Tag: hearings

Two JRP conditions are already outdated, Cullen says

Skeena Bulkley Valley MP Nathan Cullen says at least two of the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel’s 209 conditions may already be outdated.

In a news release January 15, 2013, Cullen said, “The requirement of $950 million in spill insurance was recently called into question as reports surfaced of cleanup costs at the sites of Enbridge’s 2010 Michigan spill surpassing $1.035 billion.”

The $1.035 billion figure was contained in Enbridge’s American arm, Enbridge Energy Partners, latest filing for the third quarter over 2013 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Cullen went to say that, “The JRP’s order for Enbridge to carry out new research on the behaviour of diluted in bitumen in a marine environment has been questioned following the publication of an Environment Canada study confirming that diluted bitumen will sink in saltwater in high waves and where sediment is present.”

Cullen is referring to a study by Environment Canada Emergencies Science and Technology,Fisheries and Oceans Canada Centre for Offshore Oil, Gas and Energy Research and Natural Resoures Canada on bitumen that was completed in November and released this week.

The study found

. Like conventional crude oil, both diluted bitumen products floated on saltwater (free of sediment), even after evaporation and exposure to light and mixing with water;
. When fine sediments were suspended in the saltwater, high-energy wave action mixed the sediments with the diluted bitumen, causing the mixture to sink or be dispersed as floating tarballs;
(The use of the term “tarball” in this report follows convention in the literature and refers to the consistency of floating, heavily-weathered oil. It does not describe the chemical composition of the product.)
. Under conditions simulating breaking waves, where chemical dispersants have proven effective with conventional crude oils, a commercial chemical dispersant (Corexit 9500) had quite limited effectiveness in dispersing dilbit;
. Application of fine sediments to floating diluted bitumen was not effective in helping to disperse the products;
. The two diluted bitumen products display some of the same behaviours as conventional petroleum products (i.e. fuel oils and conventional crude oils), but also significant differences, notably for the rate and extent of evaporation.

Read the report:Properties, Composition and Marine Spill Behaviour, Fate and Transport of Two Diluted Bitumen Products from the Canadian Oil Sands (pdf)
The Joint Review Panel found that dilbit was “ no more likely to sink to the bottom than other
heavier oils”

The Panel acknowledges the variety of opinions from experts regarding the behavior and fate of oil spilled in aquatic environments. These experts generally agreed that the ultimate behavior and fate of the oil would depend on a number of factors, including the volume of oil spilled, the physical and chemical characteristics of the product, and the environmental conditions at the time.

The Panel finds that likely oil behaviour and potential response options can be predicted from knowledge of the type of oil spilled and its physical and chemical characteristics. Details of oil behaviour and response options cannot be specified until the actual circumstances of a spill are known.

The Panel is of the view that, if placed along a spectrum of: tendency to submerge; persistence; and recovery difficulty, dilbit would be on the higher end of the spectrum, similar to other heavy oil products.

The Panel accepts evidence from previous spills showing that, in response to circumstances at the time, the behaviour of heavier oils, including conventional oils and synthetic crudes, can be dynamic. Some oil floats, some sinks, and some is neutrally buoyant and subject to submergence and overwashing.

Although the project would transport different types of oil, the majority of the evidence presented during the hearing process focussed on whether dilbit is likely to sink when spilled in an aquatic environment. In light of this, the Panel has chosen to focus its views on dilbit. The Panel heard that the fate and behaviour of dilbit has not been studied as much as that of other oils.

Although there is some uncertainty regarding the behavior of dilbit spilled in water, the Panel finds that the weight of evidence indicates that dilbit is no more likely to sink to the bottom than other heavier oils with similar physical and chemical properties.

The Panel finds that dilbit is unlikely to sink due to natural weathering processes alone, within the time frame in which initial, on-water response may occur, or in the absence of sediment or other particulate matter interactions. The Panel finds that a dilbit spill is not likely to sink as a continuous layer that coats the seabed or riverbed.

“It hasn’t even been a month since the JRP released their 209 conditions, and it seems like we’re already seeing some of them become obsolete,” Cullen said.

“Throughout the review process, the JRP continually ignored the situation in Michigan as it unfolded before our eyes. They saw the spill caused by Enbridge’s negligence, which was worsened by Enbridge’s incompetence, and how it brought untold damage to the local ecosystem and cost over $1 billion US. But the 209 conditions didn’t reflect what we learned about Enbridge’s history or its culture, or what we’ve learned about diluted bitumen at all.”

The Joint Review process was set up to deliver a positive verdict, according to Cullen, regardless of what the real life case studies in Michigan had already shown. “To say that it won’t cost as much – if not more – to respond to a spill in a remote corner of northwestern BC during winter than it was in Michigan in the middle of July is ridiculous,” Cullen said.

“What’s even more astonishing is that we asked repeatedly for these studies on the behaviour of diluted bitumen in the marine environment to be part of the Joint Review Panel’s assessment. That the government waited until after the JRP had given its conditional yes to release these findings is not only appalling but also highly suspect.

Cullen says there are two key questions that the Harper government now must answer. “What kind of protection is the government providing when it lowballs on the insurance for oil spills? And what kind of oversight is it giving Canadians when the verdict is given before the evidence is released?”

 

Enbridge’s Michigan cleanup costs now exceed JRP pipeline conditions for Gateway, SEC filing shows

NTSB staff examine ruptured pipe
US National Transportation Safety Board staff examine a ruptured pipe from the Enbridge oil spill in August, 2010. The photo was released by the NTSB May 21, 2012. (NTSB)

The costs for Enbridge to clean up the 2010 Marshall, Michigan oil spill now far exceeds the maximum estimate that the Joint Review Panel gave for a major spill on the Northern Gateway Pipeline and also exceeds the amount of money the JRP ordered Enbridge to set aside to deal with a spill. Enbridge’s cleanup costs have also now edged past the higher liability amount requested by the Haisla Nation.

According to the US firm Enbridge Energy Partners’ filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, as of September 30, 2013, the cost of cleanup was $1.035 billion US, not including possible additional fines and penalties that might be imposed by US authorities in the future.

In its decision, the Joint Review Panel estimated the cost a major oil spill from the Northern Gateway project would be about $693 million.  As part of the 209 conditions, the JRP ordered Enbridge to set aside “financial assurances” totaling $950 million.

Note all costs in this article are for a pipeline breach. The Joint Review Panel had different estimates for a tanker spill and the liability rules for marine traffic are different from pipelines.

In its filing for the third quarter of 2013, with the SEC, Enbridge Energy Partners say that the cost up until September 2013 had “exceed[ed] the limits of our insurance coverage.” The same filing says that Enbridge is in a legal dispute with one its insurers.

In its SEC filing, Enbridge says:

Lakehead Line 6B Crude Oil Release
We continue to perform necessary remediation, restoration and monitoring of the areas affected by the Line 6B crude oil release. All the initiatives we are undertaking in the monitoring and restoration phase are intended to restore the crude oil release area to the satisfaction of the appropriate regulatory authorities.
As of September 30, 2013, our total cost estimate for the Line 6B crude oil release is $1,035.0 million, which is an increase of $215.0 million as compared to December 31, 2012. This total estimate is before insurance recoveries and excluding additional fines and penalties which may be imposed by federal, state and local governmental agencies, other than the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, civil penalty of $3.7 million, we paid during the third quarter of 2012. On March 14, 2013, we received an order from the EPA, or the Environmental Protection Agency, which we refer to as the Order, that defined the scope which requires additional containment and active recovery of submerged oil relating to the Line 6B crude oil release. We submitted our initial proposed work plan required by the EPA on April 4, 2013, and we resubmitted the workplan on April 23, 2013. The EPA approved the Submerged Oil Recovery and Assessment workplan, or SORA, with modifications on May 8, 2013. We incorporated the modification and submitted an approved SORA on May 13, 2013. The Order states that the work must be completed by December 31, 2013.

The $175.0 million increase in the total cost estimate during the three month period ending March 31, 2013, was attributable to additional work required by the Order. The $40.0 million increase during the three month period ending June 30, 2013 was attributable to further refinement and definition of the additional dredging scope per the Order and associated environmental, permitting, waste removal and other related costs. The actual costs incurred may differ from the foregoing estimate as we complete the work plan with the EPA related to the Order and work with other regulatory agencies to assure that our work plan complies with their requirements. Any such incremental costs will not be recovered under our insurance policies as our costs for the incident at September 30, 2013 exceeded the limits of our insurance coverage.

According to the SEC filing, the breakdown of costs include $2.6 million paid to owners of homes adversely impacted by the spill.

Despite the efforts we have made to ensure the reasonableness of our estimates, changes to the recorded amounts associated with this release are possible as more reliable information becomes available. We continue to have the potential of incurring additional costs in connection with this crude oil release due to variations in any or all of the categories described above, including modified or revised requirements from regulatory agencies in addition to fines and penalties as well as expenditures associated with litigation and settlement of claims.
The material components underlying our total estimated loss for the cleanup, remediation and restoration associated with the Line 6B crude oil release include the following:
(in millions)

Response Personnel & Equipment  $454

Environmental Consultants  $193

Professional, regulatory and other $388

Total $ 1,035

For the nine month periods ended September 30, 2013 and 2012, we made payments of $62.3 million and $120.9 million, respectively, for costs associated with the Line 6B crude oil release. For the nine month period ended September 30, 2013, we recognized a $2.6 million impairment for homes purchased due to the Line 6B crude oil release which is included in the “Environmental costs, net of recoveries” on our consolidated statements of income. As of September 30, 2013 and December 31, 2012, we had a remaining estimated liability of $265.9 million and $115.8 million, respectively.

As for insurance, Enbridge Energy Partners say:

The claims for the crude oil release for Line 6B are covered by the insurance policy that expired on April 30, 2011, which had an aggregate limit of $650.0 million for pollution liability. Based on our remediation spending through September 30, 2013, we have exceeded the limits of coverage under this insurance policy. During the third quarter 2013, we received $42.0 million of insurance recoveries for a claim we filed in connection with the Line 6B crude oil release and recognized as a reduction to environmental cost in the second quarter of 2013. We recognized $170.0 million of insurance recoveries as reductions to “Environmental costs, net of recoveries” in our consolidated statements of income for the three and nine month periods ended September 30, 2012 for the Line 6B crude oil release. As of September 30, 2013, we have recorded total insurance recoveries of $547.0 million for the Line 6B crude oil release, out of the $650.0 million aggregate limit. We expect to record receivables for additional amounts we claim for recovery pursuant to our insurance policies during the period that we deem realization of the claim for recovery to be probable.

In March 2013, we and Enbridge filed a lawsuit against the insurers of our remaining $145.0 million coverage, as one particular insurer is disputing our recovery eligibility for costs related to our claim on the Line 6B crude oil release and the other remaining insurers assert that their payment is predicated on the outcome of our recovery with that insurer. We received a partial recovery payment of $42.0 million from the other remaining insurers and have since amended our lawsuit, such that it now includes only one insurer. While we believe that our claims for the remaining $103.0 million are covered under the policy, there can be no assurance that we will prevail in this lawsuit.

 

The Joint Review, Enbridge and Michigan

The Joint Review Panel based its finding on the Marshall, Michigan spill on the figure of $767 million from the summer of 2012 –again showing the limitations of the JRP’s evidentiary deadlines since the costs are now much higher.

The JRP quoted Enbridge as saying:

Northern Gateway considered the high costs of the Marshall, Michigan spill, which were at least $252,000 per cubic metre ($40,000 per barrel), to be an outlier or a rare event because the spill occurred in a densely populated area, because the pipeline’s response time was abnormally long, and because there was the prospect of potentially lengthy legal proceedings.

Enbridge assured the JRP that the corporate culture and management changes and equipment upgrades since the Marshall, Michigan spill lowered that chances of a similar event.

The company based its models for the JRP on much smaller spills, including one spill at Lake Wabamun, Alberta from a train not a pipeline (Vol. 2 p 357)

Enbridge’s risk assessment did not “generate an estimate of economic losses caused
by a spill.”

The JRP says Northern Gateway relied on its analysis of literature, and spill events experienced by Enbridge and other liquid hydrocarbon carriers in Alberta and British Columbia. After assessing all of this information, Northern Gateway regarded the high costs of a cleanup as “conservative”–meaning the company expects costs to be lower than its estimates in evidence before the JRP.

In Northern Gateway’s view the most costly pipeline spill incident would be a full-bore oil pipeline rupture, with an estimated cost of $200 million, and an extremely low probability of occurrence.

Haisla evidence

In their evidence, the Haisla (and other First Nations and intervenors) were doubtful about Northern Gateway’s assurances. The Haisla asked that Enbridge have a minimum of $1 billion in liability, an amount Enbridge has now exceeded in Michigan.

Haisla Nation estimated the cost of damage to ecosystem services because of a terrestrial oil spill from Northern Gateway’s pipeline would be in the range of $12,000 to $610 million for a 30-year period.

The Haisla’s cost estimates were based on values for environmental goods and services and probabilities of spills that were independent of Northern Gateway’s parameters for estimating oil spill costs. In contrast to Northern Gateway’s estimated spill frequency and costs, the Haisla predicted that spills would occur more often and placed a higher value on damages to environmental goods and services.

Haisla Nation argued that Northern Gateway overestimated its ability to detect and respond to a spill. In the Haisla’s view this resulted in the cost of a spill and the requisite financial assurances being understated. Haisla cited several factors, including: remote location, limited access, challenging terrain, seasonal conditions, and river flow conditions that would cause the cost of cleaning up a spill in the Kitimat River valley to be significantly greater than the costs associated with Enbridge’s Marshall, Michigan spill.

For these reasons, Haisla proposed that Northern Gateway should be required to obtain a minimum of $1 billion of liability coverage through insurance and financial assurances. Haisla said that Northern Gateway should file annually the report from an independent third party assessing the financial assurances plan. (Vol 2 p359)

In response Northern Gateway said:

Northern Gateway said that Haisla’s findings were based on a number of fundamental methodological flaws and a lack of probability analysis to support the high frequency of occurrence of oil spill events. Northern Gateway argued that Haisla’s estimates of ecosystem service values were inflated because they were based on values from unrelated studies. In Northern Gateway’s view, Haisla relied on high passive use values that were not justified.

JRP ruling

As it has in most of its decision, the JRP accepted Northern Gateway’s evidence, including its explanation of the Marshall, Michigan spill and then went on to base its spill cost estimates not on a pipeline breach but on the 2005 railway spill at Lake Wabumum, near White Sands, Alberta.

The Panel accepts that the cleanup costs for the Marshall, Michigan spill were orders of magnitude higher because of the extended response time. In this application, the Panel accepts Northern Gateway’s commitment to complete the shutdown in no more than 13 minutes after detection. For this reason the Panel did not use the Marshall spill costs in its calculations. The spill volume and the resulting costs are directly dependent on the Northern Gateway’s control room staff and the pipeline control system fully closing the adjacent block valves no longer than 13 minutes from the detection of an alarm event, as well as the amount of oil which would drain out of the pipeline after valve closure due to elevation differences.

The Panel decided on a total unit cost of $138,376 per cubic metre ($22,000 per barrel). This is midway between the unit cost of $88,058 per cubic metre ($14,000) per barrel proposed by Northern Gateway and the unit cost of $188,694 per cubic metre ($30,000 per barrel) for the Lake Wabamun spill. It is about one-half of the Marshall spill’s unit cost. Giving weight to the Lake Wabamun costs recognizes actual costs experienced in a Canadian spill and the greater costs of spills in high consequence areas. In these areas, individuals, populations, property, and the environment would have a high sensitivity to hydrocarbon spills. The deleterious effects of the spill would increase with the spill volume, the extent of the spill, and the difficulty in accessing the spill area for cleanup and remediation.

Using these spill volume and unit cost values in the calculation below, the Panel estimated the total cost of a large spill could be $700 million. Total cost of a spill = 31,500 barrels x $22,000 per barrel = $693 million, or $700 million when rounded up.

(p362)

The Panel based the financial assurances requirements for Northern Gateway on a spill with a total estimated cost of $700 million and directs Northern Gateway to develop a financial assurances plan with a total coverage of $950 million that would include the following components:
i. Ready cash of $100 million to cover the initial costs of a spill;
ii. Core coverage of $600 million that is made up of stand-alone, third party liability insurance and other appropriate financial assurance instruments, and
iii. Financial backstopping via parental, other third party guarantees, or no fault insurance of at least $250 million to cover costs that exceed the payout of components i. and ii.
The financial backstopping would be available to fill the gap if the spill volumes or unit costs were under-estimated or if the payout from the core coverage would be less than 100 per cent.

The Panel noted that:

The evidence indicates that there is some probability that a large oil spill may occur at some time over the life of the project. In these circumstances the Panel must take a careful and precautionary approach because of the high consequences of a large spill. The Panel has decided that Northern Gateway must arrange and maintain sufficient financial assurances to cover potential risks and liabilities related to large oil spills during the operating life of the project.

Northern Gateway committed to investing $500 million in additional facilities and mitigation measures such as thicker wall pipe, more block valves, more in-line inspections, and complementary leak detection systems. This initiative should enhance the safety and reliability of the system and help reduce and mitigate the effects of a spill, but it would not eliminate the risk or costs of spills. This initiative is not a direct substitute for third party liability insurance and does not eliminate the need for liability insurance or any other form of financial assurance to cover the cost of a spill. (p 361)

So the JRP decision comes down to this, if you accept Northern Gateway’s position that pipeline spills are rare and mostly small, then the company has the financial resources to cover the damage. If, however, Northern Gateway is wrong and the costs of a pipeline cleanup exceed the $950 million required by the Joint Review Panel, as has happened in Michigan, then those JRP conditions are already obsolete.

(Northwest Coast Energy News encourages all readers to read the complete JRP report  and SEC filing since space and readability does not permit fully quoting from the report)

Editorial: Kitimat Council fails in approving confusing Gateway plebiscite question

 

Kitimat Council
Unhappy councillors during the debate on the Northern Gateway plebiscite. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

District Council failed the people of Kitimat Monday night by approving a confusing question for the plebiscite on the Northern Gateway project. (There are already comments on social media that some people find the question incomprehensible).

What’s more, the Council set a sorry precedent Monday and undermined their ability to have a constructive debate on any contentious issues in the future.

Here’s what went wrong.

With the new year, Council is operating under new rules of procedure that allow discussion of an issue to take place without a motion on the floor.

The idea was, apparently, to allow members of Council to rationally and collegially discuss an issue and perhaps come to a consensus before a motion is presented, debated and voted.

That’s not what happened Monday night.

There was a staff report before Council with suggestions for either a simple yes or no vote for the Northern Gateway plebiscite or a series of questions for the voters to decide.

Councillor Rob Goffinet asked Council to discuss the issue under the new procedure. There was no motion on the floor.

The first part of the debate was about a question many have been asking. What good will a plebiscite do if all the power is in the hands of the federal government? Councillors pointed out that there was promise to “survey” the people of Kitimat after the Joint Review Report and that it was also a good idea to find out what the people of Kitimat were thinking.

Then, after only a few minutes of discussion, Councillor Mario Feldhoff introduced his motion outlining his preferred version of the plebiscite question; therefore preempting any further general discussion and, in effect, hijacking the council session.

At that point, the actual discussion by Council of one of the most important questions in Kitimat history had been going on for less than fifteen minutes.

Noting that the Council has been operating under the new rules for just three weeks, Mayor Joanne Monaghan then had to set a precedent.

What Monaghan should have done was act as a neutral Speaker and rule Feldhoff’s motion premature and out of order. At very least, she should have asked Feldhoff to withdraw the motion to allow general discussion to continue and perhaps allow a consensus to emerge.

By permitting Feldhoff’s motion to go to the floor, Monaghan undermined the spirit of the new council procedures.

It is not just Monaghan who is to blame for this. Feldhoff is an experienced councillor and a good parliamentarian. He always prepares carefully and often presents his own motions. While those motions are not always successful, presenting those motions allow Feldhoff to pilot the agenda on an issue. The other members of Council who have worked with Feldhoff for years should have anticipated this manoeuvre and, when he presented his motion, raised a point of order, telling Monaghan the motion was a violation of the spirit of the new discussion procedures.

The other failure is that those council members who preferred a simple question, as far as the reporters could tell from the debate, failed to have their own motions ready, instead depending on the staff recommendations. Again, those council members should have anticipated Feldhoff’s manoeuvre and prepared with their own motions.

The ideal, of course, was for Council to spend the time to hash out the best question on Northern Gateway, even if the debate went into the wee hours of the morning. Instead the debate was on the wording and intent of the Feldhoff motion, which reflects his belief , stated last week, that the Joint Review Panel process was valid, something many residents of Kitimat disagree with, since they consider the JRP process to have been far from fair.

The ballot question, as moved by Councillor Mario Feldhoff is:

Do you support the final report recommendations of the Joint Review Panel of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Authority (sic) and the National Energy Board, that the Enbridge Northern Gateway project be approved subject to 209 conditions set out in Volume 2 of the JRP’s final report?

Eligible residents will have the choice of voting yes, no or undecided.

There are too many questions wound up in the Feldhoff motion. There are those who support Northern Gateway and those who oppose it. There are those on both sides who have strong reservations about the Joint Review Process. There’s the big question of whether or not the Harper government will actually bother to rigorously enforce the 209 conditions. (The test for that will be in the upcoming federal budget, and whether or not there is increased funding for the agencies responsible for the conditions. Since Finance Minister Jim Flaherty is determined to balance the budget prior to the 2015 election, that is highly unlikely)

Council must revisit the plebiscite question at next Monday’s meeting and come up with a consensus on a proper question, even if it means the debate continues until the sun comes up Tuesday morning (and remember this is January).

Council must also set proper procedures so that a wide ranging discussion, as envisioned in the new procedures, aren’t unnecessarily and abruptly halted by a premature motion.

What about the JRP?

In his statement to Council on January 6, and in his motion on the plebiscite question, Councillor Mario Feldhoff is wrongly giving the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency prime of place in the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel. He points out, correctly that the CEAA has rejected the Prosperity Mine twice and uses that to validate the finding of the Joint Review Panel.

However, there is no evidence that three members of the panel have anything to do with the Environmental Assessment Agency. The biographies say that Sheila Leggett “ has been a member of the National Energy Board since 2006 and is currently the vice-chair of the National Energy Board.” Kenneth Bateman, according to the biography, has also been a member of the National Energy Board since 2006. As for the third member, Hans Matthews, he is a mining executive who works with First Nations on resource issues. None of the biographies of the three mention any connection with the Environmental Assessment Agency.

There is one note at the bottom of the bio page that says: “The Panel is supported by a group of staff called a Secretariat. The Secretariat is made up of both National Energy Board and Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency staff.”

So while the Joint Review Panel had support from the CEAA staff, the decision was made by two NEB members and a mining executive.

 

Kitimat plebiscite question
The Kitimat Northern Gateway plebiscite question as projected at the Council Chambers Jan 13, 2014. (Northwest Coast Energy News)

District of Kitimat calls for plebiscite on the Northern Gateway project

Phil Germuth
Councillor Phil Germuth listens as District of Kitimat Council debates his motion that would have required Enbridge to enhance monitoring of leaks on the pipeline in the Kitimat watershed. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

District of Kitimat Council voted Monday night to hold a plebiscite on whether or not the community supports the controversial Enbridge Northern Gateway project.

District council and staff will decide the actual question for voters and the date for the plebiscite in the coming couple of weeks.

A staff report described a plebiscite as “a non-binding form of referendum,” as defined by the BC Local Government Act.

The council decision comes after the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel released its decision on December 16, that approved the pipeline and tanker project along with 209 conditions.

After the release of the Joint Review decision, the District of Kitimat issued a news release saying, “Kitimat Council has taken a neutral stance with respect to Northern Gateway. Council will take the necessary time to review the report in order to understand the content and reasons for the decision.”

On January 16, 2012 the council adopted a resolution “that after the completion of the JRP process, the District of Kitimat survey the residents of Kitimat regarding their opinion on the Enbridge Northern Gateway project.” After the JRP decision, the District reaffrimed that it would “undertake a survey of Kitimat residents to determine their opinions of the project now that the JRP has concluded its process.”

District staff had recommended hiring an independent polling firm to conduct the survey, pointing to a pollster’s ability to craft the appropriate questions and provide quick results.

Council quickly shot down the idea. A motion by Councillor Mario Feldhoff to use a polling firm did not get a seconder.

Councillor Rob Goffinet, who made the motion for the plebiscite, noted that even as a politician he doesn’t answer phone calls from unknown numbers. He said, “People do not want a pollster to phone them and do a check list how do you feel on a project. How can we be assured if someone in or out of their home will answer a call from a pollster? I would give total responsibility to every adult citizen of Kitimat who has a point of view to express it in a yes or no ballot.”

Councillor Phil Germuth added, “Those are the same companies that went out prior to the last provincial election and said one party was going to wipe it out and we know what happened there.” Germuth was referring to BC Premier Christy Clark’s come from behind majority victory which was not predicted in the polls.

Germuth told the meeting he believed an unbiased question could be posed in the form of a referendum on the Northern Gateway project. “I have full confidence in our staff that they will be able, along with some assistance from council, to develop questions that are not going to appear biased. It should be very simple, yes means yes, no means no.”

Councillor Mario Feldhoff, who earlier in the evening had, for the first time, declared that he is in favour of the Northern Gateway project, told council that he preferred using a polling firm because it could come back with a “statistically significant” result.

Council voted six to one in favour of the plebiscite. The lone dissenter was Councillor Edwin Empinado who told his colleagues that a mail-in ballot, another of the options presented by staff, would be more inclusive.  Empinado said he was concerned that a plebiscite would mean a low voter turnout.

Warren Waycheshen, the district’s deputy chief administrative officer, told council that the plebiscite would have to be held under the provisions of BC’s Local Government Act which covers elections and referenda, but with the plebiscite the council would have more flexibility in deciding how the vote would take place. The act would still cover such things as who was eligible to vote and the use of campaign signs.

Mario Feldhoff
Councillor Mario Feldhoff reads a statement at council, supporting the findings of the Joint Review panel on the Northern Gateway project. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

The neutrality that council had maintained for at least the previous three years began to break down during Monday’s meeting meeting when Germuth proposed a motion that would have required Enbridge to install within Kitimat’s jurisdiction a detection system capable of locating small volumes of leakage from the pipeline, a measure that is likely beyond the recommendations of the JRP decision.

It was then that Feldhoff became the first Kitimat councillor to actually declare for or against the Northern Gateway, telling council, saying he agreed with the JRP, “The overall risk was manageable and the project was in Canada’s interest. On the whole I am in favour of the conditions and recommendations of the JRP… Not only am I a District of Kitimat Councillor, I am a Canadian. To my mind, opposition to the JRP Northern Gateway report at this stage is yet another case of NIMBY-ism, not in my backyard.”

In the end, at Feldhoff’s urging, the council modified the original motion, so that it called on the District to meet with Enbridge to discuss an enhanced pipeline leak detection system where a leak could “impact the Kitimat watershed.”

It’s not clear what Council will do with the result of the plebiscite, since it is “non-binding.”

 In the past two years, Terrace, Prince Rupert and Smithers councils, together with Kitimat Stikine Regional District and the Skeena Queen Charlotte Regional District, all voted to oppose Northern Gateway. Those were all council votes, taken without surveying local opinion.

Most of the decisions are in the hands of the federal government which has 180 days from the release of the JRP report to approve the project.

 

How Gateway’s plans to dredge Douglas Channel show the limitations of the JRP mandate and ruling

(First in series of reports on how the Joint Review Panel report will affect the Kitimat region)

JRP map of blasting on Douglas Channel
Joint Review map of Northern Gateway plans for dredging and blasting on Douglas Channel (JRP)

 

If there is a significant flaw in the Joint Review Panel report on Northern Gateway, it can be found in the panel’s analysis of Enbridge Northern Gateway’s plans to blast and dredge at the proposed Kitimat terminal site.

While the Joint Review Panel does consider what it calls “cumulative effects,” the panel plays down those effects and offers no specifics about interaction between the Northern Gateway project and the two liquified natural gas projects, the KM LNG project at Bish Cove and the BC LNG floating terminal at the old log dump.

It appears the JRP considered the legacy effects of the Rio Tinto Alcan smelter and other Kitimat industries while not taking into consideration future development.

The dredging and blasting planned by Northern Gateway, as Enbridge said in its evidence,  appears to have only a minimal effect on Douglas Channel.

A glance at the map in the Joint Review ruling shows that that the dredging and blasting site is directly opposite Clio Bay, where Chevron, in partnership with the Haisla Nation, plan a remediation project using marine clay from the Bish Cove construction site to cap decades of sunken and rotting logs.

The Clio Bay project was not part of the evidence before the Joint Review Panel, the plans for the project were not formulated until well after the time for evidence before the JRP closed. But those deadlines show one area where the rules of evidence and procedure fail the people of northwestern BC.

The JRP is a snapshot in time and changes in the dynamics of the industrial development in the Kitimat Arm are not really considered beyond the terms of reference for the JRP.

It appears from the report that Enbridge plans to simply allow sediment from the blasting and dredging to float down Douglas Channel, dispersed by the currents and the outflow from the Kitimat River.

Northern Gateway said that dredging and blasting for marine terminal construction would result in a sediment plume that would extend over an area of 70,000 square metres for the duration of blasting activities.

Approximately 400 square metres of the assessed area of the marine terminal is expected to receive more than 1 centimetre of sediment deposition due to dredging. Outside of this area, typical sediment deposition levels alongshore where sediment is widely dispersed (a band approximately 4 kilometres long and 400 metres wide) are very low; in the range of 0.001 to 0.1 centimetres. Dredging and blasting activities are expected to occur over a period of approximately 18 weeks.

Northern Gateway expected most of the sediment plume created by construction activities to be minor in relation to natural background levels.

Northern Gateway would use bubble curtains to reduce pressure and acoustic effects of blasting, and silt curtains to reduce the effect of sedimentation from dredging. It said that bubble curtains are used extensively for other activities, such as pile driving, to reduce the effect of high pressure pulses that can cause injury to fish.

It added that bubble curtains have been tested extensively with blasts, and literature shows they are effective.

Northern Gateway said that physical effects from suspended sediment on marine fish and invertebrates could include abrasion and clogging of filtration mechanisms, which can interfere with ingestion and respiration. In extreme cases, effects could include smothering, burial, and mortality to fish and invertebrates. Direct chemical-related effects of suspended sediment on organisms, including reduced growth and survival, can also occur as a result of the uptake of contaminants
re-suspended by project construction activities, such as dredging and blasting, and as a result ofstorm events, tides, and currents.

The Haisla Nation and Raincoast Conservation objected to Northern Gateway’s figures, noting

Northern Gateway’s sediment and circulation model and its evidence related to contaminated sediment re-suspension at the terminal site. Both parties said that the sediment model was applied for the spring, when the increase in total suspended solids would be negligible compared to background values. In the event of delays, blasting and dredging would likely occur at other times of the year when effects would likely be higher, and these scenarios were not modelled.

The panel’s assessment of the area to be blasted found few species:

Species diversity within Kitimat Arm’s rocky intertidal community is generally low. Barnacles, mussels, periwinkles, and limpets can be found on rocky substrate. Sea urchins, moon snails, sea anemones, sea stars, and sea cucumbers are in shallow subtidal areas. Sandy areas are inhabited by commercially-harvested bivalves such as butter clams and cockles.

Northern Gateway told the JRP that it would “offset” any damage to Douglas Channel caused by the blasting and dredging

Northern Gateway said that construction, operations, and decommissioning of the marine terminal would result in both permanent and temporary alteration of marine fish habitat. Dredging and blasting, and installing physical structures in the water column for the marine terminal would permanently alter marine fish habitat. Based on the current terminal design, in-water site preparation would result in the physical alteration of approximately 1.6 hectares of subtidal marine habitat and 0.38 hectares of intertidal marine habitat. Northern Gateway expected approximately 353 square metres of subtidal marine habitat and 29 square metres of intertidal habitat to be permanently lost.This habitat would be compensated for by marine habitat offsets.

The project’s in-water vertical structures that would support the mooring and berthing structures could create new habitat, offsetting potential adverse effects. The structures may act as artificial reefs, providing marine fish habitat, food, and protection from predation. Although organisms currently inhabiting the work area would be killed, the exposed bedrock would be available for colonization as soon as the physical works are completed.

In its finding on marine sediment, the panel, as it does throughout the ruling, believes that the disruption to the environment caused by previous and ongoing human activity, means that the Northern Gateway Kitimat terminal won’t make that much difference.

Sediment quality in the marine environment is important because sediment provides habitat for benthic aquatic organisms. Northern Gateway’s baseline data for the area immediately surrounding the marine terminal indicated some contamination of water, sediments, and benthic organisms from previous industrial activity. Industrial activities in the Kitimat area have released contaminants through air emissions and effluent discharges since the 1960s. Sources of contaminants to Kitimat Arm
include effluent from a municipal wastewater treatment plant, the Alcan smelter, Methanex Corporation’s methanol plant, and the Eurocan pulpmill, as well as storm water runoff from these operations and the municipality.

Area is largely controlled by natural outflow from the Kitimat River with suspended sediment levels being highest during peak river runoff (May to July, and October) and lowest during winter. Storm events, tides, and currents can also suspend sediments. Levels of total suspended solids fluctuate seasonally and in response to climatic variations, but are generally highest during the summer.

Commercial and recreational vessels currently operating in the area may increase suspended solids by creating water turbulence that disturbs sediments. Given the current sediment contamination levels and the limited area over which sedimentation from construction activities would be expected to disperse, the Panel finds that the risk posed by disturbed contaminated sediment is low. Northern Gateway has committed to monitoring during construction to verify the predicted effects on sediment and water quality for both contaminants and total suspended solids..

The dredging and blasting section of the Joint Review Report is small when compared to the much more extensive sections on pipeline construction and tanker traffic, and the possible effects of a catastrophic oil spill.

Although minor, the marine sediment section exposes the question that was never asked, given the disruptions from years of log dumping at Clio Bay and Minette Bay and the decades of  developments at the mouth of the Kitimat River, and future development from LNG, when do cumulative effects begin to overwhelm? How much is enough? How much is too much? If every project continues to be viewed in isolation, what will be left when every project is up and running?

 

Joint Review Panel tells northwestern BC to bear the “burdens” of Northern Gateway for the good of Canada

 

Joint Review Panel cover
Cover of Volume 1 of the Joint Review Panel ruling on Northern Gateway

 

If you read both the 76 pages of Volume One of the Northern Gateway Joint Review decision and the 417 pages of Volume 2, a total of 493 pages, one word keeps reappearing. That word is “burden.”

The JRP panel asks “How did we weigh the balance of burdens, benefits, and risks?”

And it says:

Many people and parties commented on the economic benefits and burdens that could be brought about by the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project. In our view, opening Pacific Basin markets wouldbe important to the Canadian economy and society. Though difficult to measure, we found that the economic benefits of the project would likely outweigh any economic burdens.

The JRP notes:

The Province of British Columbia and many hearing participants argued that most of the project’s economic benefits would flow to Alberta, the rest of Canada, and foreign shareholders in oil and pipeline companies. They said British Columbia would bear too many of the environmental and economic burdens and risks compared to the benefits.

But, as the panel does throughout the ruling, it accepts, with little, if any, skepticism, Northern Gateway’s evidence and assertion:

Northern Gateway said about three-quarters of construction employment would occur in British Columbia, and the province would get the largest share of direct benefits from continuing operations.

It does touch on the “burdens” faced by the Aboriginal people of northern BC and others in the event of a catastrophic spill.

In the unlikely event of a large oil spill, we found that there would be significant adverse effects on lands, waters, or resources used by Aboriginal groups. We found that these adverse effects would not be permanent and widespread. We recognize that reduced or interrupted access to lands, waters, or resources used by Aboriginal groups, including for country foods, may result in disruptions in the ability of Aboriginal groups to practice their traditional activities. We recognize that such an event would place burdens and challenges on affected Aboriginal groups. We find that such interruptions would be temporary. We also recognize that, during recovery from a spill, users of lands, waters, or resources may experience disruptions and possible changes in access or use.

And the JRP goes on to say:

We recommend approval of the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, subject to the 209 conditions set out in Volume 2 of our report. We have concluded that the project would be in the public interest. We find that the project’s potential benefits for Canada and Canadians outweigh the potential burdens and risks….

We are of the view that opening Pacific Basin markets is important to the Canadian economy and society. Societal and economic benefits can be expected from the project. We find that the environmental burdens associated with project construction and routine operation can generally be effectively mitigated. Some environmental burdens may not be fully mitigated in spite of reasonable best efforts and techniques…. We acknowledge that this project may require some people and local communities to adapt to temporary disruptions during construction.

As for the chance of a major oil spill, again the JRP talks about burdens:

The environmental, societal, and economic burdens of a large oil spill, while unlikely and not permanent, would be significant. Through our conditions we require Northern Gateway to implement appropriate and effective spill prevention measures and spill response capabilities, so that the likelihood and consequences of a large spill would be minimized.

It is our view that, after mitigation, the likelihood of significant adverse environmental effects resulting from project malfunctions or accidents is very low.

And concludes:

We find that Canadians will be better off with this project than without it.

In the Joint Review ruling is one fact. Northern British Columbia must bear the “burden” of the Northern Gateway project for the good of Alberta and the rest of Canada. The JRP accepts, without much questioning, Northern Gateway’s assurances that environmental disruptions during construction will be minimal and that the chances of a major spill from either a pipeline or a tanker are minimal.

Canadians as a whole may be better off with the Northern Gateway. Whether the people who live along the pipeline and tanker route will be better off is another question, one which the Joint Review Panel dismisses with casual disdain.

Cover of JRP ruling
Cover of Volume 2 of the Joint Review rulng on Northern Gateway

The politics of the Joint Review Panel

There are actually two Joint Review Panel reports.

One is political, one is regulatory. The political decision by the three member panel, two from Alberta and one from Ontario, is that the concerns of northwestern British Columbia are fully met by Enbridge Northern Gateway’s assurances. There is a second political decision, found throughout both volumes of the report, and the reader sees the Joint Review Panel has the notion that many parts of the environment have already been degraded by previous human activity, and that means the construction and operation of the Northern Gateway will have little consequence.

Here is where the Joint Review Panel is blind to its own bias. With its mandate to rule on the Canadian “public interest,” the panel makes the political determination that, in the Canadian public interest, northwestern BC must bear the “burden” of the project, while other political issues were not considered because, apparently those issues were outside the JRP’s mandate.

…some people asked us to consider the “downstream” emissions that could arise from upgrading, refining, and diluted bitumen use in China and elsewhere. These effects were outside our jurisdiction, and we did not consider them. We did consider emissions arising from construction activities, pipeline operations, and the engines of tankers in Canadian territorial waters.

During our hearings and in written submissions, many people urged us to include assessment of matters that were beyond the scope of the project and outside our mandate set out in the Joint Review Panel Agreement. These issues included both “upstream” oil development effects and “downstream” refining and use of the products shipped on the pipelines and tankers…Many people said the project would lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental and social effects from oil sands development. We did not consider that there was a sufficiently direct connection between the project and any particular existing or proposed oil sands development or other oil production activities

If someone in Northwestern British Columbia favours the Northern Gateway project, if they believe (and many people do) what Enbridge Northern Gateway says about the economic benefits, then it is likely they will accept the burden and the further environmental degradation imposed by the Joint Review Panel on this region of British Columbia.

If, on other hand, for those who are opposed to the project, then the decision to impose the burden on this region is both unreasonable and undemocratic (since no one in northern BC, in the energy friendly east or the environmental west has been formally asked to accept or reject the project). For those opposed to the project, the idea that since the environment has already been disrupted by earlier industrial development, that Canadians can continue to degrade the environment with no consequence will only fuel opposition to the project.

As for the assertion that green house gas emissions were not part of the Joint Review Panel’s mandate, that is mendacious. The panel made a political decision on the role of the people of northwestern BC and the state of northwestern BC’s environment. The panel made a political decision to avoid ruling on the role of Northern Gateway in contributing to climate change or the larger world wide economic impact of pipelines and the bitumen sands.

Regulations

The Joint Review Panel is supposed to be a regulatory body and should be pipeline, terminal and tanker project go ahead after the expected court challenges from First Nations on rights, title and consultation and from the environmental groups, then those 209 conditions kick in.

While the Joint Review Panel largely accepts Enbridge Northern Gateway’s evidence with little questions, in some areas the panel does find flaws in what Northern Gateway planned. In a few instances, it actually accepts the recommendations from intervenors (many from First Nations, who while opposed to the project, successfully demanded route changes to through environmentally sensitive or culturally significant territory.)

When it comes to regulations, as opposed to politics, the Joint Review Panel has done its job and done it well. If all 209 conditions and the other suggestions found in the extensive second volume of the ruling are actually enforced then it is likely that the Northern Gateway will be the safe project that Enbridge says it will be and actually might meet BC Premier Christy Clark’s five conditions for heavy oil pipelines across BC and tankers off the BC coast.

But and there is a big but.

The question is, however, who is going to enforce the 209 conditions? In recent conversations on various social media, people who were quiet during the JRP hearings, have now come out in favour of the pipeline project. Read those comments and you will find that the vast majority of project supporters want those conditions strictly enforced. Long before the JRP findings and before Premier Christy Clark issued her five conditions, supporters of the Northern Gateway, speaking privately, often had their own list of a dozen or two dozen conditions for their support of the project.

The people of northwestern BC had already witnessed cuts to Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard in his region even before Stephen Harper got his majority government in May 2011.

Since the majority government Harper has cut millions of dollars from the budgets for environmental studies, monitoring and enforcement. The Joint Review Panel began its work under the stringent rules of the former Fisheries Act and the Navigable Waters Act, both of which were gutted in the Harper government’s omnibus bills. Government scientists have been muzzled and, if allowed to speak, can only speak through departmental spin doctors. The Joint Review Panel requires Enbridge Northern Gateway to file hundreds of reports on the progress of surveying, environmental studies, safety studies, construction plans and activities and project operations. What is going to happen to those reports? Will they be acted on, or just filed in a filing cabinet, perhaps posted on an obscure and hard to find location on the NEB website and then forgotten?

Will the National Energy Board have the staff and the expertise to enforce the 209 conditions? Will there be any staff left at Environment Canada, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard where the conditions demand active participation by government agencies, or ongoing consultation between federal agencies and Northern Gateway? Will there actual be monitoring, participation and consultation between the project and the civil service, or will those activities amount to nothing more than meetings every six months or so, when reports are exchanged and then forgotten? Although Stephen Harper and his government say the Northern Gateway is a priority for the government, the bigger priority is a balanced budget and it is likely there will be more cuts in the coming federal budget, not enhancements to environmental protection for northwestern BC.

The opponents of the project might reluctantly agree to the 209 conditions if Harper government forces the project to go ahead. It will be up to the supporters to decide whether or not they will continue their support of Northern Gateway if the 209 conditions are nothing more than a few pages of Adobe PDF and nothing more.

 

Commentary: The earthshaking difference between Enbridge and LNG

Joint Review Panel
The Northern Gateway Joint Review panel, Kenneth Bateman, Sheila Leggett and Hans Matthews, listen to final arguments in Terrace, June 17, 2013. (Robin Rowland/Northwest Coast Energy News)

Buried deep in the LNG Canada environmental assessment application, a reader will find a key difference in attitude with at least one of the group of companies planning liquified natural gas development in the northwest and Enbridge Northern Gateway.

It’s an earthshaking difference, since it’s all about earthquakes.

The documents filed by LNG Canada with the BC Environmental Assessment Office and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency acknowledge that there is a possibility of an earthquake (a one in 2,475 year event) at the LNG terminal site.

Northwestern British Columbia was shaken by two major earthquakes in the months before the Joint Review Panel concluded its hearings in Terrace. Both were far from Kitimat, but felt across the District. On October 27, 2012, there was a magnitude 7.8 earthquake on the Queen Charlotte Fault off Haida Gwaii. That quake triggered a tsunami warning, although the actual tsunami was generally limited to the coast of Haida Gwaii. Both landline and mobile phone service in Kitimat was briefly disrupted by both the quake and overloads on the system. Kitimat was also shaken by the 7.5 magnitude earthquake centered at Craig, Alaska a few weeks later on January 9, 2013.

With the exception of one vague reference in its final argument documents presented to the Joint Review Panel, Enbridge has stubbornly refused to consider any seismic risk to the region.

That was the company’s policy long before the October. 27, 2012 Haida Gwaii earthquake and was Enbridge policy after October 27, 2012.

In a public meeting in Kitimat on September 20, 2011, more than a year before the Haida Gwaii earthquake, John Carruthers, Northern Gateway president, insisted to skeptical questioners at a community forum at Mount Elizabeth Theatre that there was no earthquake danger to the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline and bitumen terminal in Kitimat.  One of the questioners, Danny Nunes, of Kitimat, asked could the pipes withstand an earthquake? Carruthers repeated that Kitimat was not in an earthquake zone, that the fault was off Haida Gwaii and so would not affect Kitimat.

After the September, 2011 meeting, I asked Carruthers if Enbridge knew about the March 27,1964 “Good Friday” magnitude 9.2 Alaska earthquake that, because of its high magnitude, had caused major shaking in Kitimat. That earthquake destroyed much of Anchorage and triggered tsunamis that caused damage and death across Alaska and in parts of British Columbia, Oregon and California.

Carruthers promised to get back to me and never did.

On June 17, 2013, six months after the Craig, Alaska earthquake, in his opening summation before the Joint Review Panel, Richard Neufeld, lead lawyer for Northern Gateway, stayed on message track, telling the JRP, referring to pipelines: “The route is not seismically unstable. The seismic risk along the pipeline right-of-way is low, with only a few locations of moderate risk encountered, none of which are within the Haisla territory.”

That brought a gasp from spectators in the room, or at least those who had felt the October and January earthquakes.

The following day, June 18, Murray Minchin of Douglas Channel Watch found an anomaly in the Enbridge documentation, arguing in the group’s summation:

“The Proponent’s written final argument gets on shaky ground regarding design and construction of the storage tanks on a ridge beside Douglas Channel in paragraph 249 where they say:

“‘It also involves the safe construction and operation of the Kitimat terminal in Kitimat Arm in an area subject to seismic activity which encompasses both terrestrial and marine components.’

“Now, that’s interesting because isn’t that the first time — the first admission by the Proponent in a little over 10,000 pages of documents that the area they intend to build their project is in a seismically-active area?

“Haven’t they been telling us all along to this point that the only seismic concerns would be from the distant Queen Charlotte fault off of Haida Gwaii?

“Now, this completely contradicts Mr. Neufeld’s statement yesterday where he described the Project area as not “seismically unstable”. So what is it? This is their final argument and they’re contradicting themselves.”

Minchin went on to quote from the Enbridge argument: “’Seismic conditions in the project area have also been addressed.’

“Well, really? Is that a truthful statement, considering Natural Resources Canada has only submitted a preliminary report concerning a 50-kilometre fault line and massive submarine landslides they accidentally discovered last year in Douglas Channel while doing a modern survey of the Channel for navigation hazards.

“How can the Proponent claim to have adequately addressed seismic forces in their design of this Project when they don’t know what those forces are or for what duration they may be subjected to those forces.

“Has there ever been a paleoseismological study in the Project area to establish past earthquake or tsunami history?

“Wouldn’t it be in the best interest of the Proponent, the Panel and Canadians to know the risks before 1.3 billion litres of liquid petroleum products are allowed to be stored on a low ridge right beside Douglas Channel?”

In his final rebuttal on June 24, Neufeld did not address the contradictions that Minchin had pointed out.

Compare Enbridge’s attitude to the view of LNG Canada, which at very least, appears willing to consider that major events could have adverse consequences on the terminal and liquifaction facilities.

    • The first one is a bit puzzling to Kitimat residents “A 1 in 100 year 24 hour rain event,” after all the town often gets rain for 24 hours straight or more fairly often.
    • The second, 1 in 200 year flood of the Kitimat River. Flooding has always been a concern and will be even more so, because as the pipelines come into town, whether natural gas or bitumen, those pipelines will be close to the river bank.
    • The 1 in 2,475 year seismic event. That figure is probably correct for a local event given the geology of the Kitimat Valley—unless, of course, the fault line discovered by the Geological Survey of Canada on Hawksbury Island proves to be a potential danger.
    • A tsunami.
    • Change in flow of the Kitimat River.
    • Even more interesting is that LNG Canada is willing to consider possible effects of climate change on the project, saying: “Predicted climate change effects during the project lifecycle on sea-level rise, precipitation and temperature. Where relevant and possible, the implications of such climate induced changes to the extreme weather events given above will also be addressed.”

.

Although the hydrocarbon industry as a whole is reluctant to acknowledge climate change, it appears that on a practical level, the LNG Canada partners, if they are about to invest billions of dollars in a natural gas liquifaction plant and marine terminal, will certainly take steps to protect that specific investment from the effects of climate change.

On the other hand, the National Energy Board, as matter of policy and the Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel, both still stubbornly refuse to even consider any effects of climate change, even possible effects locally on a specific project application.

The Joint Review Panel decision on the Northern Gateway is expected sometime in the next three weeks. While most reports seem to indicate that the decision will be released after Christmas before the Dec. 30 deadline, there has been recent media speculation that the decision could be released next week.

In the meantime, Enbridge has pulled out all stops in a public relations campaign to build support for the Northern Gateway. While a recent poll indicates that advertising campaign may be having some success in the Lower Mainland, the same poll showed that 65 per cent of northern BC residents oppose or strongly oppose the Northern Gateway.

The problem for Enbridge is that the new public relations campaign is repeating the blunders that began when they first proposed Northern Gateway in 2005. There have been meetings across the northwest, but those meetings have been invitation only affairs at chambers of commerce and community advisory boards, with possible opponents or skeptics and media perceived as critical of Enbridge not invited. So Enbridge still wants to control the message and will only talk to friendly gatherings.

Then there are the television spots featuring Janet Holder, the Enbridge vice president in charge of Northern Gateway, supposedly showing her commitment to wilderness. Those commercials would have had more credibility if the agency had produced the ads with actual video of Holder walking through the bush, rather than shooting the spots in front of a green screen in a studio, with pristine wilderness stock video in the background, and Holder acting as if she was a model for an adventure clothing company rather than  vice president of a pipeline company.

Right-wing business columnists in Toronto and the countless Albertans fume at the so-called “hypocrisy” of British Columbians who support LNG and oppose bitumen.

Of course, those critics didn’t feel the earth move under their feet.  The critics don’t see the difference between natural gas and bitumen, differences very clear to the people of British Columbia.

It’s more than the fact, that so far, the LNG projects have been relatively open and willing to talk to potential adversaries,  as Chevron has done on the controversial Clio Bay project; more than the fact that if even a fraction of the LNG projects go ahead, the money coming into northwestern BC means that the handful of permanent jobs promised by Enbridge will be literally a drop in a bucket of warm bitumen.

Although there are many other environmental issues on the Northern Gateway project, the fact the potential for earthquakes in Kitimat is brushed off by Enbridge while LNG Canada is at least willing to consider the problem, sums it all up.

 

Updated with link to Sept. 2011  questions and answers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“Conservatives’ hatred for science intentional part of their environmental policy,” Cullen says

Skeena Bulkley Valley MP and NDP House Leader, reacting to  Northwest Coast Energy News exclusive story that the  Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has refused to consider a Fisheries and Oceans report on humpback whales says in a  Facebook posting “Like many of you, I’ve come to see the Conservatives’ hatred for science as more than a passing tendency – it’s an intentional part of their environmental policy.”

Cullen has issued an open letter to Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver and Fisheries Minister Gail Shea that says:

 

21 November 2013

Dear Ministers,

This is an open letter regarding the 21 October 2013 report, entitled Recovery Strategy for the North Pacific Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Canada, from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans on a recovery strategy for humpback whales in Canada. As you are likely aware, it is part of the DFO’s mandate to help this species recover from a century of whaling that nearly drove the species into extinction. The report identified four areas of “critical habitat” for humpbacks, one of which is at the mouth of the Douglas Channel, the gateway from Kitimat to the Pacific Ocean. The report also identified vessel traffic and toxic spills as two of the greatest threats to the recovery of this species.

Thus, it was with shock and dismay I recently learned of the decision by the federal joint review panel for the Northern Gateway project to ignore the report as evidence in its ruling, as though vessel traffic and the potential for toxic spills were not two of the primary environmental concerns surrounding this proposal.

It is particularly stunning given that the report, submitted to the panel last week, was authored by a federal government agency, and yet the federal government is now saying it refuses to take into account its own information when ruling on this project. It begs the question of why we even have a federal government agency devoted to ensuring the health and viability of our fisheries and our waters when the research and recommendations they produce are ignored by the very same federal government.

The purpose of the joint review panel hearings is to weigh the available scientific evidence in determining whether this project will negatively impact habitat and endangered species.  The purpose of the work of the DFO is to ensure that information is considered when the government is weighing projects which will impact habitat and endangered species. The decision by the JRP to ignore the DFO report is not only wasteful indifference; it’s a double-play failure and abrogation of the duty of both of your departments to protect endangered species and our natural environment.

I wish I could feign some measure of surprise on this matter. But like many Canadians, I have come to see this kind of negligence as not only a passing tendency of the Conservative government but as a very intentional aspect of the government’s resource and environmental policy.

When the government of Canada ignores its own science on endangered species protection, it’s no wonder why Canada has lost all credibility on environmental stewardship among both its own citizens and the international community.

Nathan Cullen

MP Skeena—Bulkley Valley

 

 

 
Copy of Nathan Cullen’s open letter on his website
 

 

JRP refuses to consider latest DFO findings on Humpback Whales

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has refused to consider the latest findings from the Department of Fisheries and Ocean on humpback whale critical habitat on the coast of British Columbia, including areas of ocean that could be on the route of tankers carrying diluted bitumen from Kitimat.

On October 21, 2013, Fisheries and Oceans released a report called Recovery Strategy for the North Pacific Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Canada. The DFO report notes that humpback whales are a species of “special concern” by the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada.

It is DFO policy to assist the humpback whale population to recover from the century of whaling that almost drove the species to extinction. The report identified four areas of “critical habitat” for humpbacks. One critical habitat zone is Gil Island at the mouth of Douglas Channel.

DFO map of humpback habitat
DFO map of humpback sightings on the BC coast. (DFO)

Last week, on November 13, Smithers based environmental activist Josette Weir filed a notice of motion with the JRP requesting that the panel consider the DFO report as late evidence.

Weir acknowledged that the JRP proceedings closed on June 24, after final arguments in Terrace, but she noted that rules allow the Board to override the final closure. She argued that the humpback report fell within the JRP’s mandate since the DFO report is “is likely to assist the Panel.”

Weir noted in her motion that there was insufficient information before the JRP that would identify critical humpback habitat.

She argued:

Three of the four critical known habitats are on the proposed tanker routes, and the Recovery Strategy acknowledges that other areas have not been identified. Without such information, it is impossible to assess the potential effects of the marine transport of bitumen on this endangered species.Activities likely to destroy or degrade critical habitat include vessel traffic, toxic spills, overfishing, seismic exploration, sonar and pile driving (i.e., activities that cause acoustic disturbance at levels that may affect foraging or communication, or result in the displacement of whales).

The report clearly identifies vessel traffic and toxic spills, which are associated with the Project as potential causes for destruction or degradation of the Humpback Whales’ critical habitat.

Weir went on to argue that the JRP had “insufficient information to develop relevant protection measures” because the humpback studies are ongoing, “meaning their results will not be available before decision.”

The Panel must consider this significant risk to an endangered listed species for which no meaningful protection measure can be offered against the risks associated with the Project.

Weir also noted that “No similar submission has been made by others, but I cannot predict if others will not see fit to do so.”

The JRP didn’t take long to reject Weir’s request, replying the next day, November 14.

In its response, the JRP cited the amended Joint Review Panel Agreement, signed after the passage of of the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, the Omnibus Bill C-38, that “provides that the Panel’s recommendation report is to be submitted to the Minister of Natural Resources by 31 December 2013.”

The JRP then told Weir it didn’t have jurisdiction over endangered species (even if those species inhabit the tanker route) saying:

The Panel notes that the Recovery Strategy has been released in accordance with the provisions of the Species At Risk Act, as part of a legislative scheme that operates independently of this joint review process.

It goes on to say: “In this case, the Panel also notes that the Recovery Strategy was not authored by or for Ms. Wier.”

Map of Gil Island
Humpback whale sightings at the Gil Island critical habitat. (DFO)

The executive summary of the DFO report noted:

Critical habitat for Humpback Whales in B.C. has been identified to the extent possible, based on the best available information. At present, there is insufficient information to identify other areas of critical habitat or to provide further details on the features and attributes present within the boundaries of identified critical habitat. Activities likely to destroy or degrade critical habitat include vessel traffic, toxic spills, overfishing, seismic exploration, sonar and pile driving (i.e., activities that cause acoustic disturbance at levels that may affect foraging or
communication, or result in the displacement of whales). A schedule of studies has been included to address uncertainties and provide further details on the critical habitat feature(s), as well as identify additional areas of critical habitat. It is anticipated that results from these studies will also assist in development of relevant protection measures for the critical habitat feature(s).

In the part of the report on the danger of toxic spills to humpbacks, the DFO report mentions that sinking of the BC ferry Queen of the North:

Toxic spills have occurred impacting marine habitat along the B.C. coast. For example, the Nestucca oil spill (1988) resulted in 875 tonnes of oil spilled in Gray’s Harbor, Washington. Oil slicks from this spill drifted into Canadian waters, including Humpback Whale habitat. In 2006, a tanker ruptured in Howe Sound, B.C. spilling approximately 50 tonnes of bunker fuel into coastal waters. In 2007, a barge carrying vehicles and forestry equipment sank near the Robson Bight-Michael Bigg Ecological Reserve within the critical habitat for Northern Resident Killer Whales, spilling an estimated 200 litres of fuel. The barge and equipment (including a 10,000L
diesel tank) were recovered without incident. When the Queen of the North sank on March 22, 2006, with 225,000 L of diesel fuel, 15,000 L of light oil, 3,200 L of hydraulic fluid, and 3,200 of stern tube oil, it did so on the tanker route to Kitimat, which is currently the subject of a pipeline and port proposal and within the current boundaries of Humpback Whale critical habitat

The DFO report also takes a crtical look at vessel strikes

In B.C. waters, Humpback Whales are the most common species of cetacean struck by vessels, as reported to the Marine Mammal Response Network. Between 2001 and 2008, there were 21 reports of vessel strikes involving Humpback Whales. Of these, 15 were witnessed collision events while the remaining 6 were of live individuals documented with fresh injuries consistent with recent blunt force trauma or propeller lacerations from a vessel strike.

Overall, vessel strikes can cause injuries ranging from scarring to direct mortality of individual whales. Some stranded Humpback Whales that showed no obvious external trauma, have been shown from necropsy to have internal injuries consistent with vessel strikes… It is unknown how many whales have died as a result of vessel strikes in B.C. waters. To date, only one reported dead Humpback Whale presented with evidence consistent with blunt force trauma and lacerations resulting from a vessel strike…

There are no confirmed reports of Humpback Whale collisions in B.C. waters attributed to shipping, cruise ship or ferry traffic. However, larger ships are far less likely to detect the physical impact of a collision than smaller vessels, and this could account for the lack of reported strikes. Collisions with large vessels may be more common than reported, especially in areas where larger vessel traffic is concentrated.

Despite the fact that collisions may only affect a small proportion of the overall Humpback Whale population, vessel strikes may be a cause for concern for some local and seasonal areas of high ship traffic.. In B.C., areas of high probability of humpback-vessel interaction include Johnstone Strait off northeast Vancouver Island, Juan de Fuca Strait off southwest Vancouver Island, Dixon Entrance and the “Inside Passage” off the northern B.C. mainland which include portions of two of the identified critical habitat areas..

The JRP also said

As the Panel has mentioned previously during the hearing, the later in the joint review process that new evidence is sought to be filed the greater the likelihood of the prejudice to parties. The Panel is of the view that permitting the Recovery Strategy to be filed at this late stage in the hearing process would be prejudicial to the joint review process.

Weir’s submission to the JRP did not mention an academic study published on September 11, 2013, that also identified Gil Island as critical humpback habitat.

RELATED:

“Conservatives’ hatred for science intentional part of their environmental policy,” Cullen says

DOCUMENTS:

DFO report on Humpback Recovery strategy  (PDF)

Josette Weir notice of motion on Humpback Whales (PDF)

Panel Commission Ruling on Humpback Whales (PDF)

 

 

Joint Review Panel confirms closing arguments to begin in Terrace June 17

The Northern Gateway Joint Review Panel has confirmed that final, closing arguments for the controversial Enbridge pipeline project will take place in Terrace for approximately two weeks, beginning on Monday, June 17, 2013.

The Panel says the purpose of closing arugments is to provide Parties Northern Gateway, intervenors, and government participants the opportunity to:

    • tell the Panel their views and opinions about the Project including whether Parties believe it is in the public interest;
    • persuade the Panel to recommend approval or denial of the Project;
    • make their case about the relevance and weight of any evidence on the Panel’s public registry;
    • discuss the merits of conditions that the Panel might place on any Certificate that may be issued for the Project;
    • suggest additional conditions should the Project be approved

.

As is common with National Energy Board and Joint Reivew procedures, final arguments argument should be in writing, followed by oral responses. Only one arugment document is permitted.

The written final arguments must be based on JRP evidence that is on the public record. No one can introduce new evidence in either the written argument or in their oral response.

The “aids to cross-examination” used during the questioning phase of the final
hearings cannot be used unless they were admitted onto the record by the Panel as evidence.
However a witness’ answer to questions given when an aid was used is evidence and can be
relied upon.

The absolute deadline for filing the written arugment is noon Pacific Time (1:00 pm Mountain
Time) on 31 May 2013.

Participants can take part either in the hearing room or remotely via a conferencing system.

A party of the proceeding cannot make an oral argument unless they have filed a written arugment.

The purpose of the oral argument is to let one party respond orally to the written argument filed by others. A party may also respond to the Oral Argument of other Parties who have presented Oral Argument before them and whose arguments they disagree with.

Participants are expected to have read in advance all the written arguments they may wish to challenge and are restricted from repeating arguments made by others but are allowed to indicate they agree with the earlier argument.

Top Down Bottom Up

There are very specific rules for how the closing arguments will proceed, which the JRP calls “Top Down Bottom Up”

In order to allow all Parties to respond to all of the Oral Arguments of other Parties, they will be given two opportunities to provide Oral Argument in what is referred to as a “Top Down –Bottom Up” process….

During either the Top Down or Bottom Up portion, parties may simply state that they adopt the position of specific parties who have gone before them.

In the Top Down portion, Northern Gateway will first provide its Oral Argument in response to the Written Argument of other Parties. This will be followed by the Oral Argument of intervenors and government participants in the order set out in the Order of Appearances (alphabetically, A-Z). During the Top Down, Parties will respond to the Written Argument of Parties they are opposed to as well as the Oral Argument of those who have argued before them.

Intervenors and government participants will have up to one (1) hour each to provide their Oral Argument. Since Northern Gateway has the burden of proving its case and will be responding to all other Parties, it will have up to two (2) hours for its Oral Argument.

After the Top Down Oral Argument, Parties will have the opportunity to very briefly reply to any new matters that were raised in the Oral Argument of other Parties who presented after them. This will proceed in a Bottom Up format where the Panel will start at the bottom of the Order of Appearances and proceed up from there (alphabetically, Z-A), ending with Northern Gateway.

During the Bottom Up Oral Argument, Parties can only reply to new matters that arose in Oral Argument after they presented their Oral Argument. For this reason, the Bottom Up Oral Argument should be very brief. Parties who do not have any reply comments specifically related to arguments they have not had the opportunity to address should not provide Bottom Up Oral Argument.