. Given the nature, circumstances, and gravity ofthis pattern of accidents, additional corrective measures are warranted.

The Corrective Order tells Enbridge to file its cleanup plans with the PHMSA and to have its actions checked by an independent, outside agency.

Before the PHMSA allows Enbridge to restart Line 14, which runs from Superior, Wisconsin, to Mokena, Illinois, and is a part of the 1,900 mile-long Lakehead Pipeline system, which transports “hazardous liquid” from Neche, North Dakota, to Chicago, Illinois, with an extension to Buffalo,

Enbridge must (1) submit, for review and approval, a comprehensive written plan, including timelines for specific actions to improve the safety record of Respondent’s Lakehead pipeline system and (2) hire an independent third party pipeline expert to review and assess the written plan, which the third party will submit to PHMSA and to Respondent concurrently. Further, the third party expert must oversee the creation, execution and implementation of the actions identified in the plan, and must provide monitoring summaries to PHMSA and Respondent concurrently. Respondent must commit to address any deficiencies or risks identified in the third party’s assessment, including repair and replacement of high-risk infrastructure. The plan must be sufficiently detailed with specific tasks, milestones and completion dates.

At a minimum, the plan must address:
a. Organizational issues, including the promotion of a safety culture and creation of
a safety management system;
b. Facilities response plan;
c.Control room management;
d.Priorities for pipe replacement;
e.Training;
f.In-line inspection result interpretation;
g.Current engineering and probability of failure modeling;
h.Leak detection systems;
1.Sensor and flow measuring and valve replacement;
J.Integrity verification;
k.Quality management system; and
1.Any other risk, task, issue or item that is necessary to promote and sustain the
safety ofits pipeline system.

The agency notes also that

After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may identify other corrective actions that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any additional measures required and further amendment of the CAO will be considered. To the extent consistent with safety.

The order says Enbridge will be given an opportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.

The PHMSA Corrective Order was issued about the same time as Canada’s National Energy Board announced that it was conducting its own safety audit of Enbridge operations.

PHMSA Amended Corrective Action Order_08012012

Gateway JRP denies request from Nathan Cullen to hold hearings in Kitimat

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel today denied a request from Skeena Bulkley Valley MP to reconsider its decision not to hold the questioning round of final hearings in Kitimat. The JRP is still reserving its decision on locations for final arguments.

The panel had previously decided to hold those hearings in Prince Rupert, Prince George and Edmonton.

In its ruling on Cullen’s request, the JRP said:

Your request for the Panel to reconsider its decision on the locations for the questioning phase of the final hearings did not contain any new information that was not considered by the Panel in its original determination. As such, your request is denied. The Panel further notes that no decision has been made with respect to the location for the final hearings for final argument. As indicated in Procedural Direction #8, these locations will be announced at a later date.

Cullen had also asked to be allowed to question government participants in the hearing. That request was also denied because filed the request after the deadline. Cullen also plans to question Northern Gateway witnesses and so the JRP reminded him that:

In accordance with the Panel’s letter of 25 July 2012, you are reminded that the names of the witnesses or witness panels you intend to question and an estimate of how much time you will need to question each party or witness panel is to be submitted by 3 August 2012.

Province of BC refuses to provide witnesses for Gateway Joint Review hearings

The province of British Columbia has refused requests from some of the intervenors in the Northern Gateway Joint Review to provide witnesses for cross-examination during the final stages of the hearings.

In a letter to the JRP dated on July 20, and posted recently on the JRP website, Christopher Jones, counsel for the province in the hearings says: “I write only to note that the province is an intervnor, not a government participant. Also as the province has not filed evidence, it will not be providing witnesses for cross-examination at the final hearings.”

It was just four days later that Premier Christy Clark and members of her cabinet, in releasing the Liberal government’s five conditions for the Northern Gateway project which called for “Successful completion of the environmental review process.” The provincial government has consistently refused to take part in the proceedings, and with the credibility of the Joint Review process already under question because of the limitations on reviews in Stephen Harper’s Bill C-38, BC’s continued refusal to participate can only further undermine that credibility.

Province of British Columbia Questioning at Final Hearings (pdf)

New US report slams Enbridge for spill record, as scientific investigation opens into diluted bitumen

A new US report is slamming Enbridge for its record on oil spills, just as the BC government set out strict new conditions for building pipelines and tanker traffic in the province.

The United States National Wildlife Association issued a report today called Importing Disaster, The Anatomy of Once and Future Oil Spills. (pdf of report at the bottom of this page)

At the same time, the US Academy of Sciences has opened a new investigation into diluted bitumen.

A letter critical of Enbridge, previously overlooked by the US media is getting new traction, as the anniversary of the Marshall, Michigan, Kalamazoo River spill approaches on July 25.

Enbridge, so far, has not responded to the National Wildlife Federation report.

The environmental group opens the report by saying:

As the biggest transporter of Canadian tarsands oil into the U.S., Enbridge has aresponsibility to the American public to manage their operations in a manner that protects our comm unities and natural resources. But tarsands oil is a very different beast than conventional crude oil, and it is difficult to transport the former safely through pipelines that were designed for the latter. That’s because tarsands oil is more corrosive(due to its chemical mixture)and abrasive(due to high-gritminerals), weakening the pipes to the point that they are more susceptible t oleaks and ruptures. Remarkably, there are no standards in place to ensure that new pipelines are built, maintained and operated with this fact in mind.

The National Wildlife Association goes on to say:

fossil fuel companies have a ‘stranglehold’ on our political establishment, preventing even modest initiatives that could make our energy safer and cleaner. That lobby strategy keeps in place a system that’s led to 804 spills by Enbridge alone in the last decade, and a total of 6,781,950 gallons of oil spilled in the U.S. and Canada.

“Rather than focus on safety and cleanup, Enbridge is recklessly moving ahead with plans to expand their pipeline network in the Great Lakes region and the Northeast, and to double down on high carbon fuel that is proving nearly impossible to clean from Michigan’s waters,” said Beth Wallace, NWF’s Great Lakes outreach advisor.

NWF’s report recommends comprehensive reforms to break the cycle of spills and pollution that continue to threaten communities and speed global warming. Among them, the report calls for stronger safety standards that account for increased dangers associated with heavy tar sands oil, increasing investment in clean energy and efficiency, and campaign and lobbying reforms that would put impacted citizens on a level playing field with Big Oil in the halls of Congress.

The NWF report then says:

The Kalamazoo spill may have been a poster child for corporate negligence but it is far from the company’s only black mark. According to Enbridge’s own reports, between 1999 and 2010, they have been responsible for at least 800 spills that have released close to seven million gallons of heavy crude oil into the environment — or approximately half the amount of oil that spilled from the Exxon Valdez in 1989.

Canada has seen its own share of Enbridge heartache, including a 61,000 gallon spill earlier this summer near Elk Point, Alberta.

The National Wildlife Federation report is calling for stronger pipeline safety standards that account for the dangers of transporting bitumen sands oil from Canada amd wants more rigorous reviews of all pipeline projects. The report calls bitumen sands oil “the planet’s dirtiest oil.”

US media covering the National Wildlife release and looking to the anniversary of the Kalamazoo disaster, are now quoting an overlooked letter from the US advocacy group Public Citizen issued on June 25.

Concerned about Keystone XL pipeline, the advocacy group sent a letter to the Texas House of Representatives, recommending that the state should not wait for US federal rules to prevent tar sands pipeline spills. Public Citizen called the industry’s track record “troubled” and asked the committee to take up legislation that would give Texas broader authority over pipelines.

The committee will examine state regulations governing oil and gas well construction and integrity, as well as pipeline safety and construction, to determine what changes should be made to ensure that the regulations adequately protect the public. Public Citizen will testify in support of stronger rules for the Seaway pipeline (an existing line repurposed to carry tar sands instead of crude oil), the Keystone pipeline (whose southern leg is not yet built) and proposed future tar sands pipelines.

“These companies keep calling it petroleum, but it’s not – these are pipelines of poison,” said Tom “Smitty” Smith, director of Public Citizen’s Texas office.

The media reports on the NWF release are pointing to a new investigation by the US National Academy of Sciences on the safety of diluted bitmenl safety in the United States, that will be part of a report to the US Congress

An ad hoc committee will analyze whether transportation of diluted bitumen (dilbit) by transmission pipeline has an increased risk of release compared with pipeline transportation of other liquid petroleum products. Should the committee determine that increased risk exists, it will complete a comprehensive review of federal hazardous liquid pipeline facility regulations to determine whether they are sufficient to mitigate the increased risk.

On June 25, the committee added three industry experts to the panel as there is growing scrutiny over dilbit in the US, which could become an issue in the presidential race.

NWF Enbridge Oil Spill (PDF)